Peo v. Quinlan

22CA0375 Peo v Quinlan 07-03-2025

COLORADO COURT OF APPEALS

Court of Appeals No. 22CA0375
Jefferson County District Court No. 19CR1283
Honorable Laura A. Tighe, Judge

The People of the State of Colorado,

Plaintiff-Appellee,

v.

Blake Alan Quinlan,

Defendant-Appellant.

JUDGMENT AFFIRMED

Division VI
Opinion by JUDGE SULLIVAN
Tow and Yun, JJ., concur

NOT PUBLISHED PURSUANT TO C.A.R. 35(e)
Announced July 3, 2025

Philip J. Weiser, Attorney General, Brittany Limes Zehner, Senior Assistant
Attorney General and Assistant Solicitor General, Denver, Colorado, for
Plaintiff-Appellee

Megan A. Ring, Colorado State Public Defender, Meredith K. Rose, Deputy
State Public Defender, Denver, Colorado, for Defendant-Appellant
¶1 Defendant, Blake Alan Quinlan, appeals the judgment of

conviction entered on jury verdicts finding him guilty of first degree

murder and other offenses arising from his shooting of the victim,

Joseph Brinson. We affirm.

I. Background

¶2 Quinlan and Brinson ran in the same circle of friends. But

after an altercation at Brinson’s house, Quinlan, who was eighteen

years old and intoxicated at the time, shot and killed Brinson.

Quinlan then dismembered Brinson’s body and discarded the body

parts. Quinlan fled to Texas but was arrested for unrelated

conduct. While in jail in Texas, Colorado investigators twice

interviewed Quinlan regarding Brinson’s disappearance. During the

second interview, Quinlan confessed to killing Brinson.

¶3 The jury found Quinlan guilty of first degree murder,

tampering with a deceased human body, two counts of identity

theft, tampering with physical evidence, theft, and possession of a

defaced firearm. The district court sentenced Quinlan to life in

prison without the possibility of parole on the first degree murder

count. See § 18-1.3-401(1)(a)(V)(A.1), C.R.S. 2024. One hundred

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forty-five days after sentencing, the court ordered Quinlan to pay

nearly $9,000 in restitution.

¶4 On appeal, Quinlan contends that the district court erred by

(1) denying his motion to suppress statements from his Texas

interviews; (2) omitting the statutory definitions of intoxication and

self-induced intoxication from the jury instructions; (3) denying

multiple motions for a mistrial; (4) sentencing him to life in prison

without the possibility of parole; and (5) entering an untimely order

for restitution. We address each contention in turn.

II. Suppression of Quinlan’s Statements

¶5 Quinlan contends that the district court erred by denying his

motion to suppress the statements he made during his two

interviews in Texas. He argues both (1) that the investigators failed

to Mirandize him before his custodial interrogations, see Miranda v.

Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966); and (2) that his statements to the

investigators were involuntary. We disagree with both contentions.

A. Standard of Review

¶6 Whether a person is in custody for Miranda purposes is a

mixed question of law and fact. People v. Eugene, 2024 CO 59,

¶ 13. We defer to a trial court’s factual findings that are supported

2
by the record but review de novo the court’s legal conclusions

regarding custody. Id.

¶7 We apply the same standard when evaluating a trial court’s

order on a defendant’s motion to suppress allegedly involuntary

statements. See People in Interest of Z.T.T., 2017 CO 48, ¶ 10.

B. Custody Law for Miranda Purposes

¶8 “A person subjected to custodial interrogation by a law

enforcement officer is afforded certain procedural protections

designed to safeguard rights guaranteed by the Fifth Amendment.”

People v. Garcia, 2017 CO 106, ¶ 19 (citing Miranda, 384 U.S. at

478-79). To receive Miranda’s protections, a person must be both

“in custody” and subjected to police interrogation. Garcia, ¶ 19. A

person is in custody for Miranda purposes if they have been

formally arrested or if, under the totality of the circumstances, a

reasonable person in the suspect’s position would have felt that

their freedom of action had been curtailed to a degree associated

with formal arrest. Garcia, ¶ 20.

¶9 This “free to leave” standard doesn’t apply in the same

manner, however, in the jail and prison setting. People v. Denison,

918 P.2d 1114, 1116 (Colo. 1996) (quoting Cervantes v. Walker, 589

3
F.2d 424, 428 (9th Cir. 1978)). If it did, all prison questioning

would be considered “custodial” because a reasonable prisoner

would always feel that they couldn’t leave the prison freely. Id.

Instead, we apply a “restriction” standard in the jail and prison

setting, id. (citation omitted), analyzing whether the prisoner has

experienced a change in surroundings that results in an “added

imposition on his freedom of movement,” id. As outlined in

Denison, we consider four factors in this analysis: (1) the language

used to summon the individual; (2) the physical surroundings of the

interrogation; (3) the extent to which the individual is confronted

with evidence of their guilt; and (4) the additional pressure exerted

to detain the individual. Id.

¶ 10 The Denison factors aren’t dispositive, however. People v.

Parsons, 15 P.3d 799, 801-02 (Colo. App. 2000). We may also

consider the traditional Matheny factors when evaluating whether a

jailed person is in custody for Miranda purposes. Parsons, 15 P.3d

at 801-02; see People v. Matheny, 46 P.3d 453, 465-66 (Colo. 2002).

These factors include:

(1) the time, place, and purpose of the
encounter; (2) the persons present during the
interrogation; (3) the words spoken by the

4
officer to the defendant; (4) the officer’s tone of
voice and general demeanor; (5) the length and
mood of the interrogation; (6) whether any
limitation of movement or other form of
restraint was placed on the defendant during
the interrogation; (7) the officer’s response to
any questions asked by the defendant;
(8) whether directions were given to the
defendant during the interrogation; and (9) the
defendant’s verbal or nonverbal response to
such directions.

Matheny, 46 P.3d at 465-66 (quoting People v. Trujillo, 938 P.2d

117, 124 (Colo. 1997)).

¶ 11 No single factor is determinative, and a court isn’t limited in

the number of factors it may consider. People v. Minjarez, 81 P.3d

348, 353 (Colo. 2003). The “most important” consideration is

whether the trial court accurately evaluated the totality of the

circumstances. Id.

C. Voluntariness Law

¶ 12 The Due Process Clauses of the United States and Colorado

Constitutions require that a defendant’s statements be voluntary for

the statements to be admissible into evidence. See U.S. Const.

amends. V, XIV; Colo. Const. art. II, § 25; Mincey v. Arizona, 437

U.S. 385, 397 (1978); People v. Raffaelli, 647 P.2d 230, 234 (Colo.

1982). The prosecution bears the burden of proving, by a

5
preponderance of the evidence, that the defendant’s statements

were voluntary. People v. Munoz-Diaz, 2023 COA 105, ¶ 13.

¶ 13 In determining whether a statement was voluntary, we

consider the totality of the circumstances and focus on whether the

officer “overcame the defendant’s will and brought about an

inculpatory statement that was not ‘freely self-determined.’” Id. at

¶ 14 (quoting People v. Ramadon, 2013 CO 68, ¶ 20). We follow a

two-step inquiry when evaluating whether a defendant’s statement

was voluntary, asking (1) whether the police conduct was coercive

and (2) whether the coercive police conduct played a significant role

in inducing the statements. Ramadon, ¶ 20. Both steps require

that we consider a wide range of non-exhaustive factors:

1. whether the defendant was in custody;

2. whether the defendant was free to leave;

3. whether the defendant was aware of the
situation;

4. whether the police read Miranda rights to
the defendant;

5. whether the defendant understood and
waived Miranda rights;

6. whether the defendant had an opportunity
to confer with counsel or anyone else prior to
or during the interrogation;

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7. whether the statement was made during the
interrogation or volunteered later;

8. whether the police threatened [the]
defendant or promised anything directly or
impliedly;

9. the method [or style] of the interrogation;

10. the defendant’s mental and physical
condition just prior to the interrogation;

11. the length of the interrogation;

12. the location of the interrogation; and

13. the physical conditions of the location
where the interrogation occurred.

Cardman v. People, 2019 CO 73, ¶ 23 (quoting Z.T.T., ¶ 13).

¶ 14 Our supreme court has referred to these factors as the

“Gennings voluntariness factors.” People v. Sanders, 2023 CO 62,

¶ 15 (citing People v. Gennings, 808 P.2d 839 (Colo. 1991)).

¶ 15 When weighing these factors, we don’t simply tally the factors

on each side; rather, we accord them variable weight depending on

the circumstances involved. Cardman, ¶ 27. The critical inquiry is

whether, under the circumstances, the interviewing officer “actually

overbore the defendant’s will.” People v. McIntyre, 2014 CO 39,

¶ 19.

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D. Additional Background

¶ 16 Investigator Tip Woodin and Investigator Elias Alberti first

tried to interview Quinlan in the Texas jail in February 2019. The

investigators advised Quinlan of his Miranda rights, but Quinlan

elected not to speak with them.

¶ 17 After obtaining additional evidence linking Quinlan to

Brinson’s disappearance, the investigators returned to Texas two

months later to try a second time. When the investigators arrived,

the jail administrator asked Quinlan, “[D]o you want to go and

speak with them?” Quinlan agreed. The jail administrator then

escorted Quinlan to a conference room (known as the

“commissioner’s courtroom”) in an administrative building adjacent

to the jail. The jail administrator didn’t observe anything to suggest

that Quinlan was reluctant or unwilling to speak with the

investigators.

¶ 18 Once in the conference room, the investigators recorded their

interview of Quinlan, which began at 1:25 p.m. and lasted

approximately eighty-two minutes. Quinlan sat at the table in the

chair nearest the door, which remained closed but unlocked.

Alberti sat across the table from Quinlan, and Woodin sat at the

8
head of the table to Quinlan’s right. Consistent with the jail’s

protocols, Quinlan remained handcuffed during the interview,

although not chained to the table or floor.

¶ 19 Alberti began the interview by telling Quinlan he wasn’t free to

leave the jail facility but also said (1) if you don’t want to engage,

you aren’t obligated “to be here with us and you don’t have to

answer any questions”; and (2) if “you don’t want to be in the room

anymore[,] . . . let us know and then we’ll escort you . . . back [to

the] appropriate place, okay?”

¶ 20 Alberti then relayed to Quinlan the evidence that they had

gathered related to Brinson, a missing person at the time, and how

the evidence linked to Quinlan. Among other things, Alberti

explained that they knew Brinson’s gun and cash had been stolen;

that the gun was found in Quinlan’s backpack; and that Quinlan

had used Brinson’s credit card near the time of his disappearance.

Alberti also told Quinlan that they had found Brinson’s blood in the

vehicle that Quinlan was driving at the time of his arrest in Texas.

Quinlan admitted to taking Brinson’s gun and credit card but

denied any knowledge of what happened to Brinson.

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¶ 21 At one point, Quinlan asked whether his explanation might be

incriminating. Alberti responded that he wasn’t interested in any

drug crimes but instead was interested only in finding Brinson. At

different times, the investigators encouraged Quinlan to “come

clean,” emphasizing, “[I]t’s going to help you,” and, “[I]t is in your

best interest to help yourself out if there’s anything . . . you’ve left

out.”

¶ 22 After the interview, the jail administrator escorted Quinlan

back to the jail where he made a recorded phone call to his mother

to seek her advice. After the call, Quinlan elected to speak with the

investigators again. The jail administrator observed that Quinlan

seemed “more relaxed” as she escorted him back to the

investigators.

¶ 23 At the outset of the second interview, which began at 3:20

p.m., Alberti asked Quinlan what he wanted to discuss, to which

Quinlan replied, “I did it.” When Alberti asked Quinlan what he

did, Quinlan said, “I killed [Brinson].” Alberti then advised Quinlan

of his Miranda rights. Quinlan confirmed that he understood his

rights and that he still wanted to speak with the investigators.

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Quinlan then detailed the events that led to him shoot Brinson and

dispose of his body.

¶ 24 After a two-day evidentiary hearing on Quinlan’s motion to

suppress his statements, the district court issued a detailed ruling

from the bench denying his motion. As relevant here, the court

determined that (1) Quinlan wasn’t in custody for purposes of

Miranda during either the first interview or the second interview

before Alberti Mirandized him, and (2) Quinlan voluntarily

confessed to killing Brinson.

E. Analysis

¶ 25 After reviewing the record and listening closely to the interview

recordings, we conclude that (1) Quinlan wasn’t in custody for

Miranda purposes during either the first interview or the beginning

of the second interview, and (2) Quinlan voluntarily made his

statements to the investigators.

1. Custody

¶ 26 Regarding Denison’s first factor — the language used to

summon Quinlan — the district court found, with record support,

that the jail administrator “asked” Quinlan in a pleasant tone if he

wanted to talk to the investigators. Quinlan agreed. Although

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Quinlan characterizes the jail administrator’s question as a

“directive,” no evidence at the suppression hearing suggested that

the administrator commanded or ordered Quinlan to speak with the

investigators. Indeed, the court found “no evidence” that anyone

forced Quinlan to talk with the investigators.

¶ 27 Turning to Denison’s second factor — the physical

surroundings of the interview — the court found, again with record

support, that the investigators interviewed Quinlan in the

commissioners’ courtroom, not in the jail. The court described the

room as an “executive hearing room” with an executive table,

comfortable chairs, and three windows. See Parsons, 15 P.3d at

802 (“[T]he non-coercive atmosphere of a conference room” weighed

against a finding of custody.). Further, the court found that the

investigators spoke in a direct but conversational tone, weren’t

aggressive or threatening, and didn’t touch or corner Quinlan. See

Marko v. People, 2018 CO 97, ¶ 42; Parsons, 15 P.3d at 803.

¶ 28 Although Quinlan remained handcuffed during the interviews

(albeit not chained to the table or floor), the court found that the

Texas jail protocols mandated that restraint, not the Colorado

investigators. See Marko, ¶ 41; see also Howes v. Fields, 565 U.S.

12
499, 513 (2012) (explaining that “special security precautions may

be standard procedures regardless of the purpose for which an

inmate is removed from his regular routine” and don’t necessarily

create a custodial situation to which Miranda applies). And while it

doesn’t weigh heavily in our analysis since Quinlan wasn’t free to

leave the jail facility, we note that the conference room door

remained closed but unlocked, and Quinlan sat nearest the door.

See Marko, ¶ 41 (defendant remained unblocked from the unlocked

door during the interview, weighing in favor of finding no custody).

¶ 29 Regarding Denison’s third factor, we agree with Quinlan that

Alberti confronted him with substantial evidence of his guilt, which

weighs in favor of a determination that Quinlan was in custody.

But this fact alone isn’t dispositive. See Marko, ¶ 42 (confronting

the defendant with evidence of his guilt in a nonaggressive manner

didn’t render the interview a custodial interrogation). Considering

the totality of the circumstances, Alberti informed Quinlan at the

outset that he wasn’t obligated to answer their questions and could

ask to be escorted out at any point if he didn’t want to talk. See id.

at ¶ 40; Howes, 565 U.S. at 515 (describing as “[m]ost important”

the fact that officers informed the prisoner at the interrogation’s

13
outset that he “could leave and go back to his cell whenever he

wanted”). And at the beginning of the second interview, Alberti

asked Quinlan only open-ended questions before informing him of

his Miranda rights. See Denison, 918 P.2d at 1117 (noting sheriff

didn’t confront the defendant with evidence of guilt when using

open-ended questions).

¶ 30 Moreover, the court wrapped up its Denison analysis on the

fourth factor by finding that no one exerted additional pressures to

detain Quinlan beyond the Texas jail protocols.

¶ 31 The court also made additional findings based on the

traditional Matheny factors that cut against a custody

determination. All were supported by the record. As to those

findings that weren’t redundant of the court’s Denison findings, the

court found:

• The first interview occurred at 1:25 p.m. (factor 1). Cf.

Howes, 565 U.S. at 515 (interview lasting past the time when

the prisoner generally went to bed supported a custody

finding).

• Alberti responded to Quinlan’s questions directly, without any

misdirection (factor 7).

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• The investigators said they expected Quinlan to be truthful,

but they made clear he wasn’t under arrest for Brinson’s

disappearance at that point and could stop the interview at

any time (factor 8).

• Quinlan “seemed to track” the investigators’ directions

through his responses to questions (factor 9).

¶ 32 True, the first interview was somewhat lengthy, at just under

ninety minutes (factor 5), but, again, the investigators told Quinlan

in a conversational tone that he could ask to be escorted out at any

time. See People v. Davis, 2019 CO 84, ¶ 25 (under the totality of

the circumstances, questioning the defendant for almost ninety

minutes didn’t result in a custodial interview under Miranda); cf.

Howes, 565 U.S. at 515 (while deputies interviewed the defendant

for five to seven hours, with one deputy using a “very sharp tone,”

other factors “offset” these circumstances).

¶ 33 Quinlan argues that we should consider that he was just

eighteen years old when he spoke to the investigators. But the

cases on which he relies each involved determining the custodial

status of juveniles, not young adults. See J.D.B. v. North Carolina,

564 U.S. 261, 264 (2011); People v. N.A.S., 2014 CO 65, ¶ 9; People

15
in Interest of R.A., 937 P.2d 731, 737 (Colo. 1997). In any event, the

record reflects that the court took Quinlan’s age and relative youth

into account. The court also found that Quinlan possessed above-

average intelligence, remained focused and oriented to his

surroundings, and provided cogent answers based on a rational

thought process.

¶ 34 On balance, and after weighing each of the relevant factors

and considering the totality of the circumstances, we agree with the

district court that Quinlan wasn’t in custody for purposes of

Miranda when he made his pre-advisement statements during the

first interview and at the beginning of the second interview.1

¶ 35 We now turn to whether Quinlan voluntarily confessed to

killing Brinson.

2. Voluntariness

¶ 36 Many of the Gennings voluntariness factors overlap with the

Miranda custody factors that we have already discussed. But the

1 Given our conclusion, we need not consider Quinlan’s additional

argument under Missouri v. Seibert, 542 U.S. 600 (2004), that the
investigators secured his Miranda waiver through an invalid two-
step interrogation. See United States v. Courtney, 463 F.3d 333,
337 (5th Cir. 2006) (an analysis under Seibert is unnecessary when
the suspect wasn’t in custody for Miranda purposes).

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two analyses don’t duplicate one another, and custody is only one

factor to consider when assessing a statement’s voluntariness.

Sanders, ¶¶ 13-15.

¶ 37 Without repeating our above custody analysis, we briefly

reiterate that Quinlan wasn’t in custody for Miranda purposes but

rather remained free to terminate his interviews at any point. As a

result, the investigators bore no obligation to either read Quinlan

his Miranda rights or request that he waive those rights before he

spontaneously confessed to killing Brinson. See People v. Wood,

135 P.3d 744, 749-50 (Colo. 2006).

¶ 38 After Quinlan spontaneously confessed, the investigators

immediately advised him of his Miranda rights. The district court

found, with record support, that Quinlan understood his rights

based on his prior experience with the judicial system and that no

evidence suggested that anyone coerced him into waiving his rights.

¶ 39 Quinlan also had the opportunity to speak with his mother by

telephone before he decided to confess to killing Brinson; no

evidence suggested that he couldn’t have also sought legal counsel

before confessing or that anyone limited the number of persons he

could consult. After speaking with his mother, Quinlan elected to

17
reinitiate his conversation with the investigators. Although some of

his statements during the first interview placed him at Brinson’s

house near the time of Brinson’s disappearance, he volunteered his

most incriminating statement — “I did it” — only after choosing to

reinitiate the conversation. The record supports the court’s findings

that Quinlan remained “calm” and “stoic” while making his

inculpatory statements, all of which were the product of a

methodical, deliberate, and grounded thought process.

¶ 40 We recognize that Alberti made some comments that

suggested leniency if Quinlan divulged information, such as, “[N]ow

is the time to come clean” because “it’s going to help you.” But on

the spectrum of potentially coercive promises, Alberti’s assurances

of potential help fall closer to “mere statements of possibility” than

to specific false promises of leniency that tend to overbear a

defendant’s will. People v. Smiley, 2023 CO 36, ¶ 39; see also

People v. Perez-Rodriguez, 2017 COA 77, ¶¶ 50-52 (detective’s

statements that judges and prosecutors “sometimes” have “some

sort of level of compassion” for “truthful” individuals were “merely

conjectures” that didn’t overbear the defendant’s will); cf. Smiley,

¶ 41 (detectives “affirmatively and without condition” saying that

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the defendant would “be leaving the police station that day” weighed

against voluntariness). When considering Alberti’s comments

alongside the investigators’ conversational style and the absence of

any threats, we discern no coercion that induced Quinlan’s

statements. See Ramadon, ¶ 20.

¶ 41 Accordingly, we agree with the district court that Quinlan

voluntarily confessed to killing Brinson. The court therefore didn’t

err by denying Quinlan’s motion to suppress.

III. Jury Instructions

¶ 42 Quinlan contends that the district court plainly erred by

omitting the statutory definitions of “intoxication” and “self-induced

intoxication” from the jury instructions. We disagree.

A. Standard of Review and Applicable Law

¶ 43 “We review de novo whether jury instructions adequately

inform the jury of the governing law.” Garcia v. People, 2023 CO 30,

¶ 9. If they do, the trial court enjoys substantial discretion in

formulating the instructions and deciding whether additional

instructions are required. People v. Theus-Roberts, 2015 COA 32,

¶ 18.

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¶ 44 Quinlan acknowledges that he didn’t preserve this contention,

thus limiting our review to plain error. See People v. Garcia, 28

P.3d 340, 344 (Colo. 2001). To rise to plain error, the error must be

both obvious and substantial, meaning that it so undermined the

fundamental fairness of the trial itself as to cast serious doubt on

the reliability of the judgment of conviction. Hoggard v. People,

2020 CO 54, ¶ 13. A court’s failure to instruct the jury properly

doesn’t constitute plain error when the subject of the error isn’t

contested at trial. People v. Lozano-Ruiz, 2018 CO 86, ¶ 6.

¶ 45 If supported by evidence, a defendant may assert self-induced

intoxication as a defense to a specific-intent crime. See People v.

Vigil, 127 P.3d 916, 930-31 (Colo. 2006). As a result, the defendant

may offer evidence of intoxication “when it is relevant to negative

the existence of a specific intent if such intent is an element of the

crime charged.” § 18-1-804(1), C.R.S. 2024.

¶ 46 “Intoxication” is defined by statute as “a disturbance of mental

or physical capacities resulting from the introduction of any

substance into the body.” § 18-1-804(4). “Self-induced

intoxication” means

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intoxication caused by substances which the
defendant knows or ought to know have the
tendency to cause intoxication and which he
knowingly introduced or allowed to be
introduced into his body, unless they were
introduced pursuant to medical advice or
under circumstances that would afford a
defense to a charge of crime.

§ 18-1-804(5).

B. Analysis

¶ 47 Without defining either “intoxication” or “self-induced

intoxication,” the district court provided the following jury

instruction regarding Quinlan’s intoxication defense:

The evidence presented in this case has raised
the question of self-induced intoxication with
respect to the offenses of Murder in the First
Degree, Tampering with a Deceased Human
Body, and Tampering with Physical Evidence.
For those offenses, you may consider whether
or not evidence of self-induced intoxication
negates the existence of the elements of “with
intent” and “after deliberation and with intent.”

The prosecution has the burden of proving all
the elements of the crimes charged beyond a
reasonable doubt. If you find the defendant
was intoxicated to such a degree that he did
not act with the required mental state, you
should find him not guilty of that offense.
However, you may not consider evidence of
self-induced intoxication for purposes of
deciding whether the prosecution has proved
the elements of Murder in the Second Degree.

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¶ 48 Even if we assume that the court erred by failing to define

intoxication and self-induced intoxication, we discern no plain error

that requires reversal. At trial, no one disputed that Quinlan was

intoxicated. See Lozano-Ruiz, ¶ 6. Rather, the court’s instruction

and the prosecution’s arguments zeroed in on the degree of

Quinlan’s intoxication and whether it prevented him from forming

the requisite intent for the specific-intent charges he faced. The

prosecutor acknowledged in closing argument, for example, that

Quinlan had been drinking and using Xanax and marijuana, yet he

argued that Quinlan wasn’t “blackout drunk” or “too intoxicated to

form the intent” to kill Brinson after deliberation.

¶ 49 Quinlan nevertheless argues that the statutory definitions of

intoxication or self-induced intoxication required a less onerous

showing than their common dictionary meanings. But even

accepting that fact, Quinlan doesn’t explain how, in light of the

prosecution’s acknowledgment that he was intoxicated, the

statutory definitions would have helped the jury assess whether he

formed the requisite intent. See Lozano-Ruiz, ¶ 5 (“[B]ecause the

question of whether sexual penetration occurred was not contested

at trial beyond the mere fact of the defendant pleading not guilty,

22
failure to include the definitional instruction did not rise to the level

of plain error.”); see also People v. Walden, 224 P.3d 369, 379-80

(Colo. App. 2009) (trial court’s failure to provide the statutory

definitions for “intoxication,” “voluntary,” and “involuntary” inured

to the defendant’s benefit and didn’t rise to plain error).

¶ 50 Accordingly, the district court didn’t plainly err by omitting the

statutory definitions of intoxication and self-induced intoxication

from the jury instructions.

IV. Mistrial Motions

¶ 51 Quinlan contends that the district court abused its discretion

by denying his multiple motions for a mistrial, arguing that he

suffered “cumulative prejudice” based on “three distinct incidents.”

He points to (1) courtroom outbursts by Brinson’s mother; (2) a

juror’s pre-deliberation statements; and (3) midtrial delays caused

by the COVID-19 pandemic. We perceive no abuse of discretion.

V. Standard of Review and Applicable Law

¶ 52 A trial court enjoys broad discretion to grant or deny a

mistrial, and we won’t disturb its decision on appeal absent an

abuse of discretion and prejudice to the defendant. People v. Salas,

2017 COA 63, ¶ 9. A mistrial is a drastic remedy and is warranted

23
only when the prejudice to the accused can’t be remedied by other

means. Id.

¶ 53 “Whether a mistrial is required following a witness’s emotional

outburst depends, in part, on whether the outburst was

unexpected, the steps taken by the trial court to address the

outburst, and how quickly those steps were undertaken.” People v.

Owens, 2024 CO 10, ¶ 126 (citing People v. Ned, 923 P.2d 271, 276

(Colo. App. 1996)).

A. Additional Background

¶ 54 At trial, Alberti testified that law enforcement found Brinson’s

head separate from the rest of his body. Brinson’s mother, who

testified earlier in the trial, exclaimed from the audience, “Fucking

asshole. Fucking asshole. You fucking asshole. God. Fucking

asshole,” before exiting the courtroom. Defense counsel moved for

a mistrial, which the court denied. The court instructed the jury to

disregard the outburst. It also prohibited Brinson’s mother from re-

entering the courtroom, although it said she could observe the trial

remotely over WebEx.

¶ 55 While watching over WebEx, Brinson’s mother interrupted a

second time near the end of trial when a girl scout troop entered the

24
courtroom. She requested that the court “please get those children

out of the courtroom.” The court immediately muted Brinson’s

mother and later expelled her from the Webex platform. Defense

counsel again moved for a mistrial, which the court denied.

¶ 56 On the ninth day of trial, a defense investigator overheard a

juror say to another juror, “Let’s just get this done, huh? I’m over

it. Whatever needs to be done, let’s do it.” After the court

interviewed both jurors, they agreed to continue listening to the

evidence, determine the facts, and apply the law as provided by the

court. Both jurors also committed to giving the case the “time and

attention” that it needed. Defense counsel moved to strike the

commenting juror and for a mistrial, both of which the court

denied.

¶ 57 Finally, the court twice adjourned the trial, resulting in a total

delay of one week, after two jurors contracted COVID-19. Before

each adjournment, the court instructed the jurors not to (1) discuss

the case with anyone; (2) research or investigate the case in any

way; or (3) form or express any opinion about the case before

deliberations began. Defense counsel moved for a mistrial, but the

court, again, denied the motion.

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B. Analysis

¶ 58 Turning first to the outbursts by Brinson’s mother, we discern

no abuse of discretion in the court’s decisions denying Quinlan’s

mistrial motions. Applying Owens and Ned, we can’t say that the

outbursts were unexpected. The jury would have reasonably

expected Brinson’s mother to express (1) anger upon hearing that

law enforcement recovered Brinson’s head separate from the rest of

his body and (2) frustration that children might hear gruesome

evidence regarding her son. Moreover, the court instructed the jury

to disregard the first outburst and barred Brinson’s mother from

being present in the courtroom. When she interrupted again over

WebEx, the court immediately muted her microphone and later

expelled her from the proceeding altogether. Quinlan doesn’t

challenge the timing of the court’s curative measures. On this

record, we perceive no abuse of discretion in how the court handled

the interruptions by Brinson’s mother. See Owens, ¶ 133.

¶ 59 We aren’t persuaded otherwise by Quinlan’s argument that

Harper v. People, 817 P.2d 77 (Colo. 1991), provides the governing

legal test. Harper involved jurors’ potential exposure to “extraneous

information or influences” originating outside the courtroom. Id. at

26
80. Unlike Owens and Ned, Harper doesn’t apply to outbursts

occurring in the courtroom. See People v. Raehal, 971 P.2d 256,

259 (Colo. App. 1998) (rejecting the argument that Harper applies to

“prejudicial comments made in the courtroom”).

¶ 60 Nor did the court abuse its discretion by denying Quinlan’s

motion for a mistrial based on one juror’s midtrial comments to a

second juror. Nothing in the juror’s comments suggested that he

had already formed an opinion regarding Quinlan’s guilt. Moreover,

after interviewing both jurors, the court found that they were

committed to listening to all the evidence and deciding the facts

based on the law without rushing the process. See People v.

Burnette, 775 P.2d 583, 586 (Colo. 1989) (trial courts have “wide

discretion” in deciding whether jurors have become unable to

serve). The court also instructed the jury at the beginning of trial

that it “must keep an open mind” throughout and reach a decision

“only during your deliberations at the end of the trial.” We presume

the jury followed the court’s instructions absent evidence to the

contrary. See People v. Quillen, 2023 COA 22M, ¶ 40.

¶ 61 We also see no abuse of discretion in the court’s decision

adjourning trial for one week after two jurors contracted COVID-19.

27
After consulting with public health officials, the court found that

adjourning the trial was necessary so that officials could deep clean

the court facilities and jurors could be tested. The court also

admonished the jury before each adjournment not to discuss the

case, conduct any research or investigation, or form any opinions

before deliberations began. Again, we presume jurors followed

these instructions. See id.

¶ 62 Given these circumstances and brevity of the adjournments,

we perceive no abuse of discretion in the court’s decision denying

Quinlan’s request for the drastic remedy of a mistrial. See Salas,

¶ 9; accord State v. Brown, 996 N.W.2d 691, 701-02 (Iowa 2023)

(nine-day delay midtrial due to the COVID-19 pandemic didn’t

require the court to declare a mistrial).

¶ 63 Because we conclude that the court didn’t abuse its discretion

by denying Quinlan’s mistrial motions, we reject his argument that

the cumulative effect of the court’s alleged errors warrants reversal.

See People v. Rivers, 727 P.2d 394, 401 (Colo. App. 1986) (“The

doctrine of cumulative error requires that numerous errors be

committed, not merely alleged.”).

28
VI. Sentencing

¶ 64 Quinlan contends the district court erred by sentencing him to

life in prison without the possibility of parole. Emphasizing his

relative youth (eighteen years old at the time of his offenses),

Quinlan argues that this mandatory sentence is unconstitutional

under both the Eighth Amendment to the United States

Constitution and article II, section 20, of the Colorado Constitution.

We perceive no basis to reverse.

A. Eighth Amendment

¶ 65 The Eighth Amendment prohibits cruel and unusual

punishments. U.S. Const. amend. VIII. Based on evolving

standards of decency, the United States Supreme Court has ruled

that certain sentences are unconstitutionally cruel and unusual

when the defendant was a juvenile at the time of the offense. See

Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S. 460, 479-80 (2012) (holding

unconstitutional mandatory life in prison without the possibility of

parole sentences for juvenile homicide offenders); Graham v. Florida,

560 U.S. 48, 74 (2010) (same for juvenile non-homicide offenders);

Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 568 (2005) (same for the death

penalty for juveniles).

29
¶ 66 But in each case, including Miller, the Supreme Court limited

its holding to those under eighteen at the time of the offense,

recognizing that “a line must be drawn,” and eighteen is “the point

where society draws the line for many purposes between childhood

and adulthood.” Roper, 543 U.S. at 574; accord Miller, 567 U.S. at

465; Graham, 560 U.S. at 74-75. We are bound by the Supreme

Court’s interpretations of the Eighth Amendment. See People v.

Washington, 2014 COA 41, ¶ 26; see also People v. Ray, 2025 CO

42, ¶¶ 174-75 (rejecting the argument that a nineteen-year-old

defendant’s sentence of life in prison without the possibility of

parole violated the Eighth Amendment); People v. Parks, 987

N.W.2d 161, 172 (Mich. 2022) (“[W]e cannot contradict the Supreme

Court if it has drawn a clear and unambiguous line under the

United States Constitution between those under the age of 18 and

those aged 18 and older.”).

¶ 67 Accordingly, the district court didn’t violate the Eighth

Amendment by sentencing Quinlan to life in prison without the

possibility of parole.

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B. Article II, Section 20, of the Colorado Constitution

¶ 68 For the first time on appeal, Quinlan relies on article II,

section 20, of the Colorado Constitution to challenge the

constitutionality of his sentence, arguing that it provides “more

expansive” protection than the Eighth Amendment. Because

Quinlan didn’t raise this argument before the district court, we

can’t address it. See McDonald v. People, 2024 CO 75, ¶ 10 n.2.

VII. Restitution

¶ 69 Quinlan also contends that the district court erred by entering

an order for restitution beyond the statutory ninety-one-day

deadline in section 18-1.3-603(1)(b), C.R.S. 2021 (version effective

until Feb. 28, 2022),2 without making an express finding of good

cause to extend the deadline. We conclude Quinlan waived this

contention.

2 Section 18-1.3-603, C.R.S. 2021 (version effective until Feb. 28,

2022), was in effect at the time of Quinlan’s sentencing. Since the
statute has since been amended, see Ch. 307, secs. 1-2, § 18-1.3-
603(1), (1)(b), (2)(a), 2025 Colo. Sess. Laws 1606-07, this opinion
refers to the 2021 version throughout.

31
A. Applicable Law and Standard of Review

¶ 70 With exceptions not pertinent here, section 18-1.3-603(1)

provides that “[e]very order of conviction of a felony . . . shall

include consideration of restitution.” When a trial court determines

that a defendant is obligated to pay restitution but doesn’t

determine the amount at sentencing, the court must order that the

“the specific amount of restitution shall be determined within the

ninety-one days immediately following the order of conviction,

unless good cause is shown for extending the time period by which

the restitution amount shall be determined.” § 18-1.3-603(1)(b). In

People v. Weeks, 2021 CO 75, ¶ 45, our supreme court held that

the trial court “lack[s] authority” to order restitution beyond the

ninety-one-day deadline unless it makes an express finding of good

cause to extend the deadline before it expires.

¶ 71 But the ninety-one-day deadline isn’t jurisdictional and “can

be waived.” Babcock v. People, 2025 CO 26, ¶ 27. Because the

ninety-one-day deadline is a creature of statute, waiver must be

voluntary but need not be knowing and intelligent. People v.

Roberson, 2025 CO 30, ¶¶ 13-14. Waiver may be shown through

explicit words or actions, or it may be implied when a party engages

32
in conduct that “manifests an intent to relinquish a right or

privilege” or “acts inconsistently” with a right’s assertion. Id. at

¶ 13 (citation omitted). “Waiver extinguishes error and therefore

any appellate review.” Babcock, ¶ 29.

¶ 72 We review de novo whether a party has waived a claim.

Richardson v. People, 2020 CO 46, ¶ 21.

B. Analysis

¶ 73 Before trial, the prosecution requested $7,760.78 in restitution

for Brinson’s burial expenses and therapy costs for his family. At

Quinlan’s sentencing on January 20, 2022, the district court

reserved ruling on the restitution amount for ninety-one days after

Quinlan requested additional time to review the prosecution’s

documentation. Defense counsel said, “[S]hould we seek a hearing,

we would ask to proceed via notice to set.” The court agreed and

ordered counsel to work with its division clerk “to set a hearing

should it come to pass that a hearing is needed.” Defense counsel

also demonstrated awareness of the ninety-one-day deadline during

sentencing, saying it “appear[s] that the prosecution was seeking 91

days to perfect the restitution based on [its] pleading.”

33
¶ 74 Five days after sentencing, the prosecution filed an amended

restitution motion requesting an additional $1,080. Quinlan

objected on February 24, 2022, requesting that the court deny any

restitution or, alternatively, “set a hearing to resolve” the issue. The

court scheduled a hearing for June 14, 2022 — 145 days after

sentencing. Notably, Quinlan never objected to the hearing taking

place outside the ninety-one-day window. At the end of the

hearing, the court overruled Quinlan’s objections and ordered

restitution in the amount requested by the prosecution.

¶ 75 Like the defendants in Roberson and Babcock, Quinlan waived

his statutory right to have the court determine the amount of

restitution within ninety-one days. Defense counsel was aware of

the ninety-one-day deadline but nonetheless failed to object when

the court scheduled the restitution hearing beyond the deadline in

response to Quinlan’s hearing request. See Roberson, ¶ 17; Finney

v. People, 2014 CO 38, ¶ 16 (“Counsel may waive a defendant’s

statutory rights.”). Nor did defense counsel mention the deadline

during the restitution hearing. See Roberson, ¶ 16 (defendant

waived the ninety-one-day deadline by not objecting to the trial

34
court’s suggestion that the parties hold a status conference after

the deadline had expired).

¶ 76 Accordingly, Quinlan waived his statutory right to have the

court determine the amount of restitution within ninety-one days

after sentencing.

VIII. Disposition

¶ 77 We affirm the judgment.

JUDGE TOW and JUDGE YUN concur.

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