Peo in Interest of SJC

24CA2041 Peo in Interest of SJC 04-24-2025

COLORADO COURT OF APPEALS

Court of Appeals No. 24CA2041
Montrose County District Court No. 23JV30028
Honorable D. Cory Jackson, Judge

The People of the State of Colorado,

Appellee,

In the Interest of S.J.C., a Child,

and Concerning M.M.C.,

Appellant.

JUDGMENT AFFIRMED

Division IV
Opinion by JUDGE PAWAR
Harris and Grove, JJ., concur

NOT PUBLISHED PURSUANT TO C.A.R. 35(e)
Announced April 24, 2025

Martha Phillips Whitmore, County Attorney, Julie R. Andress, Deputy County
Attorney, Montrose, Colorado, for Appellee

Alison A. Bettenberg, Guardian Ad Litem

Just Law Group, LLC, John F. Poor, Denver, Colorado, for Appellant
¶1 In this dependency and neglect proceeding, M.M.C. (mother)

appeals the judgment terminating her parent-child legal

relationship with S.J.C. (the child). We affirm.

I. Background

¶2 Montrose County Human Services (the Department) received a

referral expressing concerns about mother’s substance use, the

child’s welfare, and his lack of school attendance. Consequently,

the Department filed a petition in dependency and neglect.

¶3 The juvenile court adjudicated the child dependent and

neglected and adopted a treatment plan for mother. Among other

things, the treatment plan required her to (1) communicate with the

Department; (2) complete psychological and substance abuse

evaluations and follow any recommendations; (3) attend all

scheduled family time visits; (4) provide a safe and stable home for

the child; (5) engage in parenting education and co-parenting

therapy; and (6) address all criminal court cases.

¶4 The Department later moved to terminate parental rights.

Following a hearing, the juvenile court granted the motion.

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II. Reasonable Efforts

¶5 Mother asserts the juvenile court erred by finding that the

Department made reasonable efforts to rehabilitate her. We

disagree.

A. Preservation

¶6 The parties dispute preservation, but we need not resolve the

dispute because even assuming mother did not have to raise her

reasonable efforts argument at the termination hearing, see, e.g.,

People in Interest of S.N-V., 300 P.3d 911, 914-18 (Colo. App. 2011),

we discern no basis for reversal.

B. Standard of Review and Applicable Law

¶7 In deciding whether to terminate parental rights under section

19-3-604(1)(c), C.R.S. 2024, the juvenile court must consider

whether the county department of human services made reasonable

efforts to rehabilitate the parents and reunite them with the child.

See §§ 19-1-103(114), 19-3-100.5(1), 19-3-208, 19-3-604(2)(h),

C.R.S. 2024. “Reasonable efforts” means the “exercise of diligence

and care” for children who are in out-of-home placement. § 19-1-

103(114).

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¶8 Services provided in accordance with section 19-3-208 satisfy

the reasonable efforts standard. § 19-1-103(114). Among the

services required under section 19-3-208 are screenings,

assessments, and individual case plans for the provision of services;

home-based family and crisis counseling; information and referral

services to available public and private assistance resources; family

time services; and placement services. § 19-3-208(2)(b). Other

services — including transportation assistance, diagnostic and

mental health services, and drug and alcohol treatment services —

must be provided if the government has sufficient funding. § 19-3-

208(2)(d).

¶9 In assessing a department’s efforts, the juvenile court should

consider whether the services provided were appropriate to support

the parent’s treatment plan, S.N-V., 300 P.3d at 915, by

“considering the totality of the circumstances and accounting for all

services and resources provided to a parent to ensure the

completion of the entire treatment plan,” People in Interest of

My.K.M. v. V.K.L., 2022 CO 35, ¶ 33. But the parent is ultimately

responsible for using those services to comply with the treatment

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plan. People in Interest of J.C.R., 259 P.3d 1279, 1285 (Colo. App.

2011).

¶ 10 Whether a department satisfied its obligation to make

reasonable efforts to rehabilitate a parent and reunify the family is

a mixed question of law and fact. People in Interest of A.S.L., 2022

COA 146, ¶ 8. We review the juvenile court’s factual findings for

clear error but review de novo its legal determination whether the

Department satisfied its reasonable efforts obligation. Id.

C. Analysis

¶ 11 Mother asserts that the Department failed to assist her “in

overcoming the barriers that prevented her from engaging

consistently.” In particular, mother points to her “significant

transportation barriers” which prevented her from completing

psychological and substance abuse evaluations, and “generally

inhibited” her ability to utilize services and attend family time.

¶ 12 The juvenile court concluded that the Department made

reasonable efforts to rehabilitate mother, including providing her

with ample and consistent transportation support as well as family

time and a life skills worker. But, the court found, mother did not

avail herself of these opportunities.

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¶ 13 The record supports the court’s findings regarding the

Department’s efforts. The caseworker testified that she attempted

to provide mother with bus passes and a referral to a Medicaid ride-

share. She also offered to personally drive mother to family time

visits and her substance abuse and mental health evaluation.

Additionally, the caseworker visited mother’s residence, sometimes

multiple times per day; utilized a variety of communication

methods; and made mother an appointment with a life coach.

¶ 14 Nevertheless, mother argues that the Department’s efforts to

aid her in the completion of her treatment plan were “extremely

limited.” However, as discussed above, the caseworker offered to

personally transport mother to assist her with these treatment plan

objectives. True, as mother asserts, the Medicaid ride service would

not transport her to drug testing, but she never raised

transportation barriers as a reason why she did not complete drug

testing. The caseworker also attempted to provide mother with bus

passes by leaving one at her requested location, offering to bring

one to her, and visiting her residence multiple times. When mother

did not pick up the pass, respond to the caseworker, or answer her

door, the caseworker did not feel comfortable leaving a pass outside

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mother’s residence where someone else could take it. The record

therefore supports the court’s findings regarding the Department’s

efforts and that mother failed to avail herself of many of these

efforts. See J.C.R., 259 P.3d at 1285.

¶ 15 Mother further argues that, because transportation barriers

impeded her ability to attend family time, the Department should

have proposed phone or virtual contact with the child. Yet, no

party presented evidence during the termination hearing that

mother requested virtual visits or that, considering the child’s

special needs, virtual visits would have been appropriate. See § 19-

3-208(2)(a) (family time shall be designed to promote the health,

safety, and well-being of the child; facilitate the speedy reunification

of parents and children; and promote the best interests of the

child).

¶ 16 Finally, we are unpersuaded by mother’s assertion that the

Department failed to provide housing and employment assistance to

aid her in overcoming financial difficulties. She does not explain

what services would have helped her. And, while the juvenile court

did not make specific findings about housing or employment

assistance, it did find that the Department made “substantial”

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efforts to try to help mother engage in her treatment plan.

“[A]ccounting for all services and resources provided to [mother]”

over the course of the case, the record clearly indicates that the

Department made reasonable efforts, but mother failed to engage.

See My.K.M., ¶ 33.

¶ 17 Based on the foregoing, we discern no error in the juvenile

court’s determination that the Department made reasonable efforts

to rehabilitate mother and reunite her with the child.

III. Disposition

¶ 18 The judgment is affirmed.

JUDGE HARRIS and JUDGE GROVE concur.

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