Marriage of Tafolla

24CA1813 Marriage of Tafolla 08-21-2025

COLORADO COURT OF APPEALS

Court of Appeals No. 24CA1813
El Paso County District Court No. 23DR30649
Honorable Monica J. Gomez, Judge

In re the Marriage of

Aaron Andrew Tafolla,

Appellant,

and

Lisa Marie Tafolla,

Appellee.

JUDGMENT AFFIRMED IN PART AND REVERSED IN PART,
AND CASE REMANDED WITH DIRECTIONS

Division II
Opinion by JUDGE HARRIS
Fox and Schutz, JJ., concur

NOT PUBLISHED PURSUANT TO C.A.R. 35(e)
Announced August 21, 2025

Law Office of Greg Quimby, P.C., Greg Quimby, Erica Vasconcellos, Colorado
Springs, Colorado, for Appellant

The Byrnes Law Firm, Laurel Meyers Byrnes, Theodore D’Arcy, Jim Yontz,
Colorado Springs, Colorado, for Appellee
¶1 In this dissolution of marriage case between Aaron Andrew

Tafolla (father) and Lisa Marie Tafolla (mother), father appeals those

portions of the permanent orders concerning parenting time,

maintenance, child support, and the allocation of the children’s

extraordinary expenses. We affirm the portion of the permanent

orders concerning mother’s supervised parenting time but reverse

the portion of the permanent orders concerning mother’s

unsupervised digital and telephone contact with the children. We

also reverse the district court’s awards of maintenance and child

support and its allocation of extraordinary expenses. We remand

the case for further proceedings.

I. Background

¶2 The parties married in 2001 and have three children. In 2023,

father petitioned to dissolve the parties’ marriage, and mother

stipulated to a restriction of her parenting time after she was

charged in a separate criminal proceeding with various crimes

related to her abuse of father and the children. To resolve the

charges, mother pleaded guilty to misdemeanor harassment and

entered into a stipulation for a deferred judgment and sentence.

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¶3 A permanent orders hearing was held in July 2024. In the

resulting permanent orders, the district court awarded father sole

decision-making responsibility and allowed him to relocate with the

children to Hawaii. Mother requested reunification therapy,

although she did not seek any parenting time. The court denied

mother’s request for reunification therapy but awarded her

supervised parenting time once per month in Hawaii. The court

also awarded her “reasonable telephone/digital contact” with the

children three times per week.

¶4 After dividing the marital estate, which primarily consisted of

over $260,000 in debt, the district court awarded mother $1,600

per month in maintenance for eleven years. The court declined to

award father any child support.

II. Parenting Time

¶5 Father first challenges the allocation of parenting time. We

conclude that father invited any error as to mother’s supervised

parenting time. But because we are unable to ascertain why the

court deemed it in the children’s best interests to have

unsupervised digital and telephone contact with mother, we reverse

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and remand to the district court for further findings on the portion

of the permanent orders concerning digital and telephone contact.

A. Applicable Law

¶6 A district court must allocate parenting time according to the

children’s best interests, “giving paramount consideration to the

child[ren]’s safety and the physical, mental, and emotional

conditions and needs of the child[ren].” § 14-10-124(1.5), C.R.S.

2024. The court must consider the factors in section 14-10-

124(1.5)(a)(I)-(XI). In re Marriage of Finer, 920 P.2d 325, 327 (Colo.

App. 1996). The court is not required to make specific findings on

all statutory factors. In re Marriage of Rodrick, 176 P.3d 806, 813

(Colo. App. 2007). However, the court’s findings must be

sufficiently explicit to give the reviewing court a clear understanding

of the factual basis for the order. In re Marriage of Gibbs, 2019 COA

104, ¶ 9; In re Marriage of Garst, 955 P.2d 1056, 1058 (Colo. App.

1998) (“Factual findings are sufficient if they identify the evidence

which the fact finder deemed persuasive and determinative of the

issues raised.”).

¶7 For a court to “impos[e] . . . a parenting time restriction,” the

court must find “that parenting time by the [restricted] party would

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endanger the child[ren]’s physical health or significantly impair the

child[ren]’s emotional development” and “enumerate the specific

factual findings supporting the restriction,” including findings

related to child abuse. § 14-10-124(1.5)(a).

¶8 We review a district court’s parenting time determinations for

an abuse of discretion, meaning that we will only reverse if the

court acted in a manifestly unfair, arbitrary, or unreasonable

manner. In re Marriage of Collins, 2023 COA 116M, ¶ 8. We

generally review the district court’s factual findings for clear error,

meaning that we will not disturb them unless they are devoid of

record support. Van Gundy v. Van Gundy, 2012 COA 194, ¶ 12.

B. Discussion

¶9 To start, we reject father’s contention that, because of

mother’s history of child abuse, the district court erred by

permitting her to have any parenting time with the children. At the

hearing, father’s attorney asked father if he wanted mother to “only

have supervised parenting time at her expense,” and father replied,

“[y]es.” Consistent with father’s wishes, the court awarded mother

supervised parenting time in Hawaii, once per month, at her

expense.

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¶ 10 Accordingly, we conclude that father’s contention of error

concerning mother’s supervised parenting time is barred by the

doctrine of invited error because the permanent orders implemented

his own request as to mother’s parenting time. See In re Marriage of

O’Connor, 2023 COA 35, ¶ 24 (recognizing that “[t]he doctrine of

invited error precludes a party from appealing an error that the

party invited or injected into the case”); cf. Horton v. Suthers, 43

P.3d 611, 619 n.10 (Colo. 2002) (recognizing that invited error

merely mandates that the claim of error cannot be considered but

does not suggest that actual error occurred).

¶ 11 Father also contends that the district court abused its

discretion by permitting mother to have unsupervised digital and

telephone contact with the children. We conclude that further

proceedings are necessary because we are unable to tell what

information the district court found relevant when deciding that it

was in the children’s best interests to have unsupervised contact

with mother. See Gibbs, ¶ 9.

¶ 12 The district court found that mother had a history of verbally,

emotionally, and physically abusing the children, which included

“coercive control” of them. The court explained that “[t]he

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testimony concerning [m]other’s abuse of the children and the

videos presented [at the hearing] [were] horrific” and found that

mother’s “need to rage at the children t[ook] precedence over her

relationship with them.” Such verbal abuse included “belittling and

threatening the children” and calling one the children a “worthless

orphan child.”

¶ 13 Yet, despite these extensive findings concerning mother’s

verbal abuse, the district court, without further explanation,

allowed mother to have unsupervised telephone and digital contact

with the children. Accordingly, we cannot determine why the court

concluded that unsupervised contact with mother was in the

children’s best interests. See id.

¶ 14 We therefore reverse the portion of the permanent orders

concerning mother’s digital and telephone contact with the children

and remand for the district court to re-address that issue. See In re

Marriage of Goodbinder, 119 P.3d 584, 587 (Colo. App. 2005)

(requiring remand where the district court did not include in its

order any factual findings or legal conclusions that would enable

the appellate court to understand the basis of its order and,

accordingly, whether the court abused its discretion). Because the

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permanent orders were entered almost a year ago, the district court

should receive additional evidence on remand concerning the

children’s current circumstances and then make appropriate

factual findings regarding the type of contact authorized between

mother and the children. See In re Parental Responsibilities

Concerning M.W., 2012 COA 162, ¶ 27. The current parenting time

orders shall remain in effect pending the additional findings and

orders on remand. See id.

III. Maintenance

¶ 15 Father next challenges the award of $1,600 per month in

maintenance to mother. Because we agree that the district court,

at least in part, based the maintenance award on improper

speculation that father could consolidate or otherwise obtain relief

from his significant debt, we reverse the maintenance award and

remand for further proceedings.

A. Preservation

¶ 16 We first reject mother’s contention that this issue was not

preserved because “[t]he Rules provide for an objection to proposed

orders,” and father did not file such an objection in the district

court. At no point did either party file a proposed version of the

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permanent orders, and instead, the court indicated that it would

issue its own written permanent orders. Moreover, “a party is not

required to object to the trial court’s findings in the trial court to

preserve a challenge to those findings.” People in Interest of D.B.,

2017 COA 139, ¶ 30. We thus consider the substance of father’s

contentions.

B. Applicable Law

¶ 17 The district court has broad discretion in deciding the amount

and duration of a maintenance award, and, absent an abuse of that

discretion, we will not reverse its decision. See § 14-10-114(2),

(3)(e), C.R.S. 2024; In re Marriage of Vittetoe, 2016 COA 71, ¶ 14.

¶ 18 Under section 14-10-114(3), the court must follow a specific

process when awarding maintenance. In re Marriage of Wright,

2020 COA 11, ¶ 13. “[T]he court must first make written or oral

findings on each party’s gross income, the marital property

apportioned to each party, each party’s financial resources, the

reasonable financial need as established during the marriage, and

the taxability of the maintenance awarded.” In re Marriage of

Herold, 2021 COA 16, ¶ 25; see also § 14-10-114(3)(a)(I).

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¶ 19 Next, the court must determine the amount and term of

maintenance, if any, that is equitable after considering the

statutory advisory guidelines and a list of non-exclusive statutory

factors. § 14-10-114(3)(a)(II)(A), (3)(a)(II)(B), (3)(b), (3)(c); Wright,

¶ 15. Finally, before the court is permitted to award maintenance,

it must find that the party seeking maintenance lacks sufficient

property, including marital property apportioned to them, to provide

for their reasonable needs and is unable to support themself

through appropriate employment. § 14-10-114(3)(a)(II)(C), (3)(d).

¶ 20 The district court must “make specific written or oral findings

in support of the amount and term of maintenance awarded.” § 14-

10-114(3)(e); see also Gibbs, ¶ 9; Garst, 955 P.2d at 1058.

C. Discussion

¶ 21 In determining maintenance, the court found that father

earned $8,861 per month, whereas mother only earned $3,144 per

month. Based on the parties’ respective incomes, the district court

found that the guideline amount of maintenance was $3,649 per

month from father to mother. However, the court acknowledged

that, given the approximately $121,000 in unsecured debt allocated

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to father, with monthly payments totaling almost $3,000, father did

not have the ability to pay the guideline maintenance amount.

¶ 22 The court appeared to credit father’s sworn financial

statement showing that, even before any maintenance obligation, he

had a monthly budgetary shortfall of approximately $4,000. But

the court then opined that “[s]hould [f]ather file for bankruptcy or

manage his debt through a debt consolidation program, his

financial picture will improve dramatically.” After finding that

mother lacked the financial resources to support herself, the court

concluded that father “has the financial resources to pay spousal

maintenance” and ordered him to pay mother $1,600 per month

based “on a totality of [the] circumstances.”

¶ 23 We agree with father that the court’s speculation about his

ability to consolidate or otherwise eliminate his debt was improper

because “[a]wards of maintenance must be based upon the parties’

needs and circumstances at the time of the hearing, rather than

upon their past or future conditions.” In re Marriage of Simon, 856

P.2d 47, 51 (Colo. App. 1993); see also In re Marriage of Folwell, 910

P.2d 91, 93 (Colo. App. 1995) (recognizing that maintenance should

not be based on “speculation about future conditions”). Here, there

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was no testimony or other evidence concerning father’s ability or

intention to obtain future debt relief via bankruptcy or debt

consolidation. Consequently, the district court’s observation that

father could improve his finances, and thus his ability to pay

maintenance, by filing for bankruptcy or consolidating debt was

unsupported speculation about his future financial conditions. See

Simon, 856 P.2d at 51; Folwell, 910 P.2d at 93. Therefore, we

reverse the maintenance award and remand for the district court to

reconsider mother’s request for maintenance.

IV. Child Support and Remand Instructions

¶ 24 Maintenance and child support are “inextricably intertwined,”

In re Marriage of Salby, 126 P.3d 291, 301 (Colo. App. 2005), and

because we are reversing the maintenance award, we also reverse

the portion of the permanent orders determining child support.

Because the district court will need to reconsider child support, we

decline to address father’s contention that the district court erred

by awarding him no child support.

¶ 25 In determining both maintenance and child support on

remand, the district court must base its orders on the parties’

economic circumstances at the time of remand. In re Marriage of

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Kann, 2017 COA 94, ¶ 79 (maintenance is based on the parties’

financial situations when an order is entered); In re Marriage of

Berry, 660 P.2d 512, 513 (Colo. App. 1983) (directing court on

remand to determine the needs of the children at the time of the

hearing). Therefore, the district court should direct the parties to

produce updated disclosures, see C.R.C.P. 16.2(e)(1), (4), and allow

them to present additional evidence on their present economic

circumstances. Cf. Salby, 126 P.3d at 301 (parties on remand

should be given a full opportunity to present all relevant evidence

affecting child support and maintenance).

¶ 26 The district court must make sufficiently explicit findings of

fact to give us a clear understanding of the basis of its orders, see

Gibbs, ¶ 9, including specific findings in support of any deviation

from the child support guidelines, see § 14-10-115(8)(e), C.R.S.

2024.

V. Payment of the Children’s Extraordinary Expenses

¶ 27 We also agree with father that the district court erred by

allocating “extraordinary medical and agreed-upon extracurricular

activity expenses in proportion to income,” with mother being

responsible for nine percent and father being responsible for ninety-

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two percent of expenses. In addition to the fact that the sum of the

percentages calculated by the court exceeds 100%, we are unable to

ascertain how the court determined that father was ninety-two

percent responsible and mother was nine percent responsible given

that the court found that the parties earned $8,861 per month, and

$3,144 per month, respectively. See Gibbs, ¶ 9; § 14-10-

115(5)(I)(Y), (10)(h)(I) (requiring extraordinary medical expenses to

be divided between the parties in proportion to their “adjusted gross

incomes,” which includes maintenance, subject to certain

adjustments).

¶ 28 Accordingly, we reverse the portion of the permanent orders

allocating the children’s extraordinary expenses and direct the

district court to reconsider that allocation on remand.

VI. Discovery Issues

¶ 29 Because both parties will be required to update their financial

disclosures as part of the district court’s consideration of their

current economic circumstances on remand, we decline to consider

father’s additional contentions that the district court erred by (1)

failing to rule on his motion to compel mother to produce certain

financial documents, and (2) failing to make negative inferences

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against mother when determining maintenance and child support

because of her failure to produce certain documents.

VII. Attorney Fees

¶ 30 Father requests an award of his appellate attorney fees under

section 14-10-119, C.R.S. 2024, which allows a court to equitably

apportion, based on a disparity in the parties’ financial resources,

attorney fees in a dissolution of marriage proceeding. But father

has not identified any disparity in the parties’ financial

circumstances which would warrant an award of attorney fees in

his favor. See C.A.R. 39.1 (requiring a party seeking attorney fees

on appeal to “explain the legal and factual basis for an award of

attorney fees”). We thus deny his request.

VIII. Disposition

¶ 31 The portion of the permanent orders concerning mother’s

supervised parenting time is affirmed. Those portions of the

permanent orders concerning mother’s digital and telephone

contact with the children, maintenance, child support, and the

allocation of the children’s extraordinary expenses are reversed, and

the case is remanded for further proceedings consistent with this

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opinion. Those portions of the judgment not challenged on appeal

remain undisturbed.

JUDGE FOX and JUDGE SCHUTZ concur.

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