OHanlon v. Gillette

24CA0343 O’Hanlon v Gillette 05-22-2025

COLORADO COURT OF APPEALS

Court of Appeals No. 24CA0343
Douglas County District Court No. 22CV98
Honorable Andrew C. Baum, Judge

Kenneth O’Hanlon,

Plaintiff-Appellant,

v.

Patrick Gillette and Tracie Noel Lechman,

Defendants-Appellees.

JUDGMENT AFFIRMED

Division VII
Opinion by JUDGE MOULTRIE
Lipinsky and Johnson, JJ., concur

NOT PUBLISHED PURSUANT TO C.A.R. 35(e)
Announced May 22, 2025

Kenneth O’Hanlon, Pro Se

Reynolds Gillette, LLC, Brian R. Reynolds, Denver, Colorado, for
Defendant-Appellee Patrick Gillette

No Appearance for Defendant-Appellee Tracie Noel Lechman
¶1 Plaintiff, Kenneth O’Hanlon, appeals the district court’s

judgment dismissing his claims against defendants, Patrick Gillette

and Tracie Noel Lechman (jointly, the defendants). We affirm.

I. Background

A. Factual History

¶2 O’Hanlon has been engaged in yearslong litigation related to a

2011 patent dispute, the complex procedural history of which has

been discussed in several other state and federal cases.1

¶3 As pertinent here, O’Hanlon previously had a business

relationship with AccessU2 Mobile Solutions, LLC (AccessU2).

However, AccessU2 sued O’Hanlon and obtained a judgment

against him for various alleged torts based on his unauthorized use

of AccessU2’s proprietary business information, which was affirmed

1 O’Hanlon has been a litigant in the following non-exhaustive list of

cases: E B H, LLC v. O’Hanlon, (Colo. App. No. 16CA0828, Aug. 17,
2017) (not published pursuant to C.A.R. 35(e)); O’Hanlon v.
Hutchinson, (Colo. App. No. 20CA1049, June 16, 2022) (not
published pursuant to C.A.R. 35(e)); O’Hanlon v. AccessU2 Mobile
Solutions LLC, (Colo. App. No. 21CA1997, Feb. 16, 2023) (not
published pursuant to C.A.R. 35(e)); E B H, LLC v. O’Hanlon, (Colo.
App. No. 24CA0792, Apr. 17, 2025) (not published pursuant to
C.A.R. 35(e)); see also O’Hanlon v. AccessU2 Mobile Solutions, LLC,
Civ. A. No. 18-cv-00185, 2019 WL 1081079 (D. Colo. Jan. 22, 2019)
(unpublished order).

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on appeal. See generally E B H, LLC v. O’Hanlon, (Colo. App. No.

16CA0828, Aug. 17, 2017) (not published pursuant to C.A.R. 35(e)).

From this original business dispute, multiple other cases were

spawned, including Denver District Court Case No. 19CV200. In

that case, O’Hanlon attempted to force the dissolution of AccessU2.

The district court dismissed that case, awarded AccessU2 its

attorney fees and costs, and reduced the award to a judgment

(attorney fees judgment).

¶4 AccessU2 hired Gillette as counsel to assist with enforcing the

attorney fees judgment. After O’Hanlon frustrated Gillette’s

attempts to obtain the information needed to enforce the attorney

fees judgment, Gillette took steps to obtain the necessary

information from Catherine Faulkner,2 O’Hanlon’s domestic

partner. Gillette hired a process server to serve Faulkner with

subpoenas to produce O’Hanlon’s financial information and appear

for a deposition. On August 9, 2022, the process server served

Faulkner at the home she shared with O’Hanlon, but the process

2 The district court referred to Catherine Faulkner as “Ms. Faulker”

and “Ms. Faulkner”; however, the record supports that the correct
spelling is “Faulkner.”

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server failed to include a mileage check as required by C.R.C.P.

45(b)(3). That same day, Gillette hired Lechman to serve the

required mileage check and drove her to Faulkner’s home for this

purpose.

¶5 After Lechman made several attempts to serve the mileage

check on Faulkner, O’Hanlon stepped out of the home and

confronted the defendants (the incident). Lechman tried to leave

the mileage check on the porch of the home, but O’Hanlon

attempted to shove the mileage check down her shirt, followed her

into the street, and then jumped on the hood of Gillette’s car. The

defendants called the police to report O’Hanlon’s conduct.

O’Hanlon’s neighbor’s security camera caught most of the incident

on video, and the neighbor provided the video recording to the

police.

B. Procedural History

¶6 O’Hanlon filed the lawsuit from which this appeal stems in

October 2022. In his complaint (initial complaint) against the

defendants, O’Hanlon asserted fourteen3 claims for relief allegedly

3 The last claim in O’Hanlon’s initial complaint is titled “Claim

Fifteen”; however, the preceding claim is “Claim Thirteen.”

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arising from the incident, including, among other things,

harassment, assault, intentional inflectional of emotional distress,

and trespass. The following month, O’Hanlon filed an amended

complaint (first amended complaint) with nineteen similar claims.

In April 2023, O’Hanlon filed another amended complaint (second

amended complaint), with the court’s permission, that asserted

seventeen substantially similar claims for relief.

¶7 Between the filing of the first and second amended complaints,

the defendants each filed a motion to dismiss (first motions to

dismiss) and jointly filed a special motion to dismiss pursuant to

section 13-20-1101, C.R.S. 2024, Colorado’s anti-SLAPP4 statute

(special motion to dismiss).

¶8 In August 2023, Gillette filed another motion to dismiss

(second motion to dismiss), and Lechman filed a “Partial Motion to

Dismiss” (partial motion to dismiss). Both motions sought to

dismiss O’Hanlon’s second amended complaint. The court denied

as untimely the second motion to dismiss and the partial motion to

dismiss. However, the court issued an “omnibus” order (omnibus

4 “SLAPP” stands for “strategic lawsuit against public participation.”

Coomer v. Salem Media of Colo., Inc., 2025 COA 2, ¶ 3 n.1.

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order), in which it granted in part and denied in part the

defendants’ first motions to dismiss by dismissing eight of the

claims in O’Hanlon’s second amended complaint. The court also

ordered a hearing to be set on the special motion to dismiss.

¶9 A few days later, O’Hanlon filed a motion asking the court to

“declare as moot” the portion of the omnibus order setting the

special motion to dismiss for a hearing. O’Hanlon asserted that the

second amended complaint “supplanted in its entirety” the initial

complaint. And he argued that, because the court’s omnibus order

denied Gillette and Lechman’s motions to fully or partially dismiss

his second amended complaint, the issues raised by the defendants’

first motions to dismiss were “moot.” He further argued that the

court’s attempt to “bifurcate” the claims in the initial complaint

from those in the second amended complaint was “jurisdictionally

unenforceable.”

¶ 10 The court denied O’Hanlon’s motion, explaining that

Defendants originally filed [the first] motions to
dismiss and a combined special motion to
dismiss certain claims in Plaintiff’s [first]
Amended Complaint filed Nov. 29, 2022. The
claims in Plaintiff’s Second Amended
Complaint are substantially similar (and some
are identical) to those in his [first] Amended

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Complaint . . . , and thus the same arguments
in the [first] motions to dismiss and special
motion to dismiss applied to the claims in the
Second Amended Complaint. Importantly, the
filing of the Second Amended Complaint did
not render moot the previously filed [first]
motions to dismiss or the special motion to
dismiss under the anti-SLAPP statute. The
Court still needs to hold a hearing under the
anti-SLAPP statute.

¶ 11 The court held a hearing on the special motion to dismiss in

October 2023 and issued a thorough written order granting that

motion in January 2024 (the judgment). The entry of the judgment

ended the case because it dismissed the remaining claims in

O’Hanlon’s second amended complaint that the omnibus order had

not previously dismissed.

¶ 12 O’Hanlon appeals, asserting that the court (1) lacked

“jurisdiction” to dismiss his second amended complaint because the

court relied on motions (the first motions to dismiss and the special

motion to dismiss) that were “moot”; (2) abused its discretion by

allowing the defendants to file their answers “out of time” and

“belatedly” issuing its case management order (CMO); and (3) erred

by considering the video of the incident from his neighbor’s security

camera in granting the special motion to dismiss.

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II. O’Hanlon’s Noncompliant Opening Brief

¶ 13 Initially, we note that, notwithstanding the certificate of

compliance, O’Hanlon’s opening brief doesn’t comply with C.A.R.

28(a)(7). He fails to indicate whether his third issue — the court’s

alleged abuse of discretion by considering a video in granting the

defendants’ special motion to dismiss — was preserved and, if it

was, to direct us to the precise location in the record where it was

preserved. See C.A.R. 28(a)(7)(A). And with respect to his first and

second issues, he fails to cite any authority supporting his

arguments. See C.A.R. 28(a)(7)(B).

¶ 14 We note that O’Hanlon has previously filed briefs that have

failed to comply with various portions of C.A.R. 28. See E B H, LLC

v. O’Hanlon, (Colo. App. No. 24CA0792, Apr. 17, 2025) (not

published pursuant to C.A.R. 35(e)); O’Hanlon v. Hutchinson, (Colo.

App. No. 20CA1049, June 16, 2022) (not published pursuant to

C.A.R. 35(e)). While we exercise our discretion not to strike his

opening brief, we put O’Hanlon on notice that his failure to comply

with this court’s procedures in any future appeals risks sanctions

for such noncompliance.

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III. The Court Had Jurisdiction to Dismiss the Second Amended
Complaint

A. Applicable Legal Principles and Standard of Review

¶ 15 “Subject matter jurisdiction concerns a court’s authority to

hear and rule on a certain class of cases and is conferred by the

state constitution and statutes.” People in Interest of P.K., 2015

COA 121, ¶ 9; Meggitt v. Stross, 2021 COA 50, ¶ 39 (a court’s

subject matter jurisdiction concerns its authority to deal with the

class of cases in which it renders judgment, not its authority to

enter a particular judgment within that class). “The Colorado

Constitution vests district courts with general subject matter

jurisdiction in civil cases.” Levine v. Katz, 167 P.3d 141, 144 (Colo.

App. 2006) (citing Colo. Const. art. VI, § 9). “A [matter] is moot

when the relief granted by the court would not have a practical

effect upon an actual and existing controversy.” Sinclair Transp. Co.

v. Sandberg, 2014 COA 76M, ¶ 11.

¶ 16 We review de novo whether a court has subject matter

jurisdiction if the facts are undisputed. Black v. Black, 2018 COA

7, ¶ 20. Likewise, we review de novo whether a matter is moot.

Colo. Mining Ass’n v. Urbina, 2013 COA 155, ¶ 23.

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B. Analysis

¶ 17 Although O’Hanlon’s argument is not entirely understandable,

he appears to contend the first motions to dismiss and the special

motion to dismiss (collectively, the prior motions to dismiss) were

rendered moot because he filed the second amended complaint after

the defendants filed the prior motions to dismiss. Thus, we

understand him to argue that the court therefore lacked authority

to dismiss his second amended complaint by relying on the prior

motions to dismiss.

¶ 18 O’Hanlon also asserts “the Court’s ruling on March 9, 2023,

can have no effect on the Second Amended Complaint.” The court

issued six separate rulings on March 9, 2023. But O’Hanlon fails to

indicate which of the six rulings he refers to, and it is not our duty

to search the record for evidence to support his bald assertions.

See Brighton Sch. Dist. 27J v. Transamerica Premier Ins. Co., 923

P.2d 328, 335 (Colo. App. 1996), aff’d, 940 P.2d 348 (Colo. 1997).

Moreover, none of those six orders addressed the issue he raises on

appeal: whether by relying on the “moot” prior motions to dismiss,

the court lacked subject matter jurisdiction to dismiss his second

amended complaint.

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¶ 19 In support of his jurisdictional argument, O’Hanlon quotes

language from Continental Casualty Co. v. Anderson Excavating &

Wrecking Co., 189 F.3d 512, 518 (7th Cir. 1999), which says that

“[a] case can become moot at any time[] and destroy the court’s

jurisdiction.” But O’Hanlon fails to explain how the filing of his

second amended complaint mooted the prior motions to dismiss,

such that the court lacked jurisdiction because an actual

controversy no longer existed. See Sinclair Transp. Co., ¶ 11. On

the contrary, by authorizing O’Hanlon to file the second amended

complaint, the court determined that an actual controversy

continued to exist despite the intervening prior motions to dismiss.

¶ 20 Moreover, a motion to dismiss is generally not considered a

responsive pleading for purposes of C.R.C.P. 15(a). Schulz v. Laszlo

& Assocs., LLC, 2025 COA 24, ¶ 15; Schaden v. DIA Brewing Co.,

2021 CO 4M, ¶ 36 (“[A] motion to dismiss is not a responsive

pleading . . . .”); see Gandy v. Williams, 2019 COA 118, ¶ 10 (noting

that the defendants’ motion to dismiss did not terminate the

plaintiff’s right to amend). But see Cooper v. Shumway, 780 F.2d

27, 29 (10th Cir. 1985) (“A motion to dismiss is treated like a

responsive pleading when final judgment is entered before plaintiff

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files an amended complaint.”). In sum, a court can authorize a

plaintiff to amend his complaint even if it dismisses some, but not

all, of a plaintiff’s claims. See Schulz, ¶¶ 15, 24. And here, the

court didn’t address the substance of the prior motions to dismiss

until after O’Hanlon filed the second amended complaint. Thus, we

reject O’Hanlon’s assertion that by relying on the prior motions to

dismiss, the court lacked subject matter jurisdiction to dismiss his

second amended complaint.

¶ 21 O’Hanlon also fails to explain how the court otherwise lacked

subject matter jurisdiction, nor can we discern from our review of

the record a basis to conclude that the court didn’t have authority

to enter judgment on his second amended complaint. See Meggitt,

¶ 39. Accordingly, we discern no error.

IV. O’Hanlon’s Other Contentions

¶ 22 O’Hanlon further asserts that the court abused its discretion

by allowing the defendants to file their answers to his second

amended complaint “out of time” and by “belatedly” issuing a CMO.

O’Hanlon asserts that “[t]his not only is an [a]buse of [d]iscretion

but violates [c]onstitutional [d]ue [p]rocess.” But O’Hanlon fails to

explain how the court’s decision to allow the defendants to file their

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answers late or the timing of its CMO was manifestly arbitrary,

unreasonable, or unfair or was based on a misapprehension or

misapplication of the law. See Rains v. Barber, 2018 CO 61, ¶ 8 (A

trial court abuses its discretion when its ruling is “manifestly

arbitrary, unreasonable, or unfair” or when it misapplies the law.)

(citation omitted); see Brown v. Walker Com., Inc., 2022 CO 57, ¶ 20

(courts have discretion under C.R.C.P. 6(b) to consider untimely

responsive pleadings). Accordingly, we decline to further address

this contention because it is a bald assertion presented without

argument or development. See Barnett v. Elite Props. of Am., Inc.,

252 P.3d 14, 19 (Colo. App. 2010).

¶ 23 Lastly, O’Hanlon asserts that the court erred when it

considered the neighbor’s video of the incident in reaching the

judgment. Again, he fails to develop his argument or provide any

legal authority in support of it. Notably, O’Hanlon failed to provide

us with a transcript for the October 2023 evidentiary hearing at

which the court received evidence on the special motion to dismiss.

The court relied on the evidence presented at that hearing to reach

its judgment. “It is the obligation of the party asserting error in a

judgment to present a record that discloses that error, for a

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judgment is presumed to be correct until the contrary affirmatively

appears.” Schuster v. Zwicker, 659 P.2d 687, 690 (Colo. 1983).

Thus, we must assume the record from the evidentiary hearing

supports the court’s findings in the judgment. See People v.

Schupper, 2014 COA 80M, ¶ 31 n.3 (noting that, because a hearing

transcript was not contained in the record, the court “must assume

this hearing supports the trial court’s findings”). Accordingly, we

also reject his assertion that the court erred by considering the

video evidence in reaching the judgment.

V. Disposition

¶ 24 The judgment is affirmed.

JUDGE LIPINSKY and JUDGE JOHNSON concur.

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