Peo in Interest of RJM

24CA1114 Peo in Interest of RJM 04-10-2025

COLORADO COURT OF APPEALS

Court of Appeals No. 24CA1114
Moffat County District Court No. 21JV5
Honorable Brittany Schneider, Judge

The People of the State of Colorado,

Appellee,

In the Interest of R.J.M., a Child,

and Concerning R.H.,

Appellant.

JUDGMENT AFFIRMED

Division I
Opinion by JUDGE J. JONES
Brown and Yun, JJ., concur

NOT PUBLISHED PURSUANT TO C.A.R. 35(e)
Announced April 10, 2025

Alison D. Casias, Special Assistant County Attorney, Dillon, Colorado, for
Appellee

Debra W. Dodd, Guardian Ad Litem

Beth Padilla, Office of Respondent Parents’ Counsel, Durango, Colorado, for
Appellant
¶1 In this dependency and neglect proceeding, R.H. (mother)

appeals the judgment terminating her parent-child legal

relationship with R.J.M. (the child). We affirm.

I. Background

¶2 In June 2021, mother was arrested after physically assaulting

the child’s twelve-year-old-sister and the child’s maternal

grandmother. The Moffat County Department of Human Services

then filed a petition in dependency and neglect regarding the then-

six-year-old child, who was present during the assault. The

Department raised concerns about mother’s substance abuse,

domestic violence, and involvement in the criminal justice system.

Initially, the Department placed the child with paternal

grandmother before returning the child to mother’s care. But the

Department later removed the child from mother’s care and again

placed him with paternal grandmother.

¶3 The juvenile court adjudicated the child dependent or

neglected and adopted a treatment plan that required mother to

attend substance abuse treatment and demonstrate sobriety;

refrain from engaging in criminal activity; attend individual therapy;

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participate in life skills training and parenting classes; complete

domestic violence, psychological, and parenting capacity

evaluations and comply with any recommended treatment; develop

skills to meet the child’s needs; and cooperate with the Department.

¶4 Ten months after the juvenile court adopted mother’s

treatment plan, the Department moved to terminate her parental

rights. Though mother had been representing herself, she

requested court-appointed counsel, which the court granted. At the

Department’s recommendation, the court also appointed a guardian

ad litem (GAL) for mother.

¶5 Within a month of those appointments, mother’s counsel filed

a notice asserting that the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990

(ADA), 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101-12213, applied to mother. The notice

asserted that mother had “an undiagnosed substance use disorder

and other undiagnosed mental health issues” but did not request

any specific accommodations; rather, it said that her counsel would

confer with the other professionals “should [mother] require any

accommodations or modifications.” Mother’s counsel then moved to

continue the termination hearing because the “professional team

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need[ed] to determine what accommodations [were] necessary” for

mother. The court granted the continuance, noting that although

mother had not completed a psychological evaluation as required by

the treatment plan, her therapist had recommended a

neuropsychological evaluation, which was already scheduled.

¶6 Mother completed the neuropsychological evaluation in June

2023. However, the evaluation didn’t yield a diagnosis or any

treatment recommendations. Mother’s counsel then moved to

continue the termination hearing again so mother could participate

in a second neuropsychological evaluation. The court granted the

second continuance, and mother completed the second evaluation

in October 2023. Thereafter, mother’s counsel filed a notice of

requested accommodations, which were based on the psychologist’s

recommendations.

¶7 The juvenile court then held a three-day contested termination

hearing. Over two-and-a-half years after the filing of the petition,

the court terminated mother’s parental rights.

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II. Statutory Criteria and Standard of Review

¶8 The juvenile court may terminate parental rights if it finds, by

clear and convincing evidence, that (1) the child was adjudicated

dependent or neglected; (2) the parent hasn’t complied with an

appropriate, court-approved treatment plan or the plan hasn’t been

successful; (3) the parent is unfit; and (4) the parent’s conduct or

condition is unlikely to change within a reasonable time. § 19-3-

604(1)(c), C.R.S. 2024.

¶9 The question of whether a juvenile court properly terminated

parental rights is a mixed question of fact and law. People in

Interest of S.R.N.J-S., 2020 COA 12, ¶ 10; People in Interest of A.S.L.,

2022 COA 146, ¶ 8. Thus, we review the court’s factual findings for

clear error but review de novo its legal conclusions based on those

facts. S.R.N.J-S., ¶ 10; A.S.L., ¶ 8.

III. ADA Accommodations

¶ 10 Mother contends that the juvenile court erred by finding that

her treatment plan was appropriate and that the Department made

reasonable efforts to rehabilitate her because the Department failed

to provide reasonable accommodations for her disability. We aren’t

persuaded.
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A. Applicable Law

¶ 11 The ADA requires the juvenile court and the department of

human services to account for and, if possible, make reasonable

accommodations for a parent’s disability when devising a treatment

plan and providing rehabilitative services. People in Interest of S.K.,

2019 COA 36, ¶ 34. But the ADA doesn’t restrict the juvenile

court’s authority to terminate parental rights if a parent, even due

to a disability, isn’t able to meet a child’s needs. People in Interest

of C.Z., 2015 COA 87, ¶ 17. Rather, before terminating parental

rights under section 19-3-604(1)(c), the ADA requires the juvenile

court to consider whether reasonable accommodations were

provided when determining the appropriateness of a parent’s

treatment plan and whether the department made reasonable

efforts to rehabilitate the parent. S.K., ¶ 34.

¶ 12 Whether a parent is a qualified individual with a disability

under the ADA requires a case-by-case determination. Id. at ¶ 21.

Before a department can be required to provide reasonable

accommodations under the ADA, it must know that the individual

has a qualifying disability, either because that disability is obvious

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or because someone has informed the department of the disability.

Id. at ¶ 22. Thus, while a department must provide appropriate

screening and assessments of a parent, the parent is responsible for

disclosing information regarding her disability. Id. at ¶ 21. And a

parent should also identify any modifications that she believes are

necessary to accommodate her disability. Id.

¶ 13 In considering whether reasonable accommodations can be

made for a parent’s disability, the juvenile court’s paramount

concern must always be the child’s health and safety. Id. at ¶ 36.

Thus, what qualifies as a reasonable accommodation will vary from

case to case based on the child’s needs, the nature of the parent’s

disability, and the available resources. Id. at ¶ 39.

B. Analysis

¶ 14 We first reject mother’s argument that the juvenile court

“ignore[d] the ADA and mother’s protected disability,” as evidenced

by the lack of ADA findings in its termination judgment. Though

the court didn’t specifically find that the ADA applied or conclude

that the Department provided reasonable accommodations for

mother’s disability, it acknowledged that mother had filed a notice

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of ADA applicability. It then found that the Department “engaged in

significant efforts to assist . . . mother in getting psychological

evaluations done and seeking the necessary treatment.” It also

found that after the psychological evaluation was completed, the

Department “implemented [the] recommendations for

accommodation[s] suggested by [the psychologist].”

¶ 15 Mother doesn’t dispute these findings. Rather, she argues

that even before she had completed her psychological evaluation,

the Department should have provided reasonable accommodations

because it was “on notice” of her “obvious” disability throughout the

case.

¶ 16 It is true that the caseworker reported significant concerns

about mother’s confusion, delusional thinking, and erratic behavior

as early as August 2022. But we disagree with mother that those

concerns amounted to knowledge of an “obvious” qualifying

disability under the ADA because mother’s symptoms, on their own,

didn’t establish that mother had a “physical or mental impairment

that substantially limit[ed] one or more major life activities.” See 42

U.S.C. § 12102(1)(A). Instead, as noted by the juvenile court,

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mother’s concerning behavior made it “very clear” that a

psychological evaluation was a “key component” of mother’s

treatment plan because it would “help determine the basis for her

behavior and how she [could] be treated.”

¶ 17 In other words, while it was obvious that mother had

concerning symptoms, an evaluation was necessary to determine

whether those symptoms stemmed from a qualifying disability

under the ADA, and, if so, what accommodations were required.

See S.K., ¶¶ 21-22. Indeed, the caseworker testified that the

Department couldn’t appropriately identify the necessary

accommodations to address mother’s mental health issues until she

completed a psychological evaluation.

¶ 18 To that end, the record shows that the Department made

repeated attempts to provide psychological evaluations to determine

if mother needed accommodations for a disability. The Department

scheduled a psychological evaluation for mother in April 2022, but

she didn’t attend. A few months later, as the Department expressed

increasing concerns about mother’s mental health, the court

advised mother of the importance of completing a psychological

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evaluation, and the Department scheduled another one. Although

mother went to that appointment, she didn’t complete the

scheduled intake and decided to reschedule it for the end of

September 2022. She didn’t attend that appointment, nor did she

reschedule it.

¶ 19 Thereafter, the Department recommended that the court

appoint a GAL for mother. The court did so and specifically

directed mother’s GAL to “talk to [mother] about . . . this

psychological evaluation” because it was “crucial” for the court to

understand what was “going on in [mother’s] head.”

¶ 20 The Department then arranged a neuropsychological

evaluation, and mother completed it. But the professionals agreed

that the evaluation wasn’t helpful because it didn’t provide any

insight into mother’s mental health. The psychologist didn’t “feel

comfortable assigning a diagnosis because [mother] denied any

current psychological symptoms.” At that point, the court granted

mother’s request to continue the termination hearing, partly

because the neuropsychological evaluation was inconclusive, and

therefore the court didn’t have “potentially critical information”

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about whether the ADA applied and whether reasonable

accommodations had been provided.

¶ 21 The Department arranged a second neuropsychological

evaluation, which mother completed in October 2023. The

psychologist diagnosed mother with unspecified schizophrenia

spectrum or other psychotic disorder and made specific treatment

recommendations. The psychologist testified that after she

completed mother’s evaluation, the Department contacted her and

asked her to attend a meeting to discuss whether “further

accommodations” were necessary. And the caseworker testified

that the Department provided every accommodation the

psychologist recommended.

¶ 22 We acknowledge that in April 2023, mother requested that the

court appoint an additional professional to help her understand the

importance of the psychological evaluation and require the

Department to arrange a medication evaluation for her. But by that

time, the court had already appointed a GAL to help her understand

the proceedings. And the GAL confirmed that “part of [her] role”

was to explain to mother why the psychological evaluation was

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necessary. Further, instead of determining whether mother’s

request for the medication evaluation was reasonable or necessary,

the court reiterated that the completion of a psychological

evaluation was “critical” to determine what “special

accommodations” mother needed. In other words, the request for

the accommodation was premature. Indeed, after mother

completed the neuropsychological evaluation, the Department

arranged a medication evaluation with a psychiatrist at the

psychologist’s recommendation.

¶ 23 Last, we aren’t persuaded that mother’s treatment plan was

inappropriate because it “did not address the root-cause of mother’s

issues and did not include any [ADA] accommodations.” The

appropriateness of a treatment plan — as distinct from the

reasonableness of the efforts to implement that plan — must be

assessed in light of the facts existing at the time of the plan’s

approval. People in Interest of A.N-B., 2019 COA 46, ¶¶ 25-26.

When the court adopted mother’s treatment plan, the Department

had reported concerns about substance abuse and domestic

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violence, and the treatment plan included goals related to both of

those concerns.

¶ 24 Additionally, mother doesn’t explain what she means by “root-

cause” of her issues. But assuming she means her mental health,

the treatment plan addressed that as well. It specifically required

her to engage in individual therapy and complete a psychological

evaluation. And at the time the court adopted the treatment plan,

mother had not raised the ADA, nor had she requested any

accommodations. See People in Interest of S.Z.S., 2022 COA 133, ¶

16 (if a parent knows or has reason to know she has an ADA-

cognizable disability, the issue should be raised before the court

adopts a treatment plan so the department can include requested

accommodations in the treatment plan and provide services

accommodating the disability throughout the case).

¶ 25 Moreover, while mother argues that the treatment plan should

have been modified to include the psychologist’s recommended

accommodations, she didn’t move the juvenile court to make such

modifications; instead, she simply filed a notice of those

accommodations. And mother doesn’t dispute that the Department

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provided them. Thus, it is unclear how adding the accommodations

to her treatment plan would have affected the outcome of her case.

Accordingly, any error in failing to modify mother’s treatment plan

was harmless. See C.A.R. 35(c) (we may disregard any error not

affecting the party’s substantial rights); People in Interest of R.J.,

2019 COA 109, ¶ 22 (an error affects a substantial right if it can be

said with fair assurance that it substantially influenced the case’s

outcome or impaired the basic fairness of the proceeding).

¶ 26 In sum, the record shows that throughout the case, the

Department made significant efforts to identify mother’s disability

and determine whether accommodations were necessary. Once the

Department had that information, the record shows that it

reasonably accommodated for mother’s disability. Thus, in relation

to the ADA, we discern no error in the court’s findings that mother’s

treatment plan was appropriate and that the Department made

reasonable efforts to rehabilitate her and reunite her with the child.

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IV. Fit within a Reasonable Time

¶ 27 Mother also contends that the juvenile court erred by finding

that she couldn’t become fit within a reasonable time. We aren’t

persuaded.

A. Applicable Law

¶ 28 A parent is unfit if she is unable or unwilling to give a child

reasonable parental care. S.Z.S., ¶ 23. “Reasonable parental care

requires, at a minimum, that the parent provide nurturing and

protection adequate to meet the child’s physical, emotional, and

mental health needs.” S.R.N.J-S., ¶ 9. A parent’s noncompliance

with a treatment plan generally “demonstrates a lack of

commitment to meeting the child’s needs and, therefore, may also

be considered in determining unfitness.” People in Interest of D.P.,

181 P.3d 403, 408 (Colo. App. 2008).

¶ 29 A parent must have a reasonable amount of time to work on a

treatment plan before the juvenile court terminates her parental

rights. People in Interest of D.Y., 176 P.3d 874, 876 (Colo. App.

2007). The determination of a reasonable period is necessarily fact

specific, and, thus, what constitutes a reasonable time to comply

with a treatment plan may vary from case to case. Id. In
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determining whether a parent can become fit within a reasonable

time, the juvenile court may consider whether any change has

occurred during the pendency of the proceeding. K.D. v. People,

139 P.3d 695, 700 (Colo. 2006). A reasonable time isn’t an

indefinite time, and it must be determined by considering the

child’s physical, mental, and emotional conditions and needs.

S.Z.S., ¶ 24.

B. Analysis

¶ 30 The juvenile court considered whether mother could become fit

within a reasonable amount of time but ultimately concluded that

she couldn’t. The court noted that mother’s treatment plan had

been in effect for over two years but found that she was

“uncooperative with the evaluation process until recently” and that

her condition “ha[d] not significantly improved even following her

compliance with psychological evaluations and the introduction of

medication.” The court also found that mother’s “late effort” and

“refusal to timely address [her] mental health issues” by obtaining a

diagnosis and treatment recommendations “interfered with her

ability to . . . repair her relationship with [the child” or provide for

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his needs. The court concluded that the child had been “waiting for

permanency and deserve[d] permanency” and that mother had been

given a reasonable amount of time to comply with her treatment

plan.

¶ 31 The record supports these findings. By the time of

termination hearing, approximately twenty-six months had passed

since the court adopted mother’s amended treatment plan, yet she

hadn’t successfully resolved the concerns that gave rise to the case.

The caseworker testified that although mother had completed a

substance abuse evaluation, she hadn’t followed through with any

of the recommended treatment. While she had also completed a

mental health evaluation, mother had attended only one therapy

session. Further, she didn’t participate in life skills classes or

develop a list of potential caretakers who could fill in for her if she

was under the influence. And although mother had completed her

neuropsychological evaluation and started taking medication, the

caseworker noted that there had been no improvement in mother’s

thinking.

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¶ 32 The caseworker, as an expert in child protection, opined that

mother couldn’t safely parent the child because she hadn’t made

“adequate improvement” on the problems that existed at the

beginning of the case and wasn’t in a “mental health space” that

would allow her to provide the consistency and stability the child

needed. She also opined that “a reasonable amount of time ha[d]

already gone” because the child had been waiting for permanency

for over two-and-a-half years. Indeed, as noted by the child’s GAL,

the child had “been in out-of-home care for 793 [days].”

¶ 33 Next, the child’s therapist, who was qualified as an expert in

therapeutic evaluation and treatment of children, testified that

throughout the case, particularly in the “handful of months” leading

up to termination hearing, the child’s attachment to mother had

gotten worse. The therapist also opined that, while she didn’t know

how long it might take for mother to be able to safely parent the

child, it wasn’t in the child’s best interests to keep the case open to

allow mother more time to work on her treatment plan. In her view,

the child had waited a reasonable amount of time for mother to be

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in a place to parent him and waiting longer or “spending another

day living in this ambivalence” wasn’t going to help him.

¶ 34 We reject mother’s argument that the juvenile court should

have allowed more time, given that she had only recently been

diagnosed with schizophrenia and started taking medication. True,

mother’s individual therapist and her retained expert witness both

testified that she hadn’t been taking her medication long enough to

experience its full effects, that she had recently made progress with

her mental health problems, and that it was possible for her to

become fit within a reasonable time. But the record indicates that

the delay in mother’s medication evaluation was due largely to her

refusal to complete a psychological evaluation. Moreover, the court

— as the finder of fact — heard testimony about mother’s recent

medication and treatment progress but ultimately determined that

it wouldn’t be in the child’s best interests to allow additional time.

See People in Interest of A.J.L., 243 P.3d 244, 252 (Colo. 2010)

(attributing more weight to more recent evidence may be

appropriate in some instances, but doing so is within a juvenile

court’s discretion). And we don’t reweigh the evidence or substitute

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our judgment for that of the juvenile court. People in Interest of

K.L.W., 2021 COA 56, ¶ 62.

¶ 35 Based on the foregoing, we conclude that the juvenile court

properly analyzed whether mother could become fit within a

reasonable time. And because the court’s findings are supported by

the record, we decline to disturb its determination.

V. Less Drastic Alternatives

¶ 36 Last, mother contends that the juvenile court erred by

determining that there were no less drastic alternatives to

termination. Specifically, she argues that the court incorrectly

concluded that it couldn’t allocate parental responsibilities to

paternal grandmother over her objection. We disagree.

A. Applicable Law

¶ 37 The consideration and elimination of less drastic alternatives

are implicit in the statutory criteria for termination. People in

Interest of A.M. v. T.M., 2021 CO 14, ¶ 40. In considering less

drastic alternatives, a juvenile court must give primary

consideration to the child’s physical, mental, and emotional

conditions and needs. People in Interest of Z.M., 2020 COA 3M,

¶ 29. A juvenile court may also consider, among other things, (1)
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whether an ongoing relationship with a parent would be beneficial

to the child, which is influenced by a parent’s fitness to care for the

child’s needs, see People in Interest of A.R., 2012 COA 195M, ¶ 38;

(2) whether the child is bonded with the parent, see People in

Interest of N.D.V., 224 P.3d 410, 421 (Colo. App. 2009); (3) whether

an allocation of parental responsibilities (APR) provides adequate

permanence and meets the child’s needs, see A.R., ¶ 41; and (4)

whether the placement provider favors adoption over an APR, see

Z.M., ¶ 31.

¶ 38 For a less drastic alternative to be viable, it must do more than

adequately meet the child’s needs; it must be in the child’s best

interests. A.M., ¶ 27. Long-term or permanent placement with a

family member, short of termination, may not be in the child’s best

interests if it wouldn’t provide the permanence that adoption would

provide or otherwise meet the child’s needs. A.R., ¶ 41. If a

juvenile court considers a less drastic alternative but finds instead

that termination is in the child’s best interests, it must reject the

alternative and order termination. A.M., ¶ 32.

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B. Analysis

¶ 39 Initially, we reject mother’s argument that the juvenile court

erred by concluding that it couldn’t enter an APR to paternal

grandmother over her objection. To the contrary, a division of this

court has held that a court can’t enter an APR to an unwilling party

who isn’t the child’s parent. See People in Interest of P.D., 580 P.2d

836, 838 (Colo. App. 1978). Mother suggests that we should

disregard this precedent because it is forty-six-years old and

because it is distinguishable from a case like this one, in which a

non-parent has intervened and showed a willingness to care for the

child. But she hasn’t provided any legal authority to support her

assertion that the reasoning in P.D. is inapplicable to this case.

¶ 40 In any event, the juvenile court didn’t reject an APR solely

because of grandmother’s unwillingness to accept it. True, the

court considered grandmother’s preference and found that she was

unwilling to accept an APR. See Z.M., ¶ 31. But it also considered

whether an ongoing relationship with mother would benefit the

child, whether the child was bonded to mother, and whether an

APR could provide adequate permanency based on the child’s

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needs. See A.R., ¶¶ 38, 41; N.D.V., 224 P.3d at 421. Specifically,

the court found that child’s attachment to mother was “going in the

wrong direction.” The court noted that the child had been

diagnosed with post-traumatic stress disorder and anxiety and

found that mother couldn’t provide the stability and certainty the

child needed. The court reiterated that the child had been waiting

for permanency for over two-and-a-half years and concluded that

termination was in his best interests.

¶ 41 The record supports these findings. Contrary to mother’s

assertions, paternal grandmother testified that she understood the

different permanency options because she had discussed them with

the child’s GAL, the county attorney, and another attorney. Even

so, she testified that she wasn’t willing to accept an APR because

she didn’t believe it would be good for the child’s mental health or

in his best interests. Specifically, she didn’t believe an APR would

work because it wouldn’t give the child the security of knowing

where he would live from year to year.

¶ 42 Next, the child’s therapist testified that she couldn’t

“characterize [mother] and [the child] as having an excellent bond”

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and that the child’s attachment to mother was getting worse. She

said that the child had post-traumatic stress disorder and

generalized anxiety, which made his need for predictability and

consistency greater than the norm. And she opined that mother

couldn’t meet the child’s emotional or mental health needs. The

therapist also opined that termination and adoption, not an APR,

was in the child’s best interests because an APR couldn’t ensure

permanency or the “feeling of my life can’t be ripped out from

underneath me at any given time.” She believed that the “most

ideal” option for the child was to have some contact with mother

without her being able to dictate his future.

¶ 43 Finally, the caseworker opined that an APR wouldn’t be in the

child’s best interests because the child needed consistency and

stability, which wouldn’t be provided through an APR. She went on

to opine that even if a caretaker was willing to accept an APR, it

would “not [be] appropriate in this case because [the child] need[ed]

to have absolute surety” of where his home would be.

¶ 44 Accordingly, because the record supports the juvenile court’s

finding that termination, not an APR, was in the child’s best

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interests, we don’t see any basis for reversal. See People in Interest

of B.H., 2021 CO 39, ¶ 80 (when a juvenile court considers less

drastic alternatives but instead finds that termination is in the

child’s best interests, we are bound to affirm the decision so long as

the record supports its findings).

VI. Disposition

¶ 45 The judgment is affirmed.

JUDGE BROWN and JUDGE YUN concur.

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