Peo v. Kosak

24CA0178 Peo v Kosak 08-21-2025

COLORADO COURT OF APPEALS

Court of Appeals No. 24CA0178
Douglas County District Court No. 01CR259
Honorable Ryan J. Stuart, Judge

The People of the State of Colorado,

Plaintiff-Appellee,

v.

David Arthur Kosak,

Defendant-Appellant.

ORDER REVERSED AND CASE
REMANDED WITH DIRECTIONS

Division II
Opinion by JUDGE SCHUTZ
Fox and Harris, JJ., concur

NOT PUBLISHED PURSUANT TO C.A.R. 35(e)
Announced August 21, 2025

Philip J. Weiser, Attorney General, Marixa Frias, Assistant Attorney General,
Denver, Colorado, for Plaintiff-Appellee

Rick Silver Law LLC, Rick Silver, Fort Collins, Colorado, for Defendant-
Appellant
¶1 Defendant, David Arthur Kosak, appeals the district court’s

order denying his petition to discontinue sex offender registration.

We reverse and remand to the district court with directions to grant

Kosak’s petition.

I. Background and Procedural History

¶2 Between 1999 and 2000, on at least four different occasions,

while tucking his twelve-year-old stepdaughter, M.P., into bed,

Kosak climbed into bed with her and repeatedly touched her

breasts. The touching sometimes lasted as long as ten minutes.

M.P. disclosed the abuse and Kosak was charged with two counts of

sexual assault on a child (position of trust), one count of aggravated

incest, and one count of unlawful sexual contact.

¶3 In 2001, Kosak pleaded guilty to one count of sexual assault

on a child (position of trust), a class 3 felony, and one count of

unlawful sexual contact, a class 1 misdemeanor.1 The district court

sentenced him to a four-year deferred judgment and sentence on

the sexual assault charge, and four years of concurrent probation

1 The prosecution dismissed the remaining two counts.

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on the unlawful sexual contact charge. Kosak registered as a sex

offender as required. See § 16-22-103(1)(a), C.R.S. 2024.

¶4 In 2006, Kosak successfully completed sex offender treatment

as well as the other terms and conditions of his probation and the

deferred judgment and sentence. As a result, the court permitted

him to withdraw his guilty plea to third degree felony sexual assault

and dismissed that charge, which left only his misdemeanor

unlawful sexual contact conviction.

¶5 Under Colorado’s Sex Offender Registration Act (SORA),

registrants who have been convicted of misdemeanor unlawful

sexual contact may petition to discontinue registration after ten

years. § 16-22-113(1)(b), C.R.S. 2024. In 2017, Kosak petitioned to

discontinue sex offender registration. M.P. objected and the district

court set the matter for a hearing. At the hearing, M.P. read a

statement asking the court to deny Kosak’s petition. The district

court denied the petition, finding Kosak failed to provide evidence

that he no longer presented a risk to the community.

¶6 In 2018, Kosak moved to Georgia and registered as a sex

offender. In March 2023, he petitioned to be released from

Georgia’s sex offender registration requirements. The Superior

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Court of Clark County granted his petition after Georgia’s Sexual

Offender Registration Review Board (SORRB) assessed Kosak and

classified him at a Level I risk of reoffending — meaning that he

posed a “low risk for recidivism.” Level I is the lowest risk

classification under Georgia’s registration system.

¶7 In September 2023, Kosak filed a new petition to discontinue

sex offender registration in Colorado. In support of his petition,

Kosak included the Georgia court’s order granting his petition and

the Georgia SORRB assessment. M.P. again objected to Kosak’s

petition and the district court set the matter for a hearing.

¶8 At the January 2024 hearing, Kosak presented evidence

supporting deregistration, including that (1) he successfully

completed sex offender treatment in 2006 and had not reoffended in

the nearly twenty-three years since his arrest; (2) the SORRB

assessment determined that he posed a low risk for recidivism; (3)

he resided in Georgia and had no plans to return to Colorado; and

(4) he did not appear in the Colorado Bureau of Investigation (CBI)

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sex offender online database,2 so there was minimal benefit to his

continued registration.

¶9 Kosak’s biological daughter, C.T., testified that Kosak

understood that sexually abusing M.P. was wrong and was sorry for

his actions. She also testified that Kosak was a good father, she felt

safe with him, and that she would be comfortable with him being

around her four-year-old son.

¶ 10 M.P. was then permitted to address the court.3 She read

letters from her and her sister (Kosak’s other stepchild), both of

which provided compelling statements regarding Kosak’s abuse and

M.P.’s ongoing trauma as a consequence. M.P. expressed fear that

if the court granted Kosak’s petition, other children would suffer the

same abuse that she had endured. Immediately after M.P. read the

letters, the court invited closing arguments.

2 The CBI does not post information on offenders convicted only of

misdemeanor sex offenses. See Colo. Bureau of Investigation,
Colorado Convicted Sex Offender Search, https://perma.cc/9DNK-
3HUA.
3 The district court permitted M.P.’s statement pursuant to the

Victim Rights Act. See § 24-4.1-302.5(1)(d), C.R.S. 2024; see also
§ 16-22-113(2)(f), C.R.S. 2024 (At a hearing on a petition to
deregister, the court shall consider “any written or oral statement of
the victims.”). M.P. was not sworn as a witness prior to reading the
statement and she was not subject to cross-examination.

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¶ 11 Defense counsel emphasized the undisputed evidence

supporting a conclusion that Kosak no longer presented a risk of

committing an offense involving unlawful sexual behavior. Counsel

also amplified Kosak’s successful completion of treatment and the

absence of any additional criminal activity. The prosecution

acknowledged that the court was likely “hamstrung” by the law but

implored the court to consider the continuous hardship and trauma

M.P. and her family have suffered as a result of both the offense

and the subsequent re-traumatization caused by Kosak’s repeated

petitions.

¶ 12 After hearing counsel’s arguments, the court made the

following findings:

[The Court]: All of the factors — or all of those
pieces of — of evidence weigh in favor of a
finding, and I can certainly see why the
District Attorney would think that the Court
was somewhat hamstrung, but I think the
District Attorney didn’t have the opportunity to
see what I saw of — of Mr. Kosak during
[M.P.’s] statement.

As [M.P.] was describing the effects of this
horrific sexual abuse that she endured as a
child at the hands of Mr. Kosak, the Court
observed Mr. Kosak passing notes to his
attorney and smirking. And the Court finds
that lack of empathy is clear to me that he

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doesn’t understand the ramifications of his
actions and that he has not shown that he is
not likely to commit a subsequent offense of,
or involving unlawful sexual behavior.

[Defense Counsel]: Your Honor, may I address
that?

[The Court]: I don’t know what — what there is
to address.

[Defense Counsel]: So when he’s passing those
notes to me, [t]here’s new things that are being
said from the podium that Mr. Kosak
vehemently disagrees with as far as what —
what is being alleged here for the first time.
Like, these aren’t — things that were being
said up there were not things that Mr. Kosak
was accused of and convicted of back in 2001.
And it’s his belief that this is being embellished
to try to keep him on the registry. So when
he’s passing me a note, he’s saying, “That’s not
true,” “That never happened.”

[The Court]: Well, I don’t want to get into those
communications. . . . I’m not going to argue
about what I saw. [Kosak] didn’t appear
surprised.

....

He smirked. And that lack of empathy
suggests to this Court that he doesn’t
understand the ramifications of his actions or
the harm that he has caused, and that
because of that, he did not prove to this Court
— which is his obligation to meet his burden
— that he is not likely to reoffend. The Court
denies the petition to deregister.

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[Defense Counsel]: I — I guess, would the
Court just further unpack the correlation
between the — the note-packing [sic] and his
likelihood to reoffend —

[The Court]: The what?

[Defense Counsel]: — by committing an
unlawful sexual behavior?

[The Court]: There was — not the note-passing.
It was the smirk.

[Defense Counsel]: I guess the —

[The Court]: Smirking throughout [M.P.’s]
statements about the harm he had caused to
her shows no empathy to me.

[Kosak]: I was not smirking at that, Your
Honor. I — I could not —

[The Court]: That’s the Court’s finding, and
you can appeal it.

[Kosak]: I have been very contrite about this
whole thing.

[The Court]: You can appeal my finding.
Thank you.

¶ 13 This appeal followed.

II. Analysis

¶ 14 Kosak contends that the district court abused its discretion by

denying his petition to discontinue sex offender registration based

solely on Kosak’s perceived smirk. We agree.

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A. Standard of Review and Applicable Law

¶ 15 We review a district court’s denial of a petition to discontinue

sex offender registration for an abuse of discretion. Moore v. 4th

Jud. Dist. Att’y, 2024 COA 48, ¶ 6. A court abuses its discretion

when its decision is manifestly arbitrary, unreasonable, or unfair,

or when it misconstrues or misapplies the law. Id.

¶ 16 SORA requires an individual who has been convicted of an

unlawful sexual offense to register as a sex offender. § 16-22-

103(1)(a). An individual who has successfully completed a deferred

judgment and sentence for an unlawful sexual offense may file a

petition to discontinue registering. § 16-22-113(1)(d). An individual

convicted of class 1 misdemeanor unlawful sexual contact may

petition to discontinue registration ten years after the “final release

from the jurisdiction of the court for such offense.” § 16-22-

113(1)(b).

¶ 17 If the victim objects to the petition, the district court must set

the matter for a hearing. § 16-22-113(2)(f). A court may grant the

petition if (1) the petitioner has completed the sentence for which

they were required to register; (2) the petitioner has not

subsequently been convicted of “unlawful sexual behavior or of any

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other offense, the underlying basis of which involved unlawful

sexual behavior”; (3) the statutorily required waiting time period has

expired; and (4) the court finds that the petitioner is “not likely to

commit a subsequent offense of or involving unlawful sexual

behavior.” Id.

¶ 18 The court must consider documents evidencing the petitioner’s

completion of treatment, the victim’s statement related to the

offense, and any other relevant information presented by the

petitioner and the district attorney. § 16-22-113(2)(b), Critically,

“the purpose of registration is not to punish the defendant, but to

protect the community and to aid law enforcement officials in

investigating future sex crimes.” People v. Carbajal, 2012 COA 107,

¶ 37.

B. Application

¶ 19 Kosak contends that the district court abused its discretion by

relying on his perceived smirk to conclude that he had no empathy

for M.P. and therefore failed to establish that he was not likely to

reoffend.

¶ 20 The People contend that the district court acted within its

discretion by giving great weight and credit to M.P.’s statement and

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determining that Kosak’s smirk demonstrated that he is likely to

commit a subsequent offense involving unlawful sexual behavior.

¶ 21 Trial courts are granted substantial deference in deciding

whether to grant a petition to deregister, including the factors to be

considered when making that assessment. Moore, ¶ 6. But that

discretion is not unlimited. Id. (a court abuses its discretion when

considering a petition to deregister if its decision is manifestly

arbitrary, unreasonable, or unfair, or misconstrues or misapplies

the law).

¶ 22 Kosak presented undisputed evidence that he completed his

sentences, waited the statutorily mandated ten years on the

misdemeanor conviction, and was not convicted of a subsequent

offense involving unlawful sexual behavior. § 16-22-113(2)(f); see

also § 16-22-113(1)(b). Thus, the analysis turns on whether he is

“not likely to commit a subsequent offense of or involving unlawful

sexual behavior.” § 16-22-113(2)(f).

¶ 23 The district court found that Kosak’s alleged smirking during

M.P.’s statement indicated that he does not understand the harm

he caused or the ramifications of the abuse, and therefore, he failed

to meet his statutory burden to demonstrate that he is unlikely to

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commit another offense involving unlawful sexual behavior. But

under SORA, the court must also consider relevant information

presented by the petitioner.

¶ 24 Kosak presented undisputed evidence that he was not likely to

reoffend including that (1) he successfully completed sex offender

treatment in 2006 and the other terms and conditions of his

deferred sentence and probation; (2) he complied with the terms

and conditions of his sex offender registration requirements in

Colorado and Georgia; (3) the Georgia SORRB assessment

determined that he posed a low recidivism risk; (4) C.T. testified

that Kosak understands the harm he caused M.P. and is

remorseful; and (5) he has not been arrested or charged with any

sex offenses since 2001.

¶ 25 The district court did not properly consider any of this

evidence. Moreover, the prosecution introduced no evidence

contradicting the evidence that Kosak did not present a significant

risk to commit a new offense involving unlawful sexual behavior.

Nor did the court consider that there was very limited public benefit

to requiring Kosak to continue registering because his name is not

available on Colorado’s online sex offender database.

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¶ 26 There is no evidentiary support for the district court’s finding

that smirking means that Kosak is likely to commit another offense

involving unlawful sexual behavior. Moreover, even crediting M.P.’s

compelling unsworn statement, that statement focused on past

abuse and the ongoing emotional turmoil she understandably

suffered. But her statement did not speak to the future risk, if any,

that Kosak posed to reoffend.

¶ 27 Finally, the district court did not give Kosak a meaningful

opportunity to explain the perceived smirk; instead, it curtly ended

the hearing and told Kosak he could file an appeal.

¶ 28 Given this record, we conclude that the district court’s

(1) failure to consider Kosak’s substantial evidence that he was

unlikely to reoffend; (2) refusal to provide Kosak or his counsel an

opportunity to explain the circumstances surrounding the perceived

smirk; and (3) summary rejection of the petition based on Kosak’s

perceived smirk demonstrate that its decision was manifestly

arbitrary and unreasonable. See Carbajal, ¶ 58 (“[T]he trial court

abused its discretion in denying defendant’s petition for an order to

discontinue the requirement that he register as a sex offender.”);

Moore, ¶ 6.

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III. Disposition

¶ 29 We reverse and remand the case to the district court with

directions to grant Kosak’s petition to discontinue registering as a

sex offender.

JUDGE FOX and JUDGE HARRIS concur.

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