Hoid v. Fox 31

24CA1229 Hoid v Fox 31 05-15-2025

COLORADO COURT OF APPEALS

Court of Appeals No. 24CA1229
City and County of Denver District Court No. 23CV558
Honorable Mark T. Bailey, Judge

Edward Hoid,

Plaintiff-Appellant,

v.

FOX-31 News and Byron Grandy, General Manager,

Defendants-Appellees.

JUDGMENT AFFIRMED AND CASE
REMANDED WITH DIRECTIONS

Division VII
Opinion by JUDGE JOHNSON
Lipinsky and Moultrie, JJ., concur

NOT PUBLISHED PURSUANT TO C.A.R. 35(e)
Announced May 15, 2025

Edward Hoid, Pro Se

Ballard Spahr, LLP, Ashley I. Kissinger, Denver, Colorado; Ballard Spahr, LLP,
Kennison Lay, Phoenix, Arizona, for Defendants-Appellees
¶1 Plaintiff, Edward Herbert Hoid (Hoid), appeals the district

court’s judgment dismissing his lawsuit against defendant, FOX-31

News (FOX-31). On appeal, Hoid contends that (1) his defamation

and defamation-related claims are not barred by the statute of

limitations because they did not accrue until a later date than the

one identified by the court or the limitation period should be

extended through equitable tolling; (2) the district court erred by

applying Colorado’s anti-SLAPP statute, section 13-20-1101, C.R.S.

2024, to his lawsuit;1 and (3) the district court committed judicial

misconduct by aiding FOX-31’s concealment of its defamatory

publications.

¶2 Even if the anti-SLAPP statute did not apply to Hoid’s lawsuit,

his claims fail as a matter of law because they are time barred. But

because we agree with the district court that the anti-SLAPP statute

applies, and we agree that the court properly granted FOX-31’s

special motion to dismiss, we remand the case to the district court

1 SLAPP stands for “strategic lawsuits against public participation.”

Creekside Endodontics, LLC v. Sullivan, 2022 COA 145, ¶ 1 n.1.

1
to determine and award FOX-31 its reasonable attorney fees and

costs, including those incurred on appeal.2

I. Background

¶3 On November 5, 2020, a seventy-one-year-old man (the victim)

was found on a biking trail in Longmont suffering from injuries that

later led to his death. The Longmont Public Safety Department (the

police) investigated and discovered that the victim had been

knocked off his bicycle and robbed of his phone, wallet, credit

cards, and bicycle.

¶4 The police issued press releases from November 21, 2020, to

November 27, 2020, notifying the public concerning its

investigation. Based on the press releases, FOX-31, a Denver

television station, published three articles and one report

(collectively, the news articles) on its website updating the public

regarding the investigation. The news articles identified Hoid as a

person of interest “possibly connected to” the victim’s death, but at

2 Hoid named Bryon Grandy (Grandy), the general manager for

FOX-31, as a codefendant. Although Hoid asserts no allegations
against Grandy in this appeal, our affirmance of the district court’s
order also applies to him.

2
no time did they implicitly or explicitly state that Hoid had been

charged in the victim’s death.

¶5 On November 27, 2020, the police arrested Hoid and charged

him with various criminal offenses, including identity theft for

allegedly using the victim’s credit card. Hoid was not criminally

charged in connection with the victim’s death. Hoid pled guilty to

several criminal offenses and was sentenced to seven years in the

custody of the Department of Corrections.3

¶6 On September 8, 2023, Hoid filed this lawsuit against FOX-31,

asserting that FOX-31’s statements in the news articles created

public scrutiny that harmed his reputation and placed his family in

danger. He asserted claims of defamation, child

endangerment/abuse, public endangerment, false light, and

discrimination.

3 Following Hoid’s conviction, he filed a motion for postconviction

relief under Crim. P. 35. We take judicial notice of Hoid’s appeal in
which a division of this court affirmed the postconviction court’s
summary denial of Hoid’s request for relief. See People v. Hoid,
(Colo. App. No. 23CA1976, Dec. 19, 2024) (not published pursuant
to C.A.R. 35(e)); see also People v. Sa’ra, 117 P.3d 51, 56 (Colo. App.
2004) (“A court may take judicial notice of the contents of court
records in a related proceeding.”).

3
¶7 FOX-31 filed a special motion to dismiss, arguing that Hoid’s

defamation claim was subject to the anti-SLAPP statute, as were his

other claims because they related to the defamation claim. FOX-31

contended that Hoid’s defamation claim failed because he could not

prove that FOX-31 acted with actual malice when it made the

statements, or alternatively, Hoid’s claim was barred by the statute

of limitations. At a hearing on FOX-31’s motion, Hoid alleged that

the news station had not disclosed all its broadcast stories about

him. FOX-31 submitted to the court a copy of another television

broadcast.

¶8 The district court granted FOX-31’s special motion to dismiss,

entering a written order that found (1) Hoid’s defamation and

defamation-related claims were barred by the applicable one-year

statute of limitations, and (2) Hoid was not likely to succeed on the

merits of his claims because he could not prove that FOX-31 acted

with actual malice when it published the statements.

II. Statute of Limitations

¶9 We conclude, as did the district court, that Hoid’s claims all

stem from or are derivative of his defamation claim.

4
A. Standard of Review and Applicable Law

¶ 10 We review de novo when a claim accrues under a statute of

limitations. Rider v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 205 P.3d 519,

521 (Colo. App. 2009). But whether the statute of limitations bars a

particular claim because a court finds certain circumstances is

generally a question of fact. Sulca v. Allstate Ins. Co., 77 P.3d 897,

899 (Colo. App. 2003).

¶ 11 In Colorado, defamation claims are subject to a one-year

statute of limitations. See § 13-80-103(1)(a), C.R.S. 2024 (the one-

year period applies for “[t]he following tort actions: Assault, battery,

false imprisonment, false arrest, libel, and slander”). A defamation

claim “accrues on the date both the injury and its cause are known

or should have been known by the exercise of reasonable diligence.”

Burke v. Greene, 963 P.2d 1119, 1121 (Colo. App. 1998); Taylor v.

Goldsmith, 870 P.2d 1264, 1266 (Colo. App. 1994).

B. Accrual Date

¶ 12 The district court determined that Hoid’s defamation claim

accrued in November 2020 and, thus, his lawsuit was filed outside

the one-year limitation period found in section 13-80-103(1)(a). It

reasoned that Hoid knew, or should have known through

5
reasonable diligence, about FOX-31’s statements, based on

allegations he asserted in the federal case he filed in March 2023

against FOX-31, captioned Hoid v. FOX-31 News, No. 23-cv-00670

(D. Colo. [dismissed] Aug. 2023) (the federal case). We agree with

the court’s analysis.

¶ 13 As noted by the district court, Hoid brought substantially

similar claims in the federal case as he brought in the state lawsuit.

He claimed in the federal case, as he does in this case, that he did

not know about FOX-31’s statements until the prosecutor in his

criminal case provided him with discovery in August 2022. The

federal magistrate judge rejected this argument, reasoning that,

even if Hoid had not seen the November 2020 news articles until

August 2022, he alleged in his federal complaint that his ‘“injury

was immediate and severe’ because [FOX-31’s] broadcasts and

publications triggered a sudden and violent reaction from the

community and law enforcement that forced him to ‘bring [him]self

into Longmont Police custody in November 2020.’” The federal

court also relied on information from a December 2020 hearing at

which the parole board revoked Hoid’s parole, even though Hoid

said he was “falsely accused of murder,” leading to his incarceration

6
for eighteen months.4 Thus, like the federal court, the district court

in this lawsuit found that Hoid’s defamation claim began to accrue

in November 2020.5

¶ 14 While Hoid’s opening brief in this appeal includes screenshot

images of messages from alleged “vigilantes” that caused him and

his family harm, he does not provide the dates on which these

messages were received. He argues that he provided the

screenshots to law enforcement. Regardless, the screenshots are

4 The district court in the federal case adopted the magistrate

judge’s recommendation and dismissed Hoid’s federal lawsuit. See
Sa’ra, 117 P.3d at 56 (we may take judicial notice of related court
proceedings).
5 FOX-31 did not argue that we should apply issue or claim

preclusion to the federal court’s statute of limitations analysis and
determination, even though Colorado state courts have given
preclusive effect to issues decided in federal cases. See, e.g., Kaiser
v. Bowlen, 200 P.3d 1098, 1103 (Colo. App. 2008); see also 50
C.J.S. Judgments § 1311, Westlaw (database updated Dec. 2024)
(“[A] judgment or decree duly rendered by a federal court of
competent jurisdiction is binding and conclusive on the parties in
all subsequent litigation between them in the state courts and is
not subject to review or reexamination on the merits.”). We suspect
this might be because FOX-31 sought a merits determination under
the anti-SLAPP statute. Regardless, because FOX-31 did not argue
issue preclusion, we review the district court’s ruling on the merits.
See Galvan v. People, 2020 CO 82, ¶ 45 (“Under our adversarial
system of justice, we adhere to the party presentation principle,
which relies on the parties to frame the issues to be decided and
assigns to courts the role of neutral arbiters of the matters raised.”).

7
irrelevant to the analysis of whether Hoid knew or should have

known of FOX-31’s publications before August 2022 because

readers’ online comments to the news articles presumably

responded to the public being informed that he was a person of

interest in the criminal conduct regarding the victim. Therefore, we

conclude that the district court properly determined that Hoid’s

defamation claim accrued in November 2020, the timeframe of FOX-

31’s last known publications concerning the police investigation

involving Hoid.

C. Equitable Tolling

¶ 15 Despite the November 2020 accrual date, Hoid contends that

the statute of limitations should be tolled because (1) he and his

family suffered ongoing harm caused by the news articles; (2) FOX-

31 engaged in wrongful misconduct by concealing information from

him; and (3) he proved extraordinary circumstances, including his

incarceration, the COVID-19 pandemic, and his lawyers’

withdrawal, which kept him “uninformed” about his cases.

¶ 16 Courts may toll the statute of limitations in situations where,

despite diligent efforts, a plaintiff is unable to bring a case due to

the defendant’s wrongful impediment or other “truly extraordinary

8
circumstances.” Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc. v. Hartman, 911 P.2d

1094, 1099 (Colo. 1996). Colorado recognizes the doctrine of

equitable tolling, which courts have applied in limited

circumstances, such as when a defendant actively prevents a

plaintiff from discovering the cause of action. See Brodeur v. Am.

Home Assurance Co., 169 P.3d 139, 149-50 (Colo. 2007); see also

First Interstate Bank of Fort Collins, N.A. v. Piper Aircraft Corp., 744

P.2d 1197, 1202 (Colo. 1987) (holding that the defendant’s

fraudulent concealment equitably tolled the statute of limitations).

“[A] party who contends that the statute of limitations should be

tolled has the burden to establish a basis for such tolling.” SMLL,

L.L.C. v. Peak Nat’l Bank, 111 P.3d 563, 565 (Colo. App. 2005).

¶ 17 For three reasons, we conclude that equitable tolling does not

apply here.

¶ 18 First, the statute of limitations was not tolled based on Hoid’s

or his family’s continuing harm absent new defamatory statements.

Although each publication of a defamatory statement constitutes a

separate cause of action that would begin a new statute of

limitations period, Lokhova v. Halper, 441 F. Supp. 3d 238, 253-55

(E.D. Va. 2020), aff’d, 995 F.3d 134 (4th Cir. 2021), Hoid did not

9
provide evidence that FOX-31 wrote or broadcast any stories

involving Hoid and the police investigation after November 27,

2020. And even though some of the news articles may still be

accessible on FOX-31’s website, the “single publication rule” —

which applies to internet publications — provides that the statute of

limitations begins to run on the date of the first publication and is

not restarted every time a new copy of the same story is made

available. See Oja v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng’rs, 440 F.3d 1122,

1130-32 (9th Cir. 2006); see also Van Buskirk v. N.Y. Times Co., 325

F.3d 87, 89 (2d Cir. 2003); Bloom v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co.,

Civ. A. No. 05-cv-01317, 2006 WL 2331135, at *6-7 (D. Colo. Aug.

10, 2006) (unpublished order).

¶ 19 Second, FOX-31 did not prevent Hoid from timely filing his

lawsuit. FOX-31 did not “conceal” documents or videos from Hoid;

he provided no evidence that FOX-31 broadcast stories about him

in other states; and the fact that the news articles and the

hyperlinks to them were publicly accessible (at least at the time of

the anti-SLAPP hearing) belies Hoid’s contention that FOX-31 acted

with deceit or took action to prevent him from discovering the news

stories.

10
¶ 20 Third and finally, Hoid failed to prove extraordinary

circumstances. Courts have held that a person’s imprisonment is

insufficient to justify equitable tolling. See, e.g., Sandoval v. Jones,

447 F. App’x 1, 4 (10th Cir. 2011) (finding a vague reference to a

prison lockdown insufficient to warrant equitable tolling); Coviello v.

Berkley Publ’g Grp., Civ. No. 15-CV-01812, 2017 WL 891323, at

*11-13 (M.D. Pa. Jan. 19, 2017) (unpublished recommendation)

(declining to toll the statute of limitations for incarcerated plaintiff’s

defamation claim based on a book published while plaintiff was

incarcerated), adopted, 2017 WL 878427 (M.D. Pa. Mar. 6, 2017)

(unpublished order).

¶ 21 Likewise, without Hoid alleging events occurring during the

COVID-19 pandemic particular to him that prevented him from

timely filing his lawsuit, he failed to prove an extraordinary

circumstance. See, e.g., Gardner v. Erie Ins. Co., 639 F. Supp. 3d

135, 143 (D.D.C. 2022) (despite the restrictive court orders issued

due to the COVID-19 pandemic, plaintiffs did not explain why the

pandemic prevented them from timely filing the lawsuit, so

equitable tolling did not apply).

11
¶ 22 And Hoid’s claim of ineffective assistance of counsel is not an

extraordinary circumstance that warrants equitable tolling. See

Cadet v. Fla. Dep’t of Corr., 853 F.3d 1216, 1235-36 (11th Cir.

2017) (holding that an attorney’s negligence, even if rising to the

level of gross negligence, or misunderstanding about the law does

not alone justify equitable tolling); see also Fleming v. Evans, 481

F.3d 1249, 1255 (10th Cir. 2007) (emphasizing that habeas

counsel’s negligence is not generally a basis for equitable tolling

because there is no constitutional right to an attorney in state

postconviction proceedings); Ostrowski v. Kelly, 639 F. Supp. 3d

1084, 1087 (D. Or. 2022) (stating that the “garden variety”

negligence of an attorney, such as miscalculating deadlines, is not a

basis for equitable tolling).

¶ 23 Accordingly, we conclude that Hoid’s defamation and related

claims are time barred.

III. Anti-SLAPP Motion

¶ 24 Hoid contends that the district court erred by applying the

anti-SLAPP statute to his case and by dismissing his lawsuit. We

disagree.

12
A. Standard of Review and Applicable Law

¶ 25 We review an order granting or denying a special motion to

dismiss de novo, applying the same standards as the district court.

Anderson v. Senthilnathan, 2023 COA 88, ¶ 10; see also Salazar v.

Pub. Tr. Inst., 2022 COA 109M, ¶ 21.

¶ 26 The purpose of Colorado’s anti-SLAPP statute is to “safeguard

the constitutional rights of persons to petition, speak freely,

associate freely, and otherwise participate in government” and, at

the same time, to preserve the right to “file meritorious lawsuits for

demonstrable injury.” § 13-20-1101(1)(b); see also Gonzales v.

Hushen, 2023 COA 87, ¶ 19 (cert. granted May 28, 2024). The

statute seeks to balance these often competing interests by creating

a mechanism to “weed[] out, at an early stage, nonmeritorious

lawsuits brought in response to a defendant’s petitioning or speech

activity.” Tender Care Veterinary Ctr., Inc. v. Lind-Barnett, 2023

COA 114, ¶ 12 (cert. granted Sept. 3, 2024).

¶ 27 That mechanism — a special motion to dismiss — allows for

the early dismissal of any claim arising from an act “in furtherance

of the person’s [constitutional] right of petition or free speech . . . in

connection with a public issue,” unless the plaintiff establishes “a

13
reasonable likelihood” of prevailing on the claim. § 13-20-

1101(3)(a); see also Coomer v. Donald J. Trump for President, Inc.,

2024 COA 35, ¶ 60 (setting forth the analytical framework for the

anti-SLAPP statute and its application in Colorado); L.S.S. v. S.A.P.,

2022 COA 123, ¶ 18.

¶ 28 A court reviewing such a motion considers not only the

pleadings, but also affidavits submitted by the parties. § 13-20-

1101(3)(b). The district court must undertake a two-step analysis.

Anderson, ¶ 10. First, the court must determine whether the

defendant has made a threshold showing that the anti-SLAPP

statute applies — “that is, whether the claims arise from the

defendant’s exercise of free speech or right to petition in connection

with a public issue.” Id.; see also § 13-20-1101(2)(a), (3)(a).

Second, if the defendant meets that threshold, the burden shifts to

the plaintiff to establish a reasonable likelihood of prevailing on the

claim. See Anderson, ¶ 10; see also § 13-20-1101(3)(a).

B. Analysis

¶ 29 Hoid contends that the anti-SLAPP statute is unconstitutional.

Because Hoid does not develop this argument, we decline to

address it. See In re Marriage of Zander, 2019 COA 149, ¶ 27 (an

14
appellate court does not address conclusory or underdeveloped

arguments), aff’d, 2021 CO 12.

¶ 30 We agree with the district court’s analysis that the anti-SLAPP

statute applies to Hoid’s lawsuit. The anti-SLAPP statute applies to

any claims that arise “from any act . . . in furtherance of the

person’s right of petition or free speech . . . in connection with a

public issue.” § 13-20-1101(3)(a). A claim may be based on a

person’s or entity’s statement — whether oral or written — “made in

a place open to the public or a public forum in connection with an

issue of public interest.” § 13-20-1101(2)(a)(III). It may also include

“[a]ny other conduct or communication” in furtherance of the

constitutional rights to petition or of free speech “in connection with

a public issue or an issue of public interest.” § 13-20-

1101(2)(a)(IV).

¶ 31 The news articles constitute speech on a quintessential public

forum — the internet — and were published for the public to view.

See, e.g., Tender Care, ¶ 19 (“[I]nternet sites available to the public

(like Facebook) are ‘public forums’ for anti-SLAPP purposes.”); see

also Nygard, Inc. v. Uusi-Kerttula, 72 Cal. Rptr. 3d 210, 218 (Ct.

App. 2008) (holding that websites accessible to the public are

15
“public forums” for purposes of the California anti-SLAPP statute).

Likewise, the FOX-31 video broadcast is also speech in a public

forum. See Hannaford v. Seven Satellite Pty, No. 19STCV13245,

2021 Cal. Super. LEXIS 76672, at *20 (July 30, 2021) (unpublished

order) (“Television programs constitute ‘speech in a public

forum . . . .’” (quoting De Havilland v. FX Networks, LLC, 230 Cal.

Rptr. 3d 625, 633 (Ct. App. 2018))).6

¶ 32 And the news articles involved a criminal investigation, which

is a matter of public interest. See Bowers v. Loveland Publ’g Co.,

773 P.2d 595, 596 (Colo. App. 1988) (The commission of crime is

“without question . . . of legitimate concern to the public,” and

police reports are “matters of public concern.”). The news articles

informed the public about the police investigation, specifically that

law enforcement was seeking a person of interest in connection with

the victim’s death. The news articles also provided updates on

Hoid’s arrest and criminal charges, which we agree are issues of

6 California’s anti-SLAPP statute is substantially like our statute;

therefore, “we look to California case law for guidance in construing
and applying” section 13-20-1101, C.R.S. 2024. Tender Care
Veterinary Ctr., Inc. v. Lind-Barnett, 2023 COA 114, ¶ 16 (cert.
granted Sept. 3, 2024).

16
public interest. Therefore, we conclude the district court correctly

determined that the anti-SLAPP statute applied to Hoid’s

defamation and defamation-related claims.

¶ 33 Next, we, like the district court, conclude that Hoid failed to

plausibly plead facts to demonstrate a reasonable likelihood that he

would prevail on his defamation and defamation-related claims.

Even assuming FOX-31’s statements are defamatory, Hoid failed to

produce clear and convincing evidence that FOX-31 acted with

actual malice. See Creekside Endodontics, LLC v. Sullivan, 2022

COA 145, ¶ 31; Coomer, ¶ 143.

¶ 34 Actual malice requires the plaintiff to prove the defendant

“knew the statement to be false or made the statement with

reckless disregard for whether it was true or not.” Diversified

Mgmt., Inc. v. Denver Post, Inc., 653 P.2d 1103, 1106 (Colo. 1982)

(quoting Walker v. Colo. Springs Sun, Inc., 538 P.2d 450, 457 (Colo.

1975)). The actual malice standard requires a showing that the

publisher knew the statement at issue was false or “entertained

serious doubts as to the truth of the statement or acted with a high

degree of awareness of its probable falsity.” Creekside, ¶ 38

(quoting Fry v. Lee, 2013 COA 100, ¶ 21).

17
¶ 35 While Hoid alleged that the news articles contained false

statements, he failed to plead any allegations suggesting that FOX-

31 knew the statements were false or acted with reckless disregard

of their truth. Indeed, the news articles included verbatim wording

of, or statements consistent with, information distributed by the

Longmont police in their emails sent to various news outlets,

including FOX-31. For example, a Longmont police email sent on

November 27, 2020 said, “Mr. Hoid has not been charged in the

death of [the victim].” FOX-31’s subsequent November 27, 2020

article states this exact information: “Hoid has not been charged in

[the victim’s] death.” While Hoid maintains FOX-31 painted him

out as the victim’s “murderer,” none of the news articles did so.

And FOX-31’s video broadcast does not even mention Hoid’s name.

¶ 36 Because we conclude Hoid failed to plead facts demonstrating

a likelihood of success on the merits of his claims, we also discern

the district court did not err by granting FOX-31’s special motion to

dismiss.

IV. Judicial Misconduct and Concealment

¶ 37 Hoid contends that the district court committed judicial

misconduct when it aided FOX-31’s concealment of the video

18
broadcast that caused harm to his reputation and endangered his

family. But Hoid failed to preserve this argument. See Ortiz v.

Progressive Direct Ins. Co., 2024 COA 54, ¶ 40 (“In civil cases, we do

not review issues that are insufficiently preserved.”) (cert. granted

Apr. 14, 2025). Even so, the Colorado Commission on Judicial

Discipline has exclusive jurisdiction over investigations of, and

decision-making authority to impose discipline against, judicial

officers. See In re People, 2024 CO 12, ¶ 15. Thus, even assuming

Hoid had preserved his judicial misconduct arguments, we are

without jurisdiction to review his contentions. See In re Kamada,

2020 CO 83, ¶ 13.

V. Attorney Fees and Costs

¶ 38 Section 13-20-1101(4)(a) provides that “a prevailing defendant

on a special motion to dismiss is entitled to recover the defendant’s

attorney fees and costs.” Because we conclude that, as a matter of

law, Hoid did not have a reasonable likelihood of prevailing on his

claims because he cannot prove actual malice, FOX-31 is the

prevailing party entitled to recover its reasonable attorney fees and

costs, including those incurred on appeal. See Creekside, ¶ 54;

Coomer, ¶ 220 (anti-SLAPP statute permits recovery of appellate

19
attorney fees for a prevailing defendant). Therefore, we remand the

case to the district court to calculate and award FOX-31 its

reasonable attorney fees and costs. See C.A.R. 39.1; Rosenblum v.

Budd, 2023 COA 72, ¶ 64.

VI. Conclusion

¶ 39 The judgment is affirmed, and the case is remanded with

directions to award FOX-31 its reasonable attorney fees.

JUDGE LIPINSKY and JUDGE MOULTRIE concur.

20