Lanari v. CDOC

24CA0341 Lanari v CDOC 04-17-2025

COLORADO COURT OF APPEALS

Court of Appeals No. 24CA0341
Crowley County District Court No. 22CV3
Honorable Samual S. Vigil, Judge
Honorable Deni E. Eiring, Magistrate

Robert Bradley Lanari,

Plaintiff-Appellant,

v.

Moses ‘Andre’ Stancil, Executive Director, Colorado Department of Corrections
(CDOC); August Bauby, Manager, Time/Release Operations (CDOC); Michelle
Brodeur, Clinical Services, Head (CDOC); Nicole Allen, MPS Coordinator,
Programs Education (CDOC); Barry Goodrich, Warden, Crowley County
Correctional Facility (CCCF); Eddie Tenorio, Case Manager (CCCF); and George
Teneff, Case Manager (CCCF),

Defendants-Appellees.

JUDGMENT AFFIRMED

Division I
Opinion by JUDGE YUN
J. Jones and Brown, JJ., concur

NOT PUBLISHED PURSUANT TO C.A.R. 35(e)
Announced April 17, 2025

Robert Bradley Lanari, Pro Se

Philip J. Weiser, Attorney General, Rebekah Ryan, Senior Assistant Attorney
General, Denver, Colorado, for Defendants-Appellees Moses ‘Andre’ Stancil,
August Bauby, Michelle Brodeur, and Nicole Allen

Hall & Evans, L.L.C., Andrew D. Ringel, Denver, Colorado, for
Defendants-Appellees Barry Goodrich, Eddie Tenorio, and George Teneff
¶1 In this parole eligibility case, plaintiff, Robert Bradley Lanari,

appeals an order dismissing under C.R.C.P. 12(b)(5) his complaint

against defendants, the Colorado Department of Corrections

through its Executive Director and other officials (collectively,

DOC).1 Lanari contends that the district court erred by granting

DOC’s motion to dismiss because his complaint properly alleged

that DOC (1) failed to apply all his earned time when calculating his

parole eligibility date and (2) did not award him the “achievement

earned time” to which he was entitled. We disagree and affirm the

judgment.

I. Background

¶2 In 1986, Lanari “shot and severely wounded his estranged

wife . . . and killed his friend.” Lanari v. People, 827 P.2d 495, 497

(Colo. 1992). A jury found Lanari guilty of first degree murder and

attempted first degree murder, and the district court sentenced him

to life in prison for the first degree murder conviction and a

1 Lanari also sued the warden and several other officials of the

private prison where he is incarcerated. The district court
dismissed these defendants earlier in the case, and Lanari does not
challenge their dismissal on appeal.

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consecutive twenty-four-year prison sentence for the attempted first

degree murder conviction.

¶3 Lanari can become parole eligible for his life sentence for first

degree murder after serving “forty calendar years.”

§ 17-22.5-104(2)(c)(I), C.R.S. 2024. Meanwhile, Lanari must serve

50% of his twenty-four-year sentence for attempted murder, “less

any time authorized for earned time,” before he will be eligible for

parole for that crime. § 17-22.5-403(1), C.R.S. 2024.

¶4 “Earned time” reduces the amount of time an inmate is

required to serve on his sentence. An inmate may earn up to ten

days of earned time for each month of incarceration upon

demonstrating consistent progress in various areas, such as work

and training, group living, participation in counseling sessions, and

other positive behavior. § 17-22.5-405(1), C.R.S. 2024. With some

exceptions, earned time cannot reduce a person’s sentence by more

than 30% of the sentence’s length. § 17-22.5-405(4)(a).

¶5 DOC’s most recent calculation of Lanari’s parole eligibility is

shown below:

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Lanari’s Calculated Parole Eligibility Date

¶6 The DOC technician who performed this calculation explained

that Lanari’s life sentence “is not eligible for earned time credits.”

And the technician clarified that, though “Lanari is eligible to

receive earned time on” his attempted murder sentence, “the

maximum sentence reduction is [30%] of the [twenty-four] years” for

“a total of seven years, one month, and [twelve] days of earned

time.”2

2 But 30% of twenty-four years is seven years, two months, and

twelve days. DOC’s official time computation report reflects this
correct cap on earned time, and DOC’s parole eligibility calculations
incorporate earned time up to this cap.

3
¶7 Lanari disagreed with DOC’s parole eligibility date calculation

and filed suit in district court for mandamus under C.R.C.P.

106(a)(2) and declaratory judgment under C.R.C.P. 57. DOC, in

turn, moved to dismiss the case under C.R.C.P. 12(b)(5), arguing

that Lanari was not entitled to his requested relief as a matter of

law. The magistrate granted the motion, and the district court

judge affirmed and adopted the magistrate’s order.

II. Standard of Review and Applicable Law

¶8 Our review of a district court’s order adopting a magistrate’s

decision is effectively a second layer of appellate review. In re

Marriage of Thorburn, 2022 COA 80, ¶ 25. We review de novo

questions of law, including whether the magistrate properly

interpreted a statute or applied the correct legal standard. Id.

¶9 We also review a C.R.C.P. 12(b)(5) motion de novo, applying

the same standards as the district court. Denver Post Corp. v.

Ritter, 255 P.3d 1083, 1088 (Colo. 2011). We must “accept all

allegations of material fact as true and view the allegations in the

light most favorable to the plaintiff.” Coors Brewing Co. v. Floyd,

978 P.2d 663, 665 (Colo. 1999). “Dismissal is proper when the

plaintiff’s factual allegations cannot support a claim as a matter of

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law.” Graham v. Maketa, 227 P.3d 516, 518 (Colo. App. 2010); see

also Tomar Dev., Inc. v. Friend, 2015 COA 73, ¶ 24 (approving

dismissal of C.R.C.P. 57 declaratory judgment claims that fail as a

matter of law).3

¶ 10 C.R.C.P. 106(a)(2) permits a person to petition a court for an

order

to compel a . . . governmental body . . . to
perform an act which the law specially enjoins
as a duty resulting from an office, trust, or
station, or to compel the admission of a party
to the use and enjoyment of a right or office to
which he is entitled, and from which he is
unlawfully precluded by such . . .
governmental body.

¶ 11 Mandamus under C.R.C.P. 106(a)(2) is considered an

extraordinary remedy used to compel the performance of a

nondiscretionary ministerial duty. Jefferson Cnty. Educ. Ass’n v.

Jefferson Cnty. Sch. Dist. R-1, 2016 COA 10, ¶ 10. C.R.C.P.

3 “[I]n a declaratory judgment action in which the court rules

against the position of the plaintiff, it should enter a declaratory
judgment and not sustain a motion to dismiss.” Hobbs v. City of
Salida, 2024 COA 25, ¶ 17 (quoting Karsh v. City & Cnty. of Denver,
490 P.2d 936, 938 (Colo. 1971)) (cert. granted Sept. 30, 2024). But
“we need not decide whether the district court should have done so
here, as the result of entering a declaratory judgment would have
been the same as dismissal of the . . . claim.” Hess v. Hobart, 2020
COA 139M2, ¶ 33 n.5.

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106(a)(2) may be used to compel DOC’s proper calculation of a

parole eligibility date. See, e.g., Fields v. Suthers, 984 P.2d 1167,

1170 (Colo. 1999). But “it is not available to compel the

performance of a task that ‘is discretionary or involves the exercise

of judgment.’” Owens v. Carlson, 2022 CO 33, ¶ 21 (quoting Bd. of

Cnty. Comm’rs v. Cnty. Rd. Users Ass’n, 11 P.3d 432, 437 (Colo.

2000)).

¶ 12 A plaintiff seeking relief under C.R.C.P. 106(a)(2) bears a

demanding burden to satisfy a three-part test: (1) the plaintiff must

have “a clear right” to the relief sought; (2) the defendant must have

“a clear duty” to perform the act requested; and (3) there can be no

other remedy available. Owens, ¶ 21 (citation omitted).

¶ 13 Because Lanari appears pro se, “we liberally construe his

filings while applying the same law and procedural rules applicable

to a party represented by counsel.” Gandy v. Williams, 2019 COA

118, ¶ 8. We will not, however, rewrite his arguments or act as an

advocate on his behalf. See Johnson v. McGrath, 2024 COA 5, ¶ 10.

III. DOC Properly Calculated the Cap on Lanari’s Earned Time

¶ 14 Lanari first contends that, under the one-continuous-sentence

rule, DOC should have calculated the 30% cap on earned time

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based on his aggregate minimum sentence of sixty-four years4

rather than on his twenty-four-year sentence for attempted murder.

He claims that if DOC used the appropriate cap, he would have

additional earned time that could affect his parole eligibility date.

We are not persuaded.

¶ 15 The one-continuous-sentence rule governs Lanari’s case:

“[W]hen any inmate has been committed under several convictions

with separate sentences, [DOC] shall construe all sentences as one

continuous sentence.” § 17-22.5-101, C.R.S. 2024. Although the

legislature did not define the phrase “one continuous sentence,” the

Colorado Supreme Court has addressed various methodologies that

meet this requirement. See generally Owens, ¶¶ 37-39; Exec. Dir. of

Colo. Dep’t of Corr. v. Fetzer, 2017 CO 77, ¶¶ 15-17.

¶ 16 One such approach is the “hybrid method of calculation” that

DOC is required to use when an inmate has “consecutive sentences,

at least one of which is subject to one calculation rule and at least

one of which is subject to a different calculation rule.” Owens,

4 This aggregate minimum sentence is the combination of Lanari’s

twenty-four-year sentence for attempted murder and the forty years
he must serve on his life sentence to become eligible for parole.

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¶ 44 n.5. Under this methodology, DOC “employ[s] a hybrid system

that effectuates both of the calculation rules” by calculating the

parole eligibility date for each sentence under the rule applicable to

it and then “combin[ing] the resulting calculations to determine the

parole eligibility date for [the defendant’s] single continuous

sentence.” Id. at ¶ 44. “This system at once honors the two

different calculation rules and the one-continuous-sentence

requirement.” Id.

¶ 17 Lanari’s parole eligibility for the attempted murder sentence is

governed by sections 17-22.5-401 to -407, C.R.S. 2024. See

§ 17-22.5-406(1)(a), C.R.S. 2024. He is therefore eligible to reduce

this sentence by any earned time granted under section

17-22.5-405. But this earned time cannot reduce the length of the

attempted murder sentence by more than 30%. See

§ 17-22.5-405(4)(a).

¶ 18 On the other hand, Lanari must serve “at least forty calendar

years” of his life sentence for first degree murder before he can

become eligible for parole. § 17-22.5-104(2)(c)(I). Sections

17-22.5-401 to -407 do not apply life sentences, § 17-22.5-402(3),

C.R.S. 2024, so Lanari cannot receive earned time under section

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17-22.5-405 for this sentence, and the 30% cap on earned time is

inapplicable. Indeed, the “forty calendar years” Lanari must serve

may “not be reduced by any type of credit.” People v. Goodwin,

768 P.2d 715, 716 (Colo. App. 1988). But see Fields, 984 P.2d at

1172 (holding that the defendant was entitled to presentence

confinement credit toward the parole eligibility date for his life

sentence).

¶ 19 Thus, Lanari has two “consecutive sentences, . . . one of which

is subject to one calculation rule and . . . one of which is subject to

a different calculation rule.” Owens, ¶ 44 n.5. This means that

DOC was required to apply — and DOC did in fact apply — the

hybrid method of calculation to determine Lanari’s overall parole

eligibility date by using section 17-22.5-405 (and other relevant

provisions) to calculate the parole eligibility date for his

twenty-four-year sentence for attempted murder and then

combining the resulting calculation with the forty years that Lanari

must serve on his life sentence. See id. at ¶ 44.

¶ 20 In contrast, Lanari’s proposed method of calculation —

calculating the 30% cap on earned time based on his sixty-four-year

aggregate minimum sentence — violates section 17-22.5-104(2)(c)(I)

9
by applying credits to the “forty calendar years” that he must serve

on his life sentence before becoming eligible for parole, see

Goodwin, 768 P.2d at 716, and violates section 17-22.5-402(3) by

applying section 17-22.5-405 to a sentence governed by section

17-22.5-104(2)(c)(I). Cf. Owens, ¶ 41.

¶ 21 Accordingly, DOC correctly calculated the 30% cap on earned

time based on only Lanari’s twenty-four-year sentence for

attempted murder, and this calculation did not violate the

one-continuous-sentence requirement. See id. at ¶ 44. Any

additional earned time beyond this cap (apart from achievement

earned time, which will be discussed below) cannot further reduce

the time Lanari must serve before becoming eligible for parole. The

district court thus properly dismissed this claim. See id. at ¶ 21;

Graham, 227 P.3d at 518.

¶ 22 We are not persuaded otherwise by Lanari’s contention that

DOC is “using negative, retroactive application sentencing laws” to

calculate his parole eligibility date. As we understand it, Lanari’s

argument is that the statute establishing the 30% cap, section

17-22.5-405(4)(a), should not apply to him because it “has an

effective date of April 23, 2023,” which is long after he received his

10
earned time. But that date refers to when an amendment to the

statute came into effect, not to when the statute was originally

enacted, and that amendment did not alter the existing 30% cap on

earned time. See Ch. 66, sec. 1, § 17-22.5-405, 2023 Colo. Sess.

Laws 234-35 (adding a provision granting nonviolent offenders

earned release time if they receive a degree or certificate from a

designated higher education institution).

¶ 23 The original version of section 17-22.5-405 was enacted and

became effective in 1990. Ch. 120, sec. 19, § 17-22.5-405, 1990

Colo. Sess. Laws 952. As originally enacted, the statute included a

provision stating that “[n]otwithstanding any other provision of this

section, earned time may not reduce the sentence of any inmate . . .

by a period of time which is more than twenty-five percent of the

sentence.” § 17-22.5-405(4), C.R.S. 1990. In 2009, section

17-22.5-405(4) was amended to increase the cap on earned time

from 25% to 30%. Ch. 359, sec. 1, § 17-22.5-405, 2009 Colo. Sess.

Laws 1867.

¶ 24 Thus, contrary to Lanari’s contention, his attempted murder

sentence has been subject to a cap on earned time since 1990 —

long before he would have accumulated enough earned time to

11
reach that cap. Rather than being harmed by the retroactive

application of statutory changes to his parole eligibility, Lanari is

actually benefiting from a change that increased the cap on earned

time.

IV. Lanari Does Not Have a Clear Right to
Achievement Earned Time

¶ 25 Lanari next contends that DOC failed to grant him

“achievement earned time” to which he was entitled for completing

therapeutic and educational programs and for exceptional conduct.

We disagree.

A. The Achievement Earned Time Statute and DOC’s Regulation

¶ 26 In 2012, the Colorado General Assembly added subsection (9)

to section 17-22.5-405. Ch. 213, sec. 2, § 17-22.5-405, 2012 Colo.

Sess. Laws 916-17. That subsection currently provides, in relevant

part, that

an offender who successfully completes a
milestone or phase of an educational,
vocational, therapeutic, or reentry program, or
who demonstrates exceptional conduct that
promotes the safety of correctional staff,
volunteers, contractors, or other persons
under the supervision of the department of
corrections, may be awarded as many as sixty
days of achievement earned time per program
milestone or phase or per instance of

12
exceptional conduct, at the discretion of the
executive director; except that an offender
shall not be awarded more than one hundred
twenty days of achievement earned time
pursuant to this subsection.

§ 17-22.5-405(9)(a), C.R.S. 2024. The provision specifies that

“exceptional conduct” includes, as relevant to this appeal, “[s]aving

or attempting to save the life of another person” and “[a]iding in the

prevention of serious bodily injury or loss of life.”

§ 17-22.5-405(9)(b)(I)-(II). Earned time granted under section

17-22.5-405(9) is exempt from the 30% cap. § 17-22.5-405(4)(a).

¶ 27 DOC set forth guidelines concerning the award of achievement

earned time in DOC Admin. Reg. 550-12(IV)(D)(4) (effective Apr. 15,

2022).5 The regulation provides that achievement earned time may

be awarded to “[o]ffenders who successfully complete a milestone or

phase of an educational, vocational, therapeutic or reentry

program” after 2012. DOC Admin. Reg. 550-12(IV)(D)(4)(c). An

attachment to the regulation sets forth each program that is eligible

for the award and the amount of achievement earned time that will

be awarded for its completion. DOC Admin. Reg. Form 550-12B.

5 The regulation’s number was changed in 2023 to DOC Admin.

Reg. 625-02.

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¶ 28 The regulation also provides that an offender may be awarded

achievement earned time for exceptional conduct, as described in

section 17-22.5-405(9)(b), if a DOC employee, contract worker, or

volunteer submits an “Exceptional Conduct Nomination Form” on

his behalf. DOC Admin. Reg. 550-12(IV)(D)(4)(d)(1)-(4). Similarly, a

DOC employee, contract worker, or volunteer may submit a

“Distinguished Actions Nomination Form” to recommend that an

offender receive achievement earned time for “demonstrat[ing]

exemplary leadership through mentoring, community service,

and/or distinguished actions that benefit the health, safety,

environment, and culture affecting staff and other offenders.” DOC

Admin. Reg. 550-12(IV)(D)(4)(f).

B. Discussion

¶ 29 Lanari asserts that he is entitled to achievement earned time

for (1) various programs he completed before 2012; (2) programs he

completed after 2012; and (3) his “actions that helped to stop

several offenders from suicide.” For two reasons, we conclude that

the district court properly dismissed this claim.

¶ 30 First, mandamus under C.R.C.P. 106(a)(2) “is not available to

compel the performance of a task that ‘is discretionary or involves

14
the exercise of judgment.’” Owens, ¶ 21 (citation omitted). DOC

has the discretion to “grant, withhold, withdraw, or restore . . . an

earned time deduction from the sentence imposed.”

§ 17-22.5-405(3); see Verrier v. Colo. Dep’t of Corr., 77 P.3d 875,

878 (Colo. App. 2003). And achievement earned time is specifically

granted “at the discretion of [DOC’s] executive director.”

§ 17-22.5-405(9)(a). Thus, Lanari “has no clear right to receive, and

[DOC] ha[s] no clear duty to grant,” achievement earned time.

Verrier, 77 P.3d at 878. Accordingly, Lanari is not entitled to

mandamus relief.

¶ 31 Second, the allegations in Lanari’s complaint, taken as true,

do not demonstrate that he is entitled to achievement earned time

under DOC Admin. Reg. 550-12:

(1) Lanari’s complaint alleges that he completed several

programs before 2012. However, this predates the

legislature’s creation of achievement earned time, and

DOC Admin. Reg. 550-12(IV)(D)(4)(c)(1)(a) specifies that

“[a]chievement time is only for programs completed after

August 2012.”

15
(2) Lanari’s complaint also makes a conclusory allegation

that he “continued to successfully complete educational

and therapeutic programs in 2018, 2019, 2020, and

2021” without identifying any particular programs he

completed. See Scott v. Scott, 2018 COA 25, ¶ 19

(Conclusory allegations “are not entitled to the

assumption that they are true,” and “Colorado courts

have upheld dismissals because a complaint was

conclusory in its allegations.”). But in his response to

DOC’s motion to dismiss and in his appellate briefs,

Lanari identifies three programs that he completed after

2012 — “Mental Health First Aid USA,” “Offender Care

Aid I,” and a paralegal certificate program at Adams State

University. Even if we were to consider these programs,

they would not entitle Lanari to achievement earned time.

“Mental Health First Aid USA” and “Offender Care Aid I”

are not listed as programs eligible for achievement earned

time in DOC Admin. Reg. Form 550-12B. And Lanari

completed his paralegal certificate course in 2018, but

16
the award for certain college certificate programs did not

become effective until May 2021.

(3) Finally, Lanari’s complaint alleges that he is entitled to

achievement earned time for his “actions toward aiding

another offender.” But the complaint also states that

nobody filed any paperwork on his behalf. The regulation

states that an “Exceptional Conduct Nomination Form”

or a “Distinguished Actions Nomination Form” must be

submitted for an offender to be eligible to receive

achievement earned time for exceptional conduct or

distinguished actions. DOC Admin. Reg.

550-12(IV)(D)(4)(d)(4), (f)(3).

¶ 32 For these reasons, the district court properly granted DOC’s

motion to dismiss. See Owens, ¶ 21; Graham, 227 P.3d at 518.

V. Disposition

¶ 33 The judgment, including the orders dismissing the private

prison officials and the claims against DOC under C.R.C.P. 12(b)(5),

is affirmed.

JUDGE J. JONES and JUDGE BROWN concur.

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