Peo in Interest of PAL

25CA0332 Peo in Interest of PAL 08-07-2025

COLORADO COURT OF APPEALS

Court of Appeals No. 25CA0332
Arapahoe County District Court No. 23JV426
Honorable Bonnie H. McLean, Judge

The People of the State of Colorado,

Appellee,

In the Interest of P.A.L., a Child,

and Concerning A.L.,

Appellant.

JUDGMENT AFFIRMED

Division V
Opinion by JUDGE GROVE
Welling and Johnson, JJ., concur

NOT PUBLISHED PURSUANT TO C.A.R. 35(e)
Announced August 7, 2025

Ron Carl, County Attorney, Kiley Schaumleffel, Assistant County Attorney,
Aurora, Colorado, for Appellee

Sheena Knight, Guardian Ad Litem

Elizabeth A. McClintock, Office of Respondent Parents’ Counsel, Colorado
Springs, Colorado, for Appellant
¶1 In this dependency and neglect proceeding, A.L. (mother)

appeals the juvenile court’s judgment terminating her parent-child

legal relationship with P.A.L. (the child). We affirm.

I. Background

¶2 The Arapahoe County Department of Human Services (the

Department) received a referral raising concerns that the child was

born drug-exposed. Because mother’s toxicology test was negative,

the Department agreed that the child would be discharged from the

hospital to mother’s care with a support plan in place. But when

mother later tested positive for methamphetamine and fentanyl, the

Department enacted a safety plan and the child was placed with

maternal grandmother. After maternal grandmother became

unwilling to supervise mother’s visits or be considered a long-term

placement option, the Department sought and was granted

temporary custody. The Department then filed a petition in

dependency or neglect. One month later, the child was placed in

kinship foster care, where he remained for the duration of the case.

¶3 The juvenile court adjudicated the child dependent and

neglected and adopted a treatment plan for mother. Mother’s

treatment plan required that she (1) maintain contact with the

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Department; (2) participate in family time; (3) obtain and maintain

stable housing; (4) complete a substance abuse evaluation,

participate in treatment, and cooperate with drug testing;

(5) maintain employment or other source of legal income;

(6) complete a mental health evaluation and comply with all

treatment recommendations; and (7) complete a parenting

education program to develop protective parenting skills.

¶4 The Department later moved to terminate mother’s parental

rights. Thirteen months after the petition was filed, the juvenile

court held a contested hearing and granted the termination motion.

II. Reasonable Efforts

¶5 Mother contends that the juvenile court erred by finding that

the Department made reasonable efforts. We disagree.

A. Applicable Law and Standard of Review

¶6 Before the juvenile court may terminate parental rights under

section 19-3-604(1)(c), C.R.S. 2024, a department must make

reasonable efforts to rehabilitate the parent and reunify the family.

See §§ 19-3-100.5(1), 19-3-604(2)(h), C.R.S. 2024; People in Interest

of S.N-V., 300 P.3d 911, 915 (Colo. App. 2011). “Reasonable efforts”

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means the “exercise of diligence and care” for children who are in

out-of-home placement. § 19-1-103(114), C.R.S. 2024.

¶7 Appropriate services provided in accordance with section 19-3-

208, C.R.S. 2024, satisfy the reasonable efforts standard. § 19-1-

103(114). Among the services required under section 19-3-208 are

screenings, assessments, and individual case plans for the

provision of services; home-based family and crisis counseling;

information and referral services to available public and private

assistance resources; family time services; and placement services.

§ 19-3-208(2)(b). Other services — including transportation

assistance, diagnostic and mental health services, and drug and

alcohol treatment services — must be provided if the department

has sufficient funding. § 19-3-208(2)(d).

¶8 In assessing a department’s efforts, the juvenile court should

consider whether the services provided were appropriate to support

the parent’s treatment plan, S.N-V., 300 P.3d at 915, by

“considering the totality of the circumstances and accounting for all

services and resources provided to a parent to ensure the

completion of the entire treatment plan,” People in Interest of

My.K.M. v. V.K.L., 2022 CO 35, ¶ 33. But the parent is ultimately

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responsible for using those services to comply with the treatment

plan. People in Interest of J.C.R., 259 P.3d 1279, 1285 (Colo. App.

2011).

¶9 Whether a department satisfied its obligation to make

reasonable efforts to rehabilitate a parent and reunify the family is

a mixed question of law and fact. People in Interest of A.S.L., 2022

COA 146, ¶ 8. We review the juvenile court’s factual findings for

clear error but review de novo its legal determination whether a

department satisfied its reasonable efforts obligation. Id.

B. Analysis

¶ 10 The juvenile court concluded that the Department made

reasonable efforts to provide rehabilitative services to mother, but

that the efforts were not successful. The record supports this

conclusion.

¶ 11 The caseworker testified that she (1) provided bus passes;

(2) personally drove mother to the home visit; (3) rescheduled drug

tests for mother’s convenience; (4) provided mother with an

individualized family time coach; and (5) ensured the availability of

approximately four different treatment providers during the case.

In an effort to engage mother, the caseworker also traveled to

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mother for their meetings, rescheduled meetings that mother

cancelled or missed, and held monthly team meetings to discuss

barriers and available resources. But in spite of these efforts, the

caseworker observed that mother lacked follow-through. And

concerns about mother’s candor regarding her treatment and test

results impeded everyone’s ability to productively discuss the

Department’s concerns. The caseworker opined that there was

nothing else the Department could have provided to mother to

assist her in becoming successful with her treatment plan.

¶ 12 Nevertheless, mother asserts that the Department failed to

make reasonable efforts by not assisting her with reliable

transportation. She argues that the bus passes were insufficient

because buses can be unreliable, especially in inclement weather.

Mother testified that sometimes she “waited early at a bus stop for a

bus not to show . . . and [it took] a little while to get to [her] stop.”

But mother did not present any evidence at the termination hearing

that her lack of treatment plan compliance — such as missing

numerous treatment sessions, the majority of her scheduled drug

tests, and approximately half of her scheduled family time — was

caused by late or cancelled buses. Mother asserts that the

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Department should have provided her with scheduled rides or

vouchers for ride share services. But she cites no law, and we are

aware of none, that would require the Department to do so as part

of its obligation to provide reasonable efforts under section 19-3-

208.

¶ 13 Mother next argues that the Department failed to make

reasonable efforts by not providing her with a cell phone plan.

Mother asserts that, because her phone relied on wireless internet

to take calls and send or receive text messages and emails, it

impeded her ability to comply with the terms of her treatment plan.

This argument is unsupported by the record. The caseworker

testified that mother (1) usually responded to her messages within

twenty-four to forty-eight hours; (2) communicated with her by

phone if she had a question or concern; and (3) regularly attended

the family team meetings. Contrary to mother’s claims that phone

issues impeded her ability to call in for her drug tests, the

caseworker testified that mother “struggled with remembering to

call in.” Even so, if mother missed a call-in day, the caseworker

offered to schedule an additional testing day. But mother also

missed the rescheduled tests. See J.C.R., 259 P.3d at 1285.

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¶ 14 Based on the foregoing, we discern no error in the juvenile

court’s determination that the Department made reasonable efforts

to rehabilitate mother and reunite her with the child.

III. Less Drastic Alternatives

¶ 15 Mother next contends that the juvenile court erred by finding

that there were no less drastic alternatives to termination. We are

not persuaded.

A. Applicable Law and Standard of Review

¶ 16 Before terminating parental rights under section 19-3-

604(1)(c), the juvenile court must consider and eliminate less

drastic alternatives. People in Interest of M.M., 726 P.2d 1108, 1122

(Colo. 1986). In considering less drastic alternatives, a court must

give primary consideration to the child’s physical, mental, and

emotional conditions and needs. § 19-3-604(3); People in Interest of

D.B-J., 89 P.3d 530, 531 (Colo. App. 2004). A court may also

consider, among other things, (1) whether an ongoing relationship

with a parent would be beneficial to the child, which is influenced

by a parent’s ability to care for the child’s needs, People in Interest

of A.R., 2012 COA 195M, ¶ 38; (2) whether the child is bonded with

the parent, see People in Interest of N.D.V., 224 P.3d 410, 421 (Colo.

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App. 2009); and (3) whether an allocation of parental

responsibilities (APR) provides adequate permanence and stability

for the child, People in Interest of T.E.M., 124 P.3d 905, 910 (Colo.

App. 2005).

¶ 17 For a less drastic alternative to be viable, it must do more than

“adequately” meet a child’s needs; rather, it must be in the child’s

best interests. People in Interest of A.M. v. T.M., 2021 CO 14, ¶ 27.

Therefore, if the juvenile court considers a less drastic alternative

but finds instead that termination is in the child’s best interests, it

must reject the less drastic alternative and order termination. Id. at

¶ 32.

¶ 18 “We review a juvenile court’s less drastic alternatives findings

for clear error.” People in Interest of E.W., 2022 COA 12, ¶ 34.

Thus, when a juvenile court considers less drastic alternatives but

instead finds that termination is in the child’s best interests, we are

bound to affirm the decision so long as the record supports its

findings. People in Interest of B.H., 2021 CO 39, ¶ 80.

B. Analysis

¶ 19 The juvenile court found that there was no less drastic

alternative to termination that would meet the child’s physical,

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emotional, and mental health needs. The court focused on (1) the

length of the case and the child’s out-of-home placement; (2) the

inconsistent nature of mother’s family time; (3) the placement of the

child with his sibling; and (4) the potential trauma to the child if he

was moved from his current placement “in order to maintain a

possible APR.”

¶ 20 The record supports these findings. The caseworker testified

that mother missed about half of her family time during the case

and never moved beyond supervised visits. During the visits

mother often struggled to understand the child’s developmental

needs and the necessity to parent for the full two hours. See A.R.,

¶ 38. The caseworker opined that, given mother’s substance abuse

and inability to productively communicate, an APR was not

appropriate or in the child’s best interests. She ultimately believed

the child needed the permanency and stability that only adoption

could provide. See J.C.R., 259 P.3d at 1285 (“Permanent placement

is not a viable less drastic alternative to termination if the children

need a stable, permanent home that can only be assured by

adoption.”).

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¶ 21 Mother asserts that the Department failed to consider the

possible placements listed on her relative resource affidavit. The

Department is obligated to investigate a “reasonable number” of

placement options. D.B-J., 89 P.3d at 532. Here, the caseworker

attempted to seek out other relative placements as part of her

diligent search. These relatives included maternal grandmother

and mother’s half-sister, neither of whom were willing to be a

placement for the child. Mother’s relative affidavit listed one

additional person for placement consideration and, while we agree it

would have been best practice for the Department to review

mother’s relative affidavit when considering and contacting

potential placement options, mother’s argument ignores the juvenile

court’s finding that changing the child’s placement to any other

individual, simply for the possibility of an APR, was not in his best

interests. In other words, even if the named individual on mother’s

relative affidavit was a viable placement option, the court found,

with record support, that an APR was still not the best option for

the child. See A.M., ¶ 32.

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¶ 22 Because the record supports the juvenile court’s finding that

there was no less drastic alternative to termination, we cannot

disturb it. See B.H., ¶ 80.

IV. Disposition

¶ 23 The judgment is affirmed.

JUDGE WELLING and JUDGE JOHNSON concur.

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