Peo v. Dexter

23CA0585 Peo v Dexter 07-03-2025

COLORADO COURT OF APPEALS

Court of Appeals No. 23CA0585
Garfield County District Court No. 22CR99
Honorable John F. Neiley, Judge

The People of the State of Colorado,

Plaintiff-Appellee,

v.

Jordan Akia Dexter,

Defendant-Appellant.

JUDGMENT AFFIRMED

Division I
Opinion by JUDGE KUHN
Moultrie and Berger*, JJ., concur

NOT PUBLISHED PURSUANT TO C.A.R. 35(e)
Announced July 3, 2025

Philip J. Weiser, Attorney General, Trina K. Kissel, Senior Assistant Attorney
General and Assistant Solicitor General, Denver, Colorado, for Plaintiff-Appellee

James West, Alternate Defense Counsel, Longmont, Colorado, for Defendant-
Appellant

* Sitting by assignment of the Chief Justice under provisions of Colo. Const.
art. VI, § 5(3), and § 24-51-1105, C.R.S. 2024.
¶1 Defendant, Jordan Akia Dexter, appeals the judgment of

conviction after a jury found him guilty of two counts of attempt to

influence a public servant and one count of harassment by

telephone. We affirm.

I. Background

¶2 In January 2021, Detective Jeffrey Fain of the Glenwood

Springs Police Department obtained and executed a search warrant

for Dexter’s home based on information that Dexter was in

possession of a firearm in violation of a civil protection order.

Officers seized an AR-15 and ammunition from Dexter’s bedroom

while executing the warrant. Later that day, Dexter was arrested

and charged with a protection order violation for possessing the

firearm.

¶3 On February 14, 2022, the prosecution dismissed the criminal

case against Dexter because there was a clerical error in the

protection order, and it did not restrict Dexter from possessing

firearms. After the case was dismissed, the protection order was

modified to prohibit Dexter from possessing firearms.

¶4 Between February 15 and March 11, Dexter repeatedly called

the Glenwood Springs Police Department and various law

1
enforcement dispatch centers to get the firearm, that he said

belonged to his friend, returned. Based on these calls, the

prosecution charged Dexter with three counts of attempt to

influence a public servant, six counts of harassment, and one count

of telephone harassment. See § 18-8-306, C.R.S. 2024 (attempt to

influence a public servant); § 18-9-111(1)(e), C.R.S. 2024

(harassment); § 18-9-111(1)(f), C.R.S. 2024 (telephone harassment).

¶5 After a jury trial, Dexter was convicted of two of the attempt to

influence a public servant counts — one for the call he made to a

Garfield County dispatch operator and one for the call he made to a

Mesa County dispatch supervisor. He was also convicted of

telephone harassment for the calls he made to the Garfield County

nonemergency line. The jury acquitted Dexter of the remaining

counts, all of which involved Detective Fain. The trial court

imposed a three-year probationary sentence for the attempt to

influence a public servant counts and a concurrent one-year

probationary sentence for the telephone harassment conviction.

II. Analysis

¶6 Dexter contends that his convictions for attempt to influence a

public servant must be reversed because (1) he was convicted of

2
speech that did not rise to the level of “true threats” under the

United States and Colorado Constitutions and (2) the attempt to

influence a public servant statute, section 18-8-306, is

unconstitutionally vague and overbroad as applied to him. Dexter

further contends that the evidence presented at trial was

insufficient to sustain his conviction for harassment by telephone.

We reject each of these contentions and affirm the judgment.

A. True Threats

¶7 Dexter contends that his speech did not rise to the level of

“true threats” and is therefore constitutionally protected.

1. Applicable Law and Standard of Review

¶8 The First Amendment to the United States Constitution

provides that “Congress shall make no law . . . abridging the

freedom of speech.” U.S. Const. amend. I. But the protections

afforded by the First Amendment are not absolute; there are

categories of speech the government may permissibly regulate.

People v. Stanley, 170 P.3d 782, 786 (Colo. App. 2007) (citing

Virginia v. Black, 538 U.S. 343, 358 (2003)). One such category is

“true threats.” Id. “True threats of violence, everyone agrees, lie

outside the bounds of the First Amendment’s protection.”

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Counterman v. Colorado, 600 U.S. 66, 72 (2023). Accordingly, any

statute that criminalizes threats must be applied and interpreted

consistently with the First Amendment. Stanley, 170 P.3d at 786;

see also Watts v. United States, 394 U.S. 705, 707 (1969); People v.

Hickman, 988 P.2d 628, 639-41 (Colo. 1999).

¶9 Section 18-8-306 provides:

Any person who attempts to influence any
public servant by means of deceit or by threat
of violence or economic reprisal against any
person or property, with the intent thereby to
alter or affect the public servant’s decision,
vote, opinion, or action concerning any matter
which is to be considered or performed by the
public servant or the agency or body of which
the public servant is a member, commits a
class 4 felony.

Because section 18-8-306 criminalizes threats, courts must

interpret it to limit criminal culpability to statements constituting

“true threats.” Stanley, 170 P.3d at 786.

¶ 10 “True threats are ‘serious expressions’ conveying that a

speaker means to ‘commit an act of unlawful violence.’”

Counterman, 600 U.S. at 74 (quoting Black, 538 U.S. at 359). As

the Supreme Court explained in Counterman, “The ‘true’ in that

term distinguishes what is at issue from jests, ‘hyperbole,’ or other

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statements that when taken in context do not convey a real

possibility that violence will follow (say, ‘I am going to kill you for

showing up late’).” Id. (quoting Watts, 394 U.S. at 708).

¶ 11 Generally, the existence of a true threat depends on what the

statement conveys to the person on the other end, and not on

whether the speaker was aware of, or intended to convey, the

threatening aspect of the message. Id.; see also Black, 538 U.S. at

359-60 (“The speaker need not actually intend to carry out the

threat.”). Additionally, the Court in Counterman held that in

true-threat prosecutions, the First Amendment requires the

prosecution to prove “that the defendant had some subjective

understanding of the threatening nature of his statements,” thereby

abrogating Colorado’s objective person test. Counterman, 600 U.S.

at 69, 71-73. Specifically, the Court held that the prosecution must

prove that the defendant, at a minimum, acted recklessly — that is,

that he “consciously disregarded a substantial risk that his

communications would be viewed as threatening violence.” Id. at

69.

¶ 12 Whether a statement is a true threat is a question of fact to be

determined by the fact finder. People v. Chase, 2013 COA 27, ¶ 70.

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However, “where First Amendment concerns are implicated, the

court has an obligation to make an independent review of the

record to assure that the judgment does not impermissibly intrude

on the field of free expression.” Id. That review is “akin to de novo

review.” Anderson v. Griswold, 2023 CO 63, ¶ 227, rev’d on other

grounds by Trump v. Anderson, 601 U.S. 100 (2024). Therefore, we

“may give some ‘presumption of correctness’ to factual findings,”

and otherwise “examine for ourselves the statements in issue and

the circumstances under which they were made to see . . . whether

they are of a character which the principles of the First Amendment

. . . protect.” Id. (quoting Bose Corp. v. Consumers Union of U.S.,

Inc., 466 U.S. 485, 500 (1984); ellipses in original).

¶ 13 Initially, we note that Dexter’s trial occurred before

Counterman was announced. In anticipation of the Court’s ruling,

however, Dexter was prosecuted in accordance with a subjective

standard. The jury was instructed that a true threat required the

prosecution to prove that Dexter subjectively intended to threaten a

public servant during his calls. This standard was greater than the

recklessness mental state that Counterman requires. See

Counterman, 600 U.S. at 78-79 (“Purpose is the most culpable level

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in the standard mental-state hierarchy, and the hardest to prove. A

person acts purposefully when he ‘consciously desires’ a

result — so here, when he wants his words to be received as

threats.”). Thus, giving “some presumption of correctness,”

Anderson, ¶ 227, to the jury’s factual finding that Dexter

subjectively intended to threaten the dispatch operators, we now

examine for ourselves the statements at issue.

2. Garfield County Dispatch Operator (Count 2)

¶ 14 In the phone call to the Garfield County dispatch center,

Dexter tells the dispatcher that the Glenwood Springs Police

Department has stolen his property and she “better put somebody

high up on the phone right now because they are going to release

my property or I’m going to come physically take my property. And

that’s not a threat, that’s a promise.”

¶ 15 The dispatcher asks Dexter where his property was taken from

before he interrupts her by telling her that the Glenwood Springs

Police Department does not have “legal authority” to have his

property “so you better put someone high up on Glenwood Springs

Police Department’s list on my phone right now or I will take my

property by force, that’s not a threat, it’s a promise.”

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¶ 16 The dispatcher then tells Dexter that she will get an officer in

touch with him and again asks for the address from where his

property was taken. After providing the address, Dexter explains

that the judge and the district attorney are “shaking in their boots”

because “the search warrant was filled out improperly,” “so

somebody better get me my property five freaking minutes ago.”

¶ 17 Dexter tells the dispatcher that he has been on the phone with

records at Glenwood Springs Police Department “so you better get a

real officer on the phone to bring me my property or explain to me

the legal authority he has to keep my property, or I’m going to come

get that officer for my property today.” The dispatcher confirms

that they will have an officer call Dexter, gets his name and phone

number, and Dexter tells her, “you’ve got forty-five minutes or I’m

going to come looking” before ending the call.

¶ 18 Dexter alleges that while he threatened and promised to go to

the police station and remove his property by force, there was “no

chance” that he was expressing a serious intent to do so, or that the

dispatcher could reasonably interpret his words in that way.

Rather, he contends, his words were firmly in the realm of “bluster

and hyperbole.” We’re not persuaded.

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¶ 19 As previously discussed, Dexter did not need to intend to carry

out the threats he made for his words to qualify as “true threats.”

See Counterman, 600 U.S. at 74; see also Black, 538 U.S. at

359-60. Instead, the existence of a true threat depends on what the

statement conveys to the person on the other end. Id. And here,

the dispatcher testified that she did not know Dexter, she perceived

that he was upset and frustrated, and she took his threats

seriously. After the call, she created a call narrative within the

dispatch center’s system, which would be routed to the Glenwood

Springs Police Department. In the narrative she noted that Dexter

had his property taken by the Glenwood Springs Police Department,

he had questions about the law, and “somebody had five minutes to

call him back or he would come looking” and would physically take

his property back.

¶ 20 Moreover, based on our independent review of the call, nothing

in Dexter’s tone or words suggested that his threat was either

bluster or hyperbole. The call was made the day after his protection

order violation case was dismissed. He was upset, his tone was

forceful, and he repeatedly threatened to take his property back by

physical force if the dispatcher did not connect him to someone

9
“high up” in the Glenwood Springs Police Department. See Black,

538 U.S. at 359 (“‘True threats’ encompass those statements where

the speaker means to communicate a serious expression of an

intent to commit an act of unlawful violence to a particular

individual or group of individuals.”). Accordingly, we conclude that

Dexter’s statements to the Garfield County dispatch operator were

true threats, unprotected by the First Amendment.

3. Mesa County Dispatch Supervisor (Count 3)

¶ 21 In the call to the Mesa County dispatch operator, Dexter

explains that he is trying to make a report against the Glenwood

Springs Police Department for “failure to do their duty.” The

dispatcher explains that Dexter has reached Mesa County dispatch,

and they do not dispatch for the Glenwood Springs Police

Department. Dexter responds that he has been trying for “three

weeks” to get someone “higher up” at the Glenwood Springs Police

Department to call him back and, this time, he called the U.S.

Marshal but was rerouted to her.

¶ 22 When the dispatcher repeats that they do not dispatch for the

Glenwood Springs Police Department, Dexter, increasingly

frustrated, tells her that he has a report to make against the

10
department and he doesn’t “give a flying fuck if anybody doesn’t

want to take it, somebody is going to take it.” When Dexter starts

threatening to start “shooting up fucking tyrants,” he is quickly

transferred to a supervisor.

¶ 23 Once connected to the supervisor, Dexter immediately says,

Alright so before you say you don’t dispatch to
Glenwood, I don’t fucking care. If you don’t
listen to what I have to say, this is the last call
I’m going to make, or I’m going to start
shooting up fucking tyrants. And that’s the
last time I’m going to say it.

¶ 24 Dexter then explains how Detective Fain is violating his and

his friend’s civil rights, references that someone needs to talk to

Detective Fain that day, or he will “and you don’t want that.”

Dexter demands that the supervisor “put a cop on the phone.”

Then he says that if someone from the Glenwood Springs Police

Department contacts him and threatens him, he “will absolutely

end a tyrant’s life . . . hands down, no questions asked, on a

recorded line.”

¶ 25 When the supervisor tells Dexter that “none of our agencies

are able to help you,” he tells her to dispatch him to the U.S.

Marshal’s service, “which absolutely fucking can.” She explains

11
they do not dispatch for the U.S. Marshal’s service, only to the

Collbran or De Beque Marshal. Dexter tells her to “have a Marshal

call me.” When the supervisor tells him she “won’t be having a

Marshal call” him but would “be happy to give [his] information to a

Glenwood Springs Police Department officer,” he asks for her name

and operator number. He then tells her, “I’ll have your address by

the end of the day.” She gives him her operator number, and they

end the call.

¶ 26 Dexter asserts that his words “shoot a tyrant” were not threats

to shoot officers, or Detective Fain, but rather, were generalized

statements and “bluster in explicitly political language.” But the

record directly refutes this argument because Dexter tells the

supervisor that he “doesn’t need the Glenwood police department to

contact me and threaten me some more. If they contact me and

threaten me some more, I will absolutely end a tyrant’s life.” In this

instance, Dexter directly refers to the Glenwood Springs Police

Department officers as “tyrants.”

¶ 27 Additionally, the supervisor testified that she did not know

Dexter, he “seemed very serious” and “angry,” and she “had no

reason to believe” that this might not be a real threat of physical

12
violence. Indeed, after concluding the call, she contacted the

Garfield County dispatch center to notify them that someone “was

making threats towards their department.”

¶ 28 Moreover, in a separate call introduced at trial with Detective

Fain, Dexter refers to the Glenwood Springs Police Department as

“a bunch of tyrants.” See Counterman, 600 U.S. at 74 (considering

the statement “when taken in context” to determine whether it

conveys a real possibility that violence will follow); see also People v.

Janousek, 871 P.2d 1189, 1198 (Colo. 1994) (Mullarkey, J.,

specially concurring) (“[T]he critical inquiry for First Amendment

purposes is whether the statements, viewed in the context in which

they were spoken or written, constitute a ‘true threat.’”). Taken

together and in context, Dexter’s references to shooting a tyrant

were directed at Detective Fain and the Glenwood Springs Police

Department.

¶ 29 Nor are we persuaded by Dexter’s argument that the reference

to “tyrants” was only an expression of political thought and

dissatisfaction with his treatment by the government — in other

words that it was core political speech. See Meyer v. Grant, 486

U.S. 414, 425 (1988) (noting that political speech protections are at

13
their “zenith” when core political speech is at issue). While the

district court noted that Dexter’s reference to “tyrants” mirrored

Thomas Jefferson’s “1787 letter to William Stephens Smith, John

Adams’ son-in-law, that ‘The tree of liberty must be refreshed from

time to time with the blood of patriots and tyrants,’” in context, it

nevertheless contained a true threat. See People in Interest of R.D.,

2020 CO 44, ¶ 54 (“[A] veiled statement may carry a true threat.”),

abrogated on other grounds by Counterman, 600 U.S. at 82; see also

United States v. Jeffries, 692 F.3d 473, 482 (6th Cir. 2012) (“But

one cannot duck [a threats prosecution] merely by delivering the

threat in verse or by dressing it up with political (and protected)

attacks on the legal system.”), abrogated on other grounds by Elonis

v. United States, 575 U.S. 723 (2015).

¶ 30 Dexter also asserts that his statement to the supervisor, “I’ll

have your address by the end of the day,” was not a true threat

because it was not connected to any request and could not have

been aimed at influencing anything. But the supervisor testified

that she perceived his specific statements to her as “threatening”

and she found “the reference to finding [her] home address” to be

“troubling.” See Stanley, 170 P.3d at 790 (one factor considered in

14
identifying a true threat is the subjective reaction of the recipient).

Further, our independent review of the call confirms that Dexter’s

tone was forceful and aggressive, he was angry, and when the

supervisor refused to have a U.S. Marshal call him, he threatened

her by asking for her name and operator number and by informing

her that he would have her address by the end of the day. These

were not, as Dexter claims “colorful expression[s] of political

thought and frustration.” Rather, we conclude that Dexter’s

statements to the Mesa County dispatch supervisor were true

threats, unprotected by the First Amendment.

B. As-Applied Constitutional Challenges to Section 18-8-306

¶ 31 Having concluded that Dexter’s statements were “true threats”

we turn next to his contention that section 18-8-306 is

unconstitutionally vague and overbroad as applied to him.

1. Dexter Did Not Preserve His Vagueness Challenge

¶ 32 As an initial matter, we note that the parties disagree as to

whether Dexter preserved his argument that section 18-8-306 is

unconstitutionally vague as applied to him. Before trial, Dexter

moved to dismiss all of the counts against him as

“unconstitutionally vague and overbroad as applied, because the

15
alleged misconduct does not constitute true threats.” At a hearing

on the motion, the parties discussed only whether the statements

the prosecution intended to elicit at trial were “true threats” and

how a jury instruction should be crafted so that the jury could

make this determination. The court then took testimony from

Detective Fain. Following the hearing, the district court issued a

written order denying Dexter’s motion but noting that he could

re-raise it at the close of the prosecution’s case. In the written

order, the district court addressed Dexter’s argument that the

statute was “unconstitutional on vagueness grounds because [it]

implicate[s] a question of what constitutes a true threat.” However,

because the court perceived the objection as a “facial challenge,” it

rejected it citing to Janousek, where the supreme court concluded

that section 18-8-306 was not vague or ambiguous on its face. See

Janousek, 871 P.2d at 1197.

¶ 33 At trial, after the conclusion of the prosecution’s case, defense

counsel made a motion for judgment of acquittal and argued, as

relevant here, that the statements Dexter made were not true

threats. The court denied the motion, finding that “the evidence

and testimony presented at this point in the case . . . is sufficient

16
for a reasonable juror to come to the conclusion that these

[statements] constitute true threats that are not protected speech

under either the United States or Colorado Constitution[s].”

¶ 34 On appeal, Dexter makes a different vagueness argument. He

does not argue that the statute is unconstitutionally vague on its

face or as applied to him because it implicates a question of what

constitutes a true threat. Rather, Dexter argues that section

18-8-306 is unconstitutionally vague as applied to him because “[a]

person of ordinary intelligence in [his] position could not have

discerned that asking only for innocuous results from a public

official — even if accompanied by a threat (which may constitute a

different crime) — was committing a crime under this statute.” This

argument was not preserved. See People v. Ujaama, 2012 COA 36,

¶ 37 (“An issue is unpreserved for review when, among other things

. . . an objection or request was made in the trial court, but on

grounds different from those raised on appeal . . . .”).

¶ 35 Nor are we persuaded that the argument was preserved

because defense counsel argued during his motion for a judgment

of acquittal that the requests Dexter made of the various law

enforcement agencies were not “of the sort contemplated by the

17
statute” because they were “perfectly reasonable requests.” Here,

counsel was arguing sufficiency of the evidence, not statutory

vagueness. Indeed, the district court ruled on this argument based

on sufficiency of the evidence, not vagueness. See id.; see also

Martinez v. People, 2015 CO 16, ¶ 14 (“Parties must make

objections that are specific enough to draw the trial court’s

attention to the asserted error.”).

¶ 36 Because we conclude that Dexter’s vagueness challenge to

section 18-8-306 was not preserved, we will not address it. See

People v. Stone, 2020 COA 23, ¶ 49 (declining to address “a different

as-applied claim on appeal” that was not presented to the district

court); see also People v. Veren, 140 P.3d 131, 140 (Colo. App.

2005) (“To support [an as-applied statutory challenge], it is

imperative that the trial court make some factual record that

indicates what causes the statute to be unconstitutional as

applied.”).

2. Section 18-8-306 Is Not Overbroad As Applied

¶ 37 Next, we address Dexter’s claim that section 18-8-306 is

unconstitutionally overbroad as applied to him because it “reaches

all possible statements or actions which may influence and alter the

18
course of a public official’s action or decisions.” Dexter contends

that the statute “sweeps in far more speech than can or should be

prohibited, therefore, infringing on the exercise of a fundamental or

express constitutional right.”

¶ 38 We review the constitutionality of a statute as applied de novo.

Chase, ¶ 65. A statute is presumed to be constitutional, and the

party challenging its validity has the burden of proving

unconstitutionality beyond a reasonable doubt. Janousek, 871

P.2d at 1195.

¶ 39 The critical elements of section 18-8-306 are “(1) an attempt to

influence a public servant (2) by means of deceit or by threat of

violence or economic reprisal (3) with the intent to alter or affect the

public servant’s decision or action.” Janousek, 871 P.2d at 1194.

“The purpose of the statute is to protect public servants from undue

influence or intimidation by means of deceit or by threat of violence

or economic reprisal.” Id.

¶ 40 The tone and language Dexter used on the calls with the two

dispatchers was threatening. He threatened violence if they did not

comply with his requests to transfer him to someone “high up” in

the Glenwood Springs Police Department. He threatened violence if

19
they didn’t “listen to what [he] ha[d]to say” and connect him to a

U.S. Marshal. And the dispatchers testified that they took what he

had to say seriously. The language Dexter used went beyond mere

“innocuous requests” and, as we have already discussed, does not

lie within the area of protected speech.

¶ 41 Dexter has no constitutionally protected right to make threats

of violence to a public servant. See id. at 1193. And he points to no

language he used that should not be covered by the statute.

Because the language Dexter used fits squarely within the statute’s

proscriptions — and constitutes true threats not protected by the

First Amendment — Dexter has failed to carry his burden of

showing that the statute is unconstitutional as applied to him. See

id. at 1195.

C. Sufficiency of the Evidence (Count 9)

¶ 42 Dexter contends that the prosecution did not present

sufficient evidence to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that he was

guilty of harassment by telephone. We again disagree.

1. Standard of Review and Applicable Law

¶ 43 Irrespective of preservation, we review the record de novo to

determine whether the trial evidence was sufficient to sustain the

20
jury’s verdict. McCoy v. People, 2019 CO 44, ¶ 27; Dempsey v.

People, 117 P.3d 800, 807 (Colo. 2005). In completing this task, we

must determine whether the evidence, when viewed as a whole and

in the light most favorable to the prosecution, is substantial and

sufficient to support a conclusion by a rational fact finder that the

defendant is guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. Clark v. People, 232

P.3d 1287, 1291 (Colo. 2010). We give the prosecution the benefit

of every reasonable inference that can fairly be drawn from the

evidence, so long as any inference is supported by a convincing

logical connection between the facts established and the conclusion

inferred. People v. Perez, 2016 CO 12, ¶ 25; People v. Villalobos,

159 P.3d 624, 627 (Colo. App. 2006) (“[W]here reasonable minds

could differ, the evidence is sufficient to sustain a conviction.”).

2. Sufficient Evidence Supported the Jury’s Verdict that Dexter
Was Guilty of Harassment by Telephone (Count 9)

¶ 44 A person commits the crime of harassment by telephone “if,

with the intent to harass, annoy or alarm another person, he or she

. . . makes a telephone call or causes a telephone to ring repeatedly,

whether or not a conversation ensues, with no purpose of legitimate

conversation.” § 18-9-111(1)(f), C.R.S. 2024.

21
¶ 45 Dexter contends that there is insufficient evidence to prove

harassment by telephone because he had a legitimate purpose for

calling — to be connected to the Glenwood Springs Police Internal

Affairs — and he called repeatedly to show the dispatcher that his

calls to the department were being rerouted to her. We aren’t

persuaded.

¶ 46 The prosecution presented evidence that Dexter called a

nonemergency line requesting to speak to Internal Affairs to report

the Glenwood Springs Police Department for misconduct,

dereliction of duty, threatening a citizen, and violating his civil

rights, among other things. The dispatcher told him that she could

not transfer him to Internal Affairs, but that he could call the police

department directly in ten minutes, at 8:00 a.m., and ask to be

connected to them. She acknowledged that calls before then would

be rerouted back to her agency. Frustrated with her answer, Dexter

told her he was going to put her on YouTube, repeatedly requested

to be put in touch with Internal Affairs, and told her, “We can wait

the ten minutes.” When Dexter was disconnected, he called back,

tying up three separate nonemergency lines, chanting “you are

22
going to do your job” repeatedly until he was disconnected a second

time.

¶ 47 The dispatcher testified at trial that the three lines Dexter tied

up totaled thirty percent of the total emergency and nonemergency

lines her dispatch center operated. She explained that tying up

those lines could prevent a real emergency call from getting through

and agreed that Dexter’s actions “were a serious impediment to

dispatch’s ability to function” because outside the police

department’s hours, emergency calls “frequently” come in on

nonemergency lines.

¶ 48 Based on this evidence, a reasonable juror could conclude

that, even if Dexter’s initial call was for the legitimate purpose of

being connected to Internal Affairs, his subsequent calls were not.

The recorded calls, along with the dispatcher’s testimony, when

viewed in the light most favorable to the prosecution, were sufficient

to prove that Dexter made the three simultaneous calls with no

purpose of legitimate conversation and with the intent to harass,

annoy, or alarm a person. Accordingly, we conclude that the

evidence was sufficient to sustain the conviction of harassment by

telephone.

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III. Disposition

¶ 49 The judgment is affirmed.

JUDGE MOULTRIE and JUDGE BERGER concur.

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