Peo v. Hall

24CA0617 Peo v Hall 06-26-2025

COLORADO COURT OF APPEALS

Court of Appeals No. 24CA0617
El Paso County District Court No. 23CR1351
Honorable Samuel A. Evig, Judge

The People of the State of Colorado,

Plaintiff-Appellee,

v.

Harris Hall,

Defendant-Appellant.

ORDER AFFIRMED

Division V
Opinion by JUDGE GROVE
Welling and Johnson, JJ., concur

NOT PUBLISHED PURSUANT TO C.A.R. 35(e)
Announced June 26, 2025

Philip J. Weiser, Attorney General, Frank R. Lawson, Senior Assistant Attorney
General, Denver, Colorado, for Plaintiff-Appellee

Megan A. Ring, Colorado State Public Defender, Kimberly J. Davis, Deputy
State Public Defender, Colorado Springs, Colorado, for Defendant-Appellant
¶1 Defendant, Harris Hall, appeals the district court’s order

imposing $1,287.66 in restitution. We affirm.

I. Background

¶2 Hall, his girlfriend, L.M., and their son were staying at a motel.

One morning, the couple got into an argument that led to a physical

altercation during which Hall choked L.M. and she twisted her

ankle. Hall was charged with second degree assault, harassment,

and child abuse.

¶3 Hall entered into a plea agreement for deferred judgment and

sentencing. As part of the agreement, he pleaded guilty to

harassment as an act of domestic violence. This guilty plea would

be vacated once he successfully completed probation. He also

agreed to pay L.M. restitution for all pecuniary losses arising from

the charges against him, including those that were dismissed under

the plea agreement, and stipulated “to causation for restitution

purposes.” The agreement outlined the restitution procedure:

The Court will order restitution, the People will
submit the proposed amount within 42 days of
sentencing, and the Defendant is provided 21
days to object to the final determination of the
amount. The Parties stipulate to a sufficient
showing of “good cause” under section 18-1.3-
603(l)(b)[, C.R.S. 2024,] and “extenuating

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circumstances” under section 18-1.3-603(2)
allowing the Court to reserve its right to order
additional restitution beyond the 91 day period
but not to exceed 180 days unless the Court
makes additional findings prior to the
expiration of 180 days.
¶4 A timeline of subsequent relevant events follows:

• On September 25, 2023, the trial court accepted the plea

agreement. There is no transcript of the providency

hearing in the appellate record.

• Thirty-nine days later, on November 3, 2023, the

prosecution filed the proposed restitution amount:

$1,287.66.

• Forty-one days after sentencing, on November 5, the

court entered the restitution order, which provided that

the restitution funds would be paid to the Colorado

Department of Health Care Policy and Financing. The

order included a “Notice to Defendant,” which stated as

follows:

If you object to the restitution amount
you shall file a written objection before
this Court within 14 days to set a hearing
date. Failure to request a timely hearing
will result in a final order for the full
amount of restitution requested, and the
order will not be subject to review.

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• On December 4, 2023 — seventy days after sentencing

and twenty-nine days after the November 5 restitution

order — Harris filed an objection to the amount of

proposed restitution. The motion did not mention

Harris’s failure to comply with the deadlines set forth in

the plea agreement or in the district court’s subsequent

restitution order. Neither party contacted the court to

request a hearing after Harris filed his objection.

• Due to an administrative error, the court did not receive

Hall’s objection until February 2, 2024, well beyond the

expiration of the ninety-one-day statutory deadline to

determine restitution. Upon receipt, the court set the

matter for a hearing for February 20, 2024, 150 days

after sentencing.

¶5 At the hearing, Hall objected to the restitution order’s finality,

arguing that the order was invalid because the court had not

provided him with a hearing to object to the restitution amount

before the statutory deadline expired. Additionally, he asserted, the

court lacked the authority to shorten the ninety-one-day deadline.

The prosecution responded that, because Hall failed to file an

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objection to the restitution order within fourteen days of its

issuance, the amount of restitution became final before the ninety-

one-day statutory deadline expired.

¶6 The court agreed with the prosecution, finding that its

November 5 restitution order became final when Hall failed to object

within the fourteen-day deadline that the order set. The court

noted that the deadline was “specifically designed to comply with

the” ninety-one-day statutory deadline and the supreme court’s

holding in People v. Weeks, 2021 CO 75. Alternatively, the court

found it had authority to set a hearing outside the statutory

deadline because Hall’s untimely objection amounted to a waiver of

the deadline. Thus, it declined to disturb the award of restitution.

II. Analysis

¶7 Hall contends that the restitution order must be vacated

because (1) he objected to the restitution order before the expiration

of the statutory deadline and the court failed to set a hearing prior

to that deadline and (2) the court failed to find good cause to extend

the deadline beyond ninety-one days. We are not persuaded.

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A. Applicable Law and Standard of Review

¶8 The restitution statute requires every order of conviction to

include one of four types of restitution orders. § 18-1.3-603(1). As

relevant here, section 18-1.3-603(1)(b) requires an order of

conviction to include “[a]n order that the defendant is obligated to

pay restitution, but that the specific amount of restitution shall be

determined within the ninety-one days immediately following the

order of conviction, unless good cause is shown for extending the

time period by which the restitution amount shall be determined.”

In other words, the court must determine the amount of restitution

within ninety-one days of the judgment of conviction and may

extend this time period only if, before the deadline expires, it makes

an express finding of good cause to do so. Weeks, ¶¶ 4-5. Thus,

the statute places an obligation on the sentencing court to ensure

that restitution is resolved within ninety-one days from the entry of

the order of conviction. People v. Brassill, 2024 COA 19, ¶ 20.

¶9 Nevertheless, “district courts have the inherent authority to

manage their dockets through scheduling orders.” People v. Owens,

2014 CO 58M, ¶ 16; Brassill, ¶ 17; see also Redden v. SCI Colo.

Funeral Servs., Inc., 38 P.3d 75, 84 (Colo. 2001) (trial courts are

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responsible for managing their dockets, moving cases toward

completion, and assuring that parties comply with deadlines);

People v. Kilgore, 2020 CO 6, ¶ 26 (trial courts have inherent

discretion to manage cases).

¶ 10 We review de novo whether a trial court complied with the

restitution statute. See Weeks, ¶ 24. However, when a court has

discretion to decide an issue, we review that decision under an

abuse of discretion standard. People v. Rath, 44 P.3d 1033, 1043

(Colo. 2002). To constitute an abuse of discretion, the trial court’s

decision must be “manifestly arbitrary, unreasonable, or unfair.”

Id. A trial court necessarily abuses its discretion if its ruling is

based on an erroneous view of the law. People v. Wadle, 97 P.3d

932, 936 (Colo. 2004).

B. Discussion

¶ 11 At the heart of Hall’s appellate argument is his contention that

the district court did not enter a restitution order until the February

20 restitution hearing, but by then it was too late because the

statutory deadline had already expired without being extended for

good cause. This argument requires us to address a related

question: Does the court have the authority to impose restitution

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before the expiration of the ninety-one-day statutory deadline? If

so, then its November 5 order — which stated in relevant part that

“[t]he Court orders, in accordance with the judgment entered

herein, that the Defendant make restitution, in the amount of

$1,287.66” — is dispositive because it was entered less than ninety-

one days after sentencing.

¶ 12 In Weeks, the supreme court stated that, “at a sentencing

hearing, the trial court judge should be prepared to put in place a

plan” that ensures the prosecution submits the restitution amount

and the court determines the restitution amount within the ninety-

one-day statutory period. Weeks, ¶ 8. The November 5 order,

which entered a restitution amount but gave Hall a fourteen-day

period to object, was exactly the type of order Weeks contemplated.

See also Brassill, ¶ 52 (noting that a trial court’s thirty-day deadline

set for the prosecution to turn in its restitution amount was also

the type of order Weeks contemplated). The deadline set in the

order, as the court explained in its oral findings at the restitution

hearing, gave the court sufficient time on a busy docket to schedule

a restitution hearing before the expiration of the statutory deadline,

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while ensuring that the statutory deadline would still be met if Hall

did not file an objection.

¶ 13 Under these circumstances, we agree with the People’s

argument that the restitution order was entered before the

expiration of the ninety-one-day deadline, and that, as a result,

Hall’s objection is better characterized as a motion for

reconsideration. Because the court unquestionably had authority

to, and did, enter a restitution order before the statutory deadline

expired, we decline to disturb its ruling.1

III. Disposition

¶ 14 We affirm the district court’s order imposing $1,287.66 in

restitution.

JUDGE WELLING and JUDGE JOHNSON concur.

1 In addition, Johnson v. People, 2025 CO 29, appears to foreclose

Hall’s appellate argument. In Johnson, which was issued after the
close of briefing in this case, the supreme court held that the
statutory restitution deadline “is not jurisdictional and can be
waived.” Id. at ¶ 19. Here, as part of the plea agreement, the
parties stipulated to good cause and extenuating circumstances
that would “allow[] the Court to reserve its right to order additional
restitution beyond the 91 day period but not to exceed 180 days.”
Thus, even if the restitution order was not officially entered until
the February 20 restitution hearing, the court still had authority to
enter it because 180 days had not yet passed.

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