People v. Chronis

The summaries of the Colorado Court of Appeals published opinions
constitute no part of the opinion of the division but have been prepared by
the division for the convenience of the reader. The summaries may not be
cited or relied upon as they are not the official language of the division.
Any discrepancy between the language in the summary and in the opinion
should be resolved in favor of the language in the opinion.

SUMMARY
August 14, 2025

2025COA72

No. 23CA1376, People v. Chronis — Criminal Law — Sex
Offender Registration — Petition for Removal from Registry —
Lifetime Mandatory Registration — Adjudications as a Juvenile;
Constitutional Law — Eighth Amendment — Cruel and Unusual
Punishments — Ex Post Facto Clause

As matters of first impression, a division of the Colorado Court

of Appeals holds that lifetime registration under the Colorado Sex

Offender Registration Act’s section 16-22-113(3), C.R.S. 2024,

because of a juvenile adjudication and an adult conviction does not

implicate the Ex Post Facto Clause and does not constitute an

unconstitutional punishment under the Eighth Amendment.

The division also holds that a district court may consider an

expunged juvenile adjudication when determining whether to grant

a petition for deregistration as a sex offender under section 16-22-

113(3)(c), provided the applicable expungement statute permits the

court to review the expunged adjudication.
COLORADO COURT OF APPEALS 2025COA72

Court of Appeals No. 23CA1376
Jefferson County District Court No. 09CR2302
Honorable Meegan A. Miloud, Judge

The People of the State of Colorado,

Plaintiff-Appellee,

v.

David Patrick Chronis,

Defendant-Appellant.

ORDER REVERSED AND CASE
REMANDED WITH DIRECTIONS

Division II
Opinion by JUDGE FOX
Harris and Schutz, JJ., concur

Announced August 14, 2025

Philip J. Weiser, Attorney General, Claire V. Collins, Assistant Attorney
General, Leo T. Nguyen, Assistant Attorney General Fellow, Denver, Colorado,
for Plaintiff-Appellee

Springer and Steinberg, P.C., Harvey A. Steinberg, Taylor Ivy, Denver,
Colorado, for Defendant-Appellant
¶1 Defendant, David Patrick Chronis, appeals the district court’s

denial of his petition to discontinue sex offender registration. He

has an expunged juvenile adjudication for a charge with an

underlying factual basis involving unlawful sexual behavior and an

adult conviction for a sex offense. We reverse the district court’s

order and remand for the court to hold a hearing to determine if

good cause exists to inspect Chronis’ expunged juvenile

adjudication record.

I. Background

¶2 In 2009, Chronis engaged in sexually explicit conversations

online and over the phone with an undercover investigator posing

as an underage teenage girl. After Chronis arranged a meeting with

the undercover officer, he was arrested. Chronis was charged with

(1) internet luring of a child; (2) internet sexual exploitation of a

child; and (3) criminal attempt to commit sexual assault on a child.

Chronis ultimately pleaded guilty to criminal attempt (internet

luring of a child), a class 5 felony; in exchange, the other charges

were dismissed. On June 1, 2010, the district court sentenced

Chronis to two years of probation, requiring him to register as a sex

1
offender. Chronis’ probation officer later recommended terminating

his probation, and the court did so on May 24, 2012.

¶3 On July 21, 2022, Chronis petitioned to discontinue his sex

offender registration, certifying that section 16-22-113(3), C.R.S.

2024 — which mandates lifetime registration for some offenders —

did not make him ineligible for deregistration. He also certified that

it had been ten years since his conviction, and he had not been

convicted of any subsequent crime involving unlawful sexual

behavior. See § 16-22-113(1)(b).

¶4 A probation supervisor, responding to an inquiry from the

court, initially supported Chronis’ petition. But the probation

supervisor soon amended that support, informing the court that

Chronis did not qualify for deregistration because of a 1991 juvenile

adjudication in Denver Juvenile Court Case No. 91JD1752.

¶5 The district court held a hearing on November 1, 2022, noting

that it did not have much information concerning the basis for the

1991 adjudication and that the case had been expunged. But the

court also noted that, regardless of the adjudication’s expungement,

Chronis was ineligible for deregistration under section

16-22-113(3)(c) if the adjudication involved unlawful sexual

2
behavior. The prosecution represented that it would investigate the

basis for the 1991 adjudication, so the court continued the matter.

The prosecution responded later that day and requested that

Chronis’ petition be denied because, in the 1991 adjudication,

Chronis pleaded guilty to “sexual assault in the third degree,” a

class 1 misdemeanor, rendering him ineligible for deregistration.

The record does not show that the court ruled on the matter.

¶6 In July 2023, Chronis again petitioned for deregistration on

the same grounds and requested a hearing. Chronis argued that

expunged adjudications do not preclude deregistration under

section 16-22-113(3)(c), and because his record in the 1991 case

was expunged in 1995, he could deregister. The prosecution again

opposed the petition, arguing that an expunged adjudication for an

offense based on unlawful sexual behavior prohibited

deregistration.

¶7 The court denied Chronis’ petition without a hearing, and this

appeal followed.

II. Issues on Appeal

¶8 Chronis contends that the plain language of section 16-22-

113(3)(c), considered in the context of the Colorado Sex Offender

3
Registration Act (CSORA), §§ 16-22-101 to -115, C.R.S. 2024, does

not prohibit deregistration based on expunged adjudications.

Chronis argues that expungement erases an adjudication, and

therefore it cannot provide a legal basis to deny deregistration

where the petitioner “has a conviction as an adult and one or more

adjudications as a juvenile for unlawful sexual behavior.” § 16-22-

113(3)(c) (emphasis added).

¶9 Further, Chronis highlights that section 16-22-113(3)(c) refers

to adjudications “for unlawful sexual behavior or for any other

offense, the underlying factual basis of which is unlawful sexual

behavior pursuant to section 16-22-103(2),” C.R.S. 2024. (Emphasis

added.) And, Chronis notes, section 16-22-103(2)(a) specifies that

registration is required for convictions “[o]n and after July 1, 1994,”

for unlawful sexual behavior, and that section 16-22-103(2)(c)(I)

adds new criteria for those convicted “on or after July 1, 2002.” His

expunged 1991 plea, he says, does not satisfy the statute.

¶ 10 Chronis contends that section 16-22-113(3)(c) only prohibits

deregistration when a petitioner has prior offenses resulting in

convictions “[o]n or after July 1, 1994,” or adjudications “on or after

July 1, 2002,” requiring registration. Chronis adds that construing

4
the statutes to require lifetime registration based on an old and

expunged juvenile adjudication would create an unconstitutional ex

post facto punishment.

¶ 11 Finally, Chronis argues that, if the plain language of the

statutes does not resolve the issue, then we should apply the rule of

lenity to bar the use of expunged juvenile adjudications in

deregistration decisions.

III. Analysis

A. Standard of Review and Statutory Interpretation

¶ 12 “We review issues of statutory interpretation de novo.” McCoy

v. People, 2019 CO 44, ¶ 37. “We review a district court’s denial of

a petition to discontinue sex offender registration for an abuse of

discretion. ‘A court abuses its discretion when its decision is

manifestly arbitrary, unreasonable, or unfair, or when it

misconstrues or misapplies the law.’” Moore v. 4th Jud. Dist. Att’y,

2024 COA 48, ¶ 6 (citations omitted).

¶ 13 “When a court interprets a statute, its goal is to give effect to

the intent of the legislature.” People v. Patton, 2016 COA 187, ¶ 9.

“To do so, we look first to the language of the statute, giving its

words and phrases their plain and ordinary meanings. We read

5
statutory words and phrases in context, and we construe them

according to the rules of grammar and common usage.” McCoy,

¶ 37 (citation omitted). We also “must avoid ‘constructions that

would render any words or phrases superfluous or lead to illogical

or absurd results.’” Patton, ¶ 9 (quoting Doubleday v. People, 2016

CO 3, ¶ 20). Instead, we must effectuate the legislative scheme “as

a whole, giving consistent, harmonious, and sensible effect to all of

its parts.” McCoy, ¶ 38. “Absent clear legislative intent to the

contrary, a statute affecting substantive rights and liabilities applies

prospectively while a statute addressing procedural matters is

assumed to apply retroactively.” People v. McCreadie, 938 P.2d 528,

530 n.4 (Colo. 1997).

B. CSORA and Deregistration

¶ 14 An individual, like Chronis, with a class 5 felony conviction

involving unlawful sexual behavior may petition for deregistration

ten years after “final release from the jurisdiction of the court,”

provided that they have not “subsequently been convicted of

unlawful sexual behavior or of any other offense, the underlying

factual basis of which involved unlawful sexual behavior.” § 16-22-

113(1)(b).

6
¶ 15 Some individuals, however, may never deregister as sex

offenders. § 16-22-113(3). As relevant here, “[a]ny adult who . . .

has a conviction as an adult and one or more adjudications as a

juvenile for unlawful sexual behavior or for any other offense, the

underlying factual basis of which is unlawful sexual behavior

pursuant to section 16-22-103(2),” is never eligible for

deregistration. § 16-22-113(3)(c); see also People in Interest of T.B.,

2021 CO 59, ¶ 14.

¶ 16 CSORA defines a “conviction” for purposes of determining

whether an individual has two or more convictions that may

prevent them from deregistering as “having received a verdict of

guilty by a judge or jury, having pleaded guilty or nolo contendere,

having received a disposition as a juvenile, having been adjudicated

a juvenile delinquent, or having received a deferred judgment and

sentence or a deferred adjudication.” § 16-22-102(3), C.R.S. 2024.

Adjudication is defined as “a determination by the court that it has

been proven beyond a reasonable doubt to the trier of fact that a

juvenile has committed a delinquent act or that a juvenile has pled

guilty to committing a delinquent act.” § 16-22-102(1). The statute

adds that, “when a previous conviction must be pled and proven as

7
an element of an offense or for purposes of sentence enhancement,

‘adjudication’ means conviction.” Id.

¶ 17 In McCulley v. People, 2020 CO 40, ¶¶ 28-30, 34, the supreme

court held that a successfully completed deferred judgment does

not fall under the definition of a “conviction” for purposes of section

16-22-113(3)(c). The court reasoned that the present tense use of

“has more than one conviction,” id. at ¶ 29 (quoting § 16-22-

113(3)(c)), did not apply to completed deferred adjudications

because, once completed, they are no longer convictions — the

individual merely had a conviction. Id. at ¶ 30.

¶ 18 In Moore, a division of this court considered section 16-22-

113(3)(c)’s cross-reference to section 16-22-103(2), which provides,

in part, that “[o]n and after July 1, 1994, any person who is

convicted in the state of Colorado of unlawful sexual behavior or of

another offense . . . which involves unlawful sexual behavior” must

register as a sex offender. See Moore, ¶¶ 11-18. The division held

that the reference to the July 1, 1994, cutoff did not mean that only

offenses committed on or after July 1, 1994, satisfy section 16-22-

113(3)(c)’s multiple convictions requirements. Id. at ¶¶ 12-14. The

division reasoned that the reference to July 1, 1994, “applies to the

8
affirmative obligation to register, which is a different question from

eligibility to petition for deregistration.” Id. at ¶ 13. Instead, the

timeframe limitation only applies to convictions for “any other

offense, the underlying factual basis of which is unlawful sexual

behavior pursuant to section 16-22-103(2),” § 16-22-113(3)(c), and

not to convictions solely for “unlawful sexual behavior.” Moore,

¶¶ 12, 15. In other words, a person convicted of a qualifying

offense in 1991 would not be required to register until 1994, but the

1991 conviction still counts toward the person’s ineligibility to

deregister.

¶ 19 For the same reasons given by the division in Moore, we reject

Chronis’ argument that his 1991 adjudication may not be used to

deny his petition for deregistration based on the cross-reference to

the timeframes in section 16-22-103(2). The timeframe in section

16-22-103(2)(a) refers to the offenses triggering the obligation to

register as a sex offender. It does not mean that all convictions or

adjudications referenced in section 16-22-113(3)(c) must have

occurred on or after the cutoff of July 1, 1994. See Moore, ¶ 13.

The same reasoning applies to the “July 1, 2002,” conviction and

adjudication timeframe mentioned in section 16-22-103(2)(c)(I). See

9
also § 16-22-103(2)(c)(V) (connecting adjudications to the provisions

in section 16-22-103(2)(c)(I)). And like in Moore, Chronis’

adjudication for third degree sexual assault directly involved

unlawful sexual behavior. See Moore, ¶ 15.

C. The Ex Post Facto Clause and Eighth Amendment

¶ 20 First, we conclude that requiring Chronis to register as a sex

offender for life would not implicate the Ex Post Facto Clause or the

Eighth Amendment because he is not prohibited from deregistering

solely because of his juvenile adjudication.

¶ 21 “The ex post facto clauses of the United States and Colorado

constitutions, U.S. Const. art. I, § 9, cl. 3; Colo. Const. art. II, § 11,

address the injustice that arises when government action alters the

legal consequences of an event or act after the fact.” Woldt v.

People, 64 P.3d 256, 270 (Colo. 2003). In turn, the Eighth

Amendment to the U.S. Constitution and Article II, section 20 of the

Colorado Constitution, provide that “[e]xcessive bail shall not be

required, nor excessive fines imposed, nor cruel and unusual

punishments inflicted,” and prohibit sentences grossly

disproportionate to the crime. Wells-Yates v. People, 2019 CO 90M,

¶¶ 5, 9 (alteration in original) (quoting U.S. Const. amend. VIII).

10
¶ 22 In Smith v. Doe, the United States Supreme Court held that

Alaska’s sex offender registry scheme was “nonpunitive, and its

retroactive application did not violate the Ex Post Facto Clause.”

538 U.S. 84, 105-06 (2003). And the Colorado Supreme Court

noted in T.B. that divisions of the “court of appeals have

consistently followed Smith’s reasoning to hold that registration

pursuant to CSORA does not constitute punishment for purposes of

the Ex Post Facto Clause or the Eighth Amendment.” T.B., ¶ 35.

But the Colorado Supreme Court also held that “mandatory lifetime

sex offender registration for offenders with multiple juvenile

adjudications constitutes punishment for purposes of the Eighth

Amendment” and constitutes prohibited cruel and unusual

punishment if the registration system does not “provid[e] a

mechanism for individualized assessments or an opportunity to

deregister upon a showing of rehabilitation.” Id. at ¶¶ 44, 58, 64,

74.

¶ 23 The supreme court noted that the distinction between adult

and juvenile offenders is based on “juveniles’ increased

susceptibility to outside pressure, immature behavior, and

impulsiveness . . . [; thus] the transgressions of minors are viewed

11
as less blameworthy than those of adults.” Id. at ¶ 29. The court

also noted that juveniles are less susceptible to “[d]eterrence-based

justifications for punishment,” they are “more amenable to reform

than adult offenders,” and “the very fact of an offender’s youth

means that lifelong punishments are harsher in practice for

juveniles than for adults.” Id. at ¶¶ 30-32. Looking to these

distinctions, the supreme court held that “CSORA violates the

Eighth Amendment in imposing mandatory lifetime sex offender

registration for offenders with multiple juvenile adjudications.” Id.

at ¶¶ 43, 47-58.

¶ 24 The supreme court explicitly “decline[d] to opine on the

constitutionality of mandatory lifetime sex offender registration for

an offender who was adjudicated delinquent for a sex offense as a

juvenile and was subsequently convicted of one or more sex

offenses as an adult.” Id. at ¶ 43 n.14. However, that is the exact

situation before us today. Unlike in T.B., which involved a lifetime

registration requirement for multiple juvenile adjudications and no

adult convictions, Chronis was adjudicated as a juvenile and

convicted as an adult for unlawful sexual behavior offenses.

12
¶ 25 We conclude that a lifetime registration requirement under

CSORA, § 16-22-113(3), because of a prior juvenile conviction in

addition to an adult conviction does not constitute a punishment

for purposes of the Eighth Amendment; therefore, its retroactive

application does not implicate the Ex Post Facto Clause.1 See T.B.,

¶ 35; Smith, 538 U.S. at 105-06.

¶ 26 Unlike an offender whose record only includes multiple

juvenile offenses, an offender with a juvenile adjudication and an

adult conviction does not implicate the heightened concerns

associated with lifetime registration for juvenile offenders for

purposes of the Eighth Amendment. Adults are not as

“susceptibl[e] to outside pressure, immature behavior, and

impulsiveness” and can better weigh the risks of deterrence-based

justifications for punishment; lifetime punishments are less harsh

for adult offenders in practice; and, most importantly, such adult

offenders have demonstrated their lack of reform after their juvenile

1 This conclusion also adheres to the legislature’s clear intent to

prohibit deregistration where an offender has an adult conviction
and one or more juvenile adjudications for unlawful sexual
behavior, as evidenced by the plain language of section 16-22-
113(3)(c), C.R.S. 2024.

13
offenses by committing a subsequent offense as adults. See T.B.,

¶¶ 29-32, 55.

¶ 27 An example of this distinction can be seen in the supreme

court’s reasoning in T.B. that lifetime CSORA registration for solely

juvenile offenses was unconstitutional, in part, because such a

“registration requirement appears to be retributive in nature,

punishing a juvenile for his past conduct without regard to the

threat — or lack thereof — that the juvenile currently poses.” Id. at

¶ 53. While this is true for juveniles who do not reoffend as adults,

a registration requirement for an individual who commits a later

offense as an adult accounts for their current risk to society in light

of a new offense. And while “mandatory lifetime sex offender

registration for juveniles does not bear a rational connection to, and

is excessive in relation to, CSORA’s nonpunitive purposes of

protecting the community and aiding law enforcement,” the same

cannot be said for offenders who later commit offenses as adults.

Id. at ¶ 55.

¶ 28 Therefore, lifetime registration under CSORA is not considered

a punishment for purposes of the Eighth Amendment or the Ex Post

Facto Clause for offenders with a juvenile adjudication in addition

14
to an adult conviction. And, for the same reason, the court’s

consideration of an expunged juvenile adjudication for purposes of

a deregistration petition does not implicate the Ex Post Facto

Clause. But, as we explain below, the statutory expungement

regime in effect at the time of the expungement controls.

D. The Expungement Statutes and CSORA

¶ 29 We next consider Chronis’ argument that, because his 1991

adjudication was expunged in 1995, section 16-22-113(3)(c) does

not render him ineligible for deregistration.

¶ 30 “[W]hen a record is expunged, it is essentially erased and

treated as if it never existed. Thus, in general, after expungement,

only ‘basic identification information’ contained in the expunged

record remains available to law enforcement agencies.” People v.

Connors, 230 P.3d 1265, 1269 (Colo. App. 2010) (citations omitted);

see also Black’s Law Dictionary 725 (12th ed. 2024) (One definition

of “expunge” is “[t]o remove from a record, list, or book; to erase or

destroy.”). The parties contest which expungement statute applies:

the prosecution argues the request to deregister was made in 2022

and is therefore governed by the statute in effect then, but Chronis

15
notes that the record was expunged in 1995 and therefore asserts

that the 1995 statute applies. We examine both statutory regimes.

1. Expungement in 1995

¶ 31 The 1995 juvenile expungement statute differs from the 2022

statute, which only applies prospectively. See People v. Pennington,

2021 COA 9, ¶ 9 (“Statutes are generally presumed to operate

prospectively.”); McCreadie, 938 P.2d at 530 n.4.

¶ 32 Section 19-2-902(1), C.R.S. 1995, effective when Chronis’

record was expunged, provided that “‘expungement’ means the

designation of records whereby such records are deemed never to

have existed. Upon the entry of an expungement order, the person,

agency, and court may properly indicate that no record exists.”

Expungement was effectuated by “physically sealing or

conspicuously indicating” on the physical or computer record that it

was expunged. Id. at (2)(b). “Basic identification information on the

juvenile” was still accessible by a “district attorney, local law

enforcement agency, and the department of human services.” Id.

at (3). Section 19-2-902(4) allowed courts to order the inspection of

the expunged record “after a hearing and good cause shown,”

16
provided that interested parties were given at least five days’ notice

of the hearing.

2. Current Juvenile Record Expungement

¶ 33 Section 19-1-306, C.R.S. 2024, details how expungement of

juvenile records is now handled.2 It specifies that “[u]pon the entry

of an expungement order, the person who is the subject of the

record that has been expunged may assert that he or she has no

juvenile delinquency record.” § 19-1-306(1)(a). Expungement is

defined as “the designation of juvenile delinquency records whereby

such records are deemed never to have existed.” § 19-1-103(63),

C.R.S. 2024; see also § 19-1-306(1)(a). Unless a statutory exception

applies, expunged records are not available for inspection by others.

See § 19-1-306(1)(b).

¶ 34 Section 19-1-306(3) contains the exceptions making expunged

records available to others. Section 19-1-306(3)(b) provides that

“any record that is ordered expunged is available to any judge and

the probation department for use in any future proceeding in which

the person whose record was expunged is charged with an offense

2 The relevant provisions of the current statute and the one in effect

in 2022 and 2023 (when Chronis moved to deregister) are the same.

17
as either a juvenile or as an adult.” Chronis does not dispute that

this exception would apply here.

E. Expungement’s Legal Effect for Deregistration

¶ 35 We conclude that the statute governing whether the court

could have accessed Chronis’ expunged juvenile adjudication is the

1995 statute in effect at the time of his expungement. Nothing in

the current juvenile expungement statute evidences a clear

legislative intent to apply retroactively, nor can we say that

expungement is a purely procedural matter given that it lawfully

allows an individual to represent that they have no juvenile record.

See McCreadie, 938 P.2d at 530 n.4; § 19-1-306(1)(a). And while it

does not violate the Ex Post Facto Clause to apply CSORA’s

registration scheme retroactively — including when considering

expunged adjudications as explained above — whether an expunged

conviction can be considered depends on the expungement statute

in effect when the records were expunged.

¶ 36 We still reject Chronis’ main contention, however, that

expunged records cannot be considered at all because they have

been effectively erased. An expunged conviction — despite being

“essentially erased and treated as if it never existed” — is still a

18
conviction that may be considered in a deregistration proceeding or

other matter if the expungement statute permits its consideration.

Connors, 230 P.3d at 1269; see also § 19-1-306(3)(b); § 19-2-902(4),

C.R.S. 1995.

¶ 37 McCulley is instructive on this point. The supreme court

determined that a completed deferred judgment did not count when

deciding if a defendant “has” one or more convictions because, once

a deferred judgment is completed, they no longer have a conviction.

McCulley, ¶ 30. This is similar to how vacated or illegal convictions

are treated, which become null and void. See, e.g., United States v.

Jackson, 132 F.4th 266, 276 (3d Cir. 2025) (“When a sentence is

vacated, the defendant is rendered unsentenced.”); United States v.

Merrell, 37 F.4th 571, 576 (9th Cir. 2022) (“We start from the

settled principle that the vacatur of appellants’ original sentences

legally ‘wiped the slate clean.’” (quoting Pepper v. United States, 562

U.S. 476, 507 (2011))); see also People v. Rollins, 771 P.2d 32, 34

(Colo. App. 1989) (“When an original sentence is illegal, [it is]

therefore void . . . .”).

¶ 38 Expungement allows an individual to assert that they have no

criminal record associated with the criminal conviction or

19
adjudication, but both the 1995 and the current juvenile

expungement statutes permit courts to review and consider

expunged records in certain circumstances. See § 19-2-902(1), (4),

C.R.S. 1995; § 19-1-306(1)(a), (3)(b). In effect, individuals with an

expunged adjudication under the current statutory regime have

every right to treat it as if it does not exist — but they still have an

adjudication that, in the proper circumstances, may be reviewed.3

See McCulley, ¶ 29.

¶ 39 In Chronis’ case, section 19-2-902(4), C.R.S. 1995, provided

that his expunged adjudication could “only be inspected by order of

the court, after a hearing and good cause shown,” provided the

interested parties received at least five days’ notice before the

hearing. The plain language of this provision indicates that a court

could have inspected Chronis’ expunged record if it held a properly

noticed hearing and found good cause to do so. See Patton, ¶ 9; see

3 This conclusion is also supported by the legislature’s clear

understanding of how expungement should be treated under the
current regime, as evidenced by the exception in section 19-1-
306(3)(b), C.R.S. 2024, allowing courts to review expunged
adjudications for purposes of “future proceeding[s] in which the
person whose record was expunged is charged with an offense as
either a juvenile or as an adult.”

20
also McCoy, ¶ 37. But, based on the record before us, we cannot

say with certainty that this occurred.

¶ 40 The probation supervisor sent the amended report notifying

the court of Chronis’ juvenile adjudication on August 3, 2022, and

the court held a hearing on November 1, 2022. During the hearing,

at the request of the prosecution, the court explicitly ordered that

the prosecution was permitted to access the expunged record “for

the limited purposes of dealing with the defendant’s motion to

deregister.” So, on one hand, it seems that the parties had some

notice of the hearing more than five days in advance and the court

implicitly found that good cause existed to inspect the expunged

record.

¶ 41 But, on the other hand, while the court seemed to know at the

outset that it was dealing with an expunged record, it is unclear

whether all parties were aware that accessing the expunged record

could be a focus of the hearing. And after the prosecution

recommended rejecting Chronis’ petition for deregistration, the

court did not hold another hearing on the matter, nor did it invite

Chronis to respond to the prosecution’s recommendation. And after

Chronis’ second July 2023 petition, the court did not hold another

21
hearing. Instead, it simply denied the petition on the grounds that

Chronis was ineligible, presumably reasoning, as it did at the

November hearing, that because the prior adjudication (though

expunged) involved unlawful sexual behavior, Chronis would not be

eligible for deregistration.

¶ 42 As a result, we conclude that expunged adjudications may be

considered when determining whether to grant or deny a petition

for deregistration under CSORA where the applicable expungement

statute allows it. But in this case, a remand is appropriate for the

district court to determine in a properly noticed hearing whether

good cause exists to inspect Chronis’ expunged record in

accordance with the 1995 statute. After the hearing, if the district

court determines there is good cause to inspect the record, it may

consider the adjudication, regardless of its expungement, when

determining whether to grant or deny Chronis’ petition.

F. The Rule of Lenity

¶ 43 Finally, we reject Chronis’ argument that the rule of lenity

applies here. We have found no ambiguity in the expungement

statutes or CSORA, so the rule of lenity is not implicated. See

People v. Thoro Prods. Co., 70 P.3d 1188, 1198 (Colo. 2003) (“The

22
rule of lenity should not be applied to defeat the evident intent of

the General Assembly.”).

IV. Disposition

¶ 44 We reverse and remand the case for the district court to hold a

hearing to determine whether good cause exists to inspect Chronis’

expunged adjudication. Depending on its findings, it may then rely

on the expunged adjudication to determine whether Chronis is

eligible for deregistration.

JUDGE HARRIS and JUDGE SCHUTZ concur.

23