Peo in Interest of Schoening

25CA0838 Peo in Interest of Schoening 07-24-2025

COLORADO COURT OF APPEALS

Court of Appeals No. 25CA0838
City and County of Denver Probate Court No. 25MH377
Honorable Beth A. Tomerlin, Magistrate

The People of the State of Colorado,

Petitioner-Appellee,

In the Interest of Ian Schoening,

Respondent-Appellant.

ORDER AFFIRMED

Division VI
Opinion by JUDGE TOW
Yun and Sullivan, JJ., concur

NOT PUBLISHED PURSUANT TO C.A.R. 35(e)
Announced July 24, 2025

Katie McLoughlin, Acting City Attorney, Kathleen O’Leary Bell, Assistant City
Attorney, Daniel Horwitz, Assistant City Attorney, Denver, Colorado, for
Plaintiff-Appellee

Tezak Law, P.C., Mary Tezak, Florence, Colorado, for Respondent-Appellant.
¶1 Respondent, Ian Schoening, appeals the probate court’s order

authorizing the staff at the Colorado Mental Health Hospital at Fort

Logan (the hospital) to medicate him involuntarily. We affirm.

I. Background

¶2 Schoening was committed to the hospital in April 2025 after

being found incompetent to proceed in multiple criminal cases. He

was diagnosed with unspecified mood disorder, and presented with

symptoms including responding to internal stimuli, dysregulated

sleep, quick mood lability, and the inability to participate in

admission interviews due to grossly disorganized and tangential

thought processes. Soon after Schoening’s admission, he was

placed in seclusion and restraints and administered medications on

an emergency basis after “indecently exposing himself to staff and

peers.” Schoening was also placed on assault precautions for

posturing at staff and was considered an escape risk.

¶3 At the request of Dr. Colleen Bono, Schoening’s staff

psychiatrist at the hospital, the People petitioned the probate court

for authorization to involuntarily treat Schoening with Haldol

(haloperidol), Invega (paliperidone), Risperdal (risperidone), Zyprexa

(olanzapine), “Eskalith/Lithobid/Lithium,” Ativan (lorazepam),

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Benadryl (diphenhydramine), Cogentin (benztropine), and Inderal

(propranolol).

¶4 The probate court held an evidentiary hearing at which Dr.

Bono and Schoening testified. Dr. Bono explained Schoening’s

disorder and accompanying symptoms. She described the

requested medications, the possible side effects, and their necessity

in treating Schoening’s symptoms.

¶5 Schoening testified that he was willing to take the requested

medications without a court order. However, he questioned the

efficacy of the medications generally and testified at length

concerning the various side effects he has experienced.

¶6 The probate court granted the petition, finding that Dr. Bono’s

testimony was “essentially uncontroverted” and “credible” and that

Schoening’s testimony, to the extent it disagreed with or was

contradicted by Dr. Bono, was “not . . . entirely credible.” The court

also found that the People had established all four elements for the

involuntary administration of medication set forth in People v.

Medina, 705 P.2d 961, 973 (Colo. 1985), and, accordingly, ordered

the administration of the requested medications to Schoening

against his will.

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II. Legal Principles and Standard of Review

¶7 An involuntarily committed person retains the right to refuse

treatment. See id. at 971. Even so, a court may authorize the

involuntary administration of medication if the People prove the

following elements by clear and convincing evidence:

(1) the patient is incompetent to effectively
participate in the treatment decision;

(2) treatment by antipsychotic medication is
necessary to prevent a significant and likely
long-term deterioration in the patient’s mental
condition or to prevent the likelihood of the
patient’s causing serious harm to himself or
others in the institution;

(3) a less intrusive treatment alternative is not
available; and

(4) the patient’s need for treatment by
antipsychotic medication is sufficiently
compelling to override any bona fide and
legitimate interest of the patient in refusing
treatment.

Id. at 973. We determine whether the evidence, viewed as a whole

and in the light most favorable to the People, is sufficient to support

the court’s order. People in Interest of R.K.L., 2016 COA 84, ¶ 13. A

physician’s testimony alone may be sufficient to satisfy the Medina

test. Id. at ¶ 30.

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¶8 Applying the Medina test presents a mixed question of fact and

law, meaning we defer to the probate court’s factual findings if

supported by the record but review its legal conclusions de novo.

People in Interest of R.C., 2019 COA 99M, ¶ 7. It is for the probate

court, as the fact finder, to determine witness credibility; the

sufficiency, probative effect, and weight of the evidence; and the

inferences and conclusions to be drawn from it. Id.

III. Analysis

¶9 Schoening contends that the evidence was insufficient to prove

the first Medina element: that he is incompetent to effectively

participate in his treatment decisions. We disagree.

¶ 10 To satisfy the first Medina prong, the People must show “that

the patient is incompetent to effectively participate in the treatment

decision.” Medina, 705 P.2d at 973. “[A] court is prohibited from

ordering the forced medication of an involuntarily committed . . .

patient unless the court is satisfied that the patient’s mental illness

has so impaired his judgment as to render him ‘incapable of

participating in decisions affecting his health.’” Id. (quoting

Goedecke v. State, Dep’t of Insts., 603 P.2d 123, 125 (Colo. 1979)).

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¶ 11 The record supports the probate court’s findings. Dr. Bono

testified that she diagnosed Schoening with an unspecified mood

disorder. However, she also explained that she was “leaning

towards schizoaffective disorder bipolar type” because Schoening

shows evidence of “schizoaffective disorder and grossly disorganized

behaviors, [he is] unable to maintain hygiene, [and exhibits]

psychotic thought processes, [and] some paranoia.” Dr. Bono

testified that Schoening meets the statutory definition of a person

with a mental health disorder — namely, that he is a person with a

substantial disorder of the cognitive and emotional processes that

grossly impair his judgment and capacity to recognize reality and to

control his behavior. See § 27-65-102(22), C.R.S. 2024.

¶ 12 Dr. Bono opined that Schoening is currently incompetent to

effectively participate in his treatment decisions. Dr. Bono

explained that while Schoening has shown some improvement while

on emergency medications, he “is still gravely disabled [and] still

doesn’t have the full insight into his psychiatric history and

disorder.” For example, Dr. Bono testified that she has been unable

to obtain “a full medical history due to [Schoening’s] lack of ability

to participate.” And while Dr. Bono has attempted to discuss her

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plan for the requested medications with Schoening, he is “limited by

his lack of insight and desire to be off medications.” Further, Dr.

Bono testified that when they talk about medications Schoening

becomes “pretty agitated,” so she changes the subject. Based on

these difficulties, Dr. Bono testified that Schoening is unable to

have a meaningful discussion with her about the risks and benefits

of treatment “at this time.”

¶ 13 We are not persuaded otherwise by Schoening’s assertion that

he is competent to effectively participate in the treatment decision

because his testimony concerning this element “contradicted” that

of Dr. Bono “on several occasions.” Schoening points to his

testimony accurately describing some of the potential side effects of

the medications and the other medications available to treat those

side effects. He also points to his testimony that he is willing to

take the medications to “comprehend and understand” even though

none of the requested medications have been helpful “on a

consistent basis.”

¶ 14 But Dr. Bono testified that any willingness on Schoening’s

part to take some of the medications — he continues to object to

taking lithium — has been “a pretty recent development.”

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Moreover, Dr. Bono testified that Schoening has had “four previous

hospitalizations” over “the last seven years” and eighteen

competency evaluations. Dr. Bono explained that “typically, what

occurs is he’s hospitalized, stabilized on medications, goes back to

jail, [is] non-complian[t] with medications in jail, . . . will

decompensate, and then [is] readmitted back to the facility.” And

Dr. Bono testified that Schoening was only “3 percent medication

compliant” before being admitted to the hospital — meaning,

“maybe he took [his medications] three out of 100 days he was [in

jail].”

¶ 15 Weighing this conflicting evidence, the probate court credited

Dr. Bono’s testimony, finding it “essentially uncontroverted” and

“credible,” and found Schoening’s testimony, to the extent it

disagreed with or was contradicted by Dr. Bono, “to not be entirely

credible . . . specifically regarding [Schoening’s] mental health

history, his diagnosis, symptoms, his current presentation and

need for the recommended treatment.” We are bound by those

findings. See People in Interest of Strodtman, 293 P.3d 123, 132

(Colo. App. 2011); People in Interest of Ramsey, 2023 COA 95, ¶ 30.

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¶ 16 We likewise reject Schoening’s assertion that his competence

to effectively participate in the treatment decisions is demonstrated

by his ability to testify about his experiences with side effects, the

risk of future side effects, his willingness to take the medications,

his acknowledgment that he suffers from mental illness, and his

desire to get better. The first Medina element does not ask simply

whether a patient has the ability to “articulate his or her

preferences” regarding treatment. Strodtman, 293 P.3d at 132. It

asks whether the patient is competent to effectively participate in

the treatment decision. Medina, 705 P.2d at 973. “To participate

effectively contemplates action in addition to words.” Strodtman,

293 P.3d at 132. For the reasons discussed above, Dr. Bono’s

testimony is sufficient to support the probate court’s finding that

Schoening is not competent to effectively participate in the

treatment decision.

¶ 17 Because Schoening does not challenge the probate court’s

findings concerning the other Medina elements, we conclude the

evidence was sufficient to support the medication order.

IV. Disposition

¶ 18 The order is affirmed.

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JUDGE YUN and JUDGE SULLIVAN concur.

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