Peo in Interest of ALO

25CA0333 Peo in Interest of ALO 08-14-2025

COLORADO COURT OF APPEALS

Court of Appeals No. 25CA0333
Douglas County District Court No. 24JV30042
Honorable Ben L. Leutwyler, III, Judge

The People of the State of Colorado,

Appellee,

In the Interest of A.L.O. and A.V.M., Children,

and Concerning B.O.,

Appellant.

JUDGMENT AFFIRMED

Division VI
Opinion by JUDGE YUN
Tow and Sullivan, JJ., concur

NOT PUBLISHED PURSUANT TO C.A.R. 35(e)
Announced August 14, 2025

Jeffrey A. Garcia, County Attorney, Zoe Laird, Assistant County Attorney,
Castle Rock, Colorado, for Appellee

Nicole Savino, Guardian Ad Litem

Just Law Group, LLC, John F. Poor, Denver, Colorado, for Appellant
¶1 In this dependency and neglect action, B.O. (mother) appeals

the judgment entered on a jury’s verdict adjudicating two-year-old

A.L.O. and ten-year-old A.V.M. (collectively, the children) dependent

and neglected. She also appeals the juvenile court’s dispositional

order adopting a treatment plan for her. We affirm.

I. Background

¶2 The Douglas County Department of Human Services received a

referral with concerns about A.V.M.’s truancy and aggressive

behaviors. The Department opened a voluntary case with mother

and continued working with the family as part of a truancy case

that started two months later. During the voluntary case, the

Department became concerned about mother’s substance use and

implemented a safety plan for her to be supervised while with the

children.

¶3 Six months after the voluntary case commenced, the

Department filed a petition in dependency and neglect, raising

concerns about mother’s substance dependence and failure to

follow the safety plan during the voluntary case. Mother requested

an adjudicatory jury trial. After a two-day trial, the jury returned

special verdicts finding both children dependent and neglected

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under sections 19-3-102(1)(b) and (c), C.R.S. 2024. The juvenile

court then adopted a treatment plan for mother.

II. Adjudication

¶4 Mother first contends that there was insufficient evidence to

support the adjudication of the children as dependent and

neglected. We are not persuaded.

A. Standard of Review and Applicable Law

¶5 The purpose of an adjudicatory hearing is to determine

whether the children are dependent or neglected under section

19-3-102 and whether that status warrants intervention by the

government. People in Interest of N.G., 2012 COA 131, ¶ 39.

¶6 An adjudication may not enter without proof, by a

preponderance of the evidence, that the child is dependent or

neglected. People in Interest of J.G., 2016 CO 39, ¶¶ 15, 53. As

relevant here, a child is dependent or neglected when (1) the child

lacks proper parental care due to the parent’s actions or omissions

or (2) the child’s environment is injurious to his welfare.

§ 19-3-102(1)(b), (c). Section 19-3-102 requires proof of only one

condition for an adjudication. See People in Interest of S.M-L., 2016

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COA 173, ¶ 29, aff’d on other grounds sub nom., People in Interest of

R.S. v. G.S., 2018 CO 31.

¶7 In determining whether the evidence is sufficient to sustain an

adjudication of dependency or neglect, we review the record in the

light most favorable to the prevailing party, and we draw every

inference “fairly deducible” from the evidence in favor of the jury’s

decision. People in Interest of S.G.L., 214 P.3d 580, 583 (Colo. App.

2009). The credibility of the witnesses and the sufficiency,

probative effect, and weight of the evidence, as well as the

inferences and conclusions to be drawn therefrom, are within the

purview of the jury. Id. We will not disturb the jury’s findings if the

record supports them, even if reasonable people might arrive at

different conclusions based on the same facts. Id.; People in Interest

of T.T., 128 P.3d 328, 331 (Colo. App. 2005).

B. Analysis

¶8 Mother contends that her children were not dependent or

neglected while in her care because (1) she left a domestically

violent relationship with the father more than a year before the

adjudicatory hearing; (2) she met the children’s basic needs while

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they were in her care; and (3) A.V.M. exhibited extreme behaviors

that were beyond the control of a fit parent.

¶9 Although these facts appear to be undisputed, we reject

mother’s claim because the jury heard other evidence that could

have supported the children’s adjudications, and we cannot reweigh

the evidence. See People in Interest of S.Z.S., 2022 COA 133, ¶ 29.

¶ 10 First, the caseworker testified that mother’s failure to

supervise the children or follow through with necessary services for

A.V.M. created an unsafe environment for both children during the

voluntary case.

¶ 11 Second, mother and the caseworker testified about mother’s

substance dependence. The caseworker testified that the

Department was concerned about mother’s substance dependence

due to the results of monitored sobriety testing and mother’s lack of

engagement with recommended substance dependence treatment. .

Although mother denied substance use at the time of the

adjudicatory hearing, she admitted to a relapse involving cocaine

that began before the voluntary case opened. An expert in forensic

toxicology opined that the hair follicle test submitted by mother

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demonstrated either ongoing use of cocaine or a large amount of

use at one time.

¶ 12 Finally, mother and the caseworker testified that mother had

been unavailable to care for the children during the three months

leading up to the adjudicatory trial. Mother testified that she

experienced “a manic break” and became homeless. She also

testified that while she was missing, she was unable to provide

consent for emergency mental health treatment needed by A.V.M.

and declined to participate in family time with either child, leading

to a “horrible” impact on both children. The caseworker testified

that after mother stopped attending family time, the caseworker

was unable to locate her until the week before the hearing, when

she appeared in custody.

¶ 13 Based on the foregoing evidence, the jury could reasonably

infer that the children were each dependent or neglected under one

or more of the statutory criteria presented at the time of the

adjudication. See § 19-3-102(1)(b), (c). Accordingly, we will not

disturb the jury’s verdict.

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III. Treatment Plan

¶ 14 Next, mother contends that the treatment plan adopted by the

juvenile court during disposition was not appropriate because it

failed to provide her with mental health and domestic violence

support. We are not persuaded.

A. Relevant Law and Standard of Review

¶ 15 “[T]he purpose of a treatment plan is to preserve the

parent-child legal relationship by assisting the parent in overcoming

the problems that required intervention into the family.” People in

Interest of L.M., 2018 COA 57M, ¶ 25. Therefore, an appropriate

treatment plan is one that is approved by the court, relates to the

child’s needs, and provides treatment objectives that are reasonably

calculated to render the parent fit to provide adequate parenting to

the child within a reasonable time. § 19-1-103(12), C.R.S. 2024;

People in Interest of K.B., 2016 COA 21, ¶ 13.

¶ 16 We measure the appropriateness of a treatment plan based on

its likelihood of success in reuniting the family, which we assess in

light of the facts existing at the time the juvenile court approved the

plan. People in Interest of B.C., 122 P.3d 1067, 1071 (Colo. App.

2005). While the focus of the plan is to address the child’s needs

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and any identified safety concerns, the plan’s requirements must

also be realistic given the existing facts. See People in Interest of

B.J.D., 626 P.2d 727, 730 (Colo. App. 1981); see also People in

Interest of A.H., 736 P.2d 425, 427 (Colo. App. 1987). Such facts

necessarily include a parent’s individual circumstances and ability

to access treatment services. B.J.D., 626 P.2d at 730.

¶ 17 We review a juvenile court’s order adopting a treatment plan

for an abuse of discretion. People in Interest of M.W., 2022 COA 72,

¶ 32. A court abuses its discretion when its actions are manifestly

arbitrary, unreasonable, or unfair, or based on an erroneous

understanding or application of the law. Id. at ¶ 12.

B. Analysis

¶ 18 Mother first contends that her treatment plan was inadequate

because it lacked any component addressing her mental health. At

the dispositional hearing, the children’s guardian ad litem proposed

adding a mental health element. But mother did not appear at the

dispositional hearing and had not been in touch with the parties

since her release from jail on bond the previous month. The

juvenile court decided against adding a mental health component

but directed the parties to consider adding one once mother was in

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communication with the Department and her counsel. This

approach appropriately considered mother’s circumstances and

inability to access services unknown to her while she was out of

contact. See B.J.D., 626 P.2d at 730. Mother, through counsel, did

not object to this course of action or take any position on adding a

mental health objective to the treatment plan. See People v.

Ujaama, 2012 COA 36, ¶ 37 (An issue is unpreserved for review

when, among other things, “no objection or request was made in the

trial court.”); see also People in Interest of T.E.R., 2013 COA 73, ¶ 30

(failing to take a position on an issue presented to a juvenile court

is insufficient to preserve it for review).

¶ 19 Next, mother contends that the juvenile court erred by

adopting a “standard-issue co-parenting element” that left her

“vulnerable to father’s attempts to manipulate, control and further

victimize her.” At the dispositional hearing, mother asked the court

to modify the co-parenting objective to “specifically require a

co-parenting class that accounts for domestic violence . . . with

service providers that are trained in domestic violence dynamics.”

The court declined to change the language of the objective because

it already included (1) treatment through an identified provider

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working with a domestic violence perspective; (2) a requirement that

communication between mother and father occur only through the

Talking Parents online application; and (3) compliance with a

no-contact order. Accordingly, the court found that the existing

objective was not “unfair to [mother] or . . . impos[ing] an

unreasonable expectation.”

¶ 20 The record supports the court’s findings. The caseworker

testified that the Department considered domestic violence

dynamics when it asked mother, a survivor of domestic violence, to

engage in co-parenting with father. The caseworker testified that

the identified provider for the co-parenting class was specifically

chosen because it used a domestic violence framework, and the

course was designed to alleviate power and control dynamics in

co-parenting situations. The course was offered virtually and

required both parents to receive “the exact same co-parenting

information” to eliminate any “gray areas” of understanding. This

testimony belies mother’s contention that the Department proposed

a “standard-issue” element and ignored the domestic violence

dynamic by requiring mother to engage in co-parenting. Given this

evidence, the court’s finding that the co-parenting element was

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appropriate was not manifestly arbitrary, unreasonable, or unfair.

We therefore discern no abuse of the court’s discretion adopting

that element.

¶ 21 While mother now suggests that the treatment plan should

have included a separate provision to support her as a victim of

domestic violence, at the hearing she asked the court not to adopt a

separate domestic violence objective. We therefore will not consider

mother’s argument. People in Interest of N.A.T., 134 P.3d 535, 537

(Colo. App. 2006) (an appellate court will not consider an issue

when a parent took the opposite position in the juvenile court).

IV. Disposition

¶ 22 The judgment is affirmed.

JUDGE TOW and JUDGE SULLIVAN concur.

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