Peo v. Arredondo

23CA0628 Peo v Arredondo 08-21-2025

COLORADO COURT OF APPEALS

Court of Appeals No. 23CA0628
City and County of Denver District Court No. 21CR6352
Honorable Adam J. Espinosa, Judge

The People of the State of Colorado,

Plaintiff-Appellee,

v.

Roberto Arredondo,

Defendant-Appellant.

JUDGMENT AFFIRMED

Division I
Opinion by JUDGE J. JONES
Moultrie and Graham*, JJ., concur

NOT PUBLISHED PURSUANT TO C.A.R. 35(e)
Announced August 21, 2025

Philip J. Weiser, Attorney General, Sonia Raichur Russo, Senior Assistant
Attorney General, Denver, Colorado, for Plaintiff-Appellee

Polansky Law Firm, PLLC, Lisa A. Polansky, Boulder, Colorado, for Defendant-
Appellant

*Sitting by assignment of the Chief Justice under provisions of Colo. Const. art.
VI, § 5(3), and § 24-51-1105, C.R.S. 2024.
¶1 Defendant, Roberto Arredondo, appeals the district court’s

judgment of conviction entered on jury verdicts finding him guilty of

one count of sexual assault and two counts of violation of a

protective order.1 We affirm.

I. Background

¶2 Arredondo’s wife, A.V., alleged that on September 11, 2021,

Arredondo sexually assaulted her at their home. Arredondo came

into the bedroom A.V. had been using after a fight between them in

August (discussed in more detail below). They argued, and A.V.

started recording on her phone. Arredondo grabbed A.V., took the

phone out of A.V.’s hand, and threw it. A.V. told Arredondo she

didn’t want anything to do with him and to get out. He responded,

“You’re mine and I can do whatever I want with you.”

¶3 Arredondo “forcefully” took off A.V.’s clothes, over her repeated

demands to stop. Then he forced her down onto the bed, with her

hands behind her back, and “put his penis in [her] vagina.” A.V.

1 The People assert that Arredondo only challenges his sexual

assault conviction. But we read several of his appellate contentions
as applying equally to his violation of a protection order convictions.

1
repeatedly told him to let her go. He didn’t. The assault lasted

between ten and twenty minutes.

¶4 Based on this assault, the People charged Arredondo with

sexual assault (knowingly causing sexual intrusion or penetration

without the victim’s consent) under section 18-3-403(1)(a), C.R.S.

2024.

¶5 Three days after the September 11 assault, A.V. obtained a

civil protection order against Arredondo prohibiting him from,

among other things, coming to the home. (A.V. had filed for

dissolution of the marriage on August 24, 2021.) Twice in October,

Arredondo came to the home.

¶6 Based on those two incidents, the People charged Arredondo

with two counts of violation of a protection order under section

18-6-803.5(1), C.R.S. 2024.

¶7 At trial, Arredondo’s theory of defense was that he and A.V.

had consensual sex on September 11; A.V. had fabricated the

allegation that she had been sexually assaulted. Initially, according

to Arredondo, A.V. accused him of sexual assault because she

wanted to divorce him and had been waiting until the “time was

right” to “hit him where it hurts.” Accusing Arredondo of sexual

2
assault allowed A.V. to get a protection order — meaning she would

have some breathing room to proceed with the divorce. Later, after

learning that she could avoid having to wait in Mexico for her

application for legal residence to be processed if Arredondo was

convicted of a felony — and she was the victim — she leaned into

the sexual assault allegation. As defense counsel put it, she was

taking advantage of the situation to further her desire to obtain

legal United States residency. But, counsel argued, A.V.’s story

kept changing and she claimed not to remember things she should

have been able to remember. That, coupled with her motive to

accuse Arredondo, showed that she was making up the allegation of

sexual assault.

¶8 A jury found Arredondo guilty of all three charges.

II. Discussion

¶9 Arredondo contends that the court erred by (1) admitting

evidence of his behavior toward A.V. and the volatile nature of their

relationship, including evidence of a previous confrontation between

him, A.V., and A.V.’s adult daughters in August 2021; (2) denying

his attorney’s motions for a mistrial after two jurors learned of

A.V.’s health scare, resulting in her going to the hospital during the

3
trial; (3) allowing a law enforcement officer to give expert opinions in

the guise of lay testimony; and (4) allowing the prosecution’s

domestic violence expert to testify about irrelevant matters, bolster

A.V.’s credibility, and rely on racial stereotypes. He also contends

that (5) the evidence was insufficient to support his sexual assault

conviction and (6) the errors identified above constitute cumulative

error requiring reversal. We address and reject each of these

contentions in turn.

A. “Character Assassination” Evidence

¶ 10 Arredondo contends that much of the evidence admitted at

trial was irrelevant and unduly prejudicial, amounting to nothing

more than “character assassination.” His arguments are somewhat

diffuse, often presented in a scattershot and conclusory fashion. All

suffer from a surfeit of hyperbole. But we have done our best to

ferret out Arredondo’s precise points of disagreement with the

court’s evidentiary rulings.

1. Standard of Review

¶ 11 We review a district court’s evidentiary rulings for an abuse of

discretion. Nicholls v. People, 2017 CO 71, ¶ 17. A court abuses its

discretion in this context when its decision is manifestly arbitrary,

4
unreasonable, or unfair or based on a misunderstanding or

misapplication of the law. People v. Jones, 2025 COA 43, ¶ 19.

¶ 12 If a challenge to a court’s evidentiary ruling was preserved by

timely objection, we review any error — that is, any abuse of

discretion — for harmless error. People v. Zapata, 2016 COA 75M,

¶ 38, aff’d, 2018 CO 82. But if a challenge wasn’t preserved by

timely objection on the same grounds raised on appeal, we review

any error for plain error. Hagos v. People, 2012 CO 63, ¶ 14.

¶ 13 Some of Arredondo’s evidentiary challenges were preserved.

Some weren’t. And the parties don’t entirely agree as to which ones

were and which ones weren’t. We address preservation as to

Arredondo’s challenges only where necessary.

2. Failure to Apply Spoto

¶ 14 Arredondo first contends that the district court allowed the

prosecution to introduce extensive evidence about the nature of the

relationship and physical and verbal abuse through A.V. and her

adult daughters without analyzing it under the four-part test for

admitting evidence of other acts articulated in People v. Spoto, 795

P.2d 1314, 1318 (Colo. 1990). The record doesn’t support this

contention.

5
¶ 15 The prosecution filed a notice of its intent to introduce

evidence of other acts under CRE 404(b) and section 18-6-801.5,

C.R.S. 2024, based on the contents of an interview with A.V. The

court held a hearing on the motion. Expressly applying the Spoto

test, the court ruled admissible evidence of an incident on A.V.’s

birthday (and the following morning) during which Arredondo had

taken advantage of her after she had consumed so much alcohol

she wasn’t aware of what he was doing. Arredondo told her that

because she was his wife, he “can do anything he wants.” But the

court excluded other prior acts evidence.

¶ 16 The prosecutor argued that there was other evidence of

occasions when Arredondo had sexually assaulted A.V. and had

told her he could do whatever he wanted to her because she was his

wife, and that this evidence was disclosed in the report of the

interview. The court then thanked the prosecutor for pointing that

out and ruled that any such evidence was also admissible. The

court found expressly that the evidence satisfied the Spoto test.

¶ 17 The prosecutor then argued that additional evidence the

prosecution wished to present — including testimony by the

daughters — about the history of the relationship, threats, and

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control was relevant to Arredondo’s defense that A.V. had fabricated

the allegations, as evidenced in part by her delay in reporting the

September 11 sexual assault. Specifically, the evidence would

explain why A.V. waited until she did to come forward. The court

ruled that this evidence about the nature of the relationship and

other incidents of physical and verbal abuse would be allowed.

¶ 18 As Arredondo points out, the court didn’t reference Spoto when

ruling on the admissibility of this last fund of evidence. But the

context clearly indicates that the court was aware of the Spoto test,

knew that test applied to all the evidence in question, and that this

evidence was admissible for the same reasons as the other evidence

of other incidents.

3. The August 2021 Incident

¶ 19 A.V. learned in August 2021 that Arredondo was having an

affair with her sister. She and her daughters confronted Arredondo

about the affair. They argued. Heatedly. Arredondo tried to punch

one of the daughters; A.V. and another daughter intervened and

Arredondo threatened to punch A.V. One of the daughters recorded

part of the argument, during which Arredondo threatened A.V.

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¶ 20 A.V. told Arredondo to leave the house. He did. But he

returned a few days later. A few days after this argument, A.V. filed

for dissolution of marriage.

¶ 21 Arredondo argues that the testimony about the August 2021

confrontation and the recording were inadmissible under CRE

404(b) because the evidence “had no tendency to prove an element

of the offense” and had “no logical relevance independent of the

impermissible inference that [he] had a bad and violent character.”

We don’t agree.

¶ 22 CRE 404(b)(1) provides that evidence of other acts is

inadmissible to show that a defendant has a bad character and

acted in conformity therewith. But such evidence “may be

admissible for another purpose, such as proving motive,

opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, absence

of mistake, or lack of accident.” CRE 404(b)(2). The General

Assembly has expressly recognized that evidence of other acts may

be particularly relevant in cases involving sex offenses. As

pertinent to this case, such evidence may be relevant to refute

defenses such as consent or recent fabrication. § 16-10-301(1)-(3),

C.R.S. 2024. And the General Assembly has approved the

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admissibility of other acts of domestic violence in prosecutions

involving domestic violence to give necessary context to the charged

act and the victim’s behavior. § 18-6-801.5.

¶ 23 Whenever the prosecution seeks to admit other acts evidence

extrinsic to the charged offense, it must satisfy, and the court must

analyze, each prong of the four-part Spoto test.2 That test asks

whether (1) the evidence relates to a material fact; (2) the evidence

is logically relevant; (3) the logical relevance is independent of the

inference that the defendant acted in conformity with a bad

character; and (4) the probative value of the evidence is

substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice. Spoto,

795 P.2d at 1318.

¶ 24 As we read Arredondo’s challenge to evidence of the August

2021 altercation, he argues that it fails the second and third prongs

of the Spoto test.

¶ 25 The evidence was logically relevant. To the extent Arredondo

asserts that it wasn’t because it didn’t directly prove “an element of

the offense,” that assertion is misguided. The evidence need only be

2 We will assume that the August 21 evidence was extrinsic to the

charged offenses.

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“somehow probative of an ultimate fact.” Yusem v. People, 210 P.3d

458, 464 (Colo. 2009); see Jones, ¶ 23. The evidence was probative

of the ultimate fact of whether Arredondo sexually assaulted A.V.

because it tended to show Arredondo’s knowledge and intent as well

as to rebut Arredondo’s defenses of consent and recent fabrication.

See Jones, ¶ 26 (collecting cases); People v. Cross, 2023 COA 24,

¶¶ 10-15; People v. McBride, 228 P.3d 216, 227 (Colo. App. 2009);

People v. Fry, 74 P.3d 360, 370-71 (Colo. App. 2002), aff’d, 92 P.3d

970 (Colo. 2004); § 16-10-301(3); § 18-6-801.5(3).

¶ 26 And this relevance was independent of the impermissible

inference. Spoto “does not demand the absence of the inference”; it

“merely requires that the proffered evidence be logically relevant

independent of that inference.” People v. Snyder, 874 P.2d 1076,

1080 (Colo. 1994). To be sure, the evidence cast Arredondo in a

bad light. But it also shed light on Arredondo’s actions on

September 11 and A.V.’s lack of consent and delay in reporting the

assault.

¶ 27 The district court therefore didn’t abuse its discretion by

admitting this evidence.

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4. Other Evidence of Other Acts

¶ 28 Next, Arredondo challenges the district court’s admission of

testimony by A.V. and her two adult daughters about his “threats;

physical abuse; vile language; controlling personality; homophobia;

and infidelity.” He argues that none of this evidence had any

relevance “independent of the impermissible inference that [he] had

a bad and violent character” (Spoto prong 3) and that any probative

value the evidence had was substantially outweighed by the danger

of unfair prejudice (Spoto prong 4).

¶ 29 Largely for the reasons discussed in the preceding section, we

reject this argument. With one possible exception, the evidence had

independent relevance to the issues of Arredondo’s knowledge and

intent and A.V.’s alleged consent and delay in reporting.3 And

3 One of A.V.’s daughters testified that Aredondo “discriminated

against [her] because of my sexual orientation because I like
women. And he, in fact, threatened to send me back to Mexico
because of my sexual preference for liking women.” Arredondo’s
attorney didn’t object. This testimony was arguably irrelevant to
any issue in the case. But any error in allowing that testimony
wasn’t plain because it was an isolated remark in the midst of
several days of testimony and other evidence, and the prosecution
didn’t rely on it. It therefore doesn’t cast serious doubt on the
reliability of the judgment of conviction. Hagos v. People, 2012 CO
63, ¶ 14.

11
although the evidence had some potential for unfair prejudice,

ascribing to the evidence its maximum probative value and

minimum unfair prejudice, see Yusem, 210 P.3d at 467, we

conclude that it didn’t have an undue tendency to suggest a verdict

on an improper basis. See Cross, ¶ 26.4

B. Denial of Motions for a Mistrial

¶ 30 Arredondo contends that the district court abused its

discretion by denying his attorney’s motions for a mistrial based on

two jurors learning that A.V. was treated by medical personnel

during the trial. We disagree.

4 Arredondo contends that one of A.V.’s daughters improperly

testified that he raped A.V. On cross-examination, defense counsel
asked A.V.’s daughter about conversations she had with A.V. and
Detective Gomez. Defense counsel asked, “And [A.V.] had told you
that Roberto tried to rape her?” She answered, “Not that he tried.
That he had raped her.” He subsequently asked, “And during that
conversation [with Detective Gomez] you told her what was relayed
to you was he tried to do something inappropriate?” She
responded, “Honestly, I don’t remember if I said that. But like I
said, he didn’t try. He did it.” Her responses, to which counsel
didn’t object, indicated that defense counsel was trying to put
words into her mouth and was misrepresenting what A.V. had told
her. Those responses were foreseeable and therefore any challenge
to their admissibility is barred as invited error. See People v.
Wittrein, 221 P.3d 1076, 1082 (Colo. 2009).

12
1. Additional Facts

¶ 31 During cross-examination of A.V., the court ordered a recess

at the prosecutor’s suggestion. As a juror later indicated, A.V. had

become upset and was “kind of leaning over kind of like maybe she

was hyperventilating.”

¶ 32 After the jury left the courtroom, the court said it was going to

ask medical personnel to attend to A.V. They did so, ultimately

transporting her to the hospital.

¶ 33 Following the thirty-five-minute recess, defense counsel moved

for a mistrial, arguing that the jury had been “tainted with

sympathy . . . by what they observed.” After the prosecutor

responded, the court denied the motion because it wasn’t convinced

that the defense had been prejudiced. According to the court, A.V.

“got upset, she appeared to by crying. She turned her seat around,

almost as if not to cry in front of the jury.” No juror had seen what

subsequently happened in the courtroom.

¶ 34 When the trial recommenced, the prosecution called another

witness. (The court told the jury that the defense would continue

cross-examining A.V. “at a later point.”) A.V. testified the following

day, without incident.

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¶ 35 During deliberations, juror A.D.G. sent a note to the court

which said, “I saw who I believe was [A.V.] leave in an ambulance

yesterday while we were on a break. Is this information I can share

with the other jurors[?]” Defense counsel renewed his motion for a

mistrial. The court questioned A.D.G. on the record outside the

other jurors’ presence. A.D.G. said she had shown the foreperson

the question. The court asked, “Seeing this information, does this

cause you any concern about your ability to be fair and impartial to

both sides in this case?” A.D.G. answered, “No. I wouldn’t — I was

a little surprised to see it, but not shocked because of what we’d

seen in the courtroom.”

¶ 36 In response to questioning by the prosecutor, A.D.G. said she

was alone on a floor below where the trial was taking place when

she saw A.V. on a stretcher leaving the building. She didn’t

actually see her being loaded into an ambulance. She assumed

A.V. was “basically okay” because the court said A.V. would finish

testifying the next day. The prosecutor asked A.D.G. whether there

was “[a]nything about sort of that observation of [A.V.] that would

lead you not to be able to follow [the instruction that neither

sympathy nor prejudice should influence her decision]?” A.D.G.

14
said, “No.” She also said “no” when the prosecutor asked her

whether anything about the event “would prejudice you against the

[d]efense?” A.D.G. also confirmed that although she had seen the

emotion in the courtroom, she “wasn’t overly concerned” about A.V.

¶ 37 Defense counsel also questioned A.D.G. A.D.G. said that no

other juror had heard her discuss the question with the foreperson.

And she said none of the jurors had said anything about A.V.’s

show of emotion in the courtroom. When defense counsel pressed

A.D.G. about her response to the court’s question whether she

could still be fair and impartial, A.D.G. said, “Oh, yes. I misspoke if

I said I couldn’t be fair and impartial.”

¶ 38 The court told A.D.G. not to tell other jurors what had been

discussed.

¶ 39 The court then called in the foreperson for questioning. He

confirmed that he had read A.D.G.’s question. He hadn’t shared it

with any of the other jurors or seen what A.D.G. had seen. He also

confirmed that the incident wouldn’t affect his ability to be fair and

impartial, saying, “I don’t see it as relevant to our decision.” When

the prosecutor asked him whether A.D.G.’s question or anything he

had seen in court would prejudice him in the case, he said, “No.”

15
Defense counsel didn’t ask the foreperson any questions. The court

told the foreperson not to discuss the matter with any of the jurors.

¶ 40 The court then addressed defense counsel’s renewed motion

for a mistrial. The court denied it, saying it was “convinced that

these jurors can be fair and impartial to both sides.”

2. Applicable Law and Standard of Review

¶ 41 “A mistrial is the most drastic of remedies. It is only

warranted where the prejudice to the accused is too substantial to

be remedied by other means.” People v. Collins, 730 P.2d 293, 303

(Colo. 1986) (citation omitted).

¶ 42 The court has broad discretion to grant or deny a mistrial

motion, and we won’t disturb its decision absent a showing by the

defendant of a gross abuse of discretion and prejudice to the

defense. People v. Owens, 2024 CO 10, ¶ 125; Collins, 730 P.2d at

303.

3. Analysis

¶ 43 In the somewhat analogous context of emotional outbursts by

witnesses, the Colorado Supreme Court and a division of this court

have affirmed trial courts’ denials of mistrial motions in

circumstances arguably more extreme than those in this case.

16
Owens, ¶¶ 130-34; People v. Ned, 923 P.2d 271, 276-77 (Colo. App.

1996); cf. People v. Dominguez-Castor, 2020 COA 1, ¶¶ 94-97

(affirming denial of motion for mistrial after a juror fainted while

viewing autopsy photos of the victim). In Ned, a division also cited

several decisions affirming the denial of mistrial motions when

witnesses became distraught. Ned, 923 P.2d at 276.

¶ 44 In this case, the court took care to determine what jurors had

seen and whether they could remain impartial. The court was

entitled to take these jurors at their word that they could. See

Dominguez-Castor, ¶ 97.

¶ 45 Arredondo’s assertions of prejudice are entirely speculative.

For instance, he speculates that other jurors may have seen A.V.

being taken to the ambulance. Nothing in the record supports this

assertion; indeed, the record created by the court undermines it.

And Arredondo’s conclusory assertion that what the jurors saw in

the courtroom “clearly impacted them into the following day and

into the courtroom” is pure conjecture. A.D.G.’s responses to

questions by the court and counsel bely any such conclusion. The

fact that A.V. returned to the courtroom the following day to finish

testifying, and did so without incident, also reduced the possibility

17
of the jurors basing their decision on sympathy for the victim. See

People v. Gladney, 570 P.2d 231, 235 (Colo. 1977) (the mere

possibility of prejudice isn’t sufficient to warrant reversal of the

denial of a mistrial; an appellate court won’t “speculat[e] . . . to find

that the defendant was prejudiced”); People v. Raehal, 971 P.2d

256, 260 (Colo. App. 1998) (“[T]his court must give deference to the

findings of the trial court, based on its observation of courtroom

occurrences, rather than engage in abstract speculation to find

prejudice.”).

¶ 46 Arredondo argues, however, that the court should have

questioned the other jurors to determine whether any of them had

also seen A.V. being wheeled to the ambulance. But defense

counsel didn’t ask the court to do so. And when the court asked

defense counsel whether he wanted the court to answer A.D.G.’s

question for the jury, he said “no.” Given A.D.G.’s answers, there is

no indication that any of the jurors saw this event.

¶ 47 Arredondo also argues that the court should have given the

jury a “curative instruction” concerning what they had seen in the

courtroom. But the court offered to consider such an instruction if

defense counsel would propose one. Defense counsel didn’t take

18
the court up on the offer, arguably waiving this argument. In any

event, the court didn’t abuse its discretion by failing to give an

instruction that defense counsel didn’t request. See People v.

Mersman, 148 P.3d 199, 204 (Colo. App. 2006) (where defense

counsel didn’t ask the court to give a curative instruction, the court

didn’t abuse its discretion by denying the motion for a mistrial); see

also People v. Van Meter, 2018 COA 13, ¶¶ 10-15.

¶ 48 In sum, we conclude that the district court didn’t abuse its

discretion by denying defense counsel’s motions for a mistrial.

C. Expert Testimony by Lay Witness

1. Additional Background

¶ 49 Detective Denise Gomez testified about her role in the

investigation leading to the charges. At the time she was involved

in the investigation, she worked in the police department’s sex

crimes unit. At the beginning of her testimony, the prosecutor had

her describe her experience and training, including her training

concerning sex crimes in the domestic violence context. She

explained that the training illustrated the importance of

understanding “the cycle of domestic violence” and “the mindset of

the victim that you are going to be interviewing as well as the

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suspect.” The prosecutor asked her whether she had “training in

sort [sic] of trauma and how that might affect retention or memory.”

She said she had. The prosecutor then asked her whether “part of

your training [was] that victims of trauma can have challenges with

sequencing and details and memory.” Detective Gomez responded,

“It’s called trauma brain, yes, and, yes, there’s actually a term for

it.” The prosecutor then asked her, “In your experience with

interviewing victims of domestic violence and sexual assault, do

they have challenges with recounting specific timelines and details

of events?” Detective Gomez responded, “Yes.”

¶ 50 The prosecutor then turned to Detective Gomez’s investigation

of the case, specifically her interviews of A.V. and two of A.V.’s

daughters. At one point, the prosecutor asked her whether A.V.

had a “sort of disconnect or some confusion” in understanding and

responding to questions. She said, “Yes.” When the prosecutor

asked her what she attributed that to, Detective Gomez said,

“Trauma brain.”

¶ 51 Defense counsel didn’t object to any of this testimony. Indeed,

on cross-examination, defense counsel asked Detective Gomez a

series of questions about how “trauma brain” can occur, how it can

20
manifest itself, and the difficulty a person who has experienced

trauma may have in compartmentalizing information or

remembering things.

¶ 52 On redirect, the prosecutor asked, “[A]s counsel was asking

you some of these questions about trauma brain, fair to say that

this is complex neuroscience?” Detective Gomez said, “It is.” The

prosecutor went on to question Detective Gomez about how trauma

victims can have difficulty providing complete and accurate

timelines and details of events. Defense counsel objected to one of

these questions — about the effect of “prolonged trauma” — on

relevance grounds, arguing that the case was about “one incident.”

The court overruled that objection. Detective Gomez went on to

testify, in response to the prosecutor’s questions, how a person’s

brain may “shut down” when the natural “fight or flight” response

kicks in. And she explained the concept of “disassociation,” where

a person is “just not mentally there,” and the brain “shuts down”

and doesn’t remember what happened. The prosecutor prefaced

some of his questions on redirect with whether Detective Gomez

could answer based on her “training and experience” or, sometimes,

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just her “experience.” Other than the one relevance objection noted

above, defense counsel didn’t object to any of this testimony.

¶ 53 The prosecutor didn’t mention “trauma brain” in closing. But

defense counsel did. Defense counsel argued that the prosecution

had introduced the concept of “trauma brain” only in an attempt to

explain errors in Detective Gomez’s report — errors resulting from

A.V. providing incorrect information in terms of timing and detail —

and gaps in A.V.’s testimony. Counsel went on to say, “I’m not an

expert, but I’ve been doing criminal law for a long time. I’ve never

heard of this term.” He argued that the inconsistencies and

erroneous details in A.V.’s story weren’t “because of trauma brain.”

Rather, they were a byproduct of her inventing a story of sexual

assault.

2. Analysis

¶ 54 On appeal, Arredondo contends that the court plainly erred by

allowing Detective Gomez to testify about “trauma brain” and how it

could have affected A.V.’s ability to accurately describe the events of

September 11 because that testimony was expert testimony, and

the prosecution didn’t endorse Detective Gomez as an expert.

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¶ 55 As to defense counsel’s cross-examination questioning, of

which Arredondo now complains, we conclude that any error was

invited. And as to all the testimony of which Arredondo now

complains, any error was waived.

¶ 56 Arredondo concedes that this contention is entirely

unpreserved. But he asks us to review for plain error. The People

respond that any error was invited, precluding review even for plain

error. Alternatively, the People argue that any error wasn’t plain.

¶ 57 We have “an independent, affirmative duty to determine

whether a claim is preserved and what standard of review should

apply, regardless of the positions taken by the parties.” Forgette v.

People, 2023 CO 4, ¶ 15 (quoting People v. Tallent, 2021 CO 68,

¶ 11).

¶ 58 The doctrine of invited error prevents a party from complaining

on appeal about an error that he injected into the case. People v.

Rediger, 2018 CO 32, ¶ 34. If a party invited an error, we won’t

review the issue at all, even for plain error. See People v. Gross,

2012 CO 60M, ¶ 12.

¶ 59 Waiver is “the intentional relinquishment of a known right or

privilege.” Rediger, ¶ 39 (emphases and citation omitted). “A waiver

23
may be explicit, as, for example, when a party expressly abandons

an existing right or privilege, or it may be implied, as when a party

engages in conduct that manifests an intent to relinquish [the] right

or privilege or acts inconsistently with its assertion.” Forgette, ¶ 28.

“Waiver extinguishes error and therefore appellate review.” People

v. Roberson, 2025 CO 30, ¶ 13; accord Rediger, ¶ 40.

¶ 60 By repeatedly asking Detective Gomez on cross-examination

about “trauma brain,” defense counsel invited any error relating to

Detective Gomez’s responses to those questions because those

responses were directly responsive to the questions and foreseeable.

See People v. Wittrein, 221 P.3d 1076, 1082 (Colo. 2009).5

¶ 61 And Arredondo’s counsel waived any error with respect to

these subjects. Counsel didn’t merely fail to object when Detective

Gomez brought up the concept on direct; on cross-examination he

5 Arredondo argues that Wittrein doesn’t apply because, in that

case, defense counsel first brought up the problematic issue —
“hyper-reporting” — during cross-examination, whereas in this
case, the prosecution first asked Detective Gomez about “trauma
brain.” But in Wittrein, the prosecutor first brought up the concept
of “hyper-reporting” when questioning the prosecution’s expert on
direct, without objection, and defense counsel questioned the expert
about that concept on cross-examination. Wittrein, 221 P.3d at
1081.

24
asked several questions of Detective Gomez about the causes and

effects of “trauma brain.” The record shows that defense counsel

had a strategic reason for doing so. The primary line of defense was

that A.V. fabricated the allegation of sexual assault, and that this

was evidenced, in part, by her incomplete, changing, and factually

implausible accounts of the assault. Counsel appears to have

posited that the prosecution brought up the concept of “trauma

brain” in a desperate attempt to explain those problems with A.V.’s

story, thereby inadvertently betraying the weakness of its case.

¶ 62 Arredondo contends that this “was an oversight on the part of

defense counsel, if not incompetence.” But any question whether

counsel’s strategy amounted to ineffective assistance must be

raised in a Crim. P. 35(c) proceeding. Gross, ¶ 11.

¶ 63 Because Arredondo’s counsel invited, in part, and waived, in

toto, any claim of error with respect to Detective Gomez’s purported

expert testimony, we won’t address it on the merits.

D. Improper Testimony by Domestic Violence Expert

¶ 64 Arredondo contends that the district court erred by allowing

the prosecution’s expert witness on domestic violence — Jennifer

Walker — to give testimony that wasn’t helpful to the jury, didn’t fit

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the facts of the case, and bolstered A.V.’s credibility. We don’t

agree.

1. Additional Background

¶ 65 The prosecution called Walker to testify as a generalized expert

in the dynamics of domestic violence. (Defense counsel didn’t

object.) She hadn’t reviewed any materials related to the case or

met A.V. See People v. Cooper, 2021 CO 69, ¶ 1 n.1 (explaining

“generalized expert”); People v. Coons, 2021 CO 70, ¶ 53 (“[T]he

point of generalized expert testimony is to educate the jury about

generic concepts and principles without regard for the specific facts

of the case.”).

¶ 66 Walker began her substantive testimony by explaining the

“coercive pattern of power and control tactics” in domestic violence

environments. To illustrate the concept, she referred to the “power

and control wheel,” which describes a number of ways one person

can control another in the domestic context. (The wheel was

admitted as an exhibit.) See Coons, ¶¶ 34-36 (explaining and

depicting the power and control wheel).

¶ 67 Walker explained that understanding these dynamics helps

people understand why a victim’s behavior in response to domestic

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violence may seem counterintuitive. She then discussed several of

the slices on the wheel — economic abuse, coercion and threats,

emotional abuse, using children — in general terms. In response to

the prosecutor’s questions, she explained that these power and

control dynamics can cause a victim to delay reporting (or not

report at all) an incident of domestic violence and can make it

difficult for a victim to remember things or place events in the

correct sequence.

¶ 68 On appeal, Arredondo argues that particular aspects of

Walker’s testimony were improper.

2. Standard of Review

¶ 69 “We review a trial court’s admission of expert testimony for an

abuse of discretion and will reverse only when that decision is

manifestly erroneous.” People v. Rector, 248 P.3d 1196, 1200 (Colo.

2011); accord Cooper, ¶ 44. “This is a deferential standard that

reflects the superior opportunity a trial court has to assess both the

competence of an expert witness and whether that witness’s

anticipated opinions would be helpful to the jury.” Cooper, ¶ 44.

¶ 70 Because defense counsel didn’t object to any of the testimony

with which Arredondo now takes issue, if we conclude that any

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testimony was admitted in error, we will reverse only if the error

was plain. People v. Relaford, 2016 COA 99, ¶ 36.

3. Analysis

¶ 71 Arredondo argues first that Walker’s testimony about

prolonged emotional abuse wasn’t helpful to the jury, see CRE 702,

because it didn’t help the jury determine whether he assaulted A.V.

on September 11 or went to his home in violation of the protection

order. But the testimony was relevant to explaining why A.V.

delayed reporting the assault and why there may have been gaps or

discrepancies in her story, and it was used for those purposes. It

was therefore directly relevant to rebutting Arredondo’s defense of

fabrication. See Cooper, ¶ 47 (“Proffered expert testimony is helpful

if it ‘will assist the fact finder to either understand other evidence or

to determine a fact in issue.’” (quoting Lanari v. People, 827 P.2d

495, 502 (Colo. 1992))); accord CRE 702; see also Cooper, ¶¶ 52-53

(generalized expert testimony fits a case if it has a sufficient logical

connection to the factual issues to be helpful without being unduly

prejudicial; “the fit need not be perfect”).

¶ 72 Arredondo also contends that Walker used statistics to bolster

A.V.’s credibility. But the testimony to which he cites doesn’t

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support his position. Walker testified that “about 70 percent of [her

domestic violence crisis center] clients have never had any law

enforcement contact” and “99 percent” of victims say emotional

harm lasts longer than physical harm. The first statistic concerned

how domestic violence victims often delay reporting violence or don’t

report at all, an issue that, again, went directly to refuting

Arredondo’s defense. And the other was used to explain the long-

term emotional harm of emotional abuse which, again, helped to

explain A.V.’s behavior. Walker never opined on A.V.’s credibility or

the credibility of domestic violence victims generally. The fact her

testimony may have given the jury information which it could use to

assess A.V.’s credibility didn’t render it inadmissible.

¶ 73 Next, Arredondo argues that Walker’s testimony about

“cultural components” wasn’t helpful, was highly prejudicial, and

“hinged on highly racist and damaging stereotypes of Latino men.”

Not so.

¶ 74 Walker testified that persons from certain cultures may be

reluctant to report abuse because (1) the victim may be

undocumented; (2) distrust of law enforcement is prevalent; or (3)

keeping problems inside the family is typical. She didn’t identify

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any particular culture, nor did she mention (even implicitly) “Latino

men.” Her testimony was devoid of any “racist stereotype.” It was

helpful for the same reason as her testimony about emotional abuse

— it could help the jury to understand why A.V. delayed reporting

the assault.

¶ 75 We therefore conclude that the district court didn’t abuse its

discretion by admitting any of the challenged expert testimony.

E. Sufficiency of the Evidence

¶ 76 Arredondo contends that the evidence was insufficient to

support his sexual assault conviction. But his contention is

premised on the inadmissibility of evidence discussed above.

Because we have rejected Arredondo’s challenges to that evidence,

his challenge to the sufficiency necessarily fails.

¶ 77 In any event, as the People point out, A.V.’s testimony about

the assault itself was sufficient on its own to support the verdict.

Contrary to Arredondo’s implicit assertion, corroboration of A.V.’s

account wasn’t necessary. See Kogan v. People, 756 P.2d 945, 951

(Colo. 1988) (testimony of the victims, if accepted as true, provided

sufficient evidence for conviction on charges of sexual assault on a

child).

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F. Cumulative Error

¶ 78 Lastly, Arredondo contends that even if the errors he asserts

don’t individually require reversal, they do when considered

cumulatively. We have found only one possible error — the court’s

admission of A.V.’s daughter’s testimony about Arredondo’s

displeasure with her sexual orientation. Having concluded that

there weren’t multiple errors, the cumulative error doctrine doesn’t

apply. Jones, ¶ 56; People v. Daley, 2021 COA 85, ¶ 142.

III. Disposition

¶ 79 The judgment is affirmed.

JUDGE MOULTRIE and JUDGE GRAHAM concur.

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