Peo v. Mattorano

24CA0057 Peo v Mattorano 07-31-2025

COLORADO COURT OF APPEALS

Court of Appeals No. 24CA0057
El Paso County District Court No. 22CR4534
Honorable William H. Moller, Judge

The People of the State of Colorado,

Plaintiff-Appellee,

v.

George Craig Mattorano,

Defendant-Appellant.

JUDGMENT AFFIRMED

Division III
Opinion by JUDGE DUNN
Brown and Schock, JJ., concur

NOT PUBLISHED PURSUANT TO C.A.R. 35(e)
Announced July 31, 2025

Philip J. Weiser, Attorney General, Austin R. Johnston, Assistant Attorney
General, Jenna Baker, Assistant Attorney General Fellow, Denver, Colorado, for
Plaintiff-Appellee

McClintock Law Firm, LLC, Elizabeth A. McClintock, Colorado Springs,
Colorado, for Defendant-Appellant
¶1 Defendant, George Craig Mattorano, appeals the judgment

entered on a jury verdict finding him guilty of soliciting for child

prostitution, attempted patronizing a prostituted child, and

attempted sexual assault on a child. We affirm.

I. Background

¶2 As part of an undercover operation, a federal agent posted an

advertisement on a website dedicated to prostitution and escort

services. The post advertised a “lil princess” and listed “[a]ctivities

this service provider may enjoy” to include “Intercourse – Anal

(Greek); Intercourse – Vaginal (FS); Oral – receiving (DATY);

Intercourse – Oral; Kissing – closed lips; Oral – without condom

(BBBJ).”

¶3 Responding to the ad, Mattorano initiated the following text

exchange:

Mattorano Hello
Mattorano You look very nice
Mattorano I would like to see you when you
maybe available
Agent Hey hun my girl is available after
1. My girl is 14 but down for
whatever. Let me know
Mattorano What
Mattorano Your girl??
Agent yes my daughter
Mattorano You see people too

1
Mattorano What part of town if I may ask
Mattorano Hello
Agent downtown
Agent Just my daughter not me
Mattorano Ok
Mattorano 1:30
Agent that works
Mattorano Where at downtown
Mattorano Donation
Agent 200 fs for hour
Agent I will give u address when u are
close
Mattorano No fun busy correct
Mattorano Qv ok
Agent yeah QV is fine. what time hun
Mattorano I can be in your area by 2
Mattorano Is it safe and no issues
Agent yes safe
Mattorano You will be there too or
Agent Yes, i am here with her.
Mattorano Ok
Mattorano Just a little nervous

¶4 Shortly after this exchange, Mattorano arrived at the agreed

upon location and paid $100 for a “quick visit” to a detective posing

as the girl’s mother. The “mother” directed Mattorano to a room

where her “daughter” was waiting. Agents arrested Mattorano as he

headed toward that room.

¶5 Mattorano admitted in a recorded police interview that he had

paid $100 for sex, and that he saw the referenced age in the text

exchange, but he claimed that he thought it was a typo. He insisted

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that he thought he was meeting a nineteen-year-old, not a fourteen-

year-old. The prosecution charged Mattorano with soliciting for

child prostitution, attempted patronizing a prostituted child, and

attempted sexual assault on a child.

¶6 Mattorano did not testify at trial, but his counsel defended on

the theory that Mattorano thought that the person he was meeting

was nineteen — not fourteen — and that he had not expressly

arranged for a sex act.

¶7 The jury convicted Mattorano as charged. The district court

sentenced him to sex offender intensive supervision probation for a

controlling term of ten years to life.

¶8 On appeal, Mattorano contends that the district court erred by

(1) admitting expert testimony from a lay witness and (2) failing to

properly instruct the jury on the crime of soliciting for child

prostitution. We consider each contention in turn.

II. The Agent’s Testimony

¶9 Mattorano first contends that the district court reversibly

erred by admitting as lay opinion testimony what was actually

expert opinion testimony from the federal agent. We disagree.

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A. Standard of Review and Legal Principles

¶ 10 We review a district court’s evidentiary rulings for an abuse of

discretion. People v. Murphy, 2021 CO 22, ¶ 16. A court abuses its

discretion when its ruling is manifestly arbitrary, unreasonable, or

unfair, or is contrary to law. People v. Williams, 2025 COA 26, ¶ 28.

¶ 11 We review unpreserved evidentiary claims for plain error.

People v. Penn, 2016 CO 32, ¶ 28. Plain error is obvious and

substantial error that so undermined the fundamental fairness of

the trial that it casts serious doubt on the reliability of the

judgment of conviction. Id.

¶ 12 But we will not review alleged errors that a defendant invites

or injects into the case. People v. Rediger, 2018 CO 32, ¶ 34.

B. Direct and Redirect Examination Testimony

¶ 13 The federal agent testified on direct and redirect examination

about the text exchange he had with Mattorano. During direct

examination, he explained some of the terminology used in the

exchange, including that “donation” meant the cost of a prostitute’s

services, “no fun busy” meant “no funny business,” and “QV” meant

“quick visit.” And on redirect, the agent explained that “fs” meant

“full service” and briefly described service pricing.

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¶ 14 Mattorano didn’t object to any of this testimony but now

argues that the district court should’ve excluded it as improper

expert testimony because it was based on “specialized knowledge.”

See People v. Ramos, 2012 COA 191, ¶ 14 (holding that when an

officer’s opinion is based on “experience-based specialized

knowledge,” the officer must be qualified as an expert under CRE

702), aff’d, 2017 CO 6.

¶ 15 Even if the explanation of any of the terms used in the text

exchange required specialized knowledge — and that may be

generous — any error in allowing the agent’s testimony was not

substantial. After all, Mattorano admitted in his police interview

that he responded to the ad and paid $100 for sex. The material

disputed issue at trial was whether Mattorano believed he was

arranging a meeting with an adult or a child.1 The agent’s

testimony explaining some of the generic terms in the text exchange

had nothing to do with this issue. Indeed, Mattorano doesn’t

explain how any of the explanations were prejudicial.

1 Defense counsel also argued at trial that it wasn’t clear that

Mattorano had arranged for a sex act. But perhaps because
Mattorano admitted in his police interview that he had paid for sex,
he doesn’t raise this argument on appeal.

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¶ 16 Given this, we can hardly say that any error in allowing the

agent’s testimony substantially influenced the verdict or

undermined the fundamental fairness of the trial. See Penn, ¶ 28.

C. Cross-Examination Testimony

¶ 17 During cross-examination, defense counsel also questioned

the agent about the posted advertisement and the text exchange

with Mattorano. Defense counsel elicited testimony from the agent

that Mattorano “definitely” saw the text stating that the girl he

planned to meet was fourteen, testimony about how some people

respond when they think they are meeting a child, and testimony

about how Mattorano responded. Part of that colloquy included the

following testimony:

Defense Counsel: Well, he didn’t say, okay.
She’s 14, I’m okay with that?

Agent: But he’s actually shocked, your girl?
Question mark. Question mark. So we knew
at that point that he saw the text.

....

Defense Counsel: Well, that’s because your ad
is completely different because it doesn’t say
anything about my daughter, or anyone else.
It says, you’re going to be contacting the actual
provider? Right?

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....

Agent: Whoever replies to it would assume,
yes, they are talking to the person. That’s why
we will clarify later on that they are not talking
to the actual child.

Defense Counsel: And you keep saying a lot
that you assume. They assume. Do you know
what everyone assumes? This is a person –

Agent: I know what a reasonable person would
think when we tell them they are meeting a 14-
year-old. They would be a lot more shocked
than this person was.[2]

Defense Counsel: That’s your opinion?

Agent: Based on a hundreds of texts that we
got from people that actually said no, I will not
meet with a child.

¶ 18 Pressing the agent more on the text exchange, defense counsel

elicited the agent’s testimony that because the text plainly stated

that the girl Mattorano arranged to meet was fourteen and because

Mattorano expressed in the exchange that he was scared about the

meeting, Mattorano knew “he’s breaking the law at that point.”

2 The prosecution briefly revisited this topic in redirect examination,

again without any objection.

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¶ 19 Mattorano now asks us to reverse his convictions because he

contends that the testimony his counsel elicited was improper

expert testimony.

¶ 20 Under these circumstances, we agree with the People that

defense counsel invited any error. Indeed, defense counsel’s broad

questioning about the agent’s text exchange led to the challenged

statements and opened the door for the agent to express his

opinions. And defense counsel neither objected to any response nor

asked the court to strike any response. Because the agent’s

explanations were responsive to the questions and “were a

foreseeable result of the form of [defense counsel’s] questioning,”

any error in admitting the testimony was invited. People v. Wittrein,

221 P.3d 1076, 1082 (Colo. 2009); see also People v. Shackelford,

511 P.2d 19, 20 (Colo. 1973) (concluding that any error in admitting

“unwanted testimony” was invited by defense counsel’s

questioning). Mattorano must therefore “abide the consequences”

of defense counsel’s acts. Rediger, ¶ 34; see also Shackelford, 511

P.2d at 20.

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III. Soliciting for Child Prostitution Jury Instruction

¶ 21 Mattorano next contends that the district court reversibly

erred by instructing the jury that to be guilty of soliciting for child

prostitution, a defendant must act knowingly rather than

intentionally.

¶ 22 To be sure, the culpable mental state for soliciting for child

prostitution was disputed at the time of trial. Compare People v.

Emerterio, 819 P.2d 516, 518 (Colo. App. 1991) (holding that the

culpable mental state is knowingly), rev’d on other grounds sub

nom. People v. San Emerterio, 839 P.2d 1161 (Colo. 1992), with

People v. Ross, 2019 COA 79, ¶ 30 (concluding that the culpable

mental state is intentionally), aff’d on other grounds, 2021 CO 9,

and overruled in part by Randolph v. People, 2025 CO 44. But while

this appeal was pending, our supreme court resolved this dispute

and held that “to be guilty of soliciting for child prostitution, an

offender must act knowingly.” Randolph, ¶ 65.

¶ 23 The district court here instructed the jury that it must find

that Mattorano knowingly solicited another for the purpose of

prostitution of or by a child. Because the instruction is consistent

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with Randolph, we reject Mattorano’s contention that the court

committed reversible instructional error.

IV. Disposition

¶ 24 The judgment is affirmed.

JUDGE BROWN and JUDGE SCHOCK concur.

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