Marriage of Haibt

24CA1113 Marriage of Haibt 07-10-2025

COLORADO COURT OF APPEALS

Court of Appeals No. 24CA1113
Douglas County District Court No. 21DR30473
Honorable Robert Lung, Judge

In re the Marriage of

Edward C. Haibt,

Appellant,

and

Heather Haibt,

Appellee.

JUDGMENT AFFIRMED AND CASE
REMANDED WITH DIRECTIONS

Division VI
Opinion by JUDGE WELLING
Kuhn and Schutz, JJ., concur

NOT PUBLISHED PURSUANT TO C.A.R. 35(e)
Announced July 10, 2025

Edward C. Haibt, Pro Se

Hogan Omidi, PC, Kathleen A. Hogan, Chelsea E. Moore, Denver, Colorado, for
Appellee
¶1 In this dissolution of marriage case, Edward C. Haibt

(husband) claims the trial court erred when it classified houses,

trusts, art, and furniture as the separate property of Heather Haibt

(wife); distributed the marital property; determined the parties’

incomes for purposes of maintenance; demonstrated bias; didn’t

allocate enough time for the hearing; awarded attorney fees without

a separate hearing; and ignored wife’s excessive spending and

loans. We disagree and affirm. We also remand for consideration of

wife’s request for an award of attorney fees.

I. Background

¶2 The parties had been married for twenty years at the time of

the 2023 permanent orders, and they didn’t have children. They

met while husband was on a temporary work assignment in the

Gunnison area. At the time, husband worked for Delta Airlines in

customer service, and wife worked for an RV company. Wife owned

and lived in a house in Gunnison (Gunnison house) at that time,

and she subsequently moved to Castle Rock near a golf course

(Castle Rock house), and husband moved in with her there, but she

retained the Gunnison house.

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¶3 The parties married in 2003, and wife’s mother died suddenly

two years later. Wife received a significant inheritance following her

mother’s death, and she decided to sell their Castle Rock house and

buy a multi-million-dollar house adjacent to a different golf course

in Parker (Parker house). Wife began spending large amounts of

time and money on her hobbies, which included sailing and golf.

¶4 In 2009 husband left his job in order to be a travelling

companion and golf partner to wife. Husband began working again

in 2019 as a financial advisor and, during the pendency of the

divorce proceedings, took a second job scheduling charter flights for

sports organizations.

¶5 Wife eventually purchased another house in Arizona solely

with money from her trust, and the title to that house was held by

an L.L.C. that wife owned. The couple also accrued several

expensive golf memberships at luxury golf clubs, seven cars,

jewelry, and art and furniture in all three houses.

¶6 Wife is the beneficiary of four trusts (Trusts One, Two, Three,

and Four). These trusts are almost entirely funded from

inheritances wife received following the deaths of members of her

family.

2
¶7 Husband filed for divorce in June 2021. The parties disputed

whether any of the trusts contained marital property, so the trial

court appointed a special master to determine whether the trusts,

any distributions from the trusts, and any assets obtained with

trust funds were marital or separate property. The special master

found that the regular payments wife received from the main trust

— Trust One — were marital. The special master also found that

Trusts One and Two had gained value during the marriage and

recommended that the court find that this appreciation was marital

property. The parties stipulated that Trusts Three and Four didn’t

contain marital property.

¶8 At the permanent orders hearing, both parties requested an

award of the bulk of the marital estate. The court awarded

husband forty percent of the marital estate including four of the

cars, his retirement accounts, almost all of the furniture in the

Gunnison house, and approximately $675,000 in cash. The court

reasoned that husband had sacrificed his career for the marriage

and had made noneconomic contributions to the marriage by

serving as wife’s travel companion and golf partner. The court

awarded wife the rest of the estate, including all three houses, three

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cars, and the art and remaining furniture. Finally, the court

ordered wife to pay husband maintenance in the amount of $6,000

per month for ninety-seven months.

II. Issues on Appeal

¶9 Husband’s appeal consists of twenty-one issues that at times

overlap or are repeated. Wife has requested attorney fees and costs

because she alleges husband’s appeal is frivolous and designed to

increase her legal costs. Husband contends that wife’s answer brief

violated the page limit and requests that the brief be struck.

¶ 10 Because of the number of issues husband presents, we have

grouped them according to the steps a trial court must take when

issuing permanent orders: (1) identifying any property as marital or

separate; (2) dividing the marital property equitably; (3) determining

maintenance; (4) determining whether to award attorney fees; and

(5) addressing remaining issues. In re Marriage of de Koning, 2016

CO 2, ¶¶ 21-23. We have also combined them, when necessary,

due to repetition of issues.

¶ 11 First, we address husband’s argument that wife’s answer brief

is too long, then we address his substantive arguments, and lastly

we address wife’s request for attorney fees.

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A. The Answer Brief

¶ 12 Husband argues that wife’s answer brief violates C.A.R. 28(g)

because it’s longer than thirty pages. But C.A.R. 28(g) doesn’t have

a default page limit for a party’s answer brief — only a requirement

that it “contain no more than 9,500 words.” C.A.R. 28(g)(1). The

rule does go on to restrict a brief filed by a self-represented party

who doesn’t have access to a word processor to no more than thirty

double-spaced one-sided pages. C.A.R. 28(g)(2). But wife is neither

self-represented nor lacking access to a word processor. And wife’s

counsel certified that the answer brief comported with the word

limits and other requirements of C.A.R. 28. Accordingly, because

husband’s argument has no merit, we reject his request to strike

wife’s answer brief.

B. Classification of Property

¶ 13 Husband advances four challenges to the trial court’s

classification of property as wife’s separate property. Husband

contends that the court erred when it classified wife’s houses,

trusts, art, and furnishings as her separate property because (1)

wife comingled houses and trust assets with the marital estate and

they grew in value; (2) the special master didn’t sufficiently trace

5
whether payments on the Arizona house came from the principal or

income of Trust One; (3) furnishings and art acquired during the

marriage should have been presumed to be marital unless proved

otherwise; and (4) the court over-relied on flawed testimony from

wife’s forensic accountant. We disagree that the court erred.

1. Standard of Review and Applicable Law

¶ 14 We can’t disturb a trial court’s division of property unless the

court abuses its discretion. In re Marriage of Balanson, 25 P.3d 28,

35 (Colo. 2001). When dividing property, the trial court must first

determine whether a party’s interest constitutes property and

whether that property is marital or separate. Id. Property acquired

during the marriage is generally considered marital, but

inheritances are included in an exception to that rule. § 14-10-

113(2), C.R.S. 2024.

¶ 15 A party must object to a special master’s order or

recommendations no later than fourteen days after being served

with them. C.R.C.P. 53(f)(2).

2. Additional Facts

¶ 16 The trial court appointed a special master to decide whether

the trusts and any payments related to the trusts were separate or

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marital property. The special master had both parties submit

expert reports and position statements on various issues, such as

the proposed value of wife’s trusts. Eventually, the special master

held a hearing where several experts testified, including wife’s

forensic accountant, Tiffany Nelson. The special master found that

the annual payments from Trust One to wife were marital property.

The special master found that Trusts One and Two had appreciated

during the marriage and classified that increase as marital

property. The special master also found that furniture and art —

valued at over $260,000 — were wife’s separate property. Finally,

the special master found by clear and convincing evidence that wife

had traced money from Trust One used to the purchase of the

Arizona house. The special master filed this report on February 2,

2024.

¶ 17 On February 27 — almost four weeks later and after the

objection deadline had passed — the trial court accepted, approved,

and adopted the special master’s final report and recommendations.

The trial court explicitly noted that neither party had objected to the

special master’s final report or recommendations.

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¶ 18 In their joint trial management certificate, the parties

stipulated to the values of the houses, the marital values of Trusts

One and Two, and that Trusts Three and Four weren’t marital

property.

3. Analysis

a. Assets Were Separate

¶ 19 Husband argues that the trial court erred by classifying Trusts

Three and Four as wife’s separate property. We disagree.

¶ 20 Husband stipulated at trial that Trusts Three and Four weren’t

marital property, and “‘[s]tipulations are a form of judicial

admission,’ and ‘are binding on the party who makes them.’”

Maloney v. Brassfield, 251 P.3d 1097, 1108 (Colo. App. 2010)

(citation omitted). A trial court has the discretion to relieve a party

of their stipulations if there is a “sound reason in law or equity for

avoiding or repudiating a stipulation.” Id. But husband doesn’t

point to a place in the record where he made such a request;

therefore the issue is waived. See In re Marriage of Evans, 2021

COA 141, ¶ 24 (Waiver is the “intentional relinquishment of a

known right.”). Because husband waived the issue, we won’t

8
consider further the trial court’s determination that Trusts Three

and Four weren’t marital property.

¶ 21 Next, husband contends that the court erred by awarding wife

all three of the houses. But none of the houses were purchased

with marital funds, nor is husband listed on any deeds or loans.

Wife owned the Gunnison house before the marriage, the Parker

house was purchased by Trust One and titled in its name, and wife

purchased the Arizona house with funds from Trust One in the

name of an L.L.C. that she owned. While property that is acquired

during a marriage is presumptively marital, if that property is an

inheritance, or acquired in exchange for property acquired by

inheritance, then it falls under an exception to the general rule.

See § 14-10-113(2). Because wife demonstrated that she used

separate funds to purchase all three houses, the trial court didn’t

err by concluding that those homes were her separate property.

b. Tracing Analysis

¶ 22 Husband next argues that it isn’t clear whether separate or

marital funds were used to purchase the Arizona house because

wife didn’t trace the origin of the trust money used to purchase the

house to Trust One’s principal or interest.

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¶ 23 However, the special master explicitly found that wife had

traced her payment for the Arizona house to her separate property

with clear and convincing evidence. And husband never objected to

the special master’s recommendations before the trial court adopted

them. See C.R.C.P. 53(f)(2).

¶ 24 Therefore, we perceive no errors in the trial court’s ruling that

the Arizona house was purchased with wife’s separate property.

c. The Art and Furnishings Were Separate Property

¶ 25 Next, husband contends that the court erred when it ruled

that luxury furnishings and “other personal property” were wife’s

separate property. But again, husband stipulated that over

$260,000 worth of art and furniture were wife’s separate property.

Husband doesn’t point to anything in the record that shows he

requested the court release him from his stipulation; therefore the

issue is waived. See Maloney, 251 P.3d at 1108; Evans, ¶ 24.

¶ 26 And if husband is referring to other items, he doesn’t identify

those items with any specificity. His record and legal citations don’t

provide any support for the propositions for which they are cited.

Therefore, husband’s argument is insufficiently developed. See

Antolovich v. Brown Grp. Retail, Inc., 183 P.3d 582, 604 (Colo. App.

10
2007) (refusing to address underdeveloped argument). In any

event, because husband waived the issue, we discern no error in

the trial court’s classification of any personal property, furniture, or

art as wife’s separate property.

d. Tiffany Nelson’s Expert Testimony

¶ 27 Husband next argues that the special master overly relied on

Tiffany Nelson’s expert testimony as a forensic accountant. Again,

however, husband didn’t object to the special master’s report before

the trial court adopted its recommendations. Therefore, this

challenge is waived, and we won’t address it. See Evans, ¶ 24.

C. Property Division

¶ 28 Husband argues that the court committed seven errors when

it divided the marital estate: (1) adopting a property division that

unfairly favored wife and left husband with insufficient resources to

maintain the marital lifestyle; (2) unfairly classifying as separate

debt a $100,000 loan wife took out against the Arizona house to pay

her separate, personal expenses during the divorce; (3) permitting

wife to encumber a marital asset by taking out the $100,000 loan

with the Arizona house as collateral; (4) failing to account for

husband’s noneconomic contributions to the marriage; (5) not

11
properly accounting for wife’s substantial spending; (6) denying his

request to be awarded the Arizona and Gunnison houses; and

(7) improperly awarding wife the Parker house and $260,000 worth

of art. We disagree.

1. Standard of Review

¶ 29 We review a court’s order dividing marital property for an

abuse of discretion. Balanson, 25 P.3d at 35.

2. Analysis

a. The Property Division and Marital Lifestyle

¶ 30 Husband argues that the court’s decision to award wife the

bulk of the marital estate, including all three houses and Trust

One, left him with insufficient resources to maintain the standard of

living he enjoyed during the marriage. But the court’s decision to

award wife the houses and Trust One was proper for two reasons.

¶ 31 First, as we discussed, supra Part II.B, the court properly

determined that those assets were wife’s separate property. She

inherited the money in Trust One and used it to buy the Parker and

Arizona houses. And she owned the Gunnison house before she

married husband.

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¶ 32 Additionally, the court relied on extensive testimony that the

couple’s spending during their marriage was unsustainable and

would completely deplete Trust One within four to five years.

Husband relies on In re Marriage of de Koning, 2016 CO 2, but that

case offers no support for his argument that wife’s separate

property should be appropriated for his benefit.

¶ 33 Accordingly, we discern no error in the court’s decision to

award wife the bulk of Trust One and all three of the houses.

b. The Loan

¶ 34 At trial, wife testified that she took out a $100,000 loan

against the Arizona house to pay off her credit card bills and to

comply with a court order that she pay $50,000 of husband’s

attorney fees.

¶ 35 Husband asserts that this loan was improperly categorized as

separate property by the judge. Husband claims that he was

improperly burdened by the additional debt that was created by the

loan. But husband doesn’t explain how he was burdened by the

loan — indeed, the record reflects that half of the loan was used to

pay husband’s attorney fees. And because wife was assigned the

entirety of the debt associated with the loan, we discern no burden

13
on husband. Because his argument is undeveloped, unsupported

by legal authority, and contradicted by the record, we decline to

address it further. See In re Marriage of Humphries, 2024 COA

92M, ¶ 31.

c. Encumbrance of a Marital Asset

¶ 36 Husband argues that the loan encumbered a marital asset.

But, as set forth above, supra Part II.B, the court properly

determined that the Arizona house wasn’t a marital asset, and

instead was wife’s separate property. Thus the loan didn’t

encumber marital property. We discern no error by the trial court.

d. Husband’s Noneconomic Contributions

¶ 37 Husband next contends that the trial court didn’t properly

consider his noneconomic contributions to the marriage — namely,

that he was wife’s travel companion, social partner, and

homemaker, and that he had quit his job at Delta. But the record

contradicts his argument. At the permanent orders hearing, the

court noted that husband “sacrificed his career” to take on the role

of wife’s “travel companion” and “golf partner.” Indeed, the court

awarded husband forty percent of the marital estate in large part

based on husband’s noneconomic contributions to the marriage.

14
Therefore, because the record shows the court considered

husband’s noneconomic contributions when it divided the marital

estate, we discern no error.

e. Wife’s Spending

¶ 38 Husband contends that the court failed to address wife’s

spending of nearly one million dollars a year in its final orders. The

record contradicts his assertion. In fact, the special master

referenced wife’s spending, noting that she had depleted her

separate property by seven million dollars during the marriage.

“[Wife] spent [seven million dollars] in an extremely generous way

on herself and on her husband and all of the things that she’s

acquired.” Because wife inherited the seven million dollars, it was

her separate property. Balanson, 25 P.3d at 36. Husband’s

assertion that by spending the seven million dollars wife depleted

the marital estate is unsupported by any evidence or legal

authority, so we reject it.

f. The Parker House and Art Collection

¶ 39 Husband asserts that the court erred by awarding wife the

Parker house and $260,000 worth of art. But again, husband

stipulated that the Parker house was wife’s separate property, and

15
that $260,000 of art and furniture was wife’s separate property.

Therefore, the issue is waived, and we won’t address it further.

Maloney, 251 P.3d at 1108; Evans, ¶ 24.

D. Maintenance

¶ 40 With respect to its award of maintenance, husband argues

that the court erred when it (1) counted his second job as income

for the purposes of calculating spousal maintenance; (2) failed to

account for wife’s actual income from her trusts; and (3) failed to

account for wife’s future inheritance in Trust Four.1

1. Standard of Review

¶ 41 We review a court’s decision to award maintenance for an

abuse of discretion, and we won’t disturb the court’s factual

findings if they are supported by the record. In re Marriage of

Medeiros, 2023 COA 42M, ¶ 58. We review the court’s application

of the law de novo. Id.

1 Husband twice claims the court failed to account for wife’s future

inheritance. We consolidated those arguments.

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2. Analysis

a. Husband’s Second Job

¶ 42 Husband argues that the trial court erred when it included his

second job as income for the purposes of calculating spousal

maintenance.2 Wife responds that husband didn’t sufficiently prove

how many hours he worked at both jobs, so the court didn’t err by

including his second job as income. We agree with wife.

¶ 43 The court referenced section 14-10-114(8)(c)(II)(C), C.R.S.

2024, when it made its findings regarding husband’s employment.

Section 14-10-114(8)(c)(II)(C) says that gross income, for purposes

of calculating maintenance, doesn’t include “[i]ncome from

additional jobs that result in the employment of the obligor more

than forty hours per week or more than what would otherwise be

considered to be full-time employment.” (Emphasis added.)

¶ 44 Husband cites In re Marriage of McSoud, 131 P.3d 1208 (Colo.

App. 2006), for the proposition that courts shouldn’t consider

temporary income when making long-term financial calculations

2 Husband also claims the court made an inappropriate remark

about how many jobs husband had, but his citation to the record
isn’t to any such statement — only the court’s discussion of wife’s
income.

17
like maintenance. But while McSoud addresses other legal issues

around permanent orders, it doesn’t address spousal maintenance

or how to determine a party’s income.

¶ 45 Husband doesn’t point to anywhere in the record where he

offered any testimony or other evidence that he worked forty hours

at his primary job as a financial advisor. “[A] party who fails to

present sufficient evidence at trial should not be allowed on appeal

to challenge the inadequacy of the evidence.” In re Marriage of

Zappanti, 80 P.3d 889, 892 (Colo. App. 2003). Moreover, it isn’t this

court’s responsibility to search the record for evidence that would

support the parties’ arguments. See C.A.R. 28(a)(5) (It is the

appellant’s responsibility to include “appropriate references to the

record.”); see also Valentine v. Mountain States Mut. Cas. Co., 252

P.3d 1182, 1186 (Colo. App. 2011) (This court isn’t required to

search the record when “a party does not point us to where an issue

was raised and resolved.”).

¶ 46 Accordingly, we reject husband’s contention that the court

erred by including his second job when it calculated his income for

the purpose of spousal maintenance.

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b. Consideration of Wife’s Income

¶ 47 Husband contends that the court didn’t properly consider

wife’s actual disbursements from her trusts during the marriage.

The record contradicts his argument.

¶ 48 Kevin Bervik, the trustee of Trusts One, Two, and Three,

testified that wife’s income from the trusts was $23,500 a month.

But Bervik also testified that the actual distributions from the

trusts had been much higher than that during the final years of the

marriage — around $885,000 a year, or $73,750 a month. The

court rejected that higher level of income as inappropriate, because

both parties were operating at a loss:

But if I strictly look at [$]23,500 as [wife’s]
gross income or her allowance under her own
expert’s testimony, I — I can stick to that. But
when we get to [section 14-10-114(3)(a)(I)(C)], it
says, “Financial resources of each party,
including, but not limited to actual or potential
income from separate property,” that brings in
that other $50,000 a month that she’s
benefitting from or she’s using.

I’ve already said she can’t live like that.
Neither of these parties can live the way they
propose they’re living or want to live or that
they theorize . . . that is their reasonable
financial needs. You can’t argue to me that
that’s your reasonable financial needs when
you’re living at a loss.

19
¶ 49 Because the court’s decision not to impute wife’s income

consistent with her spending during the marriage was reasonable

based on the evidence in the record, we won’t disturb it.

c. Trust Four

¶ 50 Husband argues that the court should have considered wife’s

potential inheritance from Trust Four when it calculated spousal

maintenance. But the parties stipulated that any money that might

be awarded to wife from Trust Four wasn’t marital property3, and

husband doesn’t claim to have requested that the court release him

from that stipulation. Accordingly, the issue is waived and we

decline to address it. See Maloney, 251 P.3d at 1108; Evans, ¶ 24.

E. Procedural Issues

¶ 51 Husband contends that the court erred when it (1) allotted

insufficient time for the final orders hearing; (2) exhibited bias

against him; and (3) failed to hold a separate hearing on his request

for attorney fees. We disagree.

3 The funds in Trust Four had been subject to a lawsuit for several

years at the time of the permanent orders hearing.

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1. The Hearing Time Allotted

¶ 52 Husband argues that the trial court erred by (1) only allotting

450 minutes for the permanent orders hearing and then rushing

the hearing to attend a memorial event; and (2) not providing

enough time for husband to cross-examine Nelson, wife’s expert

forensic accountant, about Trust Three. We disagree.

a. Adequacy of Allotted Time for Hearing

¶ 53 Husband argues that the 450 minutes allotted by the trial

court was insufficient for a permanent orders hearing that involved

a highly complex divorce with substantial assets. He also argues

that the trial court rushed the proceedings by ending early on the

second day. His arguments aren’t supported by the record.

¶ 54 The trial court clarified the time it was allotting the parties at

the beginning of the permanent orders hearing:

[Husband’s counsel:] Secondly, Your Honor, I
just wanted to make sure we are on the same
page — or I’m on the same page as you are
with regard to time. The scheduling order in
this case indicates two days. When we had
our phone conference before the scheduling
order was issued, I think the Court indicated a
day and a half. But I just wanted to make
sure we’re within whatever time you’re allotting
for the hearing.

21
THE COURT: Yeah. I have it down as a day
and a half. I think I have it down as two days
because I am issuing the order after this
hearing. And I can’t do that if I give you a
hundred percent of two days. . . .

So it is a full day today and a half-day
tomorrow, and then — and generally,
depending on the complexities of issues, we’ll
take an hour or two to finalize my notes and
then I just issue an oral ruling immediately
after the hearing.

¶ 55 After the court clarified the timeframe for the hearing,

husband’s counsel responded, “Very good.”

¶ 56 It is clear that husband’s counsel agreed to the court’s

allotment of time for the hearing. Husband claims his counsel

objected to the time allotted by the court but provides no citations

to the record for us to review. See Valentine, 252 P.3d at 1186 (a

party must provide record support for their arguments). In the

absence of any record support that husband’s counsel objected to

the time allotted by the court, and in light of his agreement to the

same, the issue is waived, and we won’t address it. See Evans,

¶ 24.

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b. Adequacy of Time for Cross-Examination

¶ 57 Husband next argues that the time allotted by the trial court

deprived him of his opportunity to cross-examine Tiffany Nelson,

the forensic accountant, about Trust Three. To the extent

husband’s argument relates to insufficient time, he waived that

argument by failing to object or request additional time. See Evans,

¶ 24. To the extent that husband is attempting to relitigate the

issue of whether Trust Three was marital property, we have already

determined that he waived that issue by stipulating that it wasn’t

marital property. See supra Part II.B.3.a.

2. Judicial Bias

¶ 58 Husband contends that the trial court judge exhibited bias

and compromised the fairness of the hearing by (1) displaying

favoritism and treating the financial behaviors of the parties

differently and (2) inappropriately offering financial advice to wife

after awarding husband a $675,000 equalization payment. We

disagree that the judge exhibited any bias.

a. Standard of Review

¶ 59 We review claims of judicial bias de novo. Sanders v. People,

2024 CO 33, ¶ 25. We will only question the result of a proceeding

23
if the judge was actually biased. People v. Garcia, 2024 CO 41M,

¶ 21. In order for a claim of bias to succeed, the party asserting

bias “must establish that the judge had a substantial bent of mind

against him or her.” People in Interest of A.P., 2022 CO 24, ¶ 30

(citation omitted). “The record must clearly demonstrate the alleged

bias. Bare assertions and speculative statements are insufficient to

satisfy the burden of proof.” Id. (citation omitted).

b. Favoritism

¶ 60 Husband argues that the judge exhibited bias by excessively

focusing on how much he spent on haircuts, while ignoring wife’s

much more significant spending habits that resulted in “the

depletion” of seven million dollars of marital assets. But the judge

didn’t question husband’s haircuts:

[THE COURT]: . . . We received testimony
about [husband] saying that he spends $1,300
a month in hair and clothing. He said that he
— he gets — once a month, he gets an [eighty
dollar] haircut. So then by that rationale . . .
he’s spending $1,220 a month on — on
clothing.

The judge only referenced the price of husband’s haircut in order to

accurately calculate how much husband was spending on clothing

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every month. The judge’s comment doesn’t demonstrate any bias at

all.

¶ 61 Additionally, husband claims that the judge made two other

disparaging remarks that demonstrated bias, but his record

citations don’t match his claims. Both of his record citations in

support of these statements are to his own counsel’s cross-

examination of wife, not any statement that he claims the judge

made. Because his argument is entirely without merit, legal

authority, or legal analysis, we don’t address it. Humphries, ¶ 31.

c. Financial Advice

¶ 62 Husband’s penultimate contention is that the judge

demonstrated bias when he offered wife financial advice but not

husband. But that isn’t true. The judge wasn’t offering wife

financial advice. Consider the exchange in question:

[THE COURT]: . . . I’m finding that the
equitable division of the marital estate is that
Wife would pay to Husband $675,730.60 from
her portion of the marital estate.

. . . Now, certainly I can understand the
question being, “Well, how do I do that?” Well,
to me, it seems obvious.

And — and I’m no financial expert, and I would
suggest you consult one. But when you have a

25
property worth $2,050,000 and the only . . .
outstanding debt [is $]391,726, it seem[s] very
evident to me that you have $[1,600,000] in
equity in this property and refinancing that to
pay out [$]675[,000] should be easy.

But again, I’m no financial expert, so I suggest
you consult one. But this payout is
manageable, and it’s appropriate, and it’s
equitable, and it’s supported by the law, and
it’s certainly supported by the Court’s
consideration of [section] 14-10-113.

¶ 63 It is clear that the judge was justifying the reasonableness of

his order that wife pay husband $675,730.60 — not offering

financial advice. Indeed, the judge repeatedly disavowed any

qualifications to be a financial advisor and encouraged wife to

consult one. Moreover, the judge’s comments fall far short of

establishing that he had a “substantial bent of mind” against

husband. A.P., ¶ 30 (citation omitted). Accordingly, we reject

husband’s judicial bias claim.

¶ 64 Because husband failed to show that the judge was actually

biased against him, we reject his argument that the judge’s

statement warrants any reconsideration of the permanent orders.

26
3. Special Hearing on Attorney Fees

¶ 65 Last, husband contends that the trial court erred by failing to

hold a hearing to determine whether the attorney fees were

reasonable. But husband creates a fictitious citation — Kendall v.

Kendall, 94 P.3d 606 (Colo. 2004) — in support of this contention.

We therefore decline to address husband’s argument.

F. Appellate Attorney Fees

¶ 66 Wife argues that husband’s appeal is frivolous and requests

that this court order husband to pay her appellate attorney fees and

costs under C.A.R. 38(b) and section 13-17-102, C.R.S. 2024. We

agree that husband’s appeal is frivolous for three reasons.

¶ 67 First, as we discuss throughout this opinion, the legal

citations in husband’s briefs rarely support the proposition for

which they were cited. Moreover, two of his contentions aren’t

accompanied by citations to any legal authority at all. Even more

egregious, as we noted supra Part II.E.3, husband cited a

nonexistent case. Cf. Al-Hamim v. Star Hearthstone, LLC, 2024 COA

128, ¶ 41 (parties to any action in this court are warned against

filings that contain “hallucinations” produced by generative artificial

intelligence). Despite wife pointing out these deficiencies in her

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answer brief, husband didn’t offer an explanation or rebuttal;

instead he continued the practice in his reply brief.

¶ 68 Second, most of husband’s twenty-one separate contentions

are woefully underdeveloped. Several are repeated. Many contain

claims that aren’t substantiated by the record or include inaccurate

record citations.

¶ 69 Third, husband’s brief violates C.A.R. 28(a)(7)(A) because it

doesn’t contain any legal authorities to justify husband’s standards

of review.

¶ 70 Given all of this, we agree with wife that husband’s appeal

lacks substantial justification because the appeal is substantially

frivolous and groundless. See § 13-17-102(2). But because

husband isn’t represented by counsel on appeal, that conclusion

alone isn’t an adequate basis for an award of attorney fees. Section

13-17-102(6) requires that “[a] party who is appearing without an

attorney . . . shall not be assessed attorney fees . . . unless the

court finds that the party clearly knew or reasonably should have

known that the party’s action . . . was substantially frivolous,

substantially groundless, or substantially vexatious.” (Emphasis

added.) Because of the fact-intensive nature of the inquiry of

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whether husband clearly knew or should have known that his

appeal was frivolous, as an appellate court we aren’t in a good

position to make this determination. The trial court, however, is.

See In re Marriage of Nevedrova, 2024 COA 112, ¶ 18 (“Because the

district court is better equipped to determine the factual issues

regarding the parties’ current financial resources, we remand the

issue of whether wife should be awarded reasonable appellate

attorney fees to the district court.”).

¶ 71 Therefore, on remand, the trial court should first assess

whether husband clearly knew or should have known that his

appeal was substantially frivolous and groundless as required by

section 13-17-102(6). If the trial court determines that husband

did have the requisite knowledge (and that, therefore, attorney fees

on appeal are appropriate), then it shall determine and award wife

her reasonable attorney fees and costs incurred on appeal. See,

e.g., Tisch v. Tisch, 2019 COA 41, ¶ 93 (recognizing this court’s

discretion under C.A.R. 39.1 to remand the case to the trial court

for a determination of reasonable appellate attorney fees).

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III. Disposition

¶ 72 The judgment is affirmed, and the case is remanded to the

trial court to address issues related to wife’s request for an award of

appellate attorney fees.

JUDGE KUHN and JUDGE SCHUTZ concur.

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