Peo v. Dixon

23CA0529 Peo v Dixon 07-31-2025

COLORADO COURT OF APPEALS

Court of Appeals No. 23CA0529
Arapahoe County District Court No. 21CR1798
Honorable Darren L. Vahle, Judge

The People of the State of Colorado,

Plaintiff-Appellee,

v.

Daniel Donte Dixon,

Defendant-Appellant.

JUDGMENT AFFIRMED

Division III
Opinion by JUDGE BROWN
Dunn and Schock, JJ., concur

NOT PUBLISHED PURSUANT TO C.A.R. 35(e)
Announced July 31, 2025

Philip J. Weiser, Attorney General, Frank R. Lawson, Senior Assistant Attorney
General, Denver, Colorado, for Plaintiff-Appellee

Mulligan Breit, LLC, Patrick J. Mulligan, Denver, Colorado, for
Defendant-Appellant
¶1 Defendant, Daniel Donte Dixon, appeals the judgment of

conviction entered on seven counts of sexual abuse of a child by

one in a position of trust as a pattern of abuse. Dixon contends

that the district court made multiple evidentiary errors and that the

cumulative effect of the alleged errors requires reversal. We affirm.

I. Background

¶2 Dixon was engaged to B.C.’s mother, and B.C. referred to him

as her stepfather. When B.C. was fifteen years old, Dixon began

making sexual advances toward her and then took her virginity.

B.C. testified that Dixon penetrated her vaginally with his penis on

more than one occasion in the room he shared with her mother or

on the family’s couch. B.C. also testified that Dixon penetrated her

anally and made her perform oral sex on him and that he performed

oral sex on her.

¶3 When B.C. was sixteen years old, Dixon impregnated her

twice. B.C.’s first pregnancy ended in a miscarriage and her second

pregnancy was terminated through an abortion.

¶4 B.C. said she did not disclose the abuse until she was

seventeen because she was scared. But she collected proof of the

assaults, including numerous text messages and a cell phone video

1
recording of a conversation she had with Dixon about her

pregnancies and abortion, during which Dixon admitted it was

“wrong” that he took her virginity and got her pregnant.

¶5 The prosecution charged Dixon with seven counts of sexual

assault on a child by one in a position of trust as a pattern of

abuse.1 After a five-day trial, a jury convicted Dixon as charged.

The district court sentenced him to a total of seventy-two years to

life in the custody of the Department of Corrections.

II. Evidentiary Challenges

¶6 Dixon contends that the district court erred by admitting

(1) an excerpt from an extraction report for B.C.’s cell phone and

testimony about the report; (2) testimony from two generalized

experts; (3) testimony from a health center assistant at the abortion

clinic; and (4) a detective’s testimony about a video exhibit. We

address and reject each contention.

1 The prosecution also charged Dixon with one count of aggravated

incest but moved pretrial to dismiss the charge, and the court
granted the motion.

2
A. Standard of Review

¶7 We review a trial court’s evidentiary rulings for an abuse of

discretion. Zapata v. People, 2018 CO 82, ¶ 25. A court abuses its

discretion when its ruling is manifestly arbitrary, unreasonable, or

unfair, or if it misconstrues or misapplies the law. People v. Liggett,

2021 COA 51, ¶ 16.

¶8 We review preserved evidentiary claims for harmless error.

Hagos v. People, 2012 CO 63, ¶ 12. Reversal under this standard is

only required “if the error ‘substantially influenced the verdict or

affected the fairness of the trial proceedings.’” Id. (quoting Tevlin v.

People, 715 P.2d 338, 342 (Colo. 1986)).

¶9 We review unpreserved evidentiary claims for plain error. Id.

at ¶ 14. Plain error is error that is obvious and substantial, such

that it undermines the fundamental fairness of the trial so as to

cast serious doubt on the reliability of the judgment of conviction.

Id. For an error to be “plain,” it “must be so clear-cut, so obvious,

that a trial judge should be able to avoid it without benefit of

objection.” People v. Pollard, 2013 COA 31M, ¶ 39. Generally, for

an error to be obvious, it must contravene a statute or rule, a

3
well-settled legal principle, or established Colorado case law.

Campbell v. People, 2020 CO 49, ¶ 25.

B. Cell Phone Extraction Report

¶ 10 Dixon contends that the district court erred by admitting an

excerpt from the extraction report for B.C.’s cell phone because

(1) the report was not properly authenticated and was unreliable;

(2) the prosecution failed to lay sufficient foundation to connect

Dixon to the text messages reflected in the report excerpt; and

(3) the contents of the report excerpt and testimony about the

report excerpt constituted inadmissible hearsay. We disagree.

1. Additional Background

¶ 11 At trial, B.C. testified that she communicated with Dixon

through a messaging application called TextNow on her cell phone.

B.C. said that she texted Dixon under his real name and under the

name “Jennifer,” a name she assigned to him in the TextNow app.

¶ 12 Investigator Jared Lobato was qualified without objection as

an expert in digital forensics and downloads and testified about the

standard procedure for extracting the contents of a cell phone.

Investigator Lobato stated that the police department uses

Cellebrite software to extract and format the phone’s data into a

4
readable form. He said he downloaded the contents of B.C.’s phone

through the standard process and did not encounter any issues.

Investigator Lobato did not personally review the contents of the

extraction report, but he gave the report to the lead detective,

Detective Saied Radpour, who reviewed the report.

¶ 13 The prosecution marked two exhibits culled from the

extraction report: Exhibit 9A, a 600-page collection of text messages

between B.C. and Dixon and between B.C. and “Jennifer,” and

Exhibit 9, a 60-page excerpt from the 600-page exhibit. The

prosecutor had B.C. review parts of Exhibit 9A. Although B.C. did

not recognize some of the texts because they “[didn’t] really sound

like [her],” she recognized the texts between her and “Jennifer” as

texts from her phone and again identified “Jennifer” as Dixon.

¶ 14 Detective Radpour testified that the TextNow app was on

B.C.’s phone and that he viewed the text messages between B.C.

and Dixon and those between B.C. and “Jennifer” on B.C.’s phone.

He said that the text messages in Exhibit 9A were “a fair and

accurate representation of the text messages [he] downloaded from

[B.C.]’s phone.”

5
¶ 15 The prosecutor initially moved to admit Exhibit 9A, but

defense counsel objected on the basis that the text messages were

not connected to Dixon. The court overruled that foundation

objection, citing the evidence it had heard that “Jennifer” was

Dixon, but the court had its own concerns with the volume of text

messages in Exhibit 9A, noting that they were not all relevant. The

prosecutor explained that she had emailed defense counsel Exhibit

9, the 60-page excerpt of Exhibit 9A, and that “counsel wanted

more context to the text messages.” Defense counsel responded

that he did not want the entirety of the 600 pages admitted or even

the majority of the 60 pages but acknowledged that he

“requested . . . the context . . . immediately surrounding . . . what

they . . . propose as incriminating evidence.” The court ultimately

rejected Exhibit 9A because “the entire 600 pages [was] not

relevant,” but it allowed the prosecutor to pursue Exhibit 9.

¶ 16 The prosecutor then questioned Detective Radpour about

Exhibit 9. The detective said that Exhibit 9 contained “a fair and

accurate” representation of the text messages in Exhibit 9A. The

prosecutor moved to admit Exhibit 9, and defense counsel said, “No

objection.” The court admitted the exhibit.

6
¶ 17 But after the prosecutor started reading a text from Exhibit 9

aloud to the detective, defense counsel objected to “hearsay.”

Counsel argued that he had understood Exhibit 9 to contain only

messages between B.C. and Dixon, but the message the prosecutor

read aloud was between B.C. and “Jennifer,” and those messages

should not have been admitted because “there’s no connection

between Jennifer and [Dixon] at this point.”2 The court overruled

what it understood to be another “foundation” objection because

“[B.C.] testified that all texts to Jennifer were to Daniel. And this is

the download of the phone.”

2. Authenticity and Reliability

¶ 18 Dixon contends that the district court erred by admitting

Exhibit 9, the 60-page excerpt of the extraction report, because the

extraction report was not properly authenticated and was

unreliable. We disagree.

2 Defense counsel actually said, “[T]here’s no connection between

Jennifer and [B.C.] at this point,” but given the nature of counsel’s
argument, it seems likely he misspoke. Our analysis remains the
same regardless.

7
a. Applicable Law

¶ 19 Authenticity is a condition precedent to admissibility. CRE

901(a). The condition “is satisfied by evidence sufficient to support

a finding that the matter in question is what its proponent claims.”

Id.; People v. N.T.B., 2019 COA 150, ¶ 16. The burden to

authenticate evidence is low — only a prima facie showing is

required. Gonzales v. People, 2020 CO 71, ¶ 27. “Once the

proponent meets this burden, the actual authenticity of the

evidence and the effect of any defects go to the weight of evidence

and not its admissibility.” N.T.B., ¶ 16.

Because the rule’s plain language instructs
that a proponent need only provide sufficient
evidence to support a finding that the proffered
evidence is what the proponent claims, the
rule vests trial courts with broad discretion to
consider a variety of foundational
circumstances depending on the nature of the
proffered evidence.

Gonzales, ¶ 30; see also Colo. Citizens for Ethics in Gov’t v. Comm.

for Am. Dream, 187 P.3d 1207, 1213 (Colo. App. 2008) (“Whether a

proper foundation has been established is a matter within the

sound discretion of the trial court, whose decision will not be

disturbed absent a clear abuse of discretion.”).

8
¶ 20 “The reliability of machine-generated records can be

established ‘through the testimony of the operator of the machine or

any other relevant evidence.’” People v. Hamilton, 2019 COA 101,

¶ 33 (quoting Thomas v. People, 895 P.2d 1040, 1045 (Colo. 1995)).

And a proponent of electronically generated printouts may

authenticate them “through the testimony of a person with personal

knowledge of how the printouts were generated and that they are

what they are claimed to be.” Id. at ¶ 36.

b. The Prosecution Laid Sufficient Foundation to Show that the
Extraction Report Was Authentic and Reliable

¶ 21 Dixon contends that Exhibit 9 was not properly authenticated

and was not reliable because Investigator Lobato did not testify that

the extraction report accurately reflected the contents of B.C.’s

phone. To be sure, defense counsel did not object to the admission

of Exhibit 9 on this specific basis. But even assuming he did, we

are not persuaded that the district court abused its discretion.

¶ 22 Dixon seems to argue that only the person who performed the

extraction of B.C.’s phone could authenticate the extraction report

or establish its reliability. But Dixon fails to identify, and we are

not aware of, any case law requiring that the authenticity of an

9
exhibit be established through a single witness. So long as the

prosecution made a prima facie showing that Exhibit 9 was what

the prosecution purported it to be — text messages accurately

downloaded from B.C.’s phone — it met the low threshold for

authentication. See CRE 901(a); Gonzales, ¶ 27.

¶ 23 Through the collective testimony of B.C., Investigator Lobato,

and Detective Radpour, the prosecution presented evidence that

(1) text messages between B.C. and Dixon/“Jennifer” were on B.C.’s

phone; (2) the contents of B.C.’s phone were extracted without

incident and formatted into a report by Cellebrite software; (3) the

extraction report accurately reflected the text messages that were

on B.C.’s phone; and (4) Exhibit 9 accurately reflected the text

messages in the extraction report. Although Investigator Lobato did

not testify that the extraction report accurately reflected the text

messages on B.C.’s phone, Detective Radpour did (and so did B.C.,

to a limited extent). This evidence was enough to establish that the

exhibit was authentic and reliable. See Gonzales, ¶ 27; Hamilton,

¶ 33.

¶ 24 We are not persuaded otherwise by Dixon’s reliance on

Hamilton, in which a division of this court concluded that a

10
detective’s testimony about machine-generated reports reflecting

the downloaded contents of two cell phones was inadmissible

hearsay. Hamilton, ¶ 41. In that case, a detective testified only that

police downloaded the contents of the defendant’s and the victim’s

phones and generated reports reflecting the phones’ contents, that

he viewed the reports, and that neither phone contained text

messages from the victim to the defendant as the defendant

claimed. Id. at ¶ 9.

¶ 25 The reports themselves were not offered or admitted into

evidence. Id. Nonetheless, as part of its analysis, the division

considered whether the prosecution had established the reliability

and authenticity of the reports. Id. at ¶¶ 11, 31-40. The division

concluded that the prosecution had failed to show that the reports

were authentic and reliable because it offered no evidence that

(1) the machine used to generate the reports produced accurate

reports of the phones’ contents; (2) the machine was in proper

working condition; (3) the machine operator was qualified; (4) the

operator followed proper procedures; (5) the reports were valid or

reliable; or (6) the detective who testified about the reports was

qualified to interpret them. Id. at ¶¶ 37-38.

11
¶ 26 We are not bound by Hamilton, see People v. Smoots, 2013

COA 152, ¶ 21 (“[W]e are not bound by the decisions of other

divisions of this court.”), aff’d sub nom. Reyna-Abarca v. People,

2017 CO 15, nor are we particularly persuaded by its “inflexible set

of requirements that must be met to authenticate cell phone

extraction reports, which appears inconsistent with Gonzales,”

People v. Abad, 2021 COA 6, ¶ 47 n.4. Even so, Hamilton is

factually distinguishable.

¶ 27 Here, Investigator Lobato, the person who conducted the

extraction of B.C.’s cell phone, was qualified without objection as an

expert in digital forensics and downloads, explained the standard

procedure for using Cellebrite software to extract data from a cell

phone, and testified that the extraction reports created by that

procedure are spot checked by others. Investigator Lobato said that

he followed the standard procedures he described and that there

were no issues with the extraction of B.C.’s cell phone.

¶ 28 For his part, Detective Radpour testified that the extraction

report and the excerpt of that report that was admitted as Exhibit 9

accurately reflected the text messages from B.C.’s cell phone. He

12
was able to give that testimony because he personally viewed the

contents of the phone and the extraction report.

¶ 29 And Detective Radpour’s testimony was not, as Dixon argues,

improper expert testimony in the guise of lay testimony. Detective

Radpour’s opinion that Exhibit 9 accurately reflected the contents

of B.C.’s phone was rationally based on his observations of the

phone and report, was helpful to understand the import of Exhibit

9, and was not based on scientific, technical, or specialized

knowledge. See CRE 701; Venalonzo v. People, 2017 CO 9, ¶ 53 (“If

the witness provides testimony that could be expected to be based

on an ordinary person’s experiences or knowledge, then the witness

is offering lay testimony.”). Any ordinary person could compare text

messages on a phone to a printout of those text messages and

determine whether they match.

¶ 30 Thus, the district court did not abuse its discretion by

concluding that the prosecution laid sufficient foundation to

establish that Exhibit 9 was authentic and reliable. See Gonzales,

¶ 30; N.T.B., ¶ 16.

13
3. Messages from “Jennifer” and Detective Radpour’s Testimony
that “Jennifer” Was Dixon

¶ 31 To the extent Dixon implicitly contends that the prosecution

failed to lay sufficient foundation to connect Dixon to the text

messages from “Jennifer,” we reject that contention. We also reject

Dixon’s related argument that Detective Radpour offered

unqualified expert testimony that he “personally determined” Dixon

was “Jennifer.”

a. Sufficient Evidence Connected Dixon to “Jennifer”

¶ 32 The identity of a purported sender of text messages

may be established through a combination of
at least two of the following: (1) the phone
number was assigned to or associated with the
purported sender; (2) the substance of the text
message(s) was recognizable as being from the
purported sender; (3) the purported sender
“responded to an exchange in such a way as to
indicate circumstantially that [they were] in
fact the author of the communication”; or
(4) any other corroborative evidence under the
circumstances.

People v. Heisler, 2017 COA 58, ¶ 15 (quoting People v. Glover, 2015

COA 16, ¶¶ 30-34).

¶ 33 B.C.’s testimony provided evidence that the phone number for

“Jennifer” was associated with Dixon. See id. B.C. testified that,

14
“[w]hen everything was first happening, [Dixon] would tell [her]” not

to use his “actual name” when texting him, so she assigned the

name “Jennifer” to a number Dixon used to text her through the

TextNow app. Because she named Dixon “Jennifer,” she knew that

the messages from “Jennifer” were actually from Dixon. She also

said that she recognized the messages between her and “Jennifer”

in Exhibit 9A as messages between her and Dixon reflecting their

“sexual relationship.”

¶ 34 In addition, Exhibit 9 reflects several text messages in which

“Jennifer” either conveyed content recognizable as being from Dixon

or responded in such a way as to indicate circumstantially that

Dixon was in fact the author of the communication, see id.,

including the following:

• an exchange in which B.C. addressed “Jennifer” as

“Daniel,” and “Jennifer” responded, “Damn did you have

to put my name”;

• other messages between B.C. and “Jennifer” in which

B.C. addressed “Jennifer” as “Daniel,” and “Jennifer” did

not express confusion at being called “Daniel” or deny

being “Daniel”;

15
• an exchange between B.C. and “Jennifer” in which B.C.

asked “Jennifer,” “Do you feel nasty when we had sex in

you and my mom bed,” and “Jennifer” responded, “I

wasn’t and haven’t done anything wit ya mama in while”;

• a message in which “Jennifer” complained about B.C.’s

mom and the financial issues they were having; and

• an exchange in which B.C. said to “Jennifer,” “I feel nasty

cause you are my step dad [a]nd you use to do all the

same stuff to my mom,” and “Jennifer” responded, “So

you never said if you wanted to stop.”

¶ 35 Exhibit 9 contains many more similar examples of exchanges

between B.C. and “Jennifer.” B.C.’s testimony and the content of

Exhibit 9 provided more than enough evidence to establish that

Dixon was the sender of the text messages from the phone number

B.C. saved as “Jennifer.” See id.

b. Detective Radpour Did Not Offer Expert Testimony that
“Jennifer” Was Dixon

¶ 36 Dixon argues that Detective Radpour impermissibly testified

that he “personally determined” that “Jennifer” was Dixon. But

Dixon fails to point to any part of the record where Detective

16
Radpour said as much. Instead, Detective Radpour testified about

the steps he went through to “find out” that “Jennifer” was Dixon,

including his experience setting up a new profile in the TextNow

app that B.C. and Dixon used to message each other. He said that

a new user on TextNow is first prompted to choose from a list of

phone numbers, and once the user chooses a number, the number

is assigned to the user and appears as that person’s phone number.

But the detective admitted he was unable to connect Dixon to the

phone number associated with “Jennifer” on the TextNow app.

¶ 37 In any event, Detective Radpour’s testimony was not expert

testimony because (1) he was discussing the steps of his

investigation, see People v. Penn, 2016 CO 32, ¶¶ 32-33 (the trial

court did not plainly err by admitting police testimony explaining

investigative steps in a factual manner that provided context); and

(2) any lay person could go through the steps to set up a profile in

the TextNow app, see Venalonzo, ¶ 53.

4. Hearsay

¶ 38 Dixon next contends that (1) the extraction report was hearsay

because the prosecution failed to establish that it was generated

without human input or interpretation; (2) the contents of B.C.’s

17
phone reflected in Exhibit 9 were hearsay; and (3) the detective’s

testimony about Exhibit 9 was “hearsay within hearsay.” We

disagree.

a. Applicable Law

¶ 39 Hearsay is “a statement other than one made by the declarant

while testifying at the trial or hearing, offered in evidence to prove

the truth of the matter asserted.” CRE 801(c). A declarant is “a

person who makes a statement.” CRE 801(b). A “statement” is

either “(1) an oral or written assertion or (2) nonverbal conduct of a

person, if it is intended by the person to be communicative.” CRE

801(a). Hearsay is inadmissible except as provided by the rules of

evidence or other applicable statutes or rules. CRE 802; People v.

Buckner, 228 P.3d 245, 249 (Colo. App. 2009).

¶ 40 When a statement contains multiple layers of hearsay, we

must analyze each layer separately to determine if any include

inadmissible hearsay. See Abad, ¶¶ 58-59. “Hearsay included

within hearsay is not excluded under the hearsay rule if each part

of the combined statements conforms with an exception to the

hearsay rule.” Id. at ¶ 59.

18
b. The Extraction Report Was Not Hearsay

¶ 41 Information automatically generated by machines is not

hearsay because no “person” or “declarant” made a “statement”

within the meaning of CRE 801. Buckner, 228 P.3d at 250; see also

Abad, ¶ 54. However, if the creation of a computer-generated

record involves human input or interpretation, it may constitute

hearsay. Hamilton, ¶ 30.

¶ 42 Relying on Hamilton, Dixon contends that Exhibit 9

constitutes hearsay because the prosecution failed to establish that

it was generated without human input or interpretation. But in

Hamilton, there was no testimony about how the extraction report

was generated. Id. at ¶¶ 21-26. In contrast, Investigator Lobato

testified that, to generate an extraction report, he disconnects the

phone from Wi-Fi and its network, enables settings that allow it to

transfer files, and plugs it into a forensic extraction device. From

there, Cellebrite software extracts the phone’s data and converts it

into a readable format. Investigator Lobato followed these steps to

extract the contents of B.C.’s phone and then gave the extraction

report to Detective Radpour.

19
¶ 43 Investigator Lobato’s testimony established that the extraction

report was generated by computer software without human input or

interpretation. Dixon does not point to any contrary record

evidence. Because the extraction report was generated by a

machine, the report itself is not a “statement” made by a

“declarant,” and therefore it is not hearsay. See Buckner, 228 P.3d

at 250; Abad, ¶ 56.

c. The Text Messages Reflected in Exhibit 9 Were Not Hearsay

¶ 44 To the extent the text messages reflected in Exhibit 9 were

from Dixon, they were not hearsay because they were his own

statements offered against him. See CRE 801(d)(2). And to the

extent Dixon argues that the text messages were hearsay because

the prosecution failed to connect him to “Jennifer,” we have already

rejected that argument. Thus, any messages from “Jennifer” were

also admissions by a party opponent and not hearsay. See id.

¶ 45 To the extent Dixon argues that the text messages from B.C.

were inadmissible hearsay, he did not preserve this claim, so we

review it for plain error. See Hagos, ¶ 14. Defense counsel’s

belated “hearsay” objection to Exhibit 9 was premised exclusively

20
on the lack of “connection between Jennifer and [Dixon].”3 Counsel

did not call the court’s attention to the possibility that B.C.’s

messages might be hearsay. See People v. Melendez, 102 P.3d 315,

322 (Colo. 2004) (“We do not require that parties use ‘talismanic

language’ to preserve particular arguments for appeal, but the trial

court must be presented with an adequate opportunity to make

findings of fact and conclusions of law on any issue before we will

review it.”).

¶ 46 Even assuming the district court erred by not sua sponte

rejecting B.C.’s text messages as hearsay, we cannot conclude that

the error was obvious. See Pollard, ¶ 39. Notably, Dixon does not

identify which messages from B.C. included inadmissible hearsay.

As a result, we cannot determine (1) whether the messages contain

assertions of fact as opposed to questions or imperative

declarations, see People v. Phillips, 2012 COA 176, ¶ 104

(“[I]mperative declarations, such as orders or instructions, which by

their nature can be neither true nor false, . . . fall outside the

purview of the hearsay rule.” (quoting Cardin v. State, 540 N.E.2d

3 Or, as previously noted, “between Jennifer and [B.C.].” Again, the
distinction does not matter to our analysis.

21
51, 54 (Ind. Ct. App. 1989))); (2) whether any hearsay statements

contained in the messages were nonetheless admissible because

they satisfied an exception, see CRE 803; or (3) whether the

messages were offered to provide context for Dixon’s statements and

not for their truth, see CRE 801(c). Dixon’s failure to identify the

offending statements so that we can meaningfully analyze whether

they constitute hearsay prevents us from concluding that the court

plainly erred by admitting B.C.’s text messages.4

d. Detective Radpour’s Testimony Reciting the Messages
Reflected in Exhibit 9 Was Not Hearsay

¶ 47 Because Exhibit 9 itself was not hearsay and the text

messages reflected in Exhibit 9 were not hearsay, it follows that

Detective Radpour’s live testimony about the messages reflected in

Exhibit 9 was not hearsay. See Abad, ¶ 58; CRE 801(c). Exhibit 9

4 In his opening brief, Dixon also lists sixteen “statements by

Radpour” that he contends revealed the content of the extraction
report and were inadmissible hearsay. But Dixon did not bring any
of these “statements” to the attention of the district court, nor does
he explain on appeal how any one of the items listed meets the
definition of hearsay. We do not address this underdeveloped
argument. See People v. Rodriguez-Morelos, 2022 COA 107M, ¶ 49,
aff’d, 2025 CO 2.

22
was admitted into evidence unconditionally, so Detective Radpour

was free to read from it and discuss its contents.

¶ 48 Thus, we conclude that the district court did not err by

admitting Exhibit 9 or allowing Detective Radpour to testify about

or read aloud the messages between B.C. and Dixon/“Jennifer” that

were reflected in Exhibit 9. See Zapata, ¶ 25; Liggett, ¶ 16.

C. Generalized Expert Testimony

¶ 49 Dixon contends that the district court erroneously admitted

the generalized expert testimony of Dr. Beth Peters and Dr. Andrew

Sirotnak. We perceive no reversible error.

1. Applicable Law

¶ 50 Except where “otherwise provided by constitution, statute, or

rule, all relevant evidence is admissible.” People v. Rath, 44 P.3d

1033, 1038 (Colo. 2002) (citing CRE 402). Evidence is relevant if it

has “any tendency to make the existence of any fact that is of

consequence to the determination of the action more probable or

less probable than it would be without the evidence.” CRE 401.

¶ 51 Under CRE 403, relevant evidence “may be excluded if its

probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair

prejudice, confusion of the issues, or misleading the jury.” In

23
reviewing a trial court’s ruling under CRE 403, “we assume the

maximum probative value that a reasonable fact finder might give

the evidence and the minimum unfair prejudice to be reasonably

expected.” People v. Clark, 2015 COA 44, ¶ 18 (quoting People v.

James, 117 P.3d 91, 94 (Colo. App. 2004)).

¶ 52 CRE 702 allows for the admission of qualified expert testimony

if it will assist the trier of fact to understand the evidence or to

determine a fact in issue. The focus of a Rule 702 inquiry is

whether the proffered evidence is both reliable and relevant. People

v. Shreck, 22 P.3d 68, 77 (Colo. 2001). When admitting expert

testimony, a trial court must “make specific findings on the record

about the reliability, relevance, and usefulness” of the testimony.

People v. Yachik, 2020 COA 100, ¶ 54; see also Ruibal v. People,

2018 CO 93, ¶ 13 (“With regard to the requirement for specific

findings concerning a determination of the reliability and relevance

of evidence to be admitted pursuant to CRE 702, with record

support, we have . . . been unwavering.”).

¶ 53 Generalized expert testimony should “fit the case,” but “the fit

need not be perfect.” People v. Cooper, 2021 CO 69, ¶ 5. The “fit

inquiry” is a flexible one; “[i]f the generalized expert testimony’s

24
logical connection to the factual issues is sufficient to be helpful to

the jury without running afoul of CRE 403, the testimony fits the

case.” Id.

2. Dr. Peters’ Testimony

¶ 54 Dixon contends that the district court erred by admitting Dr.

Peters’ expert testimony because the court made insufficient

findings that the testimony was reliable, relevant, or useful, and

because the testimony did not “fit” the facts of the case. We

perceive no error.

a. Additional Background

¶ 55 At trial, defense counsel questioned B.C. extensively regarding

the timeline of the abuse, the timing of her disclosure to her

mother, and when she collected evidence of the assaults. B.C.

could not remember timing in terms of exact years or days, but she

remembered her school year and her age.

¶ 56 The prosecution qualified Dr. Peters as an expert in child

sexual abuse disclosure patterns, behaviors, and memory

processing. Dr. Peters testified that she was familiar with child sex

assault victim disclosure patterns and how sexual assault victims

processed memories of abuse. She gained that familiarity through

25
training in graduate school, through continuing education, by

reading literature, and by personally working with sexual abuse

victims. She also said that she had fifteen years of experience

observing these patterns in her more than 500 clients and hearing

about them as a supervisor to other clinicians.

¶ 57 Although defense counsel objected to Dr. Peters’ qualifications,

he did not ask the court to make specific findings regarding the

admissibility of Dr. Peters’ testimony or object to the court’s ruling

based on insufficient findings. Defense counsel also did not object

to any of Dr. Peters’ testimony.

¶ 58 Among other things, Dr. Peters testified that victim disclosure

could be affected by grooming, age, and fear of punishment,

abandonment, or blame. She said that, because of “their

independence and their participation in other rule-breaking

behaviors,” teenagers may not disclose for fear of being “blamed or

[getting] in trouble” for other behaviors they engaged in. She also

testified that victims may withhold disclosure if they are in an

“unsafe environment” or “they have no space from the perpetrator

to give that secret.” She explained that children who experience

“longer periods of abuse and more intense abuse are more likely to

26
delay that disclosure.” And she said that children generally have

difficulty providing a timeline because memories “blend” together.

¶ 59 Dr. Peters also discussed grooming, defining it as “a pattern of

behaviors that sexual offenders will exhibit to gain access to sexual

contact or activity with victims.” She said perpetrators “will pretend

it is normal for them to have sex with their teenage children as an

educational or instructional normative behavior.”

b. The District Court Did Not Err by Admitting Dr. Peters’
Testimony

¶ 60 We acknowledge that the court was required to, but did not,

make specific findings on the reliability, relevance, or usefulness of

Dr. Peters’ testimony before admitting it. See Yachik, ¶ 54. But

“when, as here, no party objects to the admissibility of the proffered

expert’s testimony, the lack of findings on the record will not

necessarily render the expert testimony inadmissible.” People v.

Martinez, 2024 CO 69, ¶ 36.

¶ 61 Dixon’s entire argument for why the district court erred by

admitting Dr. Peters’ testimony is as follows: “None of this

‘[generalized] expert’ testimony was relevant. None of the testimony

was helpful to the jury. And none of the testimony was reliable.

27
The purported expert testimony did not specifically ‘fit’ the case.”

Dixon does not explain how the lack of findings prejudiced him, nor

does he explain how Dr. Peters’ testimony did not “fit” the case —

despite Dr. Peters’ extensive training and experience and the

obvious relevance of her testimony regarding delayed disclosure and

grooming. We reject Dixon’s underdeveloped argument. See People

v. Rodriguez-Morelos, 2022 COA 107M, ¶ 49, aff’d, 2025 CO 2.

3. Dr. Sirotnak’s Testimony

¶ 62 Dixon contends that the district court erred by admitting Dr.

Sirotnak’s testimony because it was not relevant and improperly

bolstered B.C.’s credibility. We perceive no error.

a. Additional Background

¶ 63 B.C. testified that Dixon penetrated her anally when she was

sixteen. During cross-examination, defense counsel first confirmed

that B.C. had described the anal penetration as “painful,” to which

B.C. answered, “Yes, very painful.” Counsel then asked B.C. if she

was “yelling at that time to [Dixon] for him to stop?” B.C. said she

was not “yelling at the top of [her] lungs, but [she] was . . . yelling a

little bit.” B.C. declined counsel’s request to demonstrate how loud

she was yelling because she was uncomfortable doing so.

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¶ 64 Without objection, the prosecution qualified Dr. Sirotnak “as

an expert in the field of child abuse, specifically, medical child

abuse to include child sexual abuse.” Dr. Sirotnak testified that “in

the absence of acute sexual assault or concern about trauma . . .

there is no one single test” to determine if a child was sexually

assaulted. He said that if “a child or an adolescent” disclosed

something that “happened within a two to three day, four-day

period and or they are disclosing symptoms” such as “pain,

bleeding, abnormal rash or discharge in the private part of a body,”

then “an acute care screening or assessment” in the emergency

department would be conducted. But he said that an adolescent

may heal “minor trauma” like abrasions very quickly and that other

trauma like “cuts with bleeding and lacerations to parts of the

body” may “take days to weeks to heal.” He testified that in an

examination of a child, “greater than 80 percent of the time . . . , we

are not going to see physical damage or trauma to a body part.”

Defense counsel did not object to this testimony.

¶ 65 During closing argument, defense counsel argued that Dr.

Sirotnak

29
acknowledge[d] that with painful — with, you
know, anal sex, he didn’t — the things he
talked about the vagina not showing injuries
and healing quickly, didn’t really apply to anal
sex where the — when it’s painful and there is
an injury. And she talked about screaming,
you got to — I would think that would involve
an injury, if it’s true, but there is no effort to
find any scarring here.

Some scarring might have, you know, certainly
would corroborate some prolonged, painful
anal sex, but we didn’t, no effort to do that was
— was made.

b. Dr. Sirotnak’s Testimony Was Relevant

¶ 66 Dixon contends that Dr. Sirotnak’s testimony was irrelevant

because there was “no controversy . . . regarding a physical

examination” of B.C. and because Dr. Sirotnak “essentially said

that injuries might or might not result from sexual abuse.” We

disagree.

¶ 67 Defense counsel questioned B.C. about her claim that the anal

penetration was painful and that she was yelling during the

assault. Then counsel argued in closing that the jury should not

believe B.C.’s testimony about the anal penetration because there

was no effort to find scarring, which counsel argued would have

been present under the circumstances B.C. described. Thus, there

30
was controversy over B.C.’s physical examination and whether

there were, or should have been, signs of physical trauma.

¶ 68 To that end, Dr. Sirotnak’s testimony was relevant and helpful

because he explained when a physical examination would need to

be done on an adolescent to identify acute physical trauma from

sexual abuse. He also explained that even cuts or lacerations can

heal such that no physical signs of injury are found in most cases.

His testimony gave a possible reason why medical professionals did

not search for or find scarring despite B.C.’s testimony that the anal

penetration was “very painful.” Accordingly, the court did not

abuse its discretion by concluding that Dr. Sirotnak’s testimony

was relevant and helpful to the jury. See Cooper, ¶ 5; Liggett, ¶ 16.

c. Dr. Sirotnak Did Not Improperly Opine on Witness Credibility

¶ 69 Dixon also contends that Dr. Sirotnak’s testimony about the

percentage of child sex assault victims who have no visible injuries

indirectly and improperly “vouched” for B.C.’s credibility. We are

not persuaded.

¶ 70 In Colorado, one witness may not opine on the veracity of

another witness. People v. Murphy, 2021 CO 22, ¶ 36; Davis v.

People, 2013 CO 57, ¶ 15. But Dr. Sirotnak never opined that B.C.

31
told the truth or that sexual abuse victims generally tell the truth.

Cf. People v. Marx, 2019 COA 138, ¶ 17 (an expert’s “opinion that

only two to six percent ‘of sexual assaults that are reported to the

police [by children and teenagers] turn out to be false’ did not relate

to any issue other than the accuser’s truthfulness”); People in

Interest of S.M-L., 2016 COA 173, ¶ 31 (expert testimony on

“statistics regarding the probability of false allegations . . . has long

been regarded as improper”), aff’d, 2018 CO 31. And although Dr.

Sirotnak’s testimony may have incidentally bolstered B.C.’s

credibility by explaining why she may not have a physical sign of

injury from the abuse, that did not make his testimony

inadmissible. See People v. Relaford, 2016 COA 99, ¶ 30 (“[E]xpert

testimony generally tends to bolster or attack the credibility of

another witness,” but that “alone is insufficient to deny admission

of the evidence.” (quoting People v. Koon, 724 P.2d 1367, 1370

(Colo. App. 1986))). Accordingly, we conclude that the court did not

abuse its discretion by admitting the testimony despite its

incidental bolstering effect. See Cooper, ¶ 5; Liggett, ¶ 16.

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D. Lay Testimony

¶ 71 Dixon contends that the district court erred by allowing two

witnesses to give expert opinions in the guise of lay testimony. We

perceive no reversible error.

1. Schichtel’s Testimony

¶ 72 Dixon contends that the district court erred by allowing a

Planned Parenthood health center assistant to testify about her

observations of B.C. at the clinic because her testimony was

irrelevant under CRE 401, unfairly prejudicial under CRE 403, and

expert testimony in the guise of lay testimony. We are not

persuaded.

a. Additional Background

¶ 73 At trial, the prosecution called Lynn Schichtel, who worked as

a health center assistant at Planned Parenthood the day B.C. went

there to have an abortion. She testified that Planned Parenthood

trained her to spot abusive situations by looking for “signs of

abuse” or “red flags.” Schichtel testified she had a “gut feeling” that

something was “off” with B.C., so she reported suspected child

trafficking to the Department of Human Services. Although at one

point defense counsel objected on the grounds that “we have[n’t]

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actually identified the red flag” because Schichtel had “only testified

to a gut feeling,” counsel did not object on any of the grounds raised

on appeal.

¶ 74 During cross-examination, defense counsel asked,

So you’re not sure exactly what the problem
area was that you were identifying by noticing
a red flag, which really isn’t exactly a specific
red flag that you had been trained to notice,
though.

Is that fair to say?

It’s more like we’re acting not on some
objective evidentiary observations, but instead
a gut feeling that there’s a problem.

Is that fair?

Schichtel answered that she “acted more because the patient was

not honest,” referring to the fact that B.C. had not disclosed that an

adult man was waiting for her in the car.

¶ 75 The prosecution also called Dr. Sabrina Holmquist, the

physician who treated B.C. at Planned Parenthood. Dr. Holmquist

testified that she was also trained to look for signs of abuse and

noticed no red flags when interacting with B.C. that day. The

doctor said that patients who are sixteen years old can go into

Planned Parenthood on their own for abortion services so long as a

34
parent has been notified and that it would not be unusual for a

parent to sit in their vehicle in the parking lot.

b. The District Court Did Not Plainly Err by Admitting Schichtel’s
Testimony

¶ 76 Dixon first contends that Schichtel’s testimony was irrelevant

under CRE 401 and unfairly prejudicial under CRE 403. Even

affording the evidence its maximum probative value, see People v.

Welsh, 80 P.3d 296, 304 (Colo. 2003), we agree with Dixon that it

was only marginally relevant. It corroborated B.C.’s testimony

about her abortion at the clinic but did little else.

¶ 77 Even so, affording the evidence its minimum unfair prejudice,

see id., it was also marginally prejudicial. As Dixon argues on

appeal, Schichtel did not testify that she “observe[d] anything wrong

or illegal,” and her testimony was contradicted by the treating

physician. On this record, the district court did not abuse its

discretion in balancing the probative value and prejudicial effect of

Schichtel’s testimony. See id.

¶ 78 Dixon also contends that Schichtel’s testimony was

inadmissible expert testimony in the guise of lay testimony because

it was based on her training on how to spot “red flag[s]” for abuse.

35
True, Schichtel testified that she had been trained by Planned

Parenthood to spot signs of abuse. But, as defense counsel pointed

out at trial, Schichtel testified only that she had a “gut feeling”

about B.C.; she never identified what signs of abuse she was

trained to spot or if she saw those signs with respect to B.C.

specifically. So it does not appear that Schichtel’s testimony was

based on any specialized experience or training. See Venalonzo,

¶ 53. At a minimum, it would not have been obvious to the district

court that Schichtel was offering an expert opinion. See Pollard,

¶ 39. Thus, we conclude that any error in admitting Schichtel’s

testimony was not plain. See Hagos, ¶ 14.

2. Detective Radpour’s Video Exhibit Testimony

¶ 79 Dixon contends that the district court erred by allowing

Detective Radpour to give unqualified expert testimony that (1) the

prosecution edited a video marked as Exhibit 4 in “compl[iance

with] the Rules of Evidence,” and (2) the original video ran smoothly

without the edits made by the prosecution. We are not persuaded.

a. Additional Background

¶ 80 The prosecutor sought to admit an edited version of the cell

phone video B.C. recorded of her conversation with Dixon about the

36
abuse as Exhibit 4. Detective Radpour testified that he viewed both

the original video on B.C.’s phone and Exhibit 4 and that there were

some “hard cuts” in the exhibit that were not in the original video.

¶ 81 The prosecutor asked, “Within the People’s Exhibit 4, I

mentioned there were hard cuts. Is that something I did to comply

with a Rule of Evidence or something else?” Detective Radpour

answered, “On what I saw, you did comply with the Rules of

Evidence.” The prosecutor then asked Detective Radpour to

confirm, “without [going over] some Rules of Evidence,” that the

prosecutor had cut out portions of the video in which Dixon had

named other women who had abortions. The detective confirmed

the prosecutor’s representation.

¶ 82 The prosecutor then asked Detective Radpour to confirm that

another portion of the video had been cut because there was “[a] lot

of commotion in the — in the pocket, but you cannot really hear

anybody saying anything.” The detective so confirmed. Finally, the

detective testified that, without the edits, “the video overall [ran]

smoothly from start to finish.”

¶ 83 Defense counsel did not object to any of this testimony.

37
b. The District Court Did Not Plainly Err by Admitting Detective
Radpour’s Testimony

¶ 84 Addressing the testimony in reverse order, we first conclude

that Detective Radpour’s explanation of the differences between the

original and the edited versions of the video was not expert

testimony. It was based on a comparison of the two videos that any

lay person could perform. See Venalonzo, ¶ 53.

¶ 85 Second, although it may have been improper for the detective

to give an opinion about “the Rules of Evidence,” Dixon does not

explain how that testimony undermined the fundamental fairness of

the trial. See Hagos, ¶ 14. The challenged testimony was brief, and

neither the prosecutor nor the detective elaborated on what

complying with the rules of evidence meant. See People v. Salas,

2017 COA 63, ¶ 12 (inadmissible evidence has less prejudicial

impact when the reference is fleeting).

¶ 86 We perceive no reversible error. See Hagos, ¶ 14.

E. Cumulative Error

¶ 87 Finally, Dixon contends that, even if the individual alleged

errors do not require reversal, their cumulative prejudicial impact

does. We have assumed for purposes of our analysis that the

38
district court may have committed three unpreserved errors that

were not plain: the text messages from B.C. contained in Exhibit 9

may have been hearsay but were not obviously so, Schichtel’s

testimony about “red flags” may have been expert opinion but was

not obviously so, and Detective Radpour’s testimony about the

video being edited in accordance with the rules of evidence was

unqualified expert testimony but was not substantial. Even viewed

collectively, these errors did not deprive Dixon of a fair trial given

the nature and extent of the other evidence presented. See People

v. Vialpando, 2022 CO 28, ¶ 33 (cumulative error doctrine requires

the reviewing court to determine if the errors, when viewed in the

aggregate, deprived a defendant of a fair trial).

III. Disposition

¶ 88 We affirm the judgment.

JUDGE DUNN and JUDGE SCHOCK concur.

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