Peo in Interest of OAA

25CA0121 Peo in Interest of OAA 07-03-2025

COLORADO COURT OF APPEALS

Court of Appeals No. 25CA0121
Mesa County District Court No. 24JV70
Honorable Craig P. Henderson, Judge

The People of the State of Colorado,

Appellee,

In the Interest of O.A.A., a Child,

and Concerning J.P. a/k/a J.A.,

Appellant.

JUDGMENT AFFIRMED

Division III
Opinion by JUDGE BROWN
Dunn and Schock, JJ., concur

NOT PUBLISHED PURSUANT TO C.A.R. 35(e)
Announced July 3, 2025

Todd M. Starr, County Attorney, Brad Junge, Assistant County Attorney,
Grand Junction, Colorado, for Appellee

Jenna L. Mazzucca, Guardian Ad Litem

Lindsey Parlin, Office of Respondent Parents’ Council, Denver, Colorado, for
Appellant
¶1 J.P. a/k/a J.A. (mother) appeals the judgment adjudicating

O.A.A. (the child) dependent or neglected. We affirm.

I. Background

¶2 The Mesa County Department of Human Services filed a

petition in dependency or neglect because the newborn child tested

positive for methamphetamine. The Department placed the child

with a foster family upon his discharge from the hospital.

¶3 Mother appeared for the shelter hearing where she agreed to

continue the hearing. She did not appear for any further

proceedings.

¶4 Following a bench trial, the juvenile court adjudicated the

child dependent or neglected under section 19-3-102(1)(b), (c), and

(g), C.R.S. 2024.

II. Sufficiency of the Evidence

¶5 Mother contends that the evidence was insufficient to

establish that the child was dependent or neglected. We disagree.

A. Applicable Law and Standard of Review

¶6 The purpose of an adjudicatory trial is to determine whether

the factual allegations in the dependency or neglect petition are

supported by a preponderance of the evidence and whether the

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status of the child warrants intrusive protective or corrective state

intervention into the familial relationship. People in Interest of

G.E.S., 2016 COA 183, ¶ 13. A child may be adjudicated dependent

or neglected if the government proves one or more of the conditions

set forth in section 19-3-102. People in Interest of S.M-L., 2016 COA

173, ¶ 25, aff’d on other grounds sub nom People in Interest of R.S.

v. G.S., 2018 CO 31. As relevant here, a child is dependent or

neglected when (1) the child lacks proper parental care through the

actions or omissions of the parent; (2) the child’s environment is

injurious to the child’s welfare; or (3) the child is born affected by

substance exposure and the child’s health or welfare is threatened

by substance use. § 19-3-102(1)(b), (c), and (g).

¶7 An adjudication of dependency or neglect must be based on

existing circumstances and related to the child’s status at the time

of adjudication. People in Interest of A.E.L., 181 P.3d 1186, 1192

(Colo. App. 2008). Adjudications “are not made as to the parents

but, rather, relate only to the status of the child as of the date of the

adjudication.” K.D. v. People, 139 P.3d 695, 699 (Colo. 2006)

(quoting People in Interest of S.B., 742 P.2d 935, 939 (Colo. App.

1987)).

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¶8 A child is not dependent or neglected if the parent has made

appropriate arrangements for the child’s care by a person who has

a genuine interest in the child’s welfare. See Diernfeld v. People,

323 P.2d 628, 631 (Colo. 1958). A child placed with relatives has

“proper parental care when the parent sends gifts of clothing,

money, food, household items, toys, and medical supplies to the

child, and frequently visits and communicates with the child.”

People in Interest of F.M., 609 P.2d 1123, 1125 (Colo. App. 1980)

(citing Jones v. Koulos, 349 P.2d 704 (1960)).

¶9 In determining whether the evidence is sufficient to sustain an

adjudication, we review the record in the light most favorable to the

prevailing party and draw every inference fairly deducible from the

evidence in favor of the court’s decision. People in Interest of S.G.L.,

214 P.3d 580, 583 (Colo. App. 2009). Whether a child is dependent

or neglected presents a mixed question of fact and law because it

requires the application of evidentiary facts to statutory grounds.

People in Interest of M.M., 2017 COA 144, ¶ 17. Thus, we review the

juvenile court’s factual findings for clear error but review de novo

the court’s legal conclusions based on those facts. People in Interest

of S.R.N.J-S., 2020 COA 12, ¶ 10. We will not disturb the court’s

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findings and conclusions if the record supports them, even though

reasonable people might arrive at different conclusions based on the

same facts. S.G.L., 214 P.3d at 583.

B. Discussion

¶ 10 Mother argues that the evidence was insufficient to establish

the statutory criteria for adjudication because she had a safety plan

before the child’s birth, which involved placement with maternal

aunt. We disagree.

1. Lack of Proper Parental Care

¶ 11 The juvenile court found that the child lacked proper parental

care because mother had no contact with the child since his birth,

had made no attempts to parent the child, and had not

communicated with the Department or maternal aunt. The record

supports the court’s findings.

¶ 12 The caseworker testified that the last time mother had contact

with the child was the day he was born. The caseworker attempted

to locate mother (1) through every address and phone number in

the Colorado courts database; (2) by contacting her sister, attorney,

and parent advocate; (3) by sending letters; and (4) by sending

messages to mother’s Facebook account. But the caseworker could

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not locate mother and mother never reached out to the caseworker.

The caseworker testified that mother had not engaged in the case,

had not seen the child, had not asked about the child or his needs,

and had not attended any of the child’s doctor’s appointments. And

after the shelter hearing, mother did not appear for any further

proceedings. As a result, the caseworker opined, mother knew

nothing about the child’s needs and the child lacked proper

parental care.

¶ 13 To the extent mother contends that the juvenile court erred

because the child would have had proper parental care had mother

been allowed to enter into a safety plan which included placement

of the child with maternal aunt, we are not persuaded. See

§ 19-3-309.5(3), C.R.S. 2024 (although available, nothing confers a

right upon a person who is believed to be responsible for the abuse

or neglect of a child to enter into a safety plan or requires a county

department to offer one). The juvenile court considered evidence

regarding mother’s safety plan but found that the Department

decided not to place the child with maternal aunt and that the

Department’s decision had previously been reviewed by the court.

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¶ 14 The ongoing caseworker, who had been working with mother

for two years on a previous dependency or neglect case, testified

that maternal aunt was with mother at the hospital and that “they

had a couple of different ideas floating around, but it didn’t really

seem like an actual plan in place.” And the emergency caseworker

testified that she was not comfortable placing the child with

maternal aunt because of “lack of engagement with [maternal aunt]

and her husband in the previous case.” The Department attempted

to conduct a home study with maternal aunt for the previous case,

but the family did not complete it because the aunt’s husband was

concerned about “what would come back on his background

check.” A new home study was initiated for this case but had not

yet been completed.

¶ 15 Accordingly, the juvenile court heard evidence about mother’s

proposed plan to place the child with maternal aunt and was free to

accord it the weight it felt appropriate. Mother’s argument

essentially asks us to reweigh this evidence and find in her favor,

which we cannot do. See People in Interest of K.L.W., 2021 COA 56,

¶ 62. We conclude that the record supports the juvenile court’s

determination that the child lacked proper parental care.

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2. Other Statutory Grounds

¶ 16 Mother also argues that the pediatrician’s testimony was

insufficient to establish that the child’s health issues were related

to substance exposure. But having concluded that sufficient

evidence supports the juvenile court’s determination that the child

was dependent or neglected on one statutory ground, we need not

address the remaining grounds. S.M-L., ¶ 29 (“[S]ection 19-3-102

requires proof of only one condition for an adjudication.”).

III. Disposition

¶ 17 The judgment is affirmed.

JUDGE DUNN and JUDGE SCHOCK concur.

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