Peo v. Clark

23CA1244 Peo v Clark 08-07-2025

COLORADO COURT OF APPEALS

Court of Appeals No. 23CA1244
Boulder County District Court No. 22CR377
Honorable Patrick D. Butler, Judge

The People of the State of Colorado,

Plaintiff-Appellee,

v.

Randolph Scott Clark,

Defendant-Appellant.

JUDGMENT AFFIRMED

Division VI
Opinion by JUDGE GRAHAM*
Tow and Yun, JJ., concur

NOT PUBLISHED PURSUANT TO C.A.R. 35(e)
Announced August 7, 2025

Philip J. Weiser, Attorney General, Cata A. Cuneo, Assistant Attorney General,
Denver, Colorado, for Plaintiff-Appellee

Megan A. Ring, Colorado State Public Defender, Kevin M. Whitfield, Deputy
State Public Defender, Denver, Colorado, for Defendant-Appellant

*Sitting by assignment of the Chief Justice under provisions of Colo. Const. art.
VI, § 5(3), and § 24-51-1105, C.R.S. 2024.
¶1 Defendant, Randolph Scott Clark, appeals his sexually violent

predator (SVP) designation ordered by the trial court. We affirm.

I. Background

¶2 In 2021, Clark was arrested for criminal conduct related to

four victims, including sex offenses against one juvenile victim —

P.B. Clark ultimately pleaded guilty to two counts of first degree

assault; human trafficking – sexual servitude; and attempted sexual

assault on a child. Before sentencing, an evaluator conducted an

SVP assessment and psychosexual evaluation of Clark. The

evaluator concluded that Clark met the statutory SVP

requirements, including the “relationship requirement” by finding

that Clark and P.B. were “strangers” and that Clark “established a

relationship” with P.B. “primarily for the purpose of sexual

victimization.”

¶3 Clark objected to the evaluator’s finding about the relationship

criteria, arguing that he did not meet either the “stranger” or

“established relationship” requirement. He requested a hearing on

the issue if the court disagreed. The court addressed Clark’s

objection at sentencing and allowed the prosecution to file a written

response. As part of her request, the prosecutor stated that her

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response would provide “the factual information, so that the Court

has the ability to review [the information] and make factual findings

and review the legal argument” before determining whether the

requested hearing was necessary.

¶4 The prosecutor’s written response incorporated facts from

three of P.B.’s interviews with investigators, the SVP assessment,

and the psychosexual evaluation and argued that the court should

find that Clark met the SVP criteria. The court agreed, noting that

its “analysis [wa]s consistent with the [prosecutor’s] response,” and

designated Clark an SVP.

¶5 On appeal, Clark contends that the trial court erred by

(1) failing to make specific findings before designating Clark an SVP;

and (2) finding that Clark met the SVP criteria because there was

insufficient evidence to establish that he was a stranger to P.B. or

that he had established a relationship with P.B. for the primary

purpose of sexual victimization. We address and reject each

contention in turn.

II. Standard of Review and Applicable Law

¶6 We review a trial court’s SVP designation as a mixed question,

deferring to the trial court’s factual findings when they’re supported

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by the record and reviewing de novo the legal conclusions

concerning the SVP designation. Allen v. People, 2013 CO 44, ¶ 4.

¶7 In Colorado, an SVP means an offender who is likely to commit

one or more enumerated sexual offenses in the future. § 18-3-

414.5(1)(a)(IV), C.R.S. 2024. An SVP risk assessment must be

conducted when an offender is convicted of any of these

enumerated offenses, including attempted sexual assault on a

child. § 18-3-414.5(1)(a)(II)(d), (2). Four statutory requirements

must be met for a SVP designation. The offender must (1) be over

eighteen years of age when the offense is committed; (2) be

convicted of one of the enumerated sexual offenses (including

attempted sexual assault on a child); (3) have perpetrated the

offense upon a victim who was a stranger to the offender or one

with whom the offender established or promoted a relationship

primarily for sexual victimization; and (4) be likely to commit a

similar sexual offense based upon an SVP assessment. § 18-3-

414.5(1)(a). Then, “[b]ased on the results of the assessment, the

court shall make specific findings of fact and enter an order

concerning whether the defendant is [an SVP].” § 18-3-414.5(2).

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¶8 When making this decision, a trial court should start with the

findings and conclusions of the assessment. See Allen, ¶ 14 (“[T]he

scored [risk assessment] will accordingly serve as the foundation for

a trial court’s SVP designation.”). A trial court may adopt the

findings of the risk assessment without going through the

evaluation line by line, People v. Torrez, 2013 COA 37, ¶ 83, unless

the assessment is “unexplained, unsourced, and disputed,” People

v. Tuffo, 209 P.3d 1226, 1232 (Colo. App. 2009). And even if a

defendant disputes certain facts in the assessment, the prosecution

is not required to prove those facts “with the quality of evidence

required at a trial on the criminal charges themselves.” People v.

Lopez, 2020 COA 41, ¶ 7. In other words, general findings might

suffice, or the lack of specific findings might be harmless, if the

general findings are clearly supported by ample evidence in the

record. Id.

III. Discussion

A. Preservation

¶9 At the outset, we reject the People’s argument that Clark’s

objection to the SVP designation did not include an objection to the

trial court’s lack of specific findings.

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¶ 10 In his written objection, Clark specifically objected to the

entirety of the SVP designation based on the evaluator’s finding that

Clark met the “stranger” and “established relationship” criteria and

moved the court to find against an SVP designation or, alternatively,

to “hold a hearing” on the issue. On appeal, it’s clear that Clark

requested a hearing based on his belief that the trial court would

make specific factual findings regarding the relationship

requirement.

¶ 11 Accordingly, Clark’s objection to the entire question of his SVP

designation preserved the related issue of the sufficiency of the

court’s findings, and we address that issue on appeal. See People v.

Coughlin, 304 P.3d 575, 582 (Colo. App. 2011) (“Even if an objection

to evidence does not specifically identify the rule underlying the

objection, it is nonetheless sufficient to preserve an issue for appeal

if the objecting [party] presents arguments or utilizes language that

alerts the trial court to the impending error.”).

B. Sufficient Findings

¶ 12 Clark first contends that the court’s general findings were

insufficient as a matter of law to designate Clark an SVP. We

disagree.

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1. Additional Background

¶ 13 In her written response, the prosecutor incorporated evidence

based on three forensic interviews investigators conducted with

P.B., the SVP assessment, and Clark’s psychosexual evaluation.

Based on this evidence, the court could reasonably infer the

following:

• Clark added P.B. on Snapchat.

• P.B. believed Clark was a sugar daddy or pimp.

• Clark met with P.B. several times, and, nearly every time

they met, Clark engaged in sexual contact with P.B. —

sometimes in exchange for money.

• Clark exchanged money with P.B. for nude pictures of

herself.

• Clark met P.B. at a hotel, gave her marijuana, sexually

assaulted her, and recorded the assault without P.B.’s

knowledge.

¶ 14 Further, the evidence before the court indicated:

• P.B. was twelve or thirteen when Clark had sexual

contact with her.

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• Clark was over eighteen, around his mid-thirties, when

he had sexual contact with P.B.

• Based on the SVP assessment, the evaluator considered

Clark likely to commit a similar sex offense in the future.

• Clark had committed similar sex offenses in the past.

2. Analysis

¶ 15 Because this evidence has record support, Clark’s SVP

assessment is not unexplained or unsourced, and the court’s

general agreement with the prosecutor’s written response

sufficiently supports Clark’s SVP designation.

¶ 16 The trial court was privy to the arrayed evidence, and, as

stated in its order finding Clark an SVP, the court did its own

analysis based on the evidence presented in the prosecution’s

response. In other words, the court adopted the findings and

conclusions in the SVP assessment — findings that were supported

by ample evidence in the record. See People v. Cook, 197 P.3d 269,

281 (Colo. App. 2008) (an SVP assessment can be relied on by the

court when determining whether a defendant meets the SVP

requirements under statute).

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¶ 17 Although Clark disputes that he established a relationship

with P.B. primarily for the purpose of sexual victimization under

section 18-3-414.5(1)(a), as we address more fully below, the record,

the SVP assessment, and Clark’s psychosexual evaluation amply

support a general finding that Clark met this criterion. The

evaluator used police reports, official records and documentation,

and P.B.’s interviews as the source for his assessment findings.

And based on his findings, he concluded that the established

relationship criterion had been met.

¶ 18 Because the sources the evaluator used were consistent with

an SVP designation, and because there was ample record support

for this designation, the court’s general finding is sufficient. See

Lopez, ¶ 13 (As long as the sources an evaluator uses “are

consistent with the evaluator’s findings, they may be sufficient to

support a trial court’s conclusion that the defendant has satisfied

the criteria set forth in the SVP statute.”); see also Torrez, ¶ 84 (a

court’s general findings may suffice if there is ample evidence in the

record supporting an SVP finding).

¶ 19 Buttressing these general findings, the same evaluator

conducted a psychosexual evaluation of Clark, which was in the

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record. In this evaluation, the evaluator found that Clark is more

likely than others to “be manipulative, lack impulse control, [and]

have difficulty tolerating frustration”; suggested that Clark’s

relationships with others may be “superficial”; and warned that

Clark’s self-reports regarding his conduct related to P.B. should be

viewed with caution because he displayed moderate denial about

whether he committed a sex offense against P.B. and generally is

“prone to being manipulative.” Further, the evaluator concluded in

both the SVP assessment and the psychosexual evaluation that

Clark’s “long-term risk for sex offense recidivism [is] high.”

¶ 20 Consequently, we perceive no error in the court’s general

finding and analysis designating Clark an SVP. We now turn to

Clark’s second contention.

C. Established Relationship

¶ 21 Clark contends that there was insufficient evidence to support

the finding that he established a relationship with P.B. primarily to

sexually victimize her. Assuming without concluding that Clark

was not a stranger to P.B. at the time of the attempted sexual

assault, we perceive no error with the court’s SVP designation

because ample evidence in the record supports the finding that

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Clark established a relationship with P.B. primarily to sexually

victimize her.

¶ 22 Regarding the third requirement of section 18-3-414.5(1)(a), in

relevant part, an offender establishes a relationship with a victim

primarily for sexual victimization when the offender “create[s],

start[s], or beg[ins] a relationship primarily for that purpose.”

People v. Gallegos, 2013 CO 45, ¶ 1.

1. Clark’s Arguments

¶ 23 Clark argues that because (1) P.B.’s friend introduced Clark to

P.B.; (2) Clark initially gave money to P.B. without asking for

anything in return; and (3) Clark believed P.B. was eighteen when

he started a relationship with P.B., the evidence suggests that his

relationship with P.B. was independent from the primary purpose of

sexual victimization.1 Importantly, Clark never explains the reason

why he established a relationship with P.B. Instead, he simply

argues that the purpose was “independent” of sexual victimization.

1 Although Clark frames his contention as one of sufficiency, his

specific argument is that certain evidence conflicts with a finding
that the established relationship requirement had been met, rather
than an argument that there is an absence of evidence. That said,
we nevertheless address his claims.

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¶ 24 In Gallegos, the supreme court held that the defendant did not

“establish a relationship” under the SVP statute because he had

been living with the victim, his live-in girlfriend’s daughter, for three

years before the incident and interacted with her as any stepparent

would during that time. Gallegos, ¶¶ 3-4, 13. The court concluded

that “[n]othing in the record suggest[ed] that [the defendant]

created, started, or began his relationship with the victim for the

purpose of sexual victimization”; rather, he had “maintained a

stepparent-like relationship with the victim for purposes unrelated

to sexual victimization.” Id. at ¶ 13.

¶ 25 Unlike the defendant in Gallegos, Clark talked with P.B.

infrequently and remotely for only a few months before he began

sexually victimizing her, with the first instance occurring merely

after their second in-person encounter. And, whereas the

defendant in Gallegos had an independent basis for his relationship

with the victim — dating the victim’s mother and acting like a

stepparent to the victim — there is no evidence here to suggest that

Clark had any other reason for establishing a relationship with

P.B., who was twelve or thirteen at the time, other than to sexually

victimize her. Indeed, the evidence in the record suggests that the

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central purpose of their relationship was the sexual victimization of

P.B.

¶ 26 Clark’s behavior resembles that of the defendant in People v.

Ehlebracht, 2020 COA 132. In Ehlebracht, the defendant began an

online conversation with the victim, then picked her up and

brought her back to his apartment, where he gave her alcohol and

sexually assaulted her. Id. at ¶ 34. A division of this court

considered the defendant’s conduct ample evidence that he

established a relationship with the victim for the primary purpose of

sexual victimization. Id. Clark may have waited until after his first

few encounters with P.B. before he sexually victimized her, but even

so, Clark’s withholding sexual contact for merely a few months or a

few meetings before engaging in the same pattern of conduct as the

defendant in Ehlebracht does not persuade us that he established a

relationship with P.B. for a reason other than to sexually victimize

her.

¶ 27 We are likewise unpersuaded by Clark’s argument that he was

introduced to P.B. Clark argues that evidence showing he and P.B.

were introduced through P.B.’s friend weighs against a finding that

the established relationship criterion was met. It is true that P.B.’s

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friend introduced Clark to P.B., but it was Clark who first reached

out to P.B. directly via Snapchat. Even if Clark and P.B. were

introduced by P.B.’s friend, the evidence shows that Clark promptly

acted to seal his relationship with P.B. and soon after began to

sexually victimize her.

¶ 28 Next, Clark argues that evidence showing he first freely offered

P.B. gifts and money weighs against the court’s finding. However,

the record shows that, after a brief period of “freely” offering money

and gifts to P.B., Clark started to condition his gifts on sexual acts.

¶ 29 Further, the speed at which Clark demanded increasingly

more sexual acts from P.B. suggests that his gifts were not freely

given. For their first meeting, P.B. told investigators that Clark

ordered a Lyft to take P.B. to a hotel, where they talked and he

bought her food. In the second meeting, P.B. stated that they just

talked, but he gave her $100. After that, however, Clark began

asking P.B. for oral sex and nude pictures in exchange for money,

and nearly all their subsequent encounters involved some form of

sexual victimization against P.B. This is unlike the situation in

Gallegos, where the defendant lived in the same house and

maintained a stepparent-like relationship with the victim for three

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years before he sexually assaulted her. Rather, here, the evidence

suggests Clark sought to sexually victimize P.B. from the outset.

¶ 30 Last, Clark argues that his belief that P.B. was eighteen

weighs against a finding that the established relationship criterion

was met. In our view, Clark’s insistence that he believed P.B. was

eighteen at the time tends to show that he intended his relationship

with P.B. to be sexual. And broadly, being mistaken about a

victim’s age is not a defense to attempted sexual assault on a child.

See § 18-1-503.5, C.R.S. 2024. We see no reason why the mere

belief that P.B. was eighteen at the time, especially in light of

section 18-1-503.5, would be an indicium against the established

relationship criterion for Clark, rather than one in favor of the

criterion being met.

2. Evidence Showing Clark Established a Relationship with P.B.
Primarily for the Purpose of Sexual Victimization

¶ 31 Based on our review of the record, there is ample evidence

indicating that Clark established a relationship with P.B. for the

primary purpose of sexual victimization.

¶ 32 First, it’s important to note that Clark pleaded guilty to

attempted sexual assault on P.B. and had been convicted of

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numerous related offenses in the past — including pimping;

unlawful sexual contact – without consent; and failure to register as

a sex offender. As such, the record indicates that Clark was

already aware of the kind of conduct that constitutes sexual

victimization before he began to sexually victimize P.B. who, as

mentioned, was twelve or thirteen at the time Clark victimized her.

See Ehlebracht, ¶¶ 34-35 (concluding that the twenty-nine-year-old

defendant’s prior convictions involving sex with minors supported

the district court’s determination that the defendant established a

relationship with the fourteen-year-old victim primarily for sexual

victimization). And Clark’s guilty plea was based in part upon a

factual basis showing that Clark provided P.B. marijuana, P.B.

became so high that she could not see or stand, Clark sexually

assaulted her, and he recorded the incident without P.B.’s

knowledge.

¶ 33 Next, P.B.’s interviews with investigators show that Clark

exhibited possessive, controlling, and manipulative behavior against

P.B. throughout the entirety of his contact with her. P.B. told

investigators that Clark would get angry with her if he found out

that she had male friends her own age and once told P.B. that she

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was “only his.” P.B. also described an incident to investigators

where Clark became “visibly angry” and started “cussing” and

“flipping out” when she could not meet him and told investigators

that Clark exhibited similar behavior “many times before.”

Relatedly, Clark would often display certain fatherly attributes

around P.B. or inquire about P.B.’s father. On this point, one of the

forensic interviewers made a note suggesting that, based on her

experience with sexual exploitation cases, Clark exploited P.B.’s

relationship with her father and Clark’s own role as an older male

as part of a grooming technique against P.B.

¶ 34 Despite Clark’s argument to the contrary, Clark’s behavior in

this case, in conjunction with his history of predation, weighs in

favor of the court’s finding that he established a relationship with

P.B. primarily for the purpose of sexual victimization. Accordingly,

we perceive no error with the court’s decision to designate Clark an

SVP.

IV. Disposition

¶ 35 We affirm the judgment.

JUDGE TOW and JUDGE YUN concur.

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