Peo in Interest of DHB

25CA0179 Peo in Interest of DHB 08-28-2025

COLORADO COURT OF APPEALS

Court of Appeals No. 25CA0179
El Paso County District Court No. 24JV30324
Honorable Lin Billings Vela, Judge

The People of the State of Colorado,

Appellee,

In the Interest of D.H.B. and T.A.B., Children,

and Concerning M.M.B.,

Appellant.

JUDGMENT AFFIRMED

Division III
Opinion by JUDGE BROWN
Dunn and Schock, JJ., concur

NOT PUBLISHED PURSUANT TO C.A.R. 35(e)
Announced August 28, 2025

Kenneth R. Hodges, County Attorney, Melanie P. Douglas, Contract Attorney,
Colorado Springs, Colorado, for Appellee

Josi McCauley, Guardian Ad Litem, for D.H.B.

Josi McCauley, Counsel for Youth, Superior, Colorado, for T.A.B.

Just Law Group LLC, John F. Poor, Denver, Colorado, for Appellant
¶1 In this dependency and neglect action, M.B. (mother) appeals

the judgment entered on a jury’s verdict adjudicating D.H.B. (the

child) and T.A.B. (the youth) dependent or neglected. Mother also

appeals the dispositional order adopting a treatment plan. We

affirm.

I. Background

¶2 The El Paso Department of Human Services (the Department)

filed a petition in dependency or neglect, raising concerns about

mother’s substance dependence and mental health and about

domestic and family violence perpetrated by mother’s boyfriend.

Mother requested an adjudicatory jury trial. After a two-day trial,

the jury returned special verdicts finding that the ten-year-old child

and sixteen-year-old youth were dependent or neglected under

sections 19-3-102(1)(a), (b), (c), and (d), C.R.S. 2025. The court

then adopted a treatment plan requiring that mother address

mental health, alcohol and substance use, domestic and family

violence, and protective parenting skills.

II. Evidence at the Adjudicatory Trial

¶3 Mother contends that the juvenile court erred by (1) admitting

evidence of her lack of cooperation with the Department and failing

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to cure the error by giving the jury her proposed instruction; and

(2) permitting the youth to testify as a lay witness about her

substance abuse. We disagree.

A. Standard of Review and Relevant Law

¶4 We review evidentiary rulings for an abuse of discretion.

People in Interest of M.V., 2018 COA 163, ¶ 52, overruled on other

grounds by People in Interest of E.A.M. v. D.R.M., 2022 CO 42. A

court abuses its discretion when its ruling is based on an erroneous

understanding or application of the law or is manifestly arbitrary,

unreasonable, or unfair. Id. An error is harmless unless “it can be

said with fair assurance that it substantially influenced the

outcome of the case or impaired the basic fairness of the trial itself.”

Id. at ¶ 66.

B. Mother’s Lack of Cooperation with the Department

¶5 While a parent may voluntarily work with a department to

alleviate any child protection concerns, “a parent need not

cooperate with [a] department’s efforts to investigate the factual

allegations supporting the petition.” People in Interest of G.E.S.,

2016 COA 183, ¶ 14. A parent’s refusal to voluntarily participate in

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a department’s assessment process may not be used to show that a

child is dependent or neglected. Id. at ¶ 37.

¶6 Mother contends that “the Department essentially invited the

jury to make its decision on adjudication based on mother’s

willingness, pre-adjudication, to cooperate with the Department.”

In particular, mother argues that the juvenile court erred by

allowing the Department to question her about refusing to sign

releases of information and by allowing a caseworker to testify both

about the releases and about mother’s refusal to allow the

Department to see her home. But the juvenile court found that this

evidence rebutted mother’s claim that the Department had not

provided her with appropriate services — essentially, it ruled that

mother had opened the door to this evidence. See Golob v. People,

180 P.3d 1006, 1012 (Colo. 2008) (“The concept of ‘opening the

door’ represents an effort by courts to prevent one party in a

criminal trial from gaining and maintaining an unfair advantage by

the selective presentation of facts that, without being elaborated or

placed in context, create an incorrect or misleading impression.”).

And Mother does not address this basis for the court’s ruling. See

People v. Archer, 2022 COA 71, ¶ 42 (because appellant did not

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challenge the trial court’s alternative grounds for admitting

evidence, appellate court was “required to conclude” the evidence

was properly admitted).

¶7 Mother also contends that the juvenile court erred by allowing

the Department to question her about whether it had requested

that she undergo urinalysis testing (UAs). But mother denied that

the Department had requested UAs, and a caseworker confirmed

that the Department never asked mother to do UAs, so we fail to see

how this evidence reflected mother’s alleged failure to comply.1

¶8 Moreover, the Department did not argue that mother’s refusal

to cooperate or participate in services indicated that the children

were dependent or neglected. Cf. G.E.S., ¶ 35 (holding it was error

when the department argued to the jury that the child was at risk

because of a parent’s pre-adjudication refusal to cooperate). On the

1 Mother also contends that the juvenile court erred by allowing a

caseworker to testify that mother had not provided documentation
of sobriety, allowed the Department to assess her home, or signed
releases to allow the Department to make referrals for mental
health and substance abuse services. But the court sustained
mother’s counsel’s objection to this evidence, and counsel did not
request further relief. See People v. Alemayehu, 2021 COA 69,
¶ 101 (declining to review issue when trial court sustained objection
and counsel requested no additional relief).

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contrary, the caseworkers testified repeatedly that mother did not

have to use services provided by the Department or work with the

Department in any capacity pre-adjudication. And during mother’s

testimony, the juvenile court provided the following

contemporaneous limiting instruction, to which mother’s counsel

agreed:

[A] parent prior to an adjudicatory trial is
never required to complete services, engage in
services. And so I am going to allow some
limited questioning on that only to rebut what
the issue has been about the lack of visitation
or inappropriate visitation and the delays on
the visitation. So you’re only to consider it for
that limited purpose of further explaining why
the Department has or has not expanded
mother’s parenting time, but you shall not
consider it for purposes of determining the
question regarding adjudication in this case
because [mother] is not required prior to
adjudication to complete any services at all.

Absent evidence to the contrary, which we do not have, we presume

the jury followed the court’s instruction. People v. Ray, 2025 CO

42, ¶ 135.

¶9 Even so, mother contends that the court also should have

given her proposed closing instruction informing the jury that “it

was not permitted to draw any negative inferences from or

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otherwise rely on Mother’s non-engagement” when adjudicating the

children. Mother argues that the court erred by failing to give the

instruction “given the amount of improper evidence that was

admitted.” But, as discussed, the juvenile court did not admit

improper evidence. And mother does not otherwise explain why

declining to give her proposed closing instruction was an abuse of

discretion, particularly given the court’s contemporaneous limiting

instruction. See People in Interest of S.X.M., 271 P.3d 1124, 1129

(Colo. App. 2011) (“A trial court’s decision to give a particular

instruction, or to reject a party’s tendered instruction, is reviewed

for an abuse of discretion.”).

¶ 10 Thus, we discern no error in the juvenile court’s decisions to

(1) allow the evidence at issue and (2) decline the closing instruction

mother proposed.

C. The Youth’s Testimony About Mother’s Substance Use

¶ 11 To determine whether testimony is lay testimony under CRE

701 or expert testimony under CRE 702, a trial court must look to

the basis for the opinion. Venalonzo v. People, 2017 CO 9, ¶ 2. “If

the witness provides testimony that could be expected to be based

on an ordinary person’s experiences or knowledge, then the witness

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is offering lay testimony.” Id. “If, on the other hand, the witness

provides testimony that could not be offered without specialized

experiences, knowledge, or training, then the witness is offering

expert testimony.” Id. A lay witness may express an opinion as to

whether a person was under the influence of drugs or alcohol as

long as a proper foundation has been laid. People v. Russell, 2014

COA 21M, ¶ 23, aff’d, 2017 CO 3, ¶ 23.

¶ 12 The youth first testified that he was “pretty sure” that mother

was using “crystal meth.” Mother’s counsel objected, and the

Department agreed to lay further foundation. Upon further

questioning, the youth testified that mother had a “clear pipe with

little capsules of crystals” and that she would go into the bathroom

with it “and would come out with this rubbery type of smell.”

¶ 13 The youth also testified that he had seen mother use alcohol.

Mother’s counsel objected again. The court overruled the objection,

but provided the following limiting instruction:

[L]et me just make it clear, ladies and
gentlemen of the jury, currently [the youth] is
not a forensic chemist. He is not an expert.
He is testifying about what he believes a
substance is. The jury will decide how much
weight, if any, to give to that testimony.

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¶ 14 The youth went on to describe the cans of alcohol he observed

mother drinking from and her behavior when she was drinking from

the cans. The majority of the youth’s testimony focused on the

frequency and impact of mother’s drinking, including her drinking

while driving. And on cross-examination, the child admitted that

he had never before shared concerns about mother’s use of “crystal

meth.”

¶ 15 We discern no reversible error by the juvenile court in

admitting the youth’s testimony. Mother does not contend, and the

record does not suggest, that the youth’s opinion about what drug

mother was using in his home was based on any specialized

training or education. On the contrary, the youth testified based on

his observation of the substance in mother’s possession. And, to

the extent that the jury may have been confused, the court’s

limiting instruction made clear that the youth was not an expert

and the jury should not consider his testimony about drugs or

alcohol in the home to be expert testimony.

III. Sufficiency of the Evidence

¶ 16 Mother next contends that, although “[t]here was evidence

during the adjudication trial that, prior to the [youth and child’s]

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removal, mother consumed alcohol, may have used other

substances, and was in a relationship that was characterized by

domestic violence . . . , by the time of the adjudication trial, mother

had largely resolved these concerns.” We disagree.

A. Standard of Review and Applicable Law

¶ 17 In determining whether the evidence is sufficient to sustain an

adjudication of dependency or neglect, we review the record in the

light most favorable to the prevailing party, and we draw every

inference “fairly deducible” from the evidence in favor of the jury’s

decision. People in Interest of S.G.L., 214 P.3d 580, 583 (Colo. App.

2009); see also People in Interest of T.T., 128 P.3d 328, 331 (Colo.

App. 2005). We will not reverse the jury’s verdict just because

reasonable people might arrive at different conclusions based on the

same facts. S.G.L., 214 P.3d at 583.

¶ 18 The purpose of an adjudicatory trial is to determine whether

the child is dependent or neglected under section 19-3-102 and

whether that status warrants governmental intervention. People in

Interest of N.G., 2012 COA 131, ¶ 39; see also K.D. v. People, 139

P.3d 695, 699 (Colo. 2006) (noting that the adjudication is not

made as to the parents but relates only to the child’s status). As

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relevant here, a child or youth is dependent or neglected when (1) a

parent has subjected the child or youth to mistreatment or abuse,

or suffered or allowed another to mistreat or abuse the child or

youth without taking lawful means to stop the mistreatment or

abuse and prevent it from recurring; (2) the child or youth lacks

proper parental care through the actions or omissions of the parent;

(3) the child or youth’s environment is injurious to their welfare; or

(4) a parent fails or refuses to provide the child or youth with care

necessary for their health, guidance, or well-being.

§ 19-3-102(1)(a)-(d). Section 19-3-102 requires proof of only one

such condition for an adjudication. See People in Interest of S.M-L.,

2016 COA 173, ¶ 29, aff'd on other grounds sub nom. People in

Interest of R.S. v. G.S., 2018 CO 31. Because a dependency and

neglect proceeding is preventive as well as remedial, an adjudication

may be based not only on current or past harm but also on

prospective harm. S.G.L., 214 P.3d at 583.

¶ 19 An adjudication of dependency or neglect must be established

by a preponderance of the evidence. People in Interest of A.E.L., 181

P.3d 1186, 1196 (Colo. App. 2008). The credibility of the witnesses

and the sufficiency, probative effect, and weight of the evidence, as

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well as the inferences and conclusions to be drawn therefrom, are

matters within the jury’s province. People in Interest of E.S., 49

P.3d 1221, 1226 (Colo. App. 2002); see K.D., 139 P.3d at 702.

B. Analysis

¶ 20 Mother insists that the evidence was insufficient to support an

adjudication because “the two major justifications for the

Department’s involvement — mother’s alleged substance use and

domestically violent relationship — were no longer ongoing child

protection concerns by the time of the adjudication trial.” This is

because, mother contends, she stopped drinking and ended the

domestically violent relationship.

¶ 21 At the trial, mother testified that she “absolutely recognize[d]”

that she had a problem with drinking alcohol. She testified that her

last drink was the week before the adjudicatory trial and that she

didn’t bring open containers of alcohol with her when she drove

“anymore.” But she also testified that she was drinking and using

substances more in the last three months, and that substance

abuse had “been a problem for many years.” The youth, the child,

and mother’s adult daughter all testified extensively about mother’s

long-term alcohol use and its impact on her ability to care for the

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child and the youth. Given this record, the jury could have fairly

deduced that one week of sobriety was not sufficient to resolve the

concerns related to mother’s drinking and substance dependence.

¶ 22 Mother also told the jury that she “was in an abusive

relationship, and that was not okay.” Mother testified that her

former boyfriend hit her and that she “believe[d] something

happened” between the boyfriend and the child but did not “see this

as child abuse.” Mother testified that she broke up with the

boyfriend a few months before the adjudicatory trial and was not

intending to resume the relationship. But the caseworker, an

expert in child protection and child welfare, opined that mother did

not appear able to recognize the signs of an abusive relationship, a

necessary skill to keep her, the youth, and the child out of similar

situations in the future.

¶ 23 Mother also testified that, at the time of the adjudicatory trial,

she had “a lot of people over” at her home, though she knew this

was in violation of her lease. She testified that she did not know

the last name of one of these individuals and that she had “nothing

to do with” a person who was seen drinking alcohol at her home

while the youth was there. Mother refused to answer other

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questions about the people staying in the home. The youth, who

met some of these individuals, testified that he did not know them

and would not feel safe returning to mother’s home. The

caseworker testified that she was concerned that mother may not

know who was in her home and that mother was not acting as a

protective parent because these individuals could cause her to lose

her housing. The caseworker testified that, with these other adults

living in the home, “it sounds like [the youth and the child] have no

place to return home to.”

¶ 24 The jury also heard from the child, who testified that mother

was “not acting normal” at the family time held the week before the

adjudicatory trial. The child testified that he did not feel safe at the

family time session and would not feel safe returning to mother’s

home based on her demeanor during family time. While the child

agreed that mother was “doing a little bit better,” he did not feel

that she was better to the point where he would be comfortable

returning to her care.

¶ 25 From the above-described evidence, the jury could reasonably

infer that the youth and the child were each dependent or neglected

under one or more of the statutory criteria presented. See

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§ 19-3-102(1)(a)-(d). Accordingly, we will not disturb the jury’s

verdict.

IV. Dispositional Orders

¶ 26 Finally, Mother contends that the juvenile court erred by

“ordering a boilerplate, highly intrusive treatment plan.” We

discern no error.

A. Standard of Review and Applicable Law

¶ 27 “The trial court has discretion to formulate a treatment plan

reasonably calculated to render the parent fit to provide adequate

parenting to the child within a reasonable time and that relates to

the child’s needs.” People in Interest of C.L.S., 934 P.2d 851, 855

(Colo. App. 1996); see also § 19-1-103(12), C.R.S. 2025 (defining an

“appropriate treatment plan”). Again, a court abuses its discretion

when its ruling is based on an erroneous understanding or

application of the law or is manifestly arbitrary, unreasonable, or

unfair. M.V., ¶ 52.

¶ 28 Upon an adjudication of a child as dependent or neglected, the

juvenile court must fashion a treatment plan designed to “preserve

the parent-child legal relationship by assisting the parent in

overcoming the problems that required intervention into the family.”

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People in Interest of K.B., 2016 COA 21, ¶ 11. “In determining

whether a treatment plan is appropriate, the court must consider

whether the plan’s objectives adequately address the safety

concerns identified during the assessment of the family.” Id. at

¶ 14. Because the purpose of a treatment plan is to address the

material issues that are barriers to reunifying children with their

parents, it is appropriate for a treatment plan to address those

issues even if the adjudication was not necessarily predicated upon

them. C.L.S., 934 P.2d at 856.

B. Analysis

¶ 29 Mother contends that the treatment plan was inappropriate

because it “required mother to interact regularly with the

department and its contracted providers” despite mother’s “deep

distrust” of the Department. At the dispositional hearing, the

juvenile court acknowledged mother’s objection to the Department

being involved with her family. Nonetheless, the court found that

mother’s cooperation with the department was “a necessary part of

a successful treatment plan” and “in the children’s best interest.”

Even so, the court ordered that mother could locate her own

providers to meet the requirements of the treatment plan and did

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not need to go through the Department or use providers the

Department chose. The court also ordered that, if mother wanted

to work with a mental health provider who could not provide a

psychological evaluation, the court would likely amend the

treatment plan to conform to mother’s chosen provider. We discern

no abuse of the court’s discretion in these orders.

¶ 30 Mother also contends that the child protection concerns that

led to the Department’s involvement “had been entirely or nearly

resolved by the time of the adjudication trial,” rendering the

treatment plan unnecessary. But the record belies these

assertions, as more fully addressed above. The juvenile court found

that the youth, the child, and mother’s adult daughter all provided

credible testimony detailing their concerns with mother’s mental

health, alcohol consumption, relationships involving domestic

violence, and lack of protective parenting. To address these ongoing

child protection concerns, the court adopted a treatment plan

requiring mother to complete assessments for substance

dependence, mental health, domestic violence, and family violence.

Because the record supports the need to address these child

protection concerns, we discern no abuse of the court’s discretion in

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ordering mother to complete assessments to determine what, if any,

treatment might be necessary to remedy them. See K.B., ¶ 11.2

¶ 31 Mother also claims that the court adopted a “boilerplate,

highly intrusive treatment plan that was neither tailored to the

family’s specific needs nor reasonably calculated to lead to a

successful family reunification.” But mother does not develop this

claim beyond her bald assertion. We therefore decline to address it

further. See People in Interest of D.B-J., 89 P.3d 530, 531 (Colo.

App. 2004) (where an appellant does not identify supporting facts,

make specific arguments, or set forth specific authorities to support

a contention, the contention will not be addressed); see also Cikraji

v. Snowberger, 2015 COA 66, ¶ 10 (an appellate court is not

required to “comb the record” for facts supporting a party’s

argument that are not cited in the briefs).

2 At the dispositional hearing, mother did not object to the

remaining treatment plan objectives requiring her to establish and
maintain self-sufficiency, participate in family time, and attend life
skills and a nurturing parenting program. Mother does not
specifically challenge these components of the plan on appeal
either. As a result, we do not address them.

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V. Disposition

¶ 32 We affirm the judgment adjudicating the child and the youth

dependent or neglected and the dispositional order adopting the

treatment plan for mother.

JUDGE DUNN and JUDGE SCHOCK concur.

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