Peo v. Jacobs

24CA0837 Peo v Jacobs 05-29-2025

COLORADO COURT OF APPEALS

Court of Appeals No. 24CA0837
El Paso County District Court No. 21CR7135
Honorable Jill M. Brady, Judge

The People of the State of Colorado,

Plaintiff-Appellee,

v.

Roger Lee Jacobs,

Defendant-Appellant.

ORDER AFFIRMED

Division VII
Opinion by JUDGE HAWTHORNE*
Lipinsky and Pawar, JJ., concur

NOT PUBLISHED PURSUANT TO C.A.R. 35(e)
Announced May 29, 2025

Philip J. Weiser, Attorney General, Austin R. Johnston, Assistant Attorney
General, Denver, Colorado, for Plaintiff-Appellee

Roger Lee Jacobs, Pro Se

*Sitting by assignment of the Chief Justice under provisions of Colo. Const. art.
VI, § 5(3), and § 24-51-1105, C.R.S. 2024.
¶1 Roger Lee Jacobs, defendant, appeals the district court’s order

denying his pro se postconviction motion without a hearing. We

affirm.

I. Background

¶2 The prosecution charged Jacobs in a complaint and

information with four felonies — internet luring of a child, criminal

attempt to commit sexual assault on a child, and two counts of

habitual sexual offender against children. As part of a plea

agreement, Jacobs pleaded guilty to internet luring of a child, see

§ 18-3-306(1), (3), C.R.S. 2024, and the prosecution dismissed the

remaining charges.

¶3 The district court accepted Jacobs’s guilty plea and sentenced

him to three years to life in the Department of Corrections’ custody.

¶4 Jacobs then filed a pro se postconviction “motion to vacate, set

aside, and/or dismiss for want/or [sic] lack of subject matter

jurisdiction and/or personal jurisdiction.” The district court denied

the motion in a written order without holding a hearing. The court

concluded that (1) it had subject matter jurisdiction “over the case,

as well as [Jacobs’s] plea and sentencing”; (2) it had personal

jurisdiction over Jacobs; and (3) to the extent Jacobs raised other

1
arguments, including that “he [was] unlawfully detained” and “the

laws applicable to this case [were] invalid,” those arguments were

“denied as unclear, vague and conclusory.”

II. Timeliness

¶5 As an initial matter, we reject the People’s contention that

Jacobs’s notice of appeal was untimely because he filed it eighty-

five days beyond the forty-nine-day deadline set by C.A.R. 4(b)(1).

We ruled in a June 11, 2024, order that Jacobs’s notice was timely

because he was not properly served with the district court’s final

order until May 1, 2024, and he filed the notice nine days later. See

C.A.R. 26(c); cf. People v. Parks, 2021 COA 61, ¶ 9 (holding that

good cause existed to accept an untimely appeal because the

district court failed to properly serve the final order on the pro se

defendant).

III. Standard of Review

¶6 Because Jacobs’s pro se postconviction motion alleges that the

district court entered judgment against him without jurisdiction

and his conviction violated Colorado’s constitution, we construe it

as a Crim. P. 35(c) motion. See Crim. P. 35(c)(2)(I), (III); People v.

Cali, 2020 CO 20, ¶ 34 (“[W]e will broadly construe a pro se

2
litigant’s pleadings to effectuate the substance, rather than the

form, of those pleadings . . . .”); cf. People v. Collier, 151 P.3d 668,

670 (Colo. App. 2006) (“The substance of a postconviction motion

controls whether it is designated as a Crim. P. 35(a) or 35(c)

motion.”).

¶7 Under Rule 35(c), a court must review, among other things,

whether a motion “fails to state adequate factual or legal grounds

for relief” or “states legal grounds for relief that are not meritorious.”

Crim. P. 35(c)(3)(IV). “A Crim. P. 35(c) motion may be denied

without a hearing if the motion, files, and record clearly establish

that the defendant is not entitled to relief.” People v. Melendez,

2024 COA 21M, ¶ 12 (quoting People v. Venzor, 121 P.3d 260, 262

(Colo. App. 2005)). “Likewise, if the claims are bare and conclusory

in nature, and lack supporting factual allegations, the motion may

also be denied without a hearing.” Venzor, 121 P.3d at 262.

¶8 We review a district court’s summary denial of a Rule 35(c)

motion de novo. Cali, ¶ 14.

IV. Jurisdiction

¶9 Jacobs contends that the district court erred by ruling that it

had jurisdiction over his case. He argues that the court lacked

3
jurisdiction because (1) the prosecution did not seek a grand jury

indictment; (2) the charging document was of unknown authority;

and (3) the court did not have personal jurisdiction over him.1 We

disagree.

A. Legal Standards

¶ 10 “A court’s ‘jurisdiction’ concerns its ‘power to entertain and to

render a judgment on a particular claim.’” People v. C.O., 2017 CO

105, ¶ 21 (quoting In re Estate of Ongaro, 998 P.2d 1097, 1103

(Colo. 2000)). “A judgment rendered without jurisdiction is void,

and may be attacked directly or collaterally.” Id.

¶ 11 A court’s jurisdiction generally consists of subject matter

jurisdiction and personal jurisdiction. See id. at ¶ 22. “‘[S]ubject

matter jurisdiction’ concerns the court’s authority to deal with the

class of cases in which it renders judgment, not its authority to

enter a particular judgment within that class.” Id. at ¶ 24; see also

Wood v. People, 255 P.3d 1136, 1140 (Colo. 2011). “Personal

jurisdiction is the court’s power to subject a particular defendant to

1 While at times Jacobs uses broad language about the Colorado

Revised Statutes, we understand his contentions as directed at the
statute of conviction, section 18-3-306(1), (3), C.R.S. 2024.

4
the decisions of the court.” People v. Jones, 140 P.3d 325, 328

(Colo. App. 2006).

¶ 12 We review questions of jurisdiction de novo. See People v.

Wunder, 2016 COA 46, ¶ 9 (subject matter jurisdiction); Jones, 140

P.3d at 326 (personal jurisdiction).

B. Grand Jury Indictment

¶ 13 Jacobs contends that he “didn’t waive his indictment and/or

grand jury investigation due process rights,” and thus, “the

prosecutor and [Jacobs’s] then lawyer stripped him of his vital

constitutional rights, his preliminary hearing and grand/jury

investigation.” Having not been indicted by a grand jury, Jacobs

argues that “the criminal court did not have lawful jurisdiction over

the subject matter” because “[w]ithout a valid indictment any

judgment or sentence rendered is, void ab initio.”

¶ 14 This argument lacks an adequate legal foundation. While the

district courts have original jurisdiction over all criminal cases

generally, see Colo. Const. art. VI, § 9, “[s]ubject matter jurisdiction

must be properly invoked before the district court[s] can act,”

People v. Sims, 2019 COA 66, ¶ 15. To that end, the Colorado

Constitution states that, “[u]ntil otherwise provided by law, no

5
person shall, for a felony, be proceeded against criminally otherwise

than by indictment.” Colo. Const. art. II, § 8. And section 16-5-

101(1), C.R.S. 2024, otherwise provides that the prosecution may

alternatively commence a prosecution by filing an information or

complaint. Cf. People v. Gardner, 250 P.3d 1262, 1270 (Colo. App.

2010) (“The Colorado Constitution does not guarantee a grand jury

indictment for a felony charge.”). In other words, “[i]n a criminal

case, the court’s jurisdiction is invoked by the filing of a legally

sufficient complaint, information, or indictment.” Sims, ¶ 15

(emphasis added).

¶ 15 So Jacobs’s claim fails because, even without a grand jury

indictment, the district court had both (1) general jurisdiction over

the criminal proceedings, see Colo. Const. art. VI, § 9; and (2)

subject matter jurisdiction invoked by the prosecution’s filing of the

complaint charging Jacobs with four felonies, see Sims, ¶ 15.

C. Unknown Authority

¶ 16 Jacobs contends that the district court also lacked subject

matter jurisdiction because the complaint was defective for having

“unknown or questionable” authority. Jacobs asserts that the

Colorado Revised Statutes, which the complaint cites, “‘is [sic] not

6
the law’ of the legislature,” was “not enacted in the mode intended

by the term of the Constitution,” and “appear to be nothing more

that [sic] a reference book.” Jacobs argues that “[t]he contents of

such reference books ‘cannot’ be used as law in charging citizens

with crimes on a presentment or indictment or complaints and

informations.”

¶ 17 This argument misses the mark because the “reference book”

is an approved publication that, by law, provides the authority for

the charges brought against Jacobs in the complaint. Specifically,

“[t]he Colorado Revised Statutes are the official compilation of the

Session Laws of Colorado, the latter containing the official

publication of the enactments of the General Assembly.” People v.

Washington, 969 P.2d 788, 789 (Colo. App. 1998); see also Colo.

Const. art. XVIII, § 8; § 24-70-223(1), C.R.S. 2024; §§ 2-5-

101, -126, C.R.S. 2024. As an official compilation, the Colorado

Revised Statutes must provide the source of authority for each

statute by reference to the Session Laws. See Washington, 969 P.2d

at 789 (noting that the Colorado Revised Statutes are “required to

include references to the Session Laws to permit a researcher to

locate the source legislation”); accord People v. Summers, 208 P.3d

7
251, 259 (Colo. 2009). As pertinent to the charges in the complaint,

the Colorado Revised Statutes correctly cite the applicable Session

Laws.2 See § 18-3-306; § 18-3-405, C.R.S. 2024 (sexual assault on

a child); § 18-2-101, C.R.S. 2024 (criminal attempt); § 18-3-412,

C.R.S. 2024 (habitual sex offender against children).

¶ 18 Therefore, Jacobs’s contention fails because the Colorado

Revised Statutes officially and accurately establish the sources of

authority for the complaint. See Washington, 969 P.2d at 789; cf.

§ 2-5-118(1)(a), C.R.S. 2024 (“[The Colorado Revised Statutes] shall

be the only publication of the statutes entitled to be considered as

evidence in Colorado courts . . . .”).

D. Personal Jurisdiction

¶ 19 To the extent Jacobs challenges the district court’s personal

jurisdiction over him, such challenges lack factual bases because

the record shows that the criminal acts and the case’s proceedings

occurred in El Paso County, Colorado. See § 18-1-201, C.R.S.

2 By way of example, section 18-3-306 cites the following Session

Laws for its sources of authority: “Source: L. 2006: Entire section
added, p. 2055, § 4, effective July 1. L. 2007: (1) and (2) amended,
p. 1688, § 8, effective July 1; L. 2009: (1) amended, (HB 09-1132),
ch. 341, p. 1792, § 2, effective July 1.”

8
2024; People v. Vigil, 983 P.2d 805, 809 (Colo. App. 1999)

(“Criminal jurisdiction over felonies committed in the state generally

extends to all district courts in the state.”); People v. Garcia, 2013

COA 15, ¶ 15 (“The physical presence of the defendant in court

confers jurisdiction over the person.”).

¶ 20 Because Jacobs’s arguments lack adequate factual and legal

grounds, the district court did not err by dismissing his

jurisdictional claims. See Crim. P. 35(c)(3)(IV).

V. Constitutionality

¶ 21 Jacobs contends that his conviction under section 18-3-306 is

void because the statute is invalid for violating the Colorado

Constitution’s (1) enactment clause and (2) title requirement.3 We

are not persuaded.

A. Legal Standards

¶ 22 “A statute is presumed to be constitutional; the challenging

party bears the burden of proving its unconstitutionality beyond a

reasonable doubt.” Dean v. People, 2016 CO 14, ¶ 8. “[I]f the

3 We respectfully disagree with the district court that Jacobs’s

contentions about “the laws applicable to this case [being] invalid”
were prohibitively unclear, vague, or conclusory. So we will address
them.

9
language in a statute is clear and unambiguous, we give effect to its

plain meaning and look no further.” Cowen v. People, 2018 CO 96,

¶ 12.

¶ 23 We review issues of statutory and constitutional interpretation

de novo. Kazadi v. People, 2012 CO 73, ¶ 11 (statutory

interpretation); Salah v. People, 2024 CO 54, ¶ 19 (constitutional

interpretation).

B. Enacting Clause

¶ 24 The Colorado Constitution provides, “The style of the laws of

this state shall be: ‘Be it enacted by the General Assembly of the

State of Colorado.’” Colo. Const. art. V, § 18.

¶ 25 Jacobs contends that section 18-3-306 is void as

unconstitutional because it lacks such an enacting clause in the

Colorado Revised Statutes. He argues that the constitution

“prescribes an enacting clause for all laws” and “not just bills

without the Legislature. But on published laws, as well.” Thus,

according to Jacobs, “a law in a statute book without an enacting

clause is not a valid publication of law.” He also asserts that “the

enacting clause must be readily visible ‘on it’s [sic] face’ of a statute

in common mode in which it is published” and “cannot be hidden

10
away in the Session Laws or other records or books.” So he

concludes, “The purported laws in the complaint . . . referenced to

various laws/or statutes found printed in the ‘Colorado Revised

Statute books[’]” are unconstitutional because there is “no enacting

clause for any of these alleged laws/or statutes.”4

¶ 26 We reject this argument. In People v. Washington, another

division of this court addressed the same argument and concluded

there was no constitutional violation:

Because each section in the statutory
compilation is required to cite to its underlying
source legislation pursuant to § 2-5-102(1)(a),[
C.R.S. 1998,] because the act adopting the
statutory compilation itself contains the proper
enacting clause, and because § 2-5-118[,
C.R.S. 1998,] does not preclude introduction of
the Session Laws into evidence to prove or
challenge the validity of a legislative
enactment, we hold that the enacting clause as
published in the Session Laws of Colorado
satisfies the mandate of Colo. Const. art. V,
§ 18 and its underlying policy. Consequently,
the omission of the enacting clause from the
Colorado Revised Statutes does not render the
statutes unconstitutional, and there was no

4 We presume Jacobs makes this argument as an alternative to his

contention that the Colorado Revised Statutes are “nothing more
that [sic] a reference book” of unknown authority. See Jones v.
Williams, 2019 CO 61, ¶ 5 (“Pleadings by pro se litigants must be
broadly construed . . . .”).

11
constitutional deficiency in defendant’s
conviction.

969 P.2d at 790 (emphasis added); see also § 2-5-102(1)(a), C.R.S.

2024; § 2-5-118, C.R.S. 2024.

¶ 27 We deem the Washington division’s reasoning sound and apply

it here. Section 18-3-306 is not rendered unconstitutional merely

because it has no enacting clause shown in the Colorado Revised

Statutes. See Washington, 969 P.2d at 790. Because the Session

Laws pertinent to section 18-3-306 contain enacting clauses,

Jacobs’s contention is without merit. See Ch. 362, sec. 4, § 18-3-

306, 2006 Colo. Sess. Laws 2055-56 (enactment); Ch. 383, sec. 8,

§ 18-3-306, 2007 Colo. Sess. Laws 1688-89 (amendment); Ch. 341,

sec. 2, § 18-3-306, 2009 Colo. Sess. Laws 1792-93 (amendment).

C. Title

¶ 28 The Colorado Constitution states that “[n]o bill . . . shall be

passed containing more than one subject, which shall be clearly

expressed in its title.” Colo. Const. art. V, § 21. Jacobs asserts

that “[t]he alleged statute(s)/law(s) that [he] was charge[d] under

and convicted of contain no titles,” and “[t]he complete omission of

12
a title is about as substantial and plain a violation of this

constitution provision as can exist.”

¶ 29 This argument lacks any factual basis because the Session

Law enacting section 18-3-306 contains a title. See Sec. 1, 2006

Colo. Sess. Laws at 2054 (“AN ACT CONCERNING CHILD

EXPLOITATION OFFENSES, AND MAKING AN APPROPRIATION IN

CONNECTION THEREWITH”). And to the extent Jacobs intends his

argument to extend to the Colorado Revised Statutes, section 18-3-

306 in the Colorado Revised Statutes (as well as in the complaint)

also contains a title. See § 18-3-306 (“Internet luring of a child”);

see also Sec. 4, § 18-3-306, 2006 Colo. Sess. Laws at 2055

(“Internet luring of a child.”).

¶ 30 Because Jacobs’s arguments are legally and factually

inadequate, we affirm the district court’s order summarily

dismissing his postconviction motion. See Crim. P. 35(c)(3)(IV);

People v. Chase, 2013 COA 27, ¶ 17 (An appellate court “may affirm

a [district] court’s ruling on grounds different from those employed

by that court, as long as they are supported by the record.”).

13
VI. Other Claims

¶ 31 We do not address Jacobs’s remaining contentions regarding

(1) “false arrest and wrongful imprisonment”; (2) “false

imprisonment”; (3) “prosecut[ion] under false pretense or pretext”;

and (4) “an illegal plea agreement” because he neither provides

authority for these arguments nor develops them. See C.A.R.

28(a)(4), (7)(B); People v. Liggett, 2021 COA 51, ¶ 53, aff’d, 2023 CO

22; Barnett v. Elite Props. of Am., Inc., 252 P.3d 14, 19 (Colo. App.

2010) (“We will not consider a bald legal proposition presented

without argument or development.”).

VII. Disposition

¶ 32 The district court’s order is affirmed.

JUDGE LIPINSKY and JUDGE PAWAR concur.

14