Peo in Interest of YJC

24CA1695 Peo in Interest of YJC 04-24-2025

COLORADO COURT OF APPEALS

Court of Appeals No. 24CA1695
El Paso County District Court No. 23JV30096
Honorable Diana K. May, Judge

The People of the State of Colorado,

Appellee,

In the Interest of Y.J.C., a Child,

and Concerning G.J.,

Appellant.

JUDGMENT AFFIRMED

Division IV
Opinion by JUDGE GROVE
Harris and Pawar, JJ., concur

NOT PUBLISHED PURSUANT TO C.A.R. 35(e)
Announced April 24, 2025

Kenneth R. Hodges, County Attorney, Dolores Montoya-De Smidt, Staff County
Attorney, Colorado Springs, Colorado, for Appellee

Josi McCauley, Guardian Ad Litem

Ainsley Bochniak, Office of Respondent Parents’ Counsel, Denver Colorado, for
Appellant
¶1 In this dependency and neglect proceeding, G.J. (mother)

appeals the juvenile court’s judgment terminating her parent-child

legal relationship with Y.J.C. (the child). We affirm the judgment.

I. Background

¶2 The El Paso County Department of Human Services filed a

petition in dependency and neglect regarding the newborn child.

The petition alleged that mother and the child tested positive for

methamphetamine at birth. The petition further alleged that

mother tried to leave the hospital with the child against medical

advice and that she had a criminal history related to substance

abuse and an outstanding assault charge.

¶3 The juvenile court adjudicated the child dependent and

neglected. The court adopted a treatment plan for mother requiring

that she, among other things, (1) complete a substance abuse

assessment and engage in recommended treatment; (2) submit

regular random sobriety tests; (3) participate in life skills services;

(4) consistently attend family time with the child; and (5) maintain

stable employment and housing.

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¶4 The child’s guardian ad litem later moved to terminate

mother’s parental rights. Following a hearing, the court terminated

mother’s parent-child legal relationship with the child. Mother

appeals, asserting that the juvenile court erred by finding that the

Department made reasonable efforts to rehabilitate her and by

finding no less drastic alternative to termination.

II. Reasonable Efforts

A. Applicable Law and Standard of Review

¶5 Before the juvenile court may terminate parental rights under

section 19-3-604(1)(c), C.R.S. 2024, the department must make

reasonable efforts to rehabilitate the parent and reunite the family.

§§ 19-1-103(114), 19-3-100.5(1), 19-3-208, 19-3-604(2)(h), C.R.S.

2024. “Reasonable efforts” means the “exercise of diligence and

care” as to a child who is in out-of-home placement. § 19-1-

103(114). This standard is satisfied by providing services in

accordance with section 19-3-208. Id.; see also People in Interest of

C.T.S., 140 P.3d 332, 335 (Colo. App. 2006). Among the services

section 19-3-208 contemplates are screenings, assessments, and

individual case plans for the provision of services; home-based

family and crisis counseling; information and referral services to

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available public and private assistance resources; family time

services; and placement services. § 19-3-208(2)(b).

¶6 The services must be “appropriate to support the parent’s

treatment plan.” People in Interest of S.N-V., 300 P.3d 911, 915

(Colo. App. 2011). Accordingly, the juvenile court should “consider[]

the totality of the circumstances and account[] for all services and

resources provided to a parent to ensure the completion of the

entire treatment plan.” People in Interest of My.K.M. v. V.K.L., 2022

CO 35, ¶ 33.

¶7 The parent is ultimately responsible for using the services to

comply with the plan. People in Interest of J.C.R., 259 P.3d 1279,

1285 (Colo. App. 2011). And the court may consider a parent’s

unwillingness to participate in treatment in determining whether

the department made reasonable efforts. See People in Interest of

A.V., 2012 COA 210, ¶ 12.

¶8 Whether a juvenile court properly terminated parental

rights — including whether the department satisfied its obligation

to make reasonable efforts — presents a mixed question of fact and

law because it involves application of the termination statute to

evidentiary facts. See People in Interest of A.M. v. T.M., 2021 CO 14,

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¶ 15; see also People in Interest of A.S.L., 2022 COA 146, ¶ 8. The

credibility of witnesses; the sufficiency, probative value, and weight

of the evidence; and the inferences and conclusions to be drawn

from the evidentiary facts are within the juvenile court’s discretion.

People in Interest of S.K., 2019 COA 36, ¶ 41. Thus, we will not set

aside a juvenile court’s factual findings if the record supports them.

Id. But we review the juvenile court’s legal conclusions de novo. Id.

B. Analysis

¶9 Mother asserts that the Department did not help her with

transportation or pay her phone bill. The record does not support

mother’s assertions.

¶ 10 With respect to transportation, the caseworker testified that

mother had “med rides” and bus passes available. Additionally,

mother’s visitation supervisor at the time of the termination hearing

provided transportation to and from family time.

¶ 11 Nonetheless, mother asserts that the Department did not

provide bus passes until ten months into the case. However, the

record shows that mother had a car up until the time she requested

bus passes and, accordingly, the Department was not required to

provide transportation services throughout the entire proceeding.

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See § 19-3-208(2)(d)(I) (requiring the department provide a parent

with transportation to services “when other appropriate

transportation is not available”).

¶ 12 Mother also contends that the Department switched visitation

centers several times during the proceeding, which caused even

more trouble with transportation. But the testimony shows that the

change in family time providers was not due to the Department’s

lack of reasonable efforts but because of mother’s lack of

engagement and subsequent discharge from at least two family time

providers, and, in one instance, because of safety concerns for the

child presented by individuals mother chose to join her family time.

¶ 13 As for mother’s telephone, the record shows that the juvenile

court ordered the Department to pay mother’s cell phone bill. But

nothing establishes that the Department failed to do so. Indeed,

mother consistently called in for court appearances, and at the

termination hearing she testified that she had been able to secure a

phone and that she “pretty much [has] everything” she needed to

complete her treatment plan.

¶ 14 Mother also asserts that the Department made engaging in

services more complicated by submitting referrals to three separate

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providers even after her counsel asked that mother be allowed to

engage in services at one facility. Because she provides no record

support for this assertion, we will not address it. See Valentine v.

Mountain States Mut. Cas. Co., 252 P.3d 1182, 1186 (Colo. App.

2011) (“When a party does not point us to where an issue was

raised and resolved, he places the burden of searching records on

us — a search we are not required to undertake.”) (internal citation

omitted).

¶ 15 Lastly, mother contends that with more time she would have

become fit, though she does not tie this argument to the

Department’s purported lack of reasonable efforts. Indeed, she

provides no legal analysis or factual support, other than her own

testimony, to support this argument. Based on our own review of

the record, the juvenile court did not err when it found mother was

unlikely to become fit within a reasonable time. The caseworker

testified as an expert and opined that mother could not become fit

in a reasonable time and the court found, with record support, that

mother had made no progress on her treatment plan.

¶ 16 In sum, the juvenile court did not err when it found the

Department made reasonable efforts to rehabilitate mother and

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reunify the family or that mother was unlikely to become fit in a

reasonable time.

III. Less Drastic Alternatives

A. Relevant Law

¶ 17 Implicit in the statutory criteria for termination is the

requirement that the juvenile court consider and eliminate less

drastic alternatives. People in Interest of M.M., 726 P.2d 1108, 1122

(Colo. 1986). When considering less drastic alternatives, the court

must base its decision on the best interests of the child, giving

primary consideration to the child’s physical, mental, and emotional

conditions and needs. § 19-3-604(3).

¶ 18 When deciding whether permanent placement with a relative is

a viable less drastic alternative to termination, the court may

consider various factors, including whether an ongoing relationship

with the parent would be beneficial or detrimental to the child.

People in Interest of A.R., 2012 COA 195M, ¶ 38. “[L]ong-term or

permanent placement with a family member or foster family, short

of termination, may not be a viable less drastic alternative if it does

not provide adequate permanence that adoption would provide or

otherwise meet a child’s needs.” Id. at ¶ 41.

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¶ 19 For a less drastic alternative to be viable, it must do more than

“adequately” meet a child’s needs; rather, the less drastic

alternative must be in the child’s best interest. A.M., ¶ 27. If the

court considers a less drastic alternative but finds instead that

termination is in the child’s best interests, it must reject the less

drastic alternative and order termination. Id. at ¶ 32.

¶ 20 When the juvenile court considers the availability of a less

drastic alternative and determines that termination of a parent’s

rights would be in the child’s best interests, we are bound to affirm

the court’s decision if its findings have record support. People in

Interest of B.H., 2021 CO 39, ¶ 80.

B. Analysis

¶ 21 The juvenile court found no less drastic alternative to

termination. It found that the child’s kinship placement was

meeting all the child’s needs and that mother refused to engage in

treatment. The court noted that her last drug screen was eight

months prior to the termination hearing. The record supports the

juvenile court’s findings.

¶ 22 The caseworker testified that she believed it was in the child’s

best interest to terminate parental rights. She testified that mother

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had not substantially engaged in substance use treatment — the

reason the Department became involved with the family in the first

place. Mother attended only a limited number of life skills sessions,

never verified her address, and did not establish a steady, legal

source of income. And, although the caseworker acknowledged that

mother attended about seventy-five percent of scheduled family

time, the visitation supervisors had concerns about mother falling

asleep during visits and feeding the child developmentally

inappropriate food.

¶ 23 Nonetheless, mother argues that because the child’s kinship

placement did not testify at the termination hearing, “the court did

not have all the information necessary to determine whether a less

drastic alternative, such as permanent placement through [a

Relative Guardianship Assistance Program], would serve [the

child’s] best interests.” But the caseworker testified that she had

discussed the difference between termination and an allocation of

parental responsibilities (APR) with the child’s kinship placement.

And she explained that one of the placement providers worked for

the Department and fully understood the available options.

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¶ 24 Moreover, while the court may consider whether a potential

permanent placement prefers adoption over an APR, the primary

consideration in eliminating less drastic alternatives is the child’s

physical, mental, and emotional conditions and needs. See § 19-3-

604(3); People in Interest of Z.M., 2020 COA 3M, ¶ 29; People in

Interest of K.B., 2016 COA 21, ¶ 35. Here, taking those primary

considerations into account, the court determined there were no

less drastic alternatives available and that termination was in the

child’s best interests.

¶ 25 Mother also argues that an ongoing relationship was in the

child’s best interests because the caseworker “implied” as much

when she testified that she believed the paternal relatives would

continue to facilitate contact between the child, his siblings, and

biological parents if they deemed it safe. Even if the caseworker’s

testimony could be construed in such a way, we must defer to the

juvenile court’s resolution of any factual disputes. See In re

Marriage of Bowles, 916 P.2d 615, 617 (Colo. App. 1995) (“The trial

court as a finder of fact can believe all, part, or none of a witness’

testimony, even if uncontroverted.”).

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¶ 26 Lastly, mother asserts that in its oral and written rulings the

juvenile court did not discuss the child’s best interests, his bond

and attachment to mother and siblings, or make specific findings

regarding the child’s physical, mental, or emotional conditions and

needs when determining that termination was in his best interests.

¶ 27 We perceive no error in the juvenile court’s ruling. The court’s

written ruling specifically found, by clear and convincing evidence,

that the child’s placement “meets all the child’s needs,

appreciates . . . everything about him, cultural needs and cultural

background.” The court further found that termination was “in the

child’s best interest because [the kinship placement is] meeting the

child’s physical, emotional, and mental needs.” The court noted

that mother had not engaged in her treatment plan, “demonstrated

that she has no desire to change,” and “chose to participate at an

arm’s length” instead of addressing outstanding warrants. Thus,

mother was “unable and unwilling to act in the child’s best

interest.” Given these findings, the court sufficiently addressed the

child’s best interests when deciding to terminate mother’s parental

rights.

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IV. Disposition

¶ 28 We affirm the judgment.

JUDGE HARRIS and JUDGE PAWAR concur.

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