Peo in Interest of ZJJL

24CA1309 Peo in Interest of ZJJL 03-27-2025

COLORADO COURT OF APPEALS

Court of Appeals No. 24CA1309
Weld County District Court Nos. 20JV486 & 21JV89
Honorable Anita J. Crowther, Judge

The People of the State of Colorado,

Appellee,

In the Interest of Z.J.J.L., Y.C., J.L., and Y.L-N., Children,

and Concerning E.L., and R.L.L.,

Appellants.

JUDGMENT AFFIRMED

Division III
Opinion by JUDGE DUNN
Tow and Martinez*, JJ., concur

NOT PUBLISHED PURSUANT TO C.A.R. 35(e)
Announced March 27, 2025

Bruce T. Barker, County Attorney, David S. Anderson, Assistant County
Attorney, Greeley, Colorado, for Appellee

Josi McCauley, Guardian Ad Litem, for Z.J.J.L. and Y.C.

Josi McCauley, Counsel for Youth, Superior, Colorado, for J.L. and Y.L-N.

The Morgan Law Office, Kristofr P. Morgan, Colorado Springs, Colorado, for
Appellant E.L.

Lindsey Parlin, Office of Respondent Parents’ Counsel, Denver, Colorado, for
Appellant R.L.L.
*Sitting by assignment of the Chief Justice under provisions of Colo. Const. art.
VI, § 5(3), and § 24-51-1105, C.R.S. 2024.
¶1 In this consolidated dependency and neglect proceeding, E.L.

(mother) and R.L.L. (father) appeal the juvenile court’s judgment

terminating their parent-child legal relationships with Y.L-N., Y.C.,

J.L., and Z.J.J.L. (the children). We affirm.

I. Background

¶2 In 2020, the Weld County Department of Human Services

became involved with the family due to concerns about domestic

violence and the parents’ substance use. The Department filed a

petition in dependency and neglect for Y.L-N., Y.C., and J.L. The

juvenile court adjudicated those children dependent or neglected

and adopted treatment plans for the parents.

¶3 During the pendency of that case, mother gave birth to

Z.J.J.L. The Department then filed a petition in dependency and

neglect for Z.J.J.L. due to continuing concerns about the parents’

substance use. The juvenile court adjudicated Z.J.J.L. dependent

or neglected and entered additional treatment plans for the parents.

¶4 The Department later moved to terminate mother’s and

father’s parental rights to the children. After a three-day hearing,

the juvenile court granted the motion.

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II. Reasonable Efforts

¶5 The parents assert that the juvenile court erred by finding that

the Department made reasonable efforts to rehabilitate them and

reunify their family. We disagree.

A. Legal Principles and Standard of Review

¶6 Before the juvenile court may terminate parental rights under

section 19-3-604(1)(c), C.R.S. 2024, a department must make

reasonable efforts to rehabilitate the parents and reunite the family.

§§ 19-1-103(114), 19-3-208, 19-3-604(2)(h), C.R.S. 2024.

Reasonable efforts mean the “exercise of diligence and care” to

reunify parents with their children. § 19-1-103(114).

¶7 Services provided in accordance with section 19-3-208 satisfy

the reasonable efforts standard. § 19-1-103(114). Among other

services, section 19-3-208 requires screenings, assessments, and

individual case plans for the provision of services; home-based

family and crisis counseling; information and referral services to

available public and private assistance resources; family time

services; and placement services. § 19-3-208(2)(b). Other

services — such as transportation assistance, diagnostic and

mental health services, and drug and alcohol treatment

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services — must be provided if the government has sufficient

funding. § 19-3-208(2)(d).

¶8 When evaluating a department’s efforts, the juvenile court

should consider whether the services provided were appropriate to

support the parent’s treatment plan. People in Interest of E.D., 2025

COA 11, ¶ 11. But the parent is ultimately responsible for using

those services to obtain the assistance needed to comply with the

treatment plan, and the court may consider a parent’s

unwillingness to participate in treatment as a factor in determining

whether the department made reasonable efforts. Id. at ¶ 12.

¶9 Whether a department satisfied its obligation to make

reasonable efforts to rehabilitate the parents and reunify the family

is a mixed question of fact and law. People in Interest of A.S.L.,

2022 COA 146, ¶ 8. We review the juvenile court’s factual findings

for clear error but review de novo its legal determination whether a

department satisfied its reasonable efforts obligation. Id.

B. Reasonable Efforts to Rehabilitate Father

¶ 10 Father contends that the Department failed to make

reasonable efforts to rehabilitate him because it didn’t (1) assist him

in modifying the criminal protection order that prevented him from

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contacting the children; (2) facilitate family time by allowing Y.L-N.

and J.L. to refuse visits; or (3) provide family therapy that may have

encouraged Y.L-N. and J.L. to attend family time.

¶ 11 Father cites no authority — and we’re aware of none — that

required the Department to help him modify the criminal protection

order to allow family time with the children. The protection order

was put in place in father’s criminal case after father injured

mother and one of the children. Once the Department learned the

criminal protection order had been lifted, however, it started family

time services for father.

¶ 12 As to family time, though the caseworker and counsel for

youth repeatedly encouraged Y.L-N. and J.L. to participate in family

time, both children refused because they feared father and — given

father’s substance use, history of violence, and difficulty in taking

accountability for his actions — they felt unsafe around him. Both

children also reported that father’s inconsistency with family

time — attending about half of his available visits at the time of

termination — made them feel like father wasn’t prioritizing them

and contributed to their decision to stop attending family time. And

the expert who performed the parent-child interactional assessment

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(PCI) opined that forcing a child to see a parent they did not want to

see, especially in instances of child abuse and neglect, could be

harmful to the child.

¶ 13 Father’s final assertion that the Department failed to provide

recommended family therapy to ensure family time with all the

children isn’t accurate. The PCI recommended therapeutic family

time first, rather than family therapy, because Y.L-N. and J.L. had

refused any type of therapy and, therefore, therapeutic family time

could potentially act as a bridge between family therapy and family

time. Considering those recommendations, the Department

implemented therapeutic family time. But as explained, father

didn’t take full advantage of his family time, and Y.L-N. and J.L.

ultimately refused to attend family time with father, which was

functionally a prerequisite to family therapy.

¶ 14 We therefore agree with the juvenile court that the Department

satisfied its reasonable efforts obligation with respect to father.

C. Reasonable Efforts to Rehabilitate Mother

¶ 15 Mother contends that the Department failed to make

reasonable efforts to rehabilitate her because it (1) didn’t provide

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the appropriate level and time for therapeutic family time; and

(2) allowed Y.N-L. and J.L. to refuse family time.

¶ 16 While the PCI recommended separated therapeutic family time

visits so that each child could meet with mother individually, it

didn’t recommend more frequent visits. In line with the PCI’s

recommendations, the Department coordinated separate

therapeutic family time to occur once a week for two hours. Despite

prolonged supervised family time, the caseworker testified that

mother had not been able to demonstrate that she could meet the

children’s emotional, mental, physical, and developmental needs.

¶ 17 The record also doesn’t support mother’s claim that there were

“no safety concerns” with family time. Y.N-L. stopped attending

family time with mother because he felt unsafe and uncomfortable

with her. Then, during one visit, there was a physical altercation

between mother, Y.C., and J.L. While accounts varied on what

exactly happened, J.L. reported fearing mother and feeling unsafe

around her after the incident. For those reasons, J.L. eventually

refused to attend family time with mother.

¶ 18 And mother’s family time was limited to supervised visits

because she had violated a safety plan and had previously been

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under the influence of illicit substances during family time. The

expert who conducted the PCI also reported that all the children

were “anxious,” “ambivalent,” and “chaotic” during interactions with

mother and that family time with her was “upsetting” and

“dysregulating” to the children.

¶ 19 The caseworker testified that mother was dismissive of

professional advice concerning Z.J.J.L.’s medical condition and did

not understand the gravity of her medical needs (for example,

worsening Z.J.J.L.’s heart condition by feeding her unhealthy foods

that violated her diet plan).

¶ 20 And the expert who performed the PCI and the caseworker

both expressed concerns about forcing children to attend family

time when safety concerns existed. Regarding Y.N-L. specifically,

the caseworker said that “forcing” him to participate in family time

with mother would be “harmful” to his “emotional well-being.”

¶ 21 Thus, we agree with the juvenile court that the Department

satisfied its reasonable efforts obligation with respect to mother.

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III. Fitness Within a Reasonable Time

¶ 22 The parents next contend that the juvenile court erred when it

found that they could not become fit parents within a reasonable

time. We disagree.

A. Legal Principles and Standard of Review

¶ 23 An unfit parent is one whose conduct or condition renders the

parent unable or unwilling to give a child reasonable parental care.

People in Interest of S.Z.S., 2022 COA 133, ¶ 23. At minimum,

reasonable parental care requires the parent to provide nurturing

and safe parenting adequate to meet the child’s physical, emotional,

and mental needs and conditions. Id.

¶ 24 In determining whether a parent’s conduct or condition is

likely to change in a “reasonable time,” the juvenile court may

consider whether any change has occurred during the proceeding,

the parent’s social history, and the chronic or long-term nature of

the parent’s conduct or condition. Id. at ¶ 24.

¶ 25 What constitutes a reasonable time is fact specific and must

be determined by considering the child’s physical, mental, and

emotional needs and conditions. Id. at ¶ 25. A reasonable time is

not an indefinite time. Id. And even when a parent has made

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recent progress on a treatment plan, the court is not required to

give the parent additional time to comply. See id. at ¶ 24.

¶ 26 Whether a juvenile court properly terminated parental rights

presents a mixed question of fact and law, meaning we review the

court’s factual findings for clear error but its legal conclusions de

novo. Id. at ¶ 10.

B. Father’s Fitness

¶ 27 The juvenile court found that father had not complied with his

treatment plan and that he continued to exhibit “the same problems

addressed in the treatment plan without adequate improvement,”

had not improved his relationship with the children, and

“continue[d] to struggle with alcohol use which affects the ability to

care for the children.” Thus, the court found that father was unfit

to parent and could not become fit within a reasonable time.

¶ 28 The record supports the court’s factual findings and fitness

conclusion. Though father engaged in some services, the

caseworker testified that father had minimal compliance with

monitored sobriety; refused to quit drinking alcohol; and failed to

successfully engage in anger management classes, relapse

prevention groups, and individual therapy. At the time of the

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termination hearing, father attended family time only about half of

the time and continued to dismiss professional advice concerning

Z.J.J.L.’s medical condition. The older children consistently

reported they were afraid of him, and Z.J.J.L. was dysregulated

after family time with him.

¶ 29 Beyond that, an expert in parent education and family time

supervision opined that the children needed permanency. And the

caseworker testified she did not believe either parent could become

fit within a reasonable time and that it was in the children’s best

interests to terminate parental rights.

¶ 30 Given this, we agree with the juvenile court that father could

not become fit within a reasonable time.

C. Mother’s Fitness

¶ 31 The juvenile court found that although mother had

substantially complied with her treatment plan, the plan had not

been successful in reuniting the family and that mother exhibited

“the same problems addressed in the treatment plan without

adequate improvement.” Thus, the court found that mother was

unfit to parent and could not become fit within a reasonable time.

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¶ 32 The record supports the court’s factual findings and fitness

conclusion. The evidence shows that mother refused to cooperate

for most of the case, didn’t address her mental health issues,

refused to participate in relapse prevention, had ongoing housing

and employment instability, had not improved her parenting skills,

and had not progressed beyond supervised family time. On top of

that, the older children (who continued to refuse family time with

mother) didn’t trust or feel safe with her, and concerns remained

about mother’s ability to understand and accommodate Z.J.J.L.’s

considerable medical needs. Indeed, at the termination hearing,

mother admitted that she was unable to have the children return to

her care at that time.

¶ 33 And the children needed permanency. The older children’s

case had been ongoing for nearly four years and the youngest’s for

almost three. At the termination hearing, a bonding and

attachment expert testified that the children “need to have some

resolution” so that they do not remain in continuing states of

“dysregulation and anxiety and distress.” The expert further opined

that it was not in the children’s best interests to delay permanency.

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¶ 34 Even so, mother asserts that, considering her substantial

compliance with the treatment plan, she could become fit if given

more time. But the cases had been open for over three years, and

mother had several outstanding areas that she needed to address to

become fit. Under these circumstances, mother’s substantial

compliance with the treatment plan was not sufficient to render her

fit, see People in Interest of T.E.M., 124 P.3d 905, 909 (Colo. App.

2005), nor was the juvenile court required to give her more time to

become fit, see S.Z.S., ¶ 24.

¶ 35 For these reasons, we agree with the juvenile court that

mother could not become fit within a reasonable time.

IV. Disposition

¶ 36 We affirm the judgment.

JUDGE TOW and JUSTICE MARTINEZ concur.

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