Marriage of Rensch

24CA1576 Marriage of Rensch 07-17-2025

COLORADO COURT OF APPEALS

Court of Appeals No. 24CA1576
Adams County District Court No. 20DR30722
Honorable Teri L. Vasquez, Judge

In re the Marriage of

Stephanie Elizabeth Rensch,

Appellee,

and

Gabriel Thomas Rensch,

Appellant.

ORDER AFFIRMED

Division II
Opinion by JUDGE SCHUTZ
Fox and Harris, JJ., concur

NOT PUBLISHED PURSUANT TO C.A.R. 35(e)
Announced July 17, 2025

No Appearance for Appellee

Gabriel Thomas Rensch, Pro Se
¶1 In this post-decree dissolution of marriage case between

Gabriel Thomas Rensch (father) and Stephanie Elizabeth Rensch

(mother), father appeals the district court’s order granting mother’s

request to relocate with their children and denying his request for

full custody. We affirm.

I. Background

¶2 In December 2020, the Adams County Human Services

Department initiated a dependency and neglect case due to

concerns over domestic violence. At that time, father was behaving

erratically, he grabbed one of their children and barricaded himself

in the parties’ home, and law enforcement had to intervene to

negotiate the child’s release. In addition, father was accused of

verbally abusing mother and exerting coercive control over her.

¶3 The juvenile court adjudicated the children dependent and

neglected and, in 2022, it issued an order allocating parental

responsibilities primarily to mother (the APR order). The court

found that father had committed acts of domestic violence, was

resistant to treatment, and did not recognize the harm he was

causing the children. The court also found that, despite court

orders defining his parenting time, father had failed to return the

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children to mother twice during the case and that law enforcement

intervened to locate and return the children, including one such

incident when father left the state with them without notice or

authorization. The court determined that the children’s emotional

and physical safety was “compromised” with father. It ordered that

father could exercise only virtual supervised visits for one hour per

week. It also ordered that if father engaged in specific therapeutic

services, his parenting time could increase to in-person therapeutic

supervised visits of at least two hours per week.

¶4 The juvenile court certified the APR order into the dissolution

case, and the district court dissolved the marriage.

¶5 Shortly after the APR order, father filed motions to modify,

ultimately asking the district court to allocate him “full custody.”

During the pendency of his motions, mother filed a motion to

relocate to New York with the children. Mother also notified the

court that father had recently exercised his second in-person

therapeutic supervised visit and that, during the visit, he tried to

leave with one of the children. (The felony criminal charges for that

incident have not yet been resolved.)

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¶6 After a hearing, the court granted mother’s motion to relocate

and denied father’s request for full custody. Additionally, the court

restricted father’s parenting time, not allowing him to have any

visits with the children until he engages in six months of individual

therapy, completes a psychological evaluation, and receives a

written opinion from his therapist that he can safely exercise

supervised therapeutic parenting time.

II. Standard of Review

¶7 The court has broad discretion when determining whether to

modify a parenting time order. In re Parental Responsibilities

Concerning S.Z.S., 2022 COA 105, ¶ 13. We will not disturb a

court’s decision absent a showing that the court acted in a

manifestly arbitrary, unreasonable, or unfair manner, or it

misapplied the law. In re Marriage of Collins, 2023 COA 116M, ¶ 8.

III. Mother’s Relocation with the Children

¶8 Father contends that the court abused its discretion by

allowing mother to relocate with the children. We are not

persuaded.

¶9 When the parent with whom the children primarily reside

intends to relocate to a residence that substantially changes the

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geographical ties between the children and the other parent, the

court must determine, based on the statutory best interests factors

and relocation factors, whether it is in the children’s best interests

to relocate with the requesting parent. § 14-10-124(1.5)(a), C.R.S.

2024; § 14-10-129(2)(c), C.R.S. 2024; see also In re Marriage of

Ciesluk, 113 P.3d 135, 140 (Colo. 2005). The parents equally share

the burden to demonstrate to the court whether relocation is in the

children’s best interests or contrary to those interests, and the

court may not apply a presumption in favor of either parent’s

position. Ciesluk, 113 P.3d at 147-48.

¶ 10 In a detailed and thorough ruling, the district court considered

the relevant statutory factors and concluded that based on the

present circumstances, it was in the children’s best interests to

relocate to New York with mother. The court found that the

children had “a really strong relationship with [m]other,” mother

was a consistent presence in the children’s lives, and, since the APR

order, the children had lived exclusively with mother. See § 14-10-

124(1.5)(a)(III), (IV); § 14-10-129(2)(c)(III), (VI). It also found that

even though mother struggled to encourage the sharing of love,

affection, and contact between the children and father due to his

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past conduct, she could place the children’s best interests above

her own to foster that relationship. See § 14-10-124(1.5)(a)(VI), (XI).

¶ 11 By contrast, the court found that the children had a strained

relationship with father, and for the past two years, he had very

limited contact with the children. See § 14-10-124(1.5)(a)(III); § 14-

10-129(2)(c)(III). The court also found that father had not complied

with the court’s orders, referencing repeated violations of the court-

imposed limitations on his parenting time; he had a history of

abusive behavior against mother in front of the children; he had

traumatized the children; and he failed to understand the impact

his actions had on them. See § 14-10-124(1.5)(a)(III), (III.5), (V),

(VII); § 14-10-129(2)(c)(III). It also found that father had significant

mental health concerns, and that despite court orders to address

those concerns, he had not integrated the recommended treatment

in a manner that rendered him fit to safely parent the children. See

§ 14-10-124(1.5)(a)(III), (V); § 14-10-129(2)(c)(III). The court found

that father’s conduct had caused significant conditions to be placed

on his ability to exercise parenting time. See § 14-10-129(2)(c)(VIII).

And it found that the evidence failed to establish that father could

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encourage the children’s relationship with mother or place the

children’s needs ahead of his own. See § 14-10-124(1.5)(a)(VI), (XI).

¶ 12 Additionally, the court found that, in New York, the children

would have access to better educational opportunities and the

family would have more financial stability. See § 14-10-129(2)(c)(I),

(IV). It also found that the children would be near family friends,

who had children of similar ages, in New York. And the court

determined that the children would likely adapt well to the move.

See § 14-10-129(2)(c)(VII). The court then found that while the

children had extended family in Colorado, no evidence showed that

they had “any deep bonds or connections” to that family. See § 14-

10-129(2)(c)(V).

¶ 13 Father argues that the court’s ruling cannot stand because

many of its findings are unsupported by the record, and he

highlights evidence that he believes contradicts the court’s findings

and determination. However, it was for the court to resolve the

conflicts in the evidence, and when, as here, the record supports

the court’s findings, we will not disturb its ruling. See Collins, ¶ 8;

S.Z.S., ¶ 13; see also In re Marriage of Thorburn, 2022 COA 80, ¶ 49

(noting that credibility determinations and the weight, probative

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force, and sufficiency of the evidence, as well as the inferences and

conclusions to be drawn from the evidence, are matters within the

district court’s sole discretion).

¶ 14 Mother testified that she had a very strong relationship with

the children and that, for approximately two years, the children had

lived exclusively with her and seen father only a couple times. She

also said that moving to New York with the children would serve

their best interests, explaining that they could have an improved

quality of life, a more stable living situation, and better educational

opportunities. Mother explained that the children are very resilient

and that they would adjust well to New York.

¶ 15 Moreover, mother testified that father (1) acted erratically and

impulsively; (2) had “scared the children” when he tried to take one

child from the therapeutic visit and had previously removed the

children from Colorado without notice or authorization; and (3)

struggled to acknowledge and understand that his actions

traumatized the children. She also testified that unsupervised

parenting time with father was not safe and that he must engage in

treatment before he could safely parent the children.

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¶ 16 Still, father highlights that he and mother testified that the

children had family that lived in Colorado, and he argues that their

testimony contradicts the court’s finding that the children did not

have a relationship with extended family in Colorado. While the

parties noted family members lived in Colorado, they did not

expand on the children’s relationship with them. We therefore are

not convinced that the court erred by finding that it did not receive

evidence showing that the children had “any deep bonds or

connections to extended family in Colorado.” Moreover, this was

one finding of many related to the relocation, and father develops no

argument to show how this single purported misstatement affected

his substantial rights. See C.A.R. 35(c) (“The appellate court may

disregard any error or defect not affecting the substantial rights of

the parties.”).

¶ 17 Father also argues the court erred by finding that he

committed acts of domestic violence, asserting that his actions did

not meet the definition of domestic violence. The court recognized

that the juvenile court found by a preponderance of the evidence

that father committed acts of domestic violence against mother and

had admitted to verbally abusing her. The court also noted that the

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juvenile court had issued a permanent civil protection order limiting

father’s contact with mother and that, in father’s criminal cases,

additional mandatory protection orders were issued against him to

protect mother. The court noted that father presented no evidence

that was inconsistent with those prior findings.

¶ 18 Indeed, at the hearing, father confirmed that he previously

admitted to doing “awful things” to mother and saying “a lot of

awful things” to her. Father also confirmed that he had concealed

mother’s car in the past to prevent her from leaving with the

children. In addition, mother testified concerning the training she

received in the dependency and neglect case to protect the children

from future exposure to domestic violence and the protection orders

limiting father’s contact with mother and one of the children.

Moreover, the child and family investigator, who completed an

investigation before the hearing, reported that there had been “a

domestic disturbance” involving father in 2020. Thus, there is

record support for the court’s findings concerning domestic

violence, and we therefore may not disturb them. See Collins, ¶ 8;

S.Z.S., ¶ 13.

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¶ 19 To the extent father tries to challenge the domestic violence

finding by the juvenile court, the record reflects that he previously

appealed that order but then voluntarily dismissed his appeal. See

People in Interest of G.T.R., (Colo. App. No. 22CA2022, Feb. 6, 2023)

(unpublished order). He thus cannot challenge that order now. See

In re Marriage of Barber, 811 P.2d 451, 454 (Colo. App. 1991)

(recognizing that we may not review a party’s untimely appeal of a

court’s final order); see also Hrabczuk v. John Lucas Landscaping,

888 P.2d 367, 368 (Colo. App. 1994) (“The mandate provided for in

C.A.R. 41 is intended to establish the finality of the judgment upon

which the parties can rely and a direct attack upon the judgment

after the mandate has issued is not contemplated by the appellate

rules.”).

¶ 20 Father argues, however, that the court “improperly shift[ed]

the burden of proof” to him concerning mother’s motion. But for a

post-decree-relocation request, each parent has a burden to show

that the proposed relocation is either in, or contrary, to the

children’s best interests. Ciesluk, 113 P.3d at 147-48. Moreover,

father bore the burden to prove that his motions to modify

parenting time served the children’s best interests. See In re

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Parental Responsibilities Concerning B.R.D., 2012 COA 63, ¶ 30.

The court therefore properly placed a burden on father to present

evidence concerning the determination of parenting time.

¶ 21 Father also contends that the court did not “apply the same

standard of evidence” to him and mother. He asserts that, at the

hearing, the court declined to admit his evidence concerning

mother’s domestic violence that occurred before the APR order but

that it permitted mother to elicit evidence related to his conduct

from the same timeframe. However, father already had the

opportunity to litigate his allegations of mother’s alleged domestic

violence, and the juvenile court rejected his claims in the APR

order. The juvenile court’s determination was final, and the district

court acted within its discretion by not admitting evidence

concerning father’s attempt to relitigate his factual accusations

previously rejected by the juvenile court. See Bly v. Story, 241 P.3d

529, 535 (Colo. 2010) (“A trial court has broad discretion over the

admissibility of evidence.”); cf. Hrabczuk, 888 P.2d at 368. By

contrast, mother’s questions to father concerning his interactions

with mother related to the basis of the juvenile court’s restriction on

father’s parenting time and whether the circumstances concerning

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his endangering behavior had changed since the APR order. See

§ 14-10-124(1.5)(a); § 14-10-129(2)(c)(III).

¶ 22 Nor do we agree with father’s general assertion that the court

abused its discretion by conducting a combined hearing on

mother’s motion to relocate and his motions to modify the APR

order. Father argues that, by doing so, the court delayed the

resolution of his motions, but he overlooks that the court initially

took no action on his motions because he appealed the dissolution

judgment. Cf. Musick v. Woznicki, 136 P.3d 244, 246 (Colo. 2006)

(“Generally, the filing of a notice of appeal shifts jurisdiction to the

appellate court, thus divesting the trial court of jurisdiction to

conduct further substantive action related to the judgment on

appeal.”). Father develops no argument that the court erred by

staying those motions during the pendency of his appeal. See

S.Z.S., ¶ 29 (declining to consider an undeveloped appellate

argument). Then, following the resolution of father’s appeal, the

court concluded that mother’s and father’s motions both concerned

the allocation of parental responsibilities, and it determined that

conducting a combined hearing was in the interests of judicial

economy. That decision fell within the court’s discretion and did

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not cause unnecessary delay. See In re Marriage of Goellner, 770

P.2d 1387, 1389 (Colo. App. 1989) (acknowledging the court’s duty

to efficiently manage the case before it).

¶ 23 To the extent father further asserts that (1) the court violated

his constitutional rights or (2) erred by relying on a finding by

another court that lacked jurisdiction, he does not develop any legal

argument in support of his assertions, and therefore, we do not

address them. See S.Z.S., ¶ 29. Nor will we consider father’s

attempt to challenge court findings by relying on statements from

the parental evaluators in the dependency and neglect case when

those statements were not admitted during the present hearing. Cf.

Melat, Pressman & Higbie, L.L.P. v. Hannon Law Firm, L.L.C., 2012

CO 61, ¶ 18 (“[A]rguments not advanced in the trial court . . . are

generally deemed waived.”).

¶ 24 In sum, the court did not abuse its discretion by granting

mother’s motion to relocate to New York with the children.

IV. Father’s Parenting Time Restriction

¶ 25 Father also contends that the court abused its discretion by

restricting his parenting time. We disagree.

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¶ 26 A court shall not restrict a parent’s parenting time unless it

finds that parenting time would endanger the children’s physical

health or significantly impair the children’s emotional development.

§ 14-10-129(1)(b)(I); see § 14-10-124(1.5)(a).

¶ 27 The court found that father had significant mental health

concerns and that he had been resistant to (1) engaging in the

necessary treatment previously directed by the court and (2)

integrating that treatment into his parenting to safely care for the

children. The court explained that father traumatized the children

by taking them to another state without authorization and requiring

law enforcement to intervene. And it explained that he exhibited

the same erratic and impulsive behavior after the APR order entered

when he tried to take one of the children from a therapeutic

supervised visit. The court further found that, despite years of

court involvement, father did not recognize the harm his actions

and behavior had caused to the children. These findings

sufficiently demonstrate that the court determined that parenting

time with father endangered the children. See In re Marriage of

Parr, 240 P.3d 509, 512 (Colo. App. 2010) (“[W]hat constitutes

endangerment to a particular child’s physical or emotional health is

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a highly individualized determination . . . .”). The evidence

discussed above supports the court’s decision to restrict father’s

parenting time, and we therefore will not disturb it. See In re

Marriage of Newell, 192 P.3d 529, 534-35 (Colo. App. 2008)

(declining to disturb a court’s endangerment finding supported by

the record).

¶ 28 We also reject father’s argument that the court improperly

required him to engage in therapy and complete a psychological

evaluation before he could request parenting time. A court, in its

discretion, may impose reasonable conditions restricting parenting

time to serve the children’s best interests. See In re Marriage of

Zebedee, 778 P.2d 694, 699 (Colo. App. 1988) (approving a

condition that required father to complete psychological counseling

as a condition precedent to exercising parenting time). The court

found, with record support, that father’s erratic and impulsive

conduct indicated concerns with his mental health. It further

found that he must engage in treatment to understand the effect his

behavior was having on the children and learn to integrate that

treatment into his parenting to safely care for the children.

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¶ 29 The court therefore acted within its discretion to restrict

father’s parenting time and impose conditions on him before it

would allow him to exercise parenting time.

V. Disposition

¶ 30 The order is affirmed.

JUDGE FOX and JUDGE HARRIS concur.

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