Peo v. Eden

21CA1446 Peo v Eden 04-03-2025

COLORADO COURT OF APPEALS

Court of Appeals No. 21CA1446
San Miguel County District Court No. 17CR30
Mesa County District Court No. 21CR192
Honorable Keri A. Yoder, Judge
Honorable Gretchen B. Larson, Judge

The People of the State of Colorado,

Plaintiff-Appellee,

v.

Ika Eden,

Defendant-Appellant.

JUDGMENT AFFIRMED

Division III
Opinion by JUDGE TOW
Dunn and Taubman*, JJ., concur

NOT PUBLISHED PURSUANT TO C.A.R. 35(e)
Announced April 3, 2025

Philip J. Weiser, Attorney General, Erin K. Grundy, First Assistant Attorney
General, Denver, Colorado, for Plaintiff-Appellee

Casey J. Mulligan, Alternate Defense Counsel, Boulder, Colorado, for
Defendant-Appellant

*Sitting by assignment of the Chief Justice under provisions of Colo. Const. art.
VI, § 5(3), and § 24-51-1105, C.R.S. 2024.
¶1 Defendant, Ika Eden, appeals the judgment of conviction

entered following jury verdicts finding her guilty of two counts of

child abuse resulting in death. We affirm.

I. Background

¶2 Evidence at trial demonstrated the following.

¶3 Eden was a member of a small religious group, which included

three other adults and two children.1 The two children were the

biological children of one of the other members. With the

permission of a local farmer, Eden and the group settled on the

farmer’s land. In 2017, the leader of the group determined that the

spirits of the two children were impure. The leader banished the

children to a car on the property and forbade the other members to

give the children food or water. The bodies of the children were

discovered after a neighbor contacted the police.

¶4 Eden was charged with two counts of child abuse resulting in

death.2 The jury found her guilty on both counts. The court

1 The group consisted of two additional children, who are the

biological children of the group’s leader and who have no bearing on
this proceeding.
2 Other members of the group were also charged in the deaths of

the children and were tried separately.

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sentenced Eden, on each count, to forty-eight years in the custody

of the Department of Corrections to be served consecutively.

II. Competency to Proceed to Trial

¶5 Eden argues that the trial court erred by determining that she

was competent to proceed to trial. We disagree.

A. Standard of Review

¶6 “We review a trial court’s competency determination for an

abuse of discretion.” People v. Mondragon, 217 P.3d 936, 939 (Colo.

App. 2009). “A trial court abuses its discretion where its decision is

manifestly arbitrary, unreasonable, or unfair or where it applies an

incorrect legal standard.” Id. (citation omitted). Abuse of discretion

is a deferential standard of review that “serves to discourage an

appellate court from second-guessing [a trial court’s decisions]

based on a cold record.” Carrillo v. People, 974 P.2d 478, 486 (Colo.

1999). “To say that a court has discretion in resolving [an] issue

means that it has the power to choose between two or more courses

of action and is therefore not bound in all cases to select one over

the other.” People v. Milton, 732 P.2d 1199, 1207 (Colo. 1987).

¶7 “Subjecting a defendant to trial when [they are] incompetent

violates the defendant’s right to due process.” Mondragon, 217 P.3d

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at 939. A defendant is “[i]ncompetent to proceed” if, “as a result of

a mental disability . . . , the defendant does not have sufficient

present ability to consult with the defendant’s lawyer with a

reasonable degree of rational understanding in order to assist in the

defense.” § 16-8.5-101(12), C.R.S. 2024. Alternatively, a defendant

is incompetent to proceed, when “as a result of a mental

disability . . . , the defendant does not have a rational and factual

understanding of the criminal proceedings.” Id. A mental disability

“means a substantial disorder of thought, mood, perception, or

cognitive ability that results in marked functional disability,

significantly interfering with adaptive behavior.” § 16-8.5-101(15).

¶8 Once a defendant is deemed incompetent, “the party asserting

that the defendant is competent has the burden of proof by a

preponderance of the evidence.” § 16-8.5-113(6), C.R.S. 2024.

Upon the party’s timely request, the court must hold a restoration

hearing at which “the court shall determine whether the defendant

is restored to competency.” § 16-8.5-113(5)-(6). To make a proper

competency determination, the court must decide whether the

defendant has “both a factual understanding and cognitive ability

and perceptions and understandings that are rational and

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grounded in reality.” Mondragon, 217 P.3d at 941. “Thus, a

defendant’s factual understanding of the proceedings[;] proper

orientation as to time, place, and person[;] and [their] ability to

furnish accurately information as to [their] past history and the

events at issue are not alone sufficient to establish the defendant’s

competence.” Id. at 940.

B. Additional Background

¶9 In March 2018, shortly after Eden’s arraignment, defense

counsel requested the trial court order Eden to undergo a

competency evaluation. Dr. Dawn Dawson conducted the

examination and found that Eden did “not have a mental disability”

and that she was, at that time, “competent to proceed to trial.”

After a hearing, without objection from either party, the trial court

found Eden competent to proceed.

¶ 10 A few months later, the prosecution requested another

competency evaluation based on writings discovered in Eden’s jail

cell. Those writings included assertions about her spirit, the spirits

of the children, and the spirits of the judge and lawyers involved in

her case. For example, Eden claimed that she was “the first of

[Yahweh’s] creation” and that she was “6,384,964 years old.” She

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also wrote that the children placed in the car were “the two Headed

dragon,” that “in one of their reincarnation[s,] . . . had randomly

kidnapped eight (8) children for the sole pleasure of watching [them]

die of hunger and starvation” and that their death in the car was

“judgement [sic] that was meted out to their consciousness.”

¶ 11 The trial court granted the prosecution’s request and

Dr. Dawson again evaluated Eden. This time, Dr. Dawson found

that “Eden has a mental illness,” that “her writings are delusional,”

and that she portrayed a “grandiose tone that [indicates] a possible

mood disorder.” Dr. Dawson concluded that Eden was incompetent

to proceed to adjudication.

¶ 12 Eden was committed to the Colorado Mental Health Institute

in Pueblo (CMHIP)3 for restoration treatment, where she underwent

five competency evaluations with Dr. Katherine Reis over the course

of fourteen months. In each evaluation, Dr. Reis deemed Eden

incompetent to proceed and diagnosed her with “Rule/Out

Delusional Disorder,” which Dr. Reis explained meant she was

3 We recognize that, as of 2022, CMHIP underwent a name change

and is now known as the Colorado Mental Health Hospital in Pueblo
(CMHHIP). We will refer to it by its name at the time of Eden’s
inpatient stay.

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unable to “rule in or out” whether Eden’s beliefs were in fact

delusional. Because Dr. Reis was no longer making progress with

Eden, she requested that a new psychologist take over the case.

¶ 13 Dr. Nicole Glover completed the next competency evaluation.

Her report noted that Eden’s treating psychiatrist, Dr. Graham

Hoffman, “removed the diagnosis of delusional disorder”; that Eden

appeared to have a factual and rational understanding of the legal

proceedings against her; and that any decision to express her

religious convictions to the court were “more likely volitional choices

to convey her philosophies, as opposed to an inability to control her

behavior.” Dr. Glover concluded that Eden did not have a mental

disability and was competent to proceed to adjudication.

¶ 14 Defense counsel timely requested an additional competency

evaluation. Dr. Sarah Lukens conducted the final competency

evaluation. Dr. Lukens found that while Eden “has a reasonable

understanding of court processes and the allegations against her,

her delusional ideation interferes with her rational

decision-making.” Dr. Lukens further opined that “because of

[Eden’s] delusional disorder, she does not think rationally regarding

the present legal matter despite her adequate factual knowledge.”

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Dr. Lukens concluded that Eden did have a mental disability and

was incompetent to proceed to adjudication.

¶ 15 The trial court scheduled a restoration hearing, and over the

course of two days, heard testimony from Dr. Glover, Dr. Lukens,

and Dr. Reis. The court also reviewed the competency reports

submitted by the testifying witnesses, as well as Eden’s CMHIP

records. Based on all this information, the trial court found “Dr.

Glover’s opinion [to be] the most reliable” and that it was consistent

with Dr. Hoffman’s opinion. The court concluded that Eden “does

not suffer from a diagnosable delusional disorder, but, rather, that

she holds extreme religious beliefs” and that Eden’s “persistence in

applying her beliefs to the facts in this case demonstrates her

unwillingness, rather than her inability, to hold a rational

understanding of the proceedings.” The court found Eden

competent to proceed to trial.

C. Analysis

¶ 16 Eden contends the trial court found her competent because

she did not have a diagnosable mental disorder. This argument

misconstrues the court’s findings. While the court referred to the

diagnostic criteria for “delusional disorder,” see Am. Psychiatric

7
Ass’n, Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders 90 (5th

ed. 2013), it did so because “the only suggested mental disability

that [Eden] may suffer from is delusional disorder.”

See § 16-8.5-101(12).

¶ 17 According to the trial court, one of the challenges presented by

Eden’s case was “differentiating delusional disorder from radicalized

religious or political beliefs.” Dr. Reis maintained her “Rule/Out

Delusional Disorder” diagnosis because “Eden’s delusions could not

be disproven[, and] there was diagnostic uncertainty.” Under these

circumstances, the only possible mental disability Eden may have

had was a delusional disorder. But the testifying psychologists

differed as to whether Eden suffered from delusions.

¶ 18 It was, therefore, within the trial court’s province to weigh the

competing expert views. See People v. Wright, 648 P.2d 665, 668

(Colo. 1982) (“Where expert testimony is in conflict, the resolution of

the conflict and the weight to be given to the testimony is solely the

province of the trier of fact.”). Having considered the competing

views, the trial court found that Eden’s views were “extreme

religious beliefs” rather than a “delusional disorder.” Accordingly,

the court concluded that Eden did not have a mental disorder and,

8
based on this conclusion and not the lack of any official diagnosis,

determined that she was competent to proceed.

¶ 19 Eden also argues that the trial court improperly based its

finding of competence on its visual observation of Eden’s behavior

in the courtroom. Relying on Lafferty v. Cook, Eden argues that

“the physical demeanor of a person suffering from a paranoid

delusional system sheds no light on the extent to which [their]

defense decisions are driven by a deluded perception of reality.”

949 F.2d 1546, 1555 (10th Cir. 1991). Specifically, she contends

that “the court’s visual observation of Eden’s behavior provided no

information about whether she had a reasonable degree of rational

understanding so that she could assist in her defense.”

¶ 20 We first note that the language Eden quotes from Lafferty is

not that of the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals but that of an expert

who had provided uncontroverted testimony in that case. While the

court ultimately accepted this premise in Lafferty, it did so while

“recogniz[ing] that a defendant’s trial demeanor may in some cases

constitute relevant evidence on the issue of competency.” Id.

¶ 21 Moreover, we are not bound by the decisions of federal courts

of appeal. People v. Barber, 799 P.2d 936, 940 (Colo. 1990) (“Lower

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federal courts do not have appellate jurisdiction over state courts

and their decisions are not conclusive on state courts . . . .”). And

previous divisions of this court have held that a trial judge’s

observations of a defendant’s actions and demeanor may properly

influence a competency determination. See People v. Morino, 743

P.2d 49, 52 (Colo. App. 1987) (holding a trial judge who “has had

the opportunity [to] observ[e] [the] defendant, [their] actions,” and

their “general demeanor,” has discretion in determining whether

competency was successfully raised). Here, the trial court noted

that during in-person hearings, Eden “worked cooperatively with

[her counsel]” and “spoke with her counsel in a congenial way and

conferred with them during their questioning.” This, in

combination with the expert testimony that Eden knew what was

happening during these legal proceedings and understood her

charges, is sufficient to support a finding that she could consult

with her lawyer with a reasonable degree of rational understanding

and was competent to proceed. See § 16-8.5-101(12).

¶ 22 In any event, the issue in Lafferty was the relevance of the

behavior of “a person suffering from a paranoid delusional system.”

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949 F.2d at 1555. As noted, the trial court determined that Eden

did not suffer from delusions. Thus, Lafferty is inapposite.

¶ 23 Finally, Eden contends that “[m]ost of the evidence at the

restoration hearing supported a finding of incompetence.” But as

we have noted, it was for the trial court to select between the

competing views of the experts. See Wright, 648 P.2d at 668. And

because the experts gave differing views regarding Eden’s

competence, the trial court had the discretion “to choose between

two or more courses of action.” Milton, 732 P.2d at 1207. Thus, it

was within the court’s discretion to credit Dr. Glover’s conclusion

and find Eden competent to proceed.

III. Competency to Waive Counsel

¶ 24 Eden argues that the trial court erred by finding her

competent to waive her right to counsel. We disagree.

A. Standard of Review and Applicable Law

¶ 25 Criminal defendants have a constitutional right to represent

themselves. See U.S. Const. amends. VI, XIV; Colo. Const. art. II,

§ 16. “A defendant must validly waive [their] constitutional right to

counsel to exercise the right to self-representation.” People v.

Davis, 2015 CO 36M, ¶ 15. “[A] defendant validly waives the[ir]

11
right to counsel if [they] (1) [are] competent to waive the right, and

(2) make[] the waiver voluntarily, knowingly, and intelligently.” Id.

¶ 26 Under the first prong, a defendant who is competent to

proceed to trial is competent to waive their right to counsel. Id. at

¶ 16.

¶ 27 As to the second prong, “[a] ‘voluntary’ waiver . . . is one that

‘was not extracted by threats or violence, promises, or undue

influence.’” Id. at ¶ 18 (quoting People v. Smith, 716 P.2d 1115,

1118 (Colo. 1986)). A waiver is knowing and intelligent when “the

defendant understands ‘the nature of the charges, the statutory

offenses included within them, the range of allowable punishments

thereunder, possible defenses to the charges and circumstances in

mitigation thereof, and all other facts essential to a broad

understanding of the whole matter.’” People v. Arguello, 772 P.2d

87, 94 (Colo. 1989) (quoting Von Moltke v. Gillies, 332 U.S. 708, 724

(1948) (plurality opinion)).

¶ 28 “The trial court has the responsibility of ensuring the validity

of a waiver by properly advising the accused.” Id. at 95. The court

must consider a defendant’s decision to waive counsel based on the

totality of the circumstances. Davis, ¶¶ 18-20. This includes

12
considering evidence of a defendant’s mental illness and whether it

has influenced their decision to waive counsel in such a manner

that said waiver is not voluntary, knowing, or intelligent. Id.

¶ 29 “Whether a defendant effectively waived the right to counsel,

and therefore can exercise the right to self-representation, is a

mixed question of fact and law.” People v. Lavadie, 2021 CO 42,

¶ 22. “[W]e ‘accept the trial court’s findings of historic fact if those

findings are supported by competent evidence, but we assess the

legal significance of the facts de novo.’” Id. (quoting People v. Coke,

2020 CO 28, ¶ 10).

B. Additional Background

¶ 30 In June 2018, a few weeks after the court found Eden

competent to proceed following Dr. Dawson’s first evaluation,

Eden’s counsel moved to continue her trial beyond the speedy trial

date because counsel had not yet retained a rebuttal expert.

Though Eden initially refused to waive her right to speedy trial, she

ultimately agreed to do so, and the court granted the motion.

¶ 31 The following day, Eden submitted a written request asking

that she be allowed to represent herself. Eden indicated that she

wished to participate in the proceedings pro se because she did not

13
believe it was necessary to wait for an expert witness in order “to

prove [that she] is not guilty of the charges stipulated.” Upon

completion of an Arguello advisement, the court found Eden

competent to waive her constitutional right to counsel and that her

waiver was voluntary, knowing, and intelligent.

¶ 32 After Dr. Dawson completed the second competency

evaluation, the trial court concluded that Eden was “not currently

competent to waive her right to an attorney,” reappointed her

previous counsel, and ordered restoration services.

¶ 33 In March 2021, following the court’s renewed finding that

Eden was competent to proceed to trial, Eden once again requested

that she be allowed to waive her right to counsel and proceed pro

se. The trial court conducted another Arguello advisement, during

which it clarified what would be expected of Eden should she

choose to represent herself. The court also confirmed that Eden

was not under the influence of any mind-altering substances, that

she was thinking clearly, and that her decision to proceed pro se

was not based on pressure or coercion. Eden agreed to have

advisory counsel appointed to assist her. Having properly advised

Eden, the court found that “Eden knowingly, voluntarily, and

14
intelligently waive[d] her right to counsel” and that, while it “may

have concerns about her decision to proceed pro se,” it was

“ultimately her right to represent herself.”

¶ 34 Eden’s presentation of her case centered around her religious

beliefs. She relayed to the jury that this was “cosmic case number

one”; that the children’s spirits “were not of the house of light”; and

that this trial was “unsealing the Book of Daniel and Revelation,”

along with other religious references. As noted, the jury found

Eden guilty on both counts.

C. Analysis

¶ 35 Because we find no error in the trial court’s determination that

Eden was competent to stand trial, we necessarily conclude that

she was also competent to waive her right to counsel. See Davis,

¶ 17. We turn, then, to whether Eden voluntarily, knowingly, and

intelligently waived her right to counsel.

¶ 36 Eden argues that her mental health issues prevented her from

voluntarily, knowingly, and intelligently waiving her right to

counsel. Specifically, Eden points to her writings, which she

characterizes as “replete with bizarre delusions,” and her later

presentation of her defense to the jury, which consisted of her

15
firmly held spiritual beliefs and their relation to the case at hand,

as evidence of her mental health issues rendering her unable to

represent herself effectively.

¶ 37 But the trial court found that Eden’s views were not indicative

of mental illness but, rather, were “extreme religious beliefs.” In

other words, the court found that Eden did not suffer from a mental

illness. And we have discerned no error in that determination.

¶ 38 Of course, even a defendant who is competent to proceed to

trial may nevertheless have mental health issues, and those mental

health issues would be relevant to the court’s consideration of

whether a waiver of counsel is voluntary, knowing, and intelligent.

Id. at ¶¶ 19-20. But, other than Eden’s religious beliefs — which,

again, the trial court found (with record support) did not give rise to

a mental health concern — Eden points to nothing in the record

that would indicate she has any mental health issues.

¶ 39 The gist of Eden’s claim is essentially that her waiver was not

wise. “But in this context, ‘intelligently’ does not refer to the

wisdom of the waiver; rather, the court must honor a defendant’s

request to self-represent if it is satisfied that [the] defendant knows

16
what . . . she is doing and understands the consequences.” People

v. Johnson, 2015 COA 54, ¶ 18.

¶ 40 Here, the court asked Eden several questions to determine

why she was choosing to waive her right to counsel. Eden

responded that she felt that her “strategy” was something that the

defense counsel would be unwilling to adopt. This stance is

consistent with Eden’s first request to proceed pro se in 2018, when

she noted that her desire to represent herself stemmed from her

need to explain “what happened and why” and that her truth was

all she needed to convey at trial.

¶ 41 A trial court cannot stop a defendant from invoking their

constitutional right to self-representation, and consequently waiving

their right to counsel, simply because the defendant wishes to

adopt an inadvisable defense strategy. See id. Eden clearly stated

that her waiver was based on her need to share her story with the

jury. When asked by the court, Eden also confirmed that this

decision was not based on “any sort of pressure or coercion” but

rather was her “desire from the first.” See id. at ¶ 23 (holding that a

defendant’s unequivocal request to represent themself, on which

the defendant never wavered or vacillated, weighs heavily in favor of

17
allowing the defendant to proceed pro se). Eden stated that she

understood the charges, the prison sentences she faced should she

be found guilty, her constitutional right to remain silent, and other

legal practices at her disposal during trial.

¶ 42 Eden’s answers were sufficient for the trial court to find that

her waiver was voluntary, knowing, and intelligent. And, even when

considered under the totality of the circumstances, there is no

indication that Eden’s alleged mental health issues interfered with

her understanding of the case. Cf. Davis, ¶ 20 (holding the trial

court should consider whether a defendant’s mental illness

“prevent[s] [them] from broadly understanding the charges,

punishments, defenses, and other essential facts of the case”).

¶ 43 Finally, relying on People v. Romero, 694 P.2d 1256, 1265

(Colo. 1985), Eden contends that the court “failed to monitor the

proceedings to ensure that they did not become so fundamentally

unfair as to result in a denial of due process.” However, in Romero,

the supreme court held that the defendant’s participation in all

phases of the trial was sufficient so as to not be considered a

violation of the defendant’s due process rights. Id. at 1266. Eden

participated in the trial proceedings, and while her approach may

18
have been unconventional, it is not within the purview of this court

to hold that a defendant may not proceed pro se solely based on

their defense strategy or lack of technical legal skill. See Johnson,

¶¶ 18, 22.

¶ 44 Furthermore, despite Eden’s argument otherwise, there was

no indication that she was no longer competent to proceed during

the trial. Eden’s extreme religious beliefs were the primary reason

she chose to proceed pro se, and her “persistence in applying her

beliefs to the facts in this case demonstrate[d] her unwillingness,

rather than her inability, to hold a rational understanding of the

proceedings.” See supra Part I.B.

¶ 45 Because Eden was competent to waive her right to counsel,

her waiver of the right to counsel was valid so long as it was

voluntary, knowing, and intelligent. In light of the trial court’s

advisement and its subsequent findings, we agree with the court

that Eden’s waiver satisfied these requirements.

IV. Disposition

¶ 46 The judgment is affirmed.

JUDGE DUNN and JUDGE TAUBMAN concur.

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