People v. Spomer

The summaries of the Colorado Court of Appeals published opinions
constitute no part of the opinion of the division but have been prepared by
the division for the convenience of the reader. The summaries may not be
cited or relied upon as they are not the official language of the division.
Any discrepancy between the language in the summary and in the opinion
should be resolved in favor of the language in the opinion.

SUMMARY
April 10, 2025

2025COA39

No. 23CA1556, People v. Spomer — Government —
Interstate Compacts and Agreements — Interstate Agreement
on Detainers; Criminal Law — Arrest Warrants

This appeal involves the application of the Interstate

Agreement on Detainers (IAD), section 24-60-501, C.R.S. 2024. The

People appeal a judgment dismissing a criminal case based on a

violation of the IAD. The district court concluded that the IAD’s

protections extended to the defendant’s case because while the

defendant was in custody in another state, an open warrant for his

arrest in this case constituted a “detainer” under the IAD.

A division of the court of appeals addresses an issue of first

impression in Colorado: Is an arrest warrant, standing alone, a

detainer under the IAD such that its mere existence, without more,

triggers the IAD’s requirements? The division concludes that the

arrest warrant in this case didn’t constitute a detainer for IAD
purposes. So the district court erred by treating it as a detainer

and finding a violation of the IAD. The division, therefore, reverses

the judgment of dismissal and remands the case for the charges to

be reinstated and the district court to address the additional issues

that were left unresolved when it dismissed the case.
COLORADO COURT OF APPEALS 2025COA39

Court of Appeals No. 23CA1556
Jefferson County District Court No. 20CR3720
Honorable Russel Klein, Judge

The People of the State of Colorado,

Plaintiff-Appellant,

v.

Shawn Paul Spomer,

Defendant-Appellee.

JUDGMENT REVERSED AND CASE
REMANDED WITH DIRECTIONS

Division VI
Opinion by JUDGE WELLING
Brown and Hawthorne*, JJ., concur

Announced April 10, 2025

Alexis King, District Attorney, Rebecca A. Adams, Senior Appellate Deputy
District Attorney, Golden, Colorado, for Plaintiff-Appellant

Megan A. Ring, Colorado State Public Defender, Rachel Z. Geiman, Deputy
State Public Defender, Denver, Colorado, for Defendant-Appellee

*Sitting by assignment of the Chief Justice under provisions of Colo. Const. art.
VI, § 5(3), and § 24-51-1105, C.R.S. 2024.
¶1 The People appeal the judgment dismissing a Jefferson County

criminal case against defendant, Shawn Paul Spomer, based on a

violation of the Interstate Agreement on Detainers (IAD), section 24-

60-501, C.R.S. 2024. The district court concluded that the IAD’s

protections extended to Spomer’s case because while he was in

custody in another state, an open warrant for his arrest in this case

constituted a “detainer” under the IAD.

¶2 This case presents an issue of first impression in Colorado: Is

an arrest warrant, standing alone, a detainer under the IAD such

that its mere existence, without more, triggers the IAD’s

requirements? We conclude that the arrest warrant in this case

didn’t constitute a detainer for IAD purposes. So the district court

erred by treating it as a detainer and finding a violation of the IAD.

We, therefore, reverse the judgment of dismissal and remand the

case for the charges to be reinstated and the district court to

address the additional issues that were left unresolved when it

dismissed the case.

I. Background

¶3 In October 2020, a detective saw Spomer driving a vehicle that

had been reported as stolen. The detective contacted Spomer,

1
suspecting him of felony motor vehicle theft, but didn’t arrest him

because of existing COVID-19 jail restrictions. Instead, the

detective released Spomer after advising him that he would be

facing a felony summons or warrant at a later time.

¶4 In November 2020, the People filed a complaint in the

Jefferson County courts, charging Spomer with first degree

aggravated motor vehicle theft, criminal possession of an

identification document, unlawful possession of a controlled

substance, and possession of drug paraphernalia. The court issued

a summons for Spomer to appear at a hearing on the charges but

later issued a warrant for his arrest because the prosecution was

unable to serve him with the summons.

¶5 In June 2021, Spomer was arrested in Weld County, where he

was also facing criminal charges. Based on his arrest in Weld

County, the arrest warrant in this matter was cancelled. Spomer

was released on bond, the public defender was appointed to

represent him, and an arraignment in this case — the Jefferson

County case — was set for October 5, 2021. Spomer failed to

appear for that arraignment, so the Jefferson County District Court

issued a warrant for his arrest.

2
¶6 In November 2021, Spomer was arrested in Adams County,

and the warrant in this matter was again cancelled. Spomer was

once more released on bond, and the arraignment in this case was

reset for January 10, 2022. Spomer once again didn’t appear for

the scheduled arraignment, so the district court issued yet another

warrant for his arrest.

¶7 The record reflects that Spomer failed to appear at the

January 10 arraignment because he was in custody in Kansas. He

remained in custody in Kansas until sometime in February 2022,

when he was extradited to Ohio to face criminal charges there.

Spomer was sentenced in the Ohio matter in June 2022 and was

expected to be released from custody in Ohio in May 2023.

¶8 In June 2022, the Weld County District Attorney lodged a

detainer against Spomer with the Ohio Department of

Rehabilitation and Correction (ODRC) for the charges pending in

Weld County.

¶9 In March 2023, Spomer filed a pro se letter with the Jefferson

County District Court stating that he was incarcerated in Ohio and

that he had received “notice from the Bureau of Sentence

Computation & Records Management of a pending warrant and

3
detainer out of [Jefferson] [C]ounty.” He asked that the pending

Jefferson County charges be dismissed or that he be granted time

served on them so that he could remain in Ohio after his release

from custody. The court denied his requests in his pro se letter,

noting that he was represented by counsel.

¶ 10 In May 2023, Spomer completed his Ohio sentence and was

returned to Colorado based on the Weld County detainer. In June

2023, Spomer, through appointed counsel, filed a motion to dismiss

the underlying Jefferson County case for violations of the IAD and

his constitutional rights to a speedy trial and due process. As

relevant here, he asserted that the ODRC warden had failed to

comply with his obligation under the IAD to notify Spomer “of the

detainers against him from Jefferson County.” In response, the

prosecution argued that the IAD and its obligations weren’t

triggered because no detainer on the pending Jefferson County

charges had been lodged with the ODRC.

¶ 11 At a July 23, 2023, hearing, the district court addressed

Spomer’s motion, including the issue of whether the warrant issued

for his arrest in this matter constituted a detainer sufficient to

trigger the IAD’s requirements. The court found that the warrant

4
constituted a detainer because a warrant meets the definition, and

fulfills the purpose, of a detainer under the IAD. The court then

concluded that Spomer’s rights under the IAD had been violated

because officials at the ODRC had failed to notify him of the

detainer. Based on this finding, the court ruled that “the only

remedy available under the IAD [wa]s for a dismissal of the case

given the substantial time periods between when the warrant was

issued and detainer should have been notified and . . . where we are

here today.” Because it dismissed all charges based on an IAD

violation, the court didn’t address Spomer’s constitutional claims.

The People appeal this judgment of dismissal.

II. Legal Authority and Standard of Review

¶ 12 In 1969, Colorado adopted the IAD — a congressionally

sanctioned interstate compact that establishes procedures for

resolving one compact state’s pending criminal charges against a

person imprisoned in another compact state. See § 24-60-501; New

York v. Hill, 528 U.S. 110, 111 (2000); Johnson v. People, 939 P.2d

5
817, 819 (Colo. 1997).1 “[I]t is the policy of the party states and the

purpose of th[e] [IAD] to encourage the expeditious and orderly

disposition of such charges and determination of the proper status

of any and all detainers based on untried indictments,

informations, or complaints.” § 24-60-501, art. I.

¶ 13 The IAD designates the state in which the prisoner is

incarcerated as the “sending state” and the state with the untried

indictments, informations, or complaints as the “receiving state.”

§ 24-60-501, art. II(b), (c). “[S]tate” is defined as, among other

things, a state of the United States, the United States of America,

and the District of Columbia. § 24-60-501, art. II(a).

1 In 1969, the General Assembly, in a single bill, adopted the IAD

and the Uniform Mandatory Disposition of Detainers Act (UMDDA).
See Ch. 111, secs. 8-9, §§ 39-23-1 to -8 (UMDDA), §§ 74-16-1 to -7
(IAD), 1969 Colo. Sess. Laws 286, 291-97; see also Johnson v.
People, 939 P.2d 817, 819 (Colo. 1997) (discussing the legislative
history of and relationship between the IAD and UMDDA). The IAD
was originally codified in article 17 (instead of article 16) of title 74
because another interstate compact — the Interstate Library
Compact — had already been codified at the same location earlier
that session. See Ch. 193, sec. 1, §§ 74-16-1 to -7, 1969 Colo.
Sess. Laws 552-57. The IAD was subsequently renumbered to
sections 24-60-501 to -507 in the 1973 codification of the Colorado
Revised Statutes.

6
¶ 14 The IAD sets forth four procedural steps that must be followed

by the custodial officials of the receiving state, the officials of the

sending state, and the prisoner. Johnson, 939 P.2d at 820-21.

“[S]trict compliance with the terms of the IAD is required . . . .” Id.

at 824.

¶ 15 As relevant here, the first step requires the officials of the

receiving state to lodge a detainer against the prisoner with the

officials of the sending state who have custody of the prisoner.

§ 24-60-501, art. III(a); Johnson, 939 P.2d at 820. The detainer acts

as “a legal order that requires a State in which an individual is

currently imprisoned to hold that individual when [they] ha[ve]

finished serving [their] sentence so that [they] may be tried by a

different State for a different crime.” Alabama v. Bozeman, 533 U.S.

146, 148 (2001). “[T]he provisions of the [IAD] are triggered only

when a ‘detainer’ is filed with the custodial (sending) State by

another State (receiving) having untried charges pending against

the prisoner . . . .” United States v. Mauro, 436 U.S. 340, 343

(1978).

¶ 16 After a detainer is filed and the IAD is triggered, “the custodial

official is required to notify the prisoner of the source and contents

7
of the detainer and [the prisoner’s] right to make a request for final

disposition of the indictment, information, or complaint on which

the detainer is based.” Johnson, 939 P.2d at 820 (citing § 24-60-

501, art. III(c)). The prisoner must then “deliver to the warden or

custodial official a written notice and request for final disposition.”

Id. (citing § 24-60-501, art. III(b)). Finally, “the custodial official

must forward the prisoner’s request for a final disposition and a

certification containing information regarding the prisoner’s

incarceration to the appropriate court and the prosecuting officer.”

Id. (citing § 24-60-501, art. III(a)).

¶ 17 If these procedures are followed, the prosecutor in the

receiving state must try the prisoner within 180 days after receipt of

the prisoner’s request for final disposition, “unless the court having

jurisdiction grants a necessary or reasonable continuance.” Id. at

821 (citing § 24-60-501, art. III(a)).

¶ 18 We review de novo a court’s interpretation and application of

the IAD. People v. Harter, 216 P.3d 606, 608 (Colo. App. 2009); see

also People v. Walton, 167 P.3d 163, 165 (Colo. App. 2007). As an

interstate compact, the IAD is both state and federal law. Johnson,

939 P.2d at 821. Thus, “federal decisions are instructive regarding

8
the interpretation of its terms,” and “[a] uniform standard of

compliance and interpretation by the compact states reinforces the

IAD’s public policy intent.” Id.

¶ 19 We review a court’s ruling on a motion to dismiss a case under

the IAD for an abuse of discretion. United States v. Ray, 899 F.3d

852, 857 (10th Cir. 2018); cf. People v. Mascarenas, 666 P.2d 101,

106 (Colo. 1983) (reviewing for an abuse of discretion the district

court’s dismissal of a case for violating the intrastate Uniform

Mandatory Disposition of Detainers Act (UMDDA)); People v. Bost,

770 P.2d 1209, 1214 (Colo. 1989) (Because the IAD and the

UMDDA “reflect the same policy of facilitating speedy disposition of

untried charges, . . . the principles of one may be applied to the

other unless the provisions conflict.”). Under the abuse of

discretion standard, we will “uphold the trial court’s ruling unless it

is manifestly arbitrary, unreasonable, or unfair, or when it is based

on an erroneous understanding or application of the law.” People v.

Sandoval, 2018 COA 156, ¶ 26.

9
III. Analysis

¶ 20 The People contend that the district court erred by finding that

the issuance of the arrest warrant for Spomer, by itself, constituted

a detainer for IAD purposes. We agree that the district court erred.

¶ 21 The IAD doesn’t define “detainer.” Mauro, 436 U.S. at 359.

But the Supreme Court has interpreted detainer to mean “a request

filed by a criminal justice agency with the institution in which a

prisoner is incarcerated, asking that the prisoner be held for the

agency, or that the agency be advised when the prisoner’s release is

imminent.” Fex v. Michigan, 507 U.S. 43, 44 (1993); see also Hill,

528 U.S. at 112; Carchman v. Nash, 473 U.S. 716, 719 (1985).

¶ 22 The Colorado Supreme Court has consistently relied on this

definition when addressing IAD issues, see Johnson, 939 P.2d at

819; Moody v. Corsentino, 843 P.2d 1355, 1367 (Colo. 1993);

Sweaney v. Dist. Ct., 713 P.2d 914, 915 (Colo. 1986); People v.

Morgan, 712 P.2d 1004, 1006 (Colo. 1986); People v. Yellen, 704

P.2d 306, 311 (Colo. 1985); People v. Moody, 676 P.2d 691, 693 n.2

(Colo. 1984), and we are bound to follow this definition of detainer

for IAD purposes, see Ray, 899 F.3d at 858 (“[W]e are bound by the

pronouncements of the Supreme Court, and the Supreme Court has

10
defined detainer on multiple occasions to mean something specific

in the context of the IAD.”); see also In re Estate of Ramstetter, 2016

COA 81, ¶ 40 (the court of appeals is bound to follow supreme court

precedent).

¶ 23 This definition still doesn’t directly answer the question before

us — namely, whether an outstanding arrest warrant by itself

constitutes a detainer. But we aren’t without guidance in

answering that question.

¶ 24 A “warrant” is statutorily defined as “a written order issued by

a judge of a court of record directed to any peace officer

commanding the arrest of the person named or described in the

order.” § 16-1-104(18), C.R.S. 2024. Contrary to the district

court’s finding, we conclude that this statutory language doesn’t

show that a warrant falls within the definition of detainer or fulfill

the purposes of a detainer because a warrant doesn’t ask a

custodial institution to hold a prisoner for a criminal justice agency

or to advise the agency of the prisoner’s imminent release. See Fex,

507 U.S. at 44.

¶ 25 In Tucker v. United States, 569 A.2d 162 (D.C. 1990), the

District of Columbia Circuit Court of Appeals applied the United

11
States Supreme Court’s definition of detainer to determine whether

an arrest warrant constituted a detainer for IAD purposes. The

court determined that an arrest warrant could be considered a

detainer but that more than its mere issuance was required:

Under this definition, an arrest warrant will
serve as a detainer within the purview of the
IAD if: 1) it is based on an untried information,
indictment, or complaint; 2) it is filed by a
criminal justice agency; 3) it is filed directly
with the facility where a prisoner is
incarcerated; 4) it notifies prison officials that
a prisoner is wanted to face pending charges;
and 5) it asks the institution where the
prisoner is incarcerated either to hold the
prisoner at the conclusion the prisoner’s
sentence, or to notify agency officials when the
prisoner’s release is imminent.

Id. at 165. The court concluded that, “[w]here all five of these

criteria are satisfied, an arrest warrant is plainly ‘lodged’ as a

detainer, and the provisions of the IAD come into play.” Id.

¶ 26 For three reasons, we are persuaded by Tucker that these

additional criteria are required before an arrest warrant may be

considered a detainer under the IAD.

¶ 27 First, the other circuits confronted with this issue apply a

similar definition. See United States v. Jones, 454 F.3d 642, 647

(7th Cir. 2006) (“A detainer is a notice filed with a prisoner’s

12
institution of incarceration alerting both [the prisoner] and the

institution that the prisoner is wanted to face criminal charges in

another jurisdiction”; “[p]ractically, the detainer is a request that

the prisoner be held for the other jurisdiction’s prosecutors or that

the holding institution notify the prosecutors of the prisoner’s

pending release.”); United States v. Paredes-Batista, 140 F.3d 367,

372 (2d Cir. 1998) (A detainer is a notice that is “filed with an

institution in which a particular prisoner is incarcerated, advising

that [the prisoner] is wanted to face pending criminal charges in

another jurisdiction, and requesting that the prisoner either be held

for the other jurisdiction’s prosecutors or that these prosecutors be

notified when the prisoner’s release is imminent.”); Bost, 770 P.2d

at 1214 (“[T]he provisions of the IAD are triggered only when a

prosecutor files charges against a person serving a term of

imprisonment in another state and files a detainer with the official

having custody of the prisoner.”); People v. Newton, 764 P.2d 1182,

1186 (Colo. 1988) (“The provisions of the IAD are activated when a

state charges a person imprisoned in another state with a crime

and files a detainer with the official having custody of the

prisoner.”); Yellen, 704 P.2d at 311 (“[T]he IAD expressly conditions

13
the duty to promptly inform upon the filing of a detainer,” and a

detainer must be filed with the institution in which a prisoner is

serving a sentence.); cf. Ray, 899 F.3d at 858 (An arrest “doesn’t fit

within the Supreme Court’s binding definition of detainer” because

it “isn’t ‘a notification filed with the institution in which a prisoner

is serving a sentence.’” (quoting Mauro, 436 U.S. at 359)).

¶ 28 Second, adopting the Tucker criteria furthers the policy of

uniformly applying the IAD’s provisions among the party states.

See Johnson, 939 P.2d at 820-21 (“[O]ur interpretation of the IAD,

as a compact among states and the United States, should be guided

by a policy of uniformity in applying its provisions to the transfer,

transport, and trial of incarcerated persons between jurisdictions.”);

see also State v. Williams, 573 N.W.2d 106, 113 (Neb. 1997); State

v. Prentice, 613 S.E.2d 498, 503 (N.C. Ct. App. 2005); State v.

Barney, 2008 UT App 250, ¶¶ 7-8, 189 P.3d 1277, 1279; State v.

Welker, 110 P.3d 1167, 1170 (Wash. Ct. App. 2005), aff’d, 141 P.3d

8 (Wash. 2006).

¶ 29 Third and finally, adopting the Tucker criteria avoids serious

pragmatic issues that would arise under the rule urged by Spomer

and adopted by the district court. Specifically, if the mere issuance

14
of an arrest warrant constitutes a detainer, custodial officials in

each party state would be obligated to conduct daily searches of

national arrest warrant databases to determine whether an arrest

warrant had been issued for each prisoner in the custody of their

institution. This is both impractical and beyond what is

contemplated by the statute.

¶ 30 Applying the Tucker criteria to Spomer’s case, the warrant

satisfies the first, second, and fourth criteria — (1) it’s based on an

untried information or complaint; (2) it was filed by a criminal

justice agency; and (4) it notifies whoever reads it that a prisoner is

wanted to face pending charges — but it fails the third and fifth

criteria — (3) it wasn’t filed directly with the facility where Spomer

was incarcerated and (5) it doesn’t ask the institution where

Spomer was incarcerated either to hold him at the conclusion of his

sentence or to notify Colorado officials when his release is

imminent. Indeed, there is no indication in the record, and Spomer

doesn’t argue, that a Jefferson County criminal justice agency filed

or lodged the arrest warrant with the ODRC or that the agency

officials requested that Spomer be held or that they be alerted to his

imminent release.

15
¶ 31 Accordingly, we conclude that the mere issuance of the

warrant for Spomer’s arrest was insufficient to meet the definition

of detainer and to trigger the IAD provisions. See Tucker, 569 A.2d

at 164-67 (holding that District of Columbia arrest warrants left

with South Carolina police officers didn’t constitute a detainer

against the prisoner because the warrants were left at the request of

the South Carolina police, they weren’t provided to correctional

officers, and they didn’t contain a request that South Carolina hold

the prisoner at the completion of his sentence or notify the District

of Columbia of the prisoner’s imminent release); United States v.

Fulford, 825 F.2d 3, 10-11 (3d Cir. 1987) (An arrest warrant wasn’t

considered a detainer because it wasn’t directed to the institution in

which the prisoner was confined and, therefore, “cannot fairly be

considered notice to the institution’s officials.”); Barney, ¶¶ 7-8, 189

P.3d at 1279 (a Utah arrest warrant wasn’t a detainer because it

hadn’t been sent to the Montana State Prison, where the prisoner

was in custody, and the Utah officials hadn’t requested that the

prison either hold the prisoner or inform them of his imminent

release); cf. Yellen, 704 P.2d at 308, 311 (reversing the district

court’s dismissal of a case for violations of the UMDDA because,

16
while the superintendent of the institution in which the prisoner

was serving a sentence was aware of the pending charges in

another jurisdiction, no “warrant” or “detainer” had been filed with

the institution).

¶ 32 To be clear, we don’t suggest that an arrest warrant can never

constitute a detainer but only that the issuance of the warrant, by

itself, is insufficient to meet the definition of a detainer for IAD

purposes. See Tucker, 569 A.2d at 165 n.5.

¶ 33 Spomer recognizes the above authority but argues that, if an

arrest warrant isn’t considered a detainer in this case, we create a

loophole that would undermine the IAD. As an example, he posits

that, where, like here, a prisoner in out-of-state custody has

pending charges in two Colorado judicial districts and the criminal

justice agency from judicial district “B” lodges a detainer on its

pending charges, the criminal justice agency from judicial district

“A” can obtain the benefit of, but not invoke or assume the burden

of, the IAD. This is so, Spomer argues, because “[a]n arrest warrant

from district A, even if limited to Colorado, all but guarantees that

once the [prisoner] is back in Colorado because of district B’s

detainer, the [prisoner] will eventually be brought to district A.”

17
Spomer asserts that, because of district A’s decision not to file a

detainer, the prisoner would encounter the very problems that the

IAD is intended to alleviate — such as defending their case long

after the charges had been filed, losing their ability to preserve

evidence, and losing the opportunity to obtain concurrent

sentencing — with no means of availing himself of the IAD’s

safeguards.

¶ 34 Spomer isn’t wrong that declining his broad interpretation of

“detainer” creates a risk that a jurisdiction with an open arrest

warrant for a defendant being detained out-of-state will reap the

benefits of another in-state jurisdiction lodging a detainer without

the burdens associated with doing so itself. We even agree that the

circumstances Spomer presents to us seem to manifest the risk

that his hypothetical posits. But we aren’t persuaded that the risks

presented by Spomer’s hypothetical, or even his cases’ underlying

facts, warrant interpreting “detainer” as he urges or constitute an

IAD violation or a subversion of its purpose.

¶ 35 Importantly, the IAD doesn’t require a criminal justice agency

to file a detainer on pending, untried charges against a prisoner in

out-of-state custody. Fex, 507 U.S. at 50 n.4. And when a detainer

18
is filed, “[t]he applicability of the IAD is specifically limited to

charges on the basis of which detainers have been filed.” People v.

Campbell, 742 P.2d 302, 306 (Colo. 1987); see also Newton, 764

P.2d at 1184, 1189 (where a prisoner in out-of-state custody had

charges pending in two separate cases from Adams County, the IAD

applied only to the one case listed in the detainer and not to the

other case).

¶ 36 Moreover, the purpose of the IAD is to address the problems

resulting from the filing of a detainer, and issues related to pending

charges on which a detainer isn’t filed fall outside of the IAD’s

reach. See People v. Higinbotham, 712 P.2d 993, 997 (Colo. 1986)

(“[T]he primary purpose of . . . the [IAD] is to provide a mechanism

for prisoners to insist upon speedy and final disposition of untried

charges that are the subjects of detainers . . . .”) (emphasis added);

Harter, 216 P.3d at 609; see also Campbell, 742 P.2d at 307 (While

“[m]any of the same adverse effects that attend the filing of a

detainer are also presented by the existence of untried charges even

in the absence of a detainer,” “these concerns are expressly placed

outside the purview of the IAD by its language requiring the filing of

a detainer to trigger the statute’s applicability.”).

19
¶ 37 Finally, we are persuaded by People v. Greenwald, 704 P.2d

312 (Colo. 1985), where the Colorado Supreme Court faced a

factual scenario similar to Spomer’s hypothetical and declined to

apply the IAD. While the opinion in Greenwald didn’t answer the

question posed in this appeal, we find its legal analysis instructive.

¶ 38 In Greenwald, the defendant was incarcerated in Oregon while

he had two pending criminal cases in Jefferson County and a

pending criminal case in Arapahoe County. Id. at 314. The

Jefferson County prosecutor lodged a detainer with the Oregon

custodial institution. Id. After the defendant was released on

parole from his Oregon sentence, he was returned to Jefferson

County. Id. Upon learning that the defendant was in custody in

Jefferson County, the Arapahoe County prosecutor obtained a writ

of habeas ad prosequendum, and the defendant was brought to

Arapahoe County in connection with the pending charges there. Id.

at 314-15.

¶ 39 The defendant filed motions to dismiss in all three cases for

IAD violations. Id. at 315. Two divisions of the Jefferson County

District Court granted the motions and dismissed the cases in that

jurisdiction. Id. The Arapahoe County District Court also granted

20
the motion and dismissed its case, finding that the IAD applied to

the charges pending against the defendant in its jurisdiction. Id.

¶ 40 The Colorado Supreme Court upheld the dismissal of the

Jefferson County cases because the detainer lodged by the

Jefferson County prosecutor triggered application of the IAD to

those charges, and the Oregon custodial officials failed to comply

with their obligations by not advising the defendant of his right to

request a final disposition of the Jefferson County charges

underlying the detainer. Id. But the supreme court reversed the

Arapahoe County case’s dismissal, concluding that “the Arapahoe

County charges were not subject to the [requirements of the IAD]

because those charges did not underlie a detainer previously lodged

against the defendant.” Id. at 316.

¶ 41 The supreme court held that, even though “the defendant’s

presence in Colorado was achieved by means of provisions of the

IAD,” the IAD didn’t apply to the Arapahoe County charges because

“the proceedings relating to his return to Colorado were concerned

solely with charges pending in Jefferson County” and “the

proceedings giving rise to the filing of the detainer against the

defendant related to Jefferson County.” Id. The court noted that,

21
unlike the Jefferson County cases, “[t]he Arapahoe County

proceedings were made possible by . . . [the defendant’s] return to

the Arapahoe County District Court . . . as a result of the issuance

of a writ of habeas corpus ad prosequendum to authorities who had

custody of him.” Id.; see also Mauro, 436 U.S. at 361 (“[A] writ of

habeas corpus ad prosequendum is not a detainer for purposes of

the [IAD].”).

¶ 42 So we aren’t persuaded that it would violate or undermine the

purposes of the IAD to determine the arrest warrant in Spomer’s

Jefferson County case wasn’t a detainer. Instead, we conclude that

the district court abused its discretion by dismissing the case

against Spomer because its findings that the arrest warrant was a

detainer that triggered application of the IAD and that the IAD had

been violated was a misapplication of the law. Because of our

holding, we don’t reach the People’s alternative contention that the

court erred by finding that the IAD violations required the dismissal

of the case against Spomer.

¶ 43 Lastly, we decline Spomer’s invitation to affirm the district

court’s dismissal of the case on the alternative basis that his

constitutional rights had been violated. Because the district court

22
didn’t rule on this issue, it should be addressed on remand in the

first instance. See LTCPRO, LLC v. Johnson, 2024 COA 123, ¶¶ 46-

47 (declining to address issues in the first instance on appeal

because, “[i]n light of [its] ruling, the district court did not consider”

or make factual findings on those issues, and “[a]lthough we have

discretion to affirm on any ground supported by the record, ‘we are

a court of review, not of first view’” (quoting Doe v. Wellbridge Club

Mgmt. LLC, 2022 COA 137, ¶ 31)).

IV. Disposition

¶ 44 We reverse the district court’s judgment of dismissal and

remand the case to the district court to reinstate the charges and

consider Spomer’s contention that his constitutional rights were

violated.

JUDGE BROWN and JUDGE HAWTHORNE concur.

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