Peo v. Hatfield

22CA1731 Peo v Hatfield 04-10-2025

COLORADO COURT OF APPEALS

Court of Appeals No. 22CA1731
El Paso County District Court No. 14CR1732
Honorable David Shakes, Judge

The People of the State of Colorado,

Plaintiff-Appellee,

v.

Justin Jay Hatfield,

Defendant-Appellant.

ORDER REVERSED AND CASE REMANDED WITH DIRECTIONS

Division IV
Opinion by JUDGE GROVE
Harris and Pawar, JJ., concur

NOT PUBLISHED PURSUANT TO C.A.R. 35(e)
Announced April 10, 2025

Philip J. Weiser, Attorney General, William G. Kozeliski, Senior Assistant
Attorney General, Denver, Colorado, for Plaintiff-Appellee

R. Scott Reisch, Alternate Defense Counsel, Robert F. LeVeen, Alternate
Defense Counsel, Denver, Colorado, for Defendant-Appellant
¶1 Defendant, Justin Jay Hatfield, appeals the district court’s

order denying his “Petition for Postconviction Relief Pursuant to

Crim. P. 35(c)” without a hearing. We reverse and remand the case

for further proceedings.

I. Background

¶2 In 2014, a jury convicted Hatfield of sexual assault and

unlawful sexual contact. The district court sentenced him to a

controlling term of six years to life in prison. A division of this court

affirmed Hatfield’s conviction on direct appeal. People v. Hatfield,

(Colo. App. No. 15CA1802, Mar. 1, 2018) (not published pursuant

to C.A.R. 35(f)) (Hatfield I). The mandate issued on August 21,

2018.

¶3 Three months later, Hatfield filed a “Motion for Sentence

Reconsideration” in which he asked the district court to

(1) reconsider his sentence and (2) vacate the crimes against a child

surcharge. While the court commended Hatfield’s rehabilitation

efforts, it nevertheless found that the sentence imposed remained

appropriate. However, because the court found that the surcharge

had been imposed by “mistake” — Hatfield’s victim was an adult,

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not a child — the court vacated the surcharge and on December 3,

2018, issued a revised mittimus reflecting the correction.

¶4 In November 2021, Hatfield filed a pro se Crim. P. 35(c) motion

asserting various claims of ineffective assistance of trial counsel.

None of the claims related to the court’s correction of the surcharge.

¶5 Counsel was appointed and moved for a determination

concerning the timeliness of Hatfield’s motion. Counsel informed

the district court of the then-recent decision in Hunsaker v. People,

2021 CO 83 (Hunsaker II), and explained that Hatfield had relied on

Leyva v. People, 184 P.3d 48 (Colo. 2008), which was the “state of

the law” when he filed his motion, but if the court disagreed that his

motion was timely, the “change in the law . . . provided justifiable

excuse or excusable neglect for the late filing.” The court set the

matter for a hearing.

¶6 At the hearing, Hatfield testified that it was his understanding

that he “had three years from the date of [his] mittimus” to file a

Crim. P. 35(c) motion and that he used December 3, 2018, as the

date to calculate the filing of his motion because that was the date

on the revised mittimus. Additionally, although he could not recall

any names, Hatfield testified that the “people at the law library told

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[him that he] had three years from that date.” The prosecution did

not present any evidence.

¶7 Based on the evidence presented, the district court found that

Hatfield’s reliance on Leyva was “not at all . . . rational” because his

“Motion for Sentence Reconsideration” was “not a motion to correct

an illegal sentence under Crim. P. 35(a)” that would have

“extend[ed] the time” to file his Crim. P. 35(c) motion. And no one

“would interpret Leyva to mean that changing a surcharge on a

[Crim. P.] 35(b) motion was intended to start, again, a three-year

period on a . . . [Crim. P.] 35(c) . . . motion.”

¶8 The district court also found that Hatfield’s purported reliance

on what the individuals in the law library told him concerning the

deadline was not credible. The court based its credibility finding on

Hatfield’s “incredible and unbelievable” trial testimony and the fact

that he could not recall any of the names of these individuals at the

law library.

¶9 Finally, addressing the factors in People v. Wiedemer, 852 P.2d

424, 441-42 (Colo. 1993), the district court found that there were

no outside influences that prevented Hatfield from seeking

postconviction relief in a timely fashion and the need to challenge

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the conviction was present “from day one.” Thus, the court

concluded that the motion was untimely and that Hatfield had not

alleged sufficient justifiable excuse or excusable neglect to avoid its

untimeliness.

II. Discussion

¶ 10 Hatfield contends that the district court erred by denying his

motion as untimely. In the alternative, he contends that he

demonstrated justifiable excuse or excusable neglect for failing to

collaterally attack the validity of his felony conviction within the

applicable three-year limitations period. Because we agree with

Hatfield’s second contention, we reverse the court’s order and

remand the case for the district court to proceed as directed by

Crim. P. 35(c)(V). See People v. Chalchi-Sevilla, 2019 COA 75, ¶ 23

(concluding that where appellate courts find an error in a district

court’s denial of a postconviction motion the appropriate procedure

is to remand with directions “to put the train back on the tracks at

the point it derailed”).

A. Standard of Review

¶ 11 We review de novo both the decision to deny a Crim. P. 35(c)

motion without an evidentiary hearing and whether the facts alleged

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in a Crim. P. 35(c) motion, if true, would constitute justifiable

excuse or excusable neglect pursuant to section 16-5-402(2)(d),

C.R.S. 2024. People v. Cali, 2020 CO 20, ¶ 14; People v. Hinojos,

2019 CO 60, ¶ 12. However, where, as here, a defendant receives a

hearing on the timeliness of his motion and is challenging the

district court’s determination that the statutory exception does not

apply, we must affirm if the record supports the court’s findings.

See People v. Smith, 2024 CO 3, ¶ 16 (“In Crim. P. 35(c)

proceedings, we review the postconviction court’s legal conclusions

de novo but defer to its factual findings if they are supported by the

record.”); see also People v. Vigil, 983 P.2d 805, 810 (Colo. App.

1999) (noting that deference is to be given to the district court’s

findings of fact following a hearing concerning justifiable excuse or

excusable neglect).

B. Timeliness of the Motion

¶ 12 Hatfield’s motion was untimely because it was not filed within

three years of August 21, 2018, the date of the mandate from

Hatfield’s direct appeal, and his postconviction claims did not relate

to the illegality in the sentence that the court corrected in the

revised mittimus. See Hunsaker II, ¶¶ 35-37. Accordingly, his

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request for postconviction relief “cannot proceed unless an

exception under section 16-5-402(2) applies.” Id. at ¶ 36. We turn

to that question next.

C. Justifiable Excuse or Excusable Neglect

¶ 13 A defendant’s untimely submission of a Crim. P. 35(c) motion

may be excused if his “failure to seek relief within the applicable

time period was the result of circumstances amounting to justifiable

excuse or excusable neglect.” § 16-5-402(2)(d).

¶ 14 Hatfield contends, as he did at the hearing, that the

“uncertainty in the law” at the time he filed his Crim. P. 35(c)

motion, and his “detrimental reliance on the holding of Leyva”

provides justifiable excuse or excusable neglect for his belated

filing. Under these circumstances, we agree.

¶ 15 Before Hunsaker II, divisions of our court disagreed as to

whether every successful Crim. P. 35(a) motion reset the three-year

time limit or if the underlying claims of an otherwise untimely Crim.

P. 35(c) motion had to relate to the illegality found in the earlier

Crim. P. 35(a) motion. Compare People v. Baker, 2017 COA 102,

rev’d, 2019 CO 97M, with People v. Hunsaker, 2020 COA 48, aff’d,

2021 CO 83 (Hunsaker I). The confusion stemmed from Leyva,

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which espoused both broad and narrow interpretations of Crim. P.

35(a)’s effect on an untimely Crim. P. 35(c) motion. See Hunsaker

II, ¶ 24. In Hunsaker II, the supreme court resolved the issue,

holding that “[a] defendant who successfully corrects an illegal

sentence may thereafter collaterally attack their conviction, but [if

the time bar has otherwise expired and no exceptions apply,] they

may only raise arguments addressing how the illegality in the

sentence potentially affected the original conviction.” Id. at ¶ 26.

¶ 16 Accordingly, Hunsaker II closed the door on Hatfield’s

argument that the revision of his mittimus reset the clock under

section 16-5-402. But at the same time, it opened a window that

may, under some circumstances, allow a defendant to establish

justifiable excuse or excusable neglect for an untimely filing. See

Hunsaker II, ¶ 41 (concluding that Hunsaker should be permitted to

argue justifiable excuse or excusable neglect on remand because he

“seems likely to have relied on the language in Leyva that we have

now disavowed in delaying the filing of his Crim. P. 35(c) motion”).

¶ 17 In Wiedemer, the supreme court identified six non-exclusive

factors that may bear on the justifiable excuse or excusable neglect

inquiry. 852 P.2d at 441-42. Applying some, but not all, of the

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Wiedemer factors, the district court here found that Hatfield had

failed to establish justifiable excuse or excusable neglect because

no circumstances outside of Hatfield’s control prevented him from

filing his Crim. P. 35(c) motion earlier and Hatfield had a present

need to challenge his conviction “from day one.” The court also

found that, despite the delay in filing Hatfield’s motion, there was

no “proof of prejudice” to the prosecution’s ability to defend against

his challenge, and that Hatfield’s purported reliance on what the

individuals in the law library told him concerning the deadline was

not credible.

¶ 18 We respectfully disagree with the district court’s finding that

there were “no outside influences that prevented [Hatfield] from

making a timely challenge to the conviction.” True, as the court

observed, there was no evidence of “an administrative hold, illness,

no access to a library.” But there was evidence of another outside

influence: Leyva, as interpreted by the Baker division. Hatfield

testified that it was his understanding that he “had three years from

the date of [his] mittimus” to file a Crim. P. 35(c) motion. And,

consistent with his reading of Leyva — which was itself supported

by Baker — he used December 3, 2018, as the date to calculate the

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filing of his motion because that was the date that “the Court

corrected an error.”1 Because Hatfield’s reasonable reliance on

Leyva caused him to miss the statutory deadline, the court’s finding

that there were “no outside influences” lacks record support. And

where a court’s finding lacks record support, we will not defer to it.

Vigil, 983 P.2d at 810.

¶ 19 The district court also found that Hatfield’s need to challenge

his conviction was present “from day one.” That may be true, but it

does not shed any light on the statutory deadline, which Hatfield

reasonably concluded was reset when the district court issued the

revised mittimus.

1 Contrary to the district court’s conclusion that Hatfield’s “Motion

for Sentence Reconsideration” was “not a motion to correct an
illegal sentence under Crim. P. 35(a)” — and thus did not implicate
the holding in Leyva v. People, 184 P.3d 48 (Colo. 2008), at all — we
conclude that Hatfield’s motion did assert that his sentence was
illegal because it included a child victim surcharge that was not
authorized by statute for his conviction. See People v. Wenzinger,
155 P.3d 415, 418 (Colo. App. 2006) (“[A] sentence is ‘illegal’ under
Crim. P. 35(a) if it is ‘inconsistent with the statutory scheme
outlined by the legislature.’” (quoting People v. Rockwell, 125 P.3d
410, 414 (Colo. 2005))). “The substance of a postconviction motion
controls whether it is designated as a Crim. P. 35(a) or 35(c)
motion.” People v. Collier, 151 P.3d 668, 670 (Colo. App. 2006).

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¶ 20 The final factor considered by the district court was the

amount of time that had passed since Hatfield’s conviction and the

effect of the passage of time on the prosecution’s ability to defend

against his challenge to it. The mandate following Hatfield I issued

in August 2018. Hatfield’s Crim. P. 35(c) motion was filed — three

years and three months later — in November 2021. Given a delay

of just three months past the statutory deadline, the court found

that there was no prejudice to the prosecution’s ability to defend

against Hatfield’s challenge. The court’s finding has record support

and we will not disturb it.

¶ 21 For these reasons, we conclude that Hatfield’s delay in filing

his Crim. P. 35(c) motion was excused by his reliance on Leyva and

Baker. Therefore, we do not address the district court’s findings

concerning Hatfield’s testimony about what the individuals at the

law library told him. Because the record adequately supports

Hatfield’s assertion that he relied on his own, at the time

reasonable, interpretation of the time bar established by section 16-

5-402, he is justifiably excused on this basis alone.

¶ 22 We are not persuaded otherwise by the People’s assertion that

Hatfield’s position lacks “factual support in the record” because he

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never specifically testified that he relied on Leyva or any other prior

decision to calculate the date his Crim. P. 35(c) motion was due.

We acknowledge that Hatfield never identified Leyva as the basis for

his calculations. But his testimony explaining how he determined

the statutory deadline tracked the case precisely.

¶ 23 Nor are we persuaded that Hatfield’s concession to the

uncertainty of the law “dooms his argument.” As discussed, the law

at the time was indeed uncertain and it may well have been prudent

for Hatfield to have submitted his pro se Crim. P. 35(c) motion

under the more conservative interpretation of Leyva. But given the

unsettled nature of the Leyva holding, Hatfield’s failure to file his

Crim. P. 35(c) motion earlier is not so unreasonable as to be

unjustifiable. And when analyzing if the time bar should be strictly

enforced or if the motion’s tardiness should be excused, we must

“give effect to the overriding concern . . . that a defendant have the

meaningful opportunity required by due process to challenge his

conviction.” Wiedemer, 852 P.2d at 441.

¶ 24 Accordingly, we conclude that the district court erred when it

found that Hatfield had failed to demonstrate justifiable excuse or

excusable neglect for his untimely motion. While Hatfield’s Crim. P.

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35(c) motion was untimely, its untimeliness was justifiably excused

based on Hatfield’s reliance on his own, at the time reasonable,

interpretation of Leyva.

III. Disposition

¶ 25 The order is reversed. The case is remanded for the district

court to continue the appointment of defense counsel, allowing

counsel the opportunity to investigate and supplement, as needed,

Hatfield’s pro se motion with any claims counsel finds to have

arguable merit. The district court should then proceed as directed

by Crim. P. 35(c)(V).

JUDGE HARRIS and JUDGE PAWAR concur.

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