Marriage of Wroten

24CA1220 Marriage of Wroten 04-24-2025

COLORADO COURT OF APPEALS

Court of Appeals No. 24CA1220
El Paso County District Court No. 20DR31499
Honorable Monica Jo Gomez, Judge

In re the Marriage of

Matthew Christian Wroten,

Appellee,

and

Cori Elizabeth Slack,

Appellant.

ORDER AFFIRMED

Division A
Opinion by CHIEF JUDGE ROMÁN
Hawthorne* and Berger*, JJ., concur

NOT PUBLISHED PURSUANT TO C.A.R. 35(e)
Announced April 24, 2025

Matthew Christian Wroten, Pro Se

Cori Elizabeth Slack, Pro Se

*Sitting by assignment of the Chief Justice under provisions of Colo. Const. art.
VI, § 5(3), and § 24-51-1105, C.R.S. 2024.
¶1 In this post-dissolution of marriage case involving Cori

Elizabeth Wroten, now known as Cori Elizabeth Slack (mother), and

Matthew Christian Wroten (father), mother appeals the district

court’s order granting father sole parenting time and greater

decision-making responsibility. We affirm.

I. Relevant Facts

¶2 After sixteen years of marriage and four biological children,

father filed a petition to dissolve the marriage in 2020.1

¶3 In January 2021, the police arrested father on charges of

domestic violence and child abuse, and the criminal court entered a

mandatory protection order prohibiting him from contacting mother

and the children.

¶4 A few months later, the parties stipulated that father would

follow a phased-in unsupervised parenting-time schedule, with the

goal of equal time, while mother would be the primary residential

parent.

1 The parties also have a fifth child, who was adopted, but none of

the filings or rulings in this case involve that child; they only
pertain to the four biological children. In this opinion, our use of
the phrase “the children” refers only to the four biological children.

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¶5 In October 2021, the district court dissolved the marriage. In

the permanent orders, the court accepted the parties’ prior

parenting time stipulation. The court found that the domestic

violence incident was an “isolated event.” And because the parties

could make decisions cooperatively, the court allocated joint

decision-making responsibility.

¶6 About a year later, mother filed a motion to modify parenting

time and decision-making responsibility for the children. She

alleged a series of concerns about the children’s well-being while in

father’s care: (1) the children voiced a reluctance to see father and

exhibited signs of both physical and emotional distress upon the

children’s return to mother; (2) the children were not safe or

adequately supervised, listing instances where they were dropped

off excessively early at extracurricular activities, leaving them

unattended; (3) the children suffered physical harm, with one child

treated recently for a severe burn; (4) the children’s basic needs

were not being met; (5) father taunted and belittled the children,

leading to emotional volatility and school absences upon their

return to mother; and (6) father told the children to speak

negatively about mother. At this time, father was in the third phase

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of the stipulated parenting plan, having regular overnight parenting

time every Wednesday and on alternating weekends.

¶7 The district court appointed a Child and Family Investigator

(CFI) to investigate, report, and make recommendations regarding

mother’s modification motion.

¶8 In August 2023, the CFI submitted a written report to the

district court and both parties. While raising serious issues about

mother persistently disparaging father, the CFI also stressed that

the parenting-time situation was immediately and detrimentally

affecting the children’s mental health and well-being. The CFI

proposed that mother continue as the primary parent; father

comply with a parenting time schedule that begins with three

dinner visits per week and progresses toward an equal time

arrangement; both parties retain joint decision-making

responsibility; and the children participate in individual therapy.

To address the children’s emotional suffering, caused by the parties’

animosity toward each other, the CFI recommended that the parties

complete the following educational tasks:

• watch an instructive film to gain perspective on how their

behavior was affecting the children;

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• enroll in a nurturing parenting course designed to redirect the

children’s insulting remarks about their father and provide

him with skills to manage their acting-out;

• complete an online course on the importance of a father’s role

in a daughter’s life, along with co-parenting;

• attend two co-parenting classes; and

• participate in a co-parenting support group.

¶9 In May 2024, after an evidentiary hearing, the district court

acknowledged mother’s credible domestic violence allegation,

stemming from the January 2021 incident. However, the court

determined that the incident was “not indicative of ongoing

domestic violence.” The court stated that there was no evidence

showing that father was “continuing to be controlling or

threatening.” It found that the “parent-child contact problems

emanated from the [parties] and not from any domestic violence the

[children] may have witnesse[d] in January 2021.”

¶ 10 The district court also found that the children were making

disparaging remarks about father. Because no evidence showed

that mother or her own family members intervened to correct the

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children, the court concluded that the children were unable to give

their opinion on parenting time.

¶ 11 The court expressed concern about the “emotional chasm”

between the parties, which was forcing the children to an

“unhealthy level.” The court held mother primarily responsible for

the “high degree of discord” in the parties’ co-parenting efforts. In

fact, one of the children was in distress and in need of mental

health therapy, which mother resisted. The court reasoned that

father’s support for the children’s consistent school attendance and

therapy “cut against any suggestion he’s abusive to the children, as

both teachers and therapists [were] mandatory reporte[rs].”

¶ 12 The court found that father had finished all the CFI-

recommended educational tasks except for those requiring mother’s

participation. The court also found that father asked mother to

cooperate with the CFI recommendations, to which she disagreed.

¶ 13 In the end, the district court ordered that the children reside

with father until mother completed the CFI’s recommendations, and

that in the meantime, she have video contact with the children at

least four times a week. The court also granted father sole decision-

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making responsibility over the children’s medical decisions,

including mental health therapy.

¶ 14 On July 9, 2024, mother filed her notice of appeal.

II. Mootness

¶ 15 Because it could be dispositive, we first address father’s

assertion that mother’s appeal is moot. He says that, following her

notice of appeal, the parties agreed to revise the court-ordered

educational requirements, which are now satisfied, resulting in an

equal parenting time arrangement since August 30, 2024. In her

reply brief, mother does not dispute that statement.

¶ 16 If an event occurs during the pendency of an appeal that

makes it “impossible for the court to grant ‘any effectual relief’ . . .

to a prevailing party,” the appeal must be dismissed as moot.

DePriest v. People, 2021 CO 40, ¶ 8 (citation omitted); see also In re

Marriage of Thomas, 2021 COA 123, ¶ 21 (an issue is moot when

the relief requested, if granted, would have no practical effect on an

existing controversy); In re Marriage of Salby, 126 P.3d 291, 301

(Colo. App. 2005) (original parenting time orders deemed moot when

they were superseded by later modifying orders). An appellate court

will not render an opinion on an issue’s merits when later events

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have rendered it moot. In re Parental Responsibilities Concerning

S.Z.S., 2022 COA 105, ¶ 50.

¶ 17 Mother sought “full parental responsibilities,” not the equal

parenting time schedule currently in place. Because hypothetically

we could reverse the district court’s order and the court could, on

remand, grant mother’s requested relief, an actual controversy

exists, and the appeal is not moot. So, we will address the merits.

III. Modification of Parenting Time

A. Children’s Safety

¶ 18 Mother contends that the district court erred by granting

father sole parenting time. She reasons that the court did not give

“paramount consideration to the safety of the children in

accordance with the best interests of the child standard,” thereby

violating section 14-10-124(1.5)(a), C.R.S. 2024, and section 14-10-

127.5(1)(b)(I), C.R.S. 2024. We are not persuaded.

¶ 19 A district court has broad discretion when modifying parenting

time, and we must exercise every presumption to uphold its

decision. In re Marriage of Dale, 2025 COA 29, ¶ 7. The court

abuses its discretion if its decision is manifestly arbitrary,

unreasonable, or unfair, or if it misapplies the law. Id.

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¶ 20 But we review de novo whether the district court applied the

correct legal standard. Id. at ¶ 8.

¶ 21 A district court may generally modify an order granting or

denying parenting time rights whenever such modification would

serve the child’s best interests. See § 14-10-129(1)(a)(I), C.R.S.

2024. However, the court must not restrict a party’s parenting time

rights unless it finds that the parenting time would endanger the

child’s physical health or significantly impair their emotional

development. § 14-10-129(1)(b)(I).

¶ 22 In all cases, a court must determine the allocation of parenting

time according to the child’s best interests, “giving paramount

consideration to the child’s safety and the physical, mental, and

emotional conditions and needs of the child.” § 14-10-124(1.5); see

also § 14-10-123.4(1)(a), C.R.S. 2024 (a child has the right to have

parental responsibilities determined based on their best interests).

In determining the best interests, the court must consider the

factors set forth in section 14-10-124(1.5)(a). In re Marriage of

Finer, 920 P.2d 325, 327 (Colo. App. 1996).

¶ 23 The court is also required to consider any domestic violence or

child abuse allegations. § 14-10-124(1.5)(a), (4)(a). If the court

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finds that one parent has committed either, it shall consider, as the

primary concern, the child’s and the abused person’s safety and

well-being. § 14-10-124(4)(d).

¶ 24 In section 14-10-127.5(1)(b)(I), the general assembly recently

declared that the district court’s priority, when making decisions

regarding parental responsibilities, is the child’s safety. And in all

cases where the court believes that a party has committed domestic

violence or child abuse, the court, as pertinent here, must consider

evidence of the accused party’s past abuse, including protection

orders and arrest records, and coercive control. See § 14-10-

127.5(3)(a)(II)-(III). The court is prohibited from removing or

restricting a child’s contact with a protective parent solely to

improve the child’s relationship with the accused party. § 14-10-

127.5(3)(b)(I). If allegations of domestic violence or child abuse have

been made, the court must give “strong consideration to a child’s

stated preference made to the court [or] [CFI], if the stated

preference is consistent with the paramount consideration given to

the child’s safety and the physical, mental, and emotional

conditions and needs of the child.” § 14-10-127.5(3.5).

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¶ 25 Even so, a finding that a parent has committed domestic

violence or child abuse does not automatically preclude an award of

parenting time. See In re Marriage of Hatton, 160 P.3d 326, 333

(Colo. App. 2007) (“[E]ven in those circumstances of serious

criminal conduct and domestic abuse, which by their nature would

likely establish endangerment and thus be most susceptible of an

order denying parenting time rights, the best interests standard

applies to the determination of whether parenting time should be

permitted.”); see also In re Marriage of Yates, 148 P.3d 304, 308-09

(Colo. App. 2006) (district court did not abuse its discretion in

naming the mother the child’s primary parent after she was

convicted of misdemeanor child abuse and felony menacing

stemming from an incident in which she threatened the father with

a knife in the child’s presence); In re Marriage of Bertsch, 97 P.3d

219, 220-22 (Colo. App. 2004) (district court did not abuse its

discretion in granting primary residential parent status to the father

who had been abusive to the children in the past but was in

therapy and was recommended as their primary parent by

evaluators).

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¶ 26 While acknowledging mother’s credible domestic violence

allegation from January 2021, the district court found that the

incident did not constitute ongoing domestic violence by father.

The court pointed out that he pled guilty, took responsibility for his

actions, completed court-ordered classes, and complied with the

protection order. It also did not observe any evidence supporting

mother’s allegations that father was engaging in controlling or

threatening behavior. As well, it identified that the parent-child

contact problems arose from the parties’ conduct, independent of

any domestic violence the children may have witnessed in January

2021. A few months after the domestic violence incident, mother

consented to modify the criminal protection order and later

stipulated to allow father unsupervised parenting time, with the

intention of establishing equal parenting time.

¶ 27 The court indicated that the CFI testified about mother

coaching the children to dislike father. The court found that the

children’s disparaging remarks disqualified them from making

informed decisions about parenting time.

¶ 28 The district court then focused on the children’s emotional

well-being, highlighting the “emotional chasm” between the parties

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and the anguish it caused the children. The court specified that the

children were exposed to significant discord in the parties’ co-

parenting efforts, with mother being the primary source of conflict.

One child engaged in self-harm and required mental health therapy,

which mother resisted, dismissing father’s related concerns.

Because therapists and teachers were mandatory reporters, the

court found that father’s push for the children’s therapy and school

attendance undermined any suggestion of child abuse.

¶ 29 The court also found that father was trying to improve the co-

parenting situation, but mother was not. For example, father had

completed all CFI-recommended educational tasks, except those

requiring mother’s participation, and had asked her to cooperate

with the recommendations, but she refused.

¶ 30 Based on these findings, the district court modified the

existing parenting time order, granting father sole parenting time

until mother completes the CFI-recommended educational tasks.

¶ 31 Contrary to mother’s contention, the court complied with the

directives of section 14-10-124(1.5)(a) and section 14-10-

127.5(1)(b)(I) by thoroughly evaluating the children’s safety before

granting sole parenting time to father. Given that the court’s

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findings and ultimate determination are well-supported by the

record, we cannot say that the court exceeded its broad discretion.

See Dale, ¶ 7.

¶ 32 Still, mother insists that other evidence compels a different

conclusion. For example, she cites her testimony at the

modification hearing plus certain exhibits purportedly establishing

safety concerns about father. But this argument essentially asks

us to reweigh the evidence, which we cannot do. See In re Marriage

of Thorburn, 2022 COA 80, ¶ 49 (it is for the district court to

determine witness credibility and the weight, probative force, and

sufficiency of the evidence, as well as the inferences and

conclusions to be drawn therefrom); see also In re Marriage of Kann,

2017 COA 94, ¶ 36 (“[O]ur supreme court has . . . expressed

unbridled confidence in [district] courts to weigh conflicting

evidence.”); In re Marriage of Udis, 780 P.2d 499, 504 (Colo. 1989)

(an appellate court may presume that the district court considered

all of the evidence admitted).

¶ 33 In her opening brief, mother also relies on newspaper articles

about how courts ignore allegations of abuse in contentious custody

cases as well as a November 2023 El Paso Department of Human

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Services assessment summary. But those documents were neither

offered nor admitted into evidence at the modification hearing. So

we do not consider the new information. See In re Marriage of

Drexler, 2013 COA 43, ¶ 24 (declining to consider exhibit appended

to a party’s brief that was not part of the certified record); see also

Boulder Plaza Residential, LLC v. Summit Flooring, LLC, 198 P.3d

1217, 1222 (Colo. App. 2008) (an appellate court will not consider

evidence not admitted at the hearing or submitted to the district

court before ruling).

B. In Camera Interview of the Children

¶ 34 Mother contends that the district court erroneously ignored

section 14-10-127.5(3.5) by denying her request for an in-chambers

interview of the children. We will not address the issue because it

is undeveloped. See In re Marriage of Zander, 2019 COA 149, ¶ 27

(an appellate court may decline to consider an argument not

supported by legal authority or any meaningful legal analysis),

aff’d, 2021 CO 12; see also Vallagio at Inverness Residential Condo.

Ass’n v. Metro. Homes, Inc., 2017 CO 69, ¶ 40 (an appellate court

will “decline to assume the mantle” when parties offer no

supporting arguments for their claims); In re Marriage of Dean,

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2017 COA 51, ¶ 31 (an appellate court will not consider arguments

in a reply brief that seek to expand on contentions raised in an

opening brief).

C. CFI Report

¶ 35 Mother next contends that the district court erred by

admitting the CFI report because “it had multiple factual errors and

recommendations that rel[ied] on unproven theories, not supported

by evidence-based and peer-reviewed research.” But when father

moved to admit the report as an exhibit, she did not object. We

therefore will not review this evidentiary objection for the first time

on appeal. See Antolovich v. Brown Grp. Retail, Inc., 183 P.3d 582,

600 (Colo. App. 2007) (“If a party makes no contemporaneous

objection to the introduction of evidence, we will not review the

alleged error on appeal.”); see also In re Marriage of Garrett, 2018

COA 154, ¶ 35 (issues not raised before the district court will not be

addressed for the first time on appeal).

¶ 36 To the extent mother argues that the district court should

have deemed the CFI’s report and testimony not credible and biased

against her, we cannot disturb the court’s credibility assessment.

See Thorburn, ¶ 49; see also In re Marriage of Amich, 192 P.3d 422,

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424 (Colo. App. 2007) (the district court can believe all, part, or

none of a witness’s testimony, even if uncontroverted).

¶ 37 We decline to address mother’s “concern about the validity of

[the CFI’s] expertise” under section 14-10-127(4)(a.5), C.R.S. 2024

because it lacks any meaningful legal analysis. See Zander, ¶ 27.

IV. Modification of Decision-Making Responsibility

¶ 38 Finally, mother contends that the district court erred by

modifying decision-making responsibility. Again she does not

demonstrate, with any legal analysis, how the court erred in that

regard. So we decline to address the issue. See Zander, ¶ 27; see

also Dean, ¶ 31.

V. Appellate Attorney Fees and Costs

¶ 39 Father asks for his appellate attorney fees based on this

appeal’s frivolity. Although mother has not prevailed, we deny his

request. See In re Estate of Shimizu, 2016 COA 163, ¶ 34 (“[A]n

award of fees on appeal is appropriate only in clear and unequivocal

cases where no rational argument is presented . . . .”).

¶ 40 However, father is entitled to costs on appeal, see C.A.R. 39(a),

and may seek those costs in the district court, see C.A.R. 39(c).

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VI. Disposition

¶ 41 The order is affirmed.

Judge HAWTHORNE and Judge BERGER concur.

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