Peo v. Peterson

22CA1368 Peo v Peterson 03-27-2025

COLORADO COURT OF APPEALS

Court of Appeals No. 22CA1368
El Paso County District Court Nos. 10CR3801, 10CR877, 12CR3794 &
15CR737
Honorable David A. Gilbert, Judge

The People of the State of Colorado,

Plaintiff-Appellee,

v.

Clinton Anthony Peterson,

Defendant-Appellant.

SENTENCE AFFIRMED

Division IV
Opinion by JUDGE PAWAR
Harris and Grove, JJ., concur

NOT PUBLISHED PURSUANT TO C.A.R. 35(e)
Announced March 27, 2025

Philip J. Weiser, Attorney General, Jaycey DeHoyos, Assistant Attorney
General, Denver, Colorado, for Plaintiff-Appellee

Megan A. Ring, Colorado State Public Defender, Tracy C. Renner, Deputy State
Public Defender, Denver, Colorado, for Defendant-Appellant
¶1 Defendant, Clinton Anthony Peterson, appeals the

indeterminate prison sentence imposed after he pled guilty to

failure to register as a sex offender, resulting in revocation of

probation in three cases. We affirm.

I. Background

¶2 Peterson had been serving a three-year probation sentence

based on two cases in which he was found guilty of vehicular

assault and possession of a prohibited weapon. While on

probation, he pled guilty in a new case to sexual assault on a child

and was placed on sex offender intensive supervised probation for

an indeterminate term of ten years to life. Based on the new

offense, probation in the two prior cases was revoked and

reinstated.

¶3 A year later, the prosecution filed probation revocation

complaints in all three cases, alleging multiple violations, including

frequent alcohol consumption, failure to submit to substance

testing, and failure to obtain substance abuse treatment. Probation

was again revoked and reinstated, and Peterson was sentenced to

ninety days in jail as a condition of probation.

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¶4 Peterson then absconded from probation and fled to Kentucky

with his roommate. The prosecution charged him in a new case

with multiple counts of failure to register as a sex offender. He was

found seven years later and returned to Colorado.

¶5 Peterson pled guilty to failure to register as a sex offender, and

probation was again revoked in his three prior cases. Following a

hearing, the district court sentenced him to eighteen months in the

custody of the Department of Corrections for failure to register, four

years for vehicular assault, and an indeterminate term of eight

years to life for sexual assault on a child.

¶6 Peterson appeals, arguing the district court violated his due

process rights by (1) allowing over a dozen members of the Bikers

Against Child Abuse (BACA) organization to be present at his

sentencing hearing and (2) considering irrelevant evidence

presented by two witnesses at the hearing. He also argues the

court abused its discretion by imposing a lengthy prison sentence

without considering sentencing goals beyond punishment. We

disagree with these arguments and affirm.

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II. Due Process

¶7 Due process requires a district court to maintain a fair

courtroom, dedicated to the equal treatment of the litigants. People

v. Aleem, 149 P.3d 765, 776 (Colo. 2007). It is a flexible standard

that requires balancing a defendant’s constitutional interests and

legitimate government objectives. People v. Pourat, 100 P.3d 503,

505 (Colo. App. 2004). Because a defendant at a sentencing

hearing has already been found guilty, his due process rights are

correspondingly limited. Id.

¶8 We review constitutional challenges to sentencing

determinations de novo. People v. Fritts, 2014 COA 103, ¶ 16.

A. BACA Presence

¶9 Peterson argues his sentencing hearing was fundamentally

unfair because the BACA members created an inherently prejudicial

atmosphere. We disagree.

¶ 10 Defense counsel requested that the district court exclude the

BACA members because they were “dressed as part of a theme as a

biker gang” and were there to intimidate the court and counsel.

The court denied the request because it was a public hearing and,

barring any disruptions or improper conduct, “everyone is

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welcome.” It warned that it would take measures to ensure a fair

process, including dismissing disruptive individuals or, if

necessary, charging them with contempt of court or intimidation.

The court further stated that it was not intimidated by the BACA

members’ presence or attire.

¶ 11 Beyond their mere presence, Peterson does not allege any

actual disruption by the BACA members at the hearing. Based on

this record, and combined with the district court’s findings and

admonishment, we conclude the court properly balanced Peterson’s

interest in a fair hearing against the important governmental

interest in maintaining a public proceeding. See People v. Gonzalez-

Quezada, 2023 COA 124M, ¶ 51 (in addition to supporting a

defendant’s constitutional rights, public proceedings encourage

witnesses to come forward, prevent perjury, and protect the

community’s interest in monitoring the criminal justice system).

¶ 12 The single out-of-state case on which Peterson relies, Long v.

State, 151 So. 3d 498, 501-02 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2014), does not

persuade us otherwise. There, the court concluded that BACA’s

presence at a criminal trial prejudiced the defendant’s right to an

impartial jury because the bikers interacted with jurors before trial,

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sat close to them during trial, and displayed an insignia that was

intended to “send an implied message.” Id. But Peterson had

already been found guilty at the time of sentencing. As the district

court observed, there was therefore no jury and no risk that a jury

would be “faced with lots of buttons or indicators of what side

people were on.”

¶ 13 Moreover, the court explicitly found that it, as the decision

maker at sentencing, was not intimidated by BACA’s presence. And

at the conclusion of the hearing, it thanked everyone in the

courtroom for “allowing everyone to share their information and do

this in a very civil manner.” We therefore conclude Peterson is not

entitled to relief based on BACA’s presence.

B. Witness Statements

¶ 14 Peterson next asserts he was deprived of due process because

the court heard and considered irrelevant, unproven, and

uncharged conduct presented by two witnesses related to his

activity in Kentucky. We are not persuaded.

¶ 15 A district court is largely unconstrained as to the evidence it

may consider during the sentencing phase of criminal proceedings.

People v. Tallwhiteman, 124 P.3d 827, 837 (Colo. App. 2005); see

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also Pourat, 100 P.3d at 505 (rules of evidence are not applicable at

sentencing hearings). While the court may not consider evidence

that is materially untrue, it may consider uncharged conduct in

evaluating the nature of an offense and the character of the

offender. Tallwhiteman, 124 P.3d at 837.

¶ 16 According to a presentence investigation report (PSIR), after

Peterson absconded from probation, he and his roommate became

persons of interest in the disappearance and suspected homicide of

a Kentucky woman named Lori Feltz. Following “a nationwide

manhunt for them,” the pair was found and led authorities to

Feltz’s remains. Peterson was never charged in relation to Feltz’s

disappearance. The PSIR indicated that he had discovered her body

at some point earlier, but he never reported it because it was near

his hideout, and he knew he had a warrant out for his arrest.

¶ 17 Over defense counsel’s repeated objections, the district court

allowed two of Feltz’s sisters to make statements at the sentencing

hearing regarding their beliefs about Peterson. Both sisters stated

that Peterson’s mother — with whom Peterson was living in

Kentucky — lied to the police despite knowing Feltz’s whereabouts,

and that she and Peterson delayed reporting the discovery of Feltz’s

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body, which harmed Feltz’s family and impeded the investigation

into her disappearance. One sister stated her belief that Feltz was

Peterson’s “second known victim.” The other stated outright that

she believed Peterson and his roommate “kidnapped and murdered

our sister,” who would still be alive but for the prior sentencing

judge’s decision not to send Peterson to prison. She further stated

that she had been told “Peterson killed a puppy just to see what it

was like. He was fascinated by torture and death, and he did this.”

¶ 18 First, Peterson argues that the defense was blindsided by the

sisters’ presence and ability to speak at the hearing. But the record

shows that he was aware the Feltz-related evidence could be an

issue at sentencing. The PSIR described his involvement in the

Kentucky investigation, giving defense counsel “notice of the

information the court [was] to consider” and allowing him to contest

it. See People v. Cross, 2023 COA 24, ¶ 45. Indeed, counsel began

the sentencing hearing by factually disputing the Feltz-related

evidence in the report. While the PSIR said nothing about Peterson

killing a puppy, the district court noted counsel’s objection to this

evidence as “outrageously prejudicial hearsay,” and Peterson’s

mother explained in her statement that this claim was made by a

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family member who lacked credibility. In any event, Peterson does

not explain how any lack of notice prejudiced him. See C.A.R. 35(c)

(we may disregard any error or defect not affecting parties’

substantial rights). And given the district court’s statement that it

“clearly [was] not going to be able to consider” any alleged criminal

conduct, we find no prejudice.

¶ 19 Regarding the substance of the sisters’ testimony, we

recognize it was troubling. But we cannot conclude it amounted to

a due process violation. While the district court allowed the sisters

to speak, it repeatedly emphasized that it could not and would not

take unproven homicide claims into consideration. It also found

that the sisters’ statements played “no part whatsoever” in its

sentencing decision. Cf. Liggett v. People, 135 P.3d 725, 733 (Colo.

2006) (holding, in the context of a bench trial, that we presume that

“all incompetent evidence is disregarded by the court in reaching its

conclusions, and the judgment will not be disturbed unless it is

clear that the court could not have reached the result but for the

incompetent evidence”) (citation omitted).

¶ 20 We disagree with Peterson that the time and sympathy the

court gave to the Feltz sisters belies its insistence that their

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statements did not inform its decision. The court carefully

explained that it allowed them to speak as a “courtesy” and because

Peterson’s decision to “hide [himself] away” was the cause of their

worries.1 And as discussed, the court took pains to emphasize that

it would not consider their testimony for any improper purpose. We

therefore conclude the court properly exercised its discretion during

the sentencing phase to allow the sisters to testify and to limit its

consideration of their statements. See Pourat, 100 P.3d at 505 (the

court is granted greater latitude at this stage than at trial).

¶ 21 Peterson also argues that the sisters’ testimony lessened the

mitigating impact of his mother’s statement, because she was

forced to defend against the allegations. But while his mother spent

some of her speaking time at the sentencing hearing defending her

credibility, Peterson doesn’t identify anything she was not able to

say because of the sisters’ testimony. As we read the record, his

mother read the entirety of a prepared statement in support of her

1 Viewed in this context, the court’s later observation that the

offense of sexual assault on a child can cause “a community — in
this case, more than one community” a lifelong harm also properly
focused on the widespread impact of Peterson’s decision to flee
probation for seven years.

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son. Her fiance also gave a statement that she was a truthful

person, despite the “propaganda” created against her. Especially

given the district court’s adamance that it could “take nothing” from

the sisters’ statements for sentencing purposes anyway, we see no

due process violation.

III. Failure to Consider Non-Punishment Sentencing Goals

¶ 22 Finally, we disagree with Peterson’s argument that the court

erred by considering only punitive justifications for his sentence.

¶ 23 Sentencing is a discretionary function, and the district court is

afforded wide latitude in imposing a sentence. People v. Martinez,

179 P.3d 23, 25 (Colo. App. 2007). A court abuses its discretion if

“it fails to consider the nature of the offense, the character and

rehabilitative potential of the offender, the development of respect

for the law and the deterrence of crime, and the protection of the

public.” People v. Linares-Guzman, 195 P.3d 1130, 1137 (Colo.

App. 2008). While it may not unduly emphasize one factor to the

exclusion of the others, it need not engage in a point-by-point

discussion of every factor relevant to its sentencing decision. People

v. Torrez, 2013 COA 37, ¶ 73. “A reasonable explanation for the

sentence will suffice.” Martinez, 179 P.3d at 26.

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¶ 24 We conclude the district court properly exercised its discretion

in imposing the sentence it did. The court acknowledged that an

indeterminate prison sentence is serious and severe. It reasoned

that Peterson’s “abuse of a child in this way is heinous and

unforgivable, and creates a circumstance for a survivor and for a

community that can be lifelong.” It further explained that

Peterson’s probation violation was “probably the most serious

violation of probation that exists,” given that he demonstrated an

inability or unwillingness to engage in treatment “for almost a

decade.”

¶ 25 While Peterson argues the court failed to consider his capacity

for rehabilitation and his need for substance abuse treatment, the

court made specific findings about “the considerable resources” that

were available to him while he was on probation, including

individual and group therapy and substance abuse testing. It

further found that Peterson actively avoided taking advantage of

those resources, despite having “about 2,700 chances” to

rehabilitate himself — one for “every day [he] woke up out of the

jurisdiction and out of treatment.”

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¶ 26 “While rehabilitation is a preferred goal [of sentencing], it is

only one factor which must be considered in tailoring a sentence to

each individual case.” People v. Jordan, 630 P.2d 613, 615 (Colo.

1981) (citation omitted). We conclude the court properly considered

the case before it and determined that certain sentencing factors —

including the severity of Peterson’s crime and his demonstrated

inability to succeed on probation — were more compelling than

others. See Torrez, ¶¶ 74, 77 (court properly exercised discretion to

impose maximum sentence where it set forth reasons for its

decision, analyzed the egregious nature of the crimes, and

determined a harsh sentence was justified). Because the court

provided a reasonable explanation for the sentence it imposed, we

will not disturb its decision.

IV. Disposition

¶ 27 The sentence is affirmed.

JUDGE HARRIS and JUDGE GROVE concur.

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