Marriage of Navarro-Garfio

24CA0428 Marriage of Navarro-Garfio 03-20-2025

COLORADO COURT OF APPEALS

Court of Appeals No. 24CA0428
Weld County District Court No. 22DR1335
Honorable Kimberly B. Schutt, Judge

In re the Marriage of

Irma Felipa Navarro-Garfio,

Appellee,

and

Susano Morales Lopez,

Appellant.

APPEAL DISMISSED

Division VI
Opinion by JUDGE BROWN
Welling and Moultrie, JJ., concur

NOT PUBLISHED PURSUANT TO C.A.R. 35(e)
Announced March 20, 2025

Weibel Zacheis & Greenfield, LLC, Kristin M. Zacheis, Greeley, Colorado, for
Appellee

The Bagley Law Firm, LLC, Brian J. Bagley, Samuel T. Townsend, Lakewood,
Colorado, for Appellant
¶1 Susano Morales Lopez, appeals the district court’s order

affirming the magistrate’s determination that a common law

marriage exists between him and Irma Felipa Navarro-Garfio. We

dismiss the appeal for lack of jurisdiction.

I. Procedural History

¶2 Morales and Navarro-Garfio were in a relationship from 2010

until 2022. In 2022, Navarro-Garfio filed a petition for dissolution

of marriage. Morales filed a motion to dismiss the petition alleging

that a common law marriage could not be established. A magistrate

held a hearing and orally ruled that a common law marriage existed

between the parties. The magistrate did not issue a written, dated,

and signed order, but Morales petitioned the district court for

review of the oral finding of a common law marriage under

C.R.M. 7. The district court adopted the magistrate’s finding, and

Morales Lopez appealed to us.

¶3 After reviewing the briefs in this case, we suspected that we

may not have jurisdiction over this appeal and issued a show cause

order directing Morales to explain why the appeal should not be

dismissed for lack of a final, appealable order. See People v. S.X.G.,

2012 CO 5, ¶ 9 (“Because we must always satisfy ourselves that we

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have jurisdiction to hear an appeal, we may raise jurisdictional

defects sua sponte, regardless of whether the parties have raised

the issue.”). Morales timely filed a response to the show cause

order. After considering the response, we vacated oral arguments.

We now dismiss the appeal.

II. Analysis

¶4 This court only has jurisdiction over appeals from final

judgments. See C.A.R. 1(a); § 13-4-102(1), C.R.S. 2024; see also

Musick v. Woznicki, 136 P.3d 244, 249 (Colo. 2006). A final

judgment “ends the particular action in which it is entered, leaving

nothing further for the court pronouncing it to do except to execute

the judgment.” Musick, 136 P.3d at 249 (citation omitted).

¶5 A finding of common law marriage, by itself, does not

constitute a final judgment or order. In re Marriage of Armstrong,

515 P.2d 1152, 1153 (Colo. App. 1973) (not published pursuant to

C.A.R. 35(f)) (An order determining a common law marriage existed

was not final when “it did not end the suit and decided only one of

the several issues which had to be resolved in connection with the

petition for a decree of dissolution.”). Such a finding is one step in

the process of dissolving a marriage that is followed by the entry of

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permanent orders and a decree of dissolution. See id.; see also

Nguyen v. Lai, 2022 COA 141, ¶¶ 12-14 (dismissing an appeal of a

decree invalidating a marriage for lack of final judgment when the

district court had yet to divide the parties’ property).

¶6 Here, the district court’s order adopting the magistrate’s

finding that a common law marriage existed only resolved one part

of the dispute; it has not entered permanent orders or a decree of

dissolution. Under these circumstances, there is no final judgment

for us to review. See Armstrong, 515 P.2d at 1153; In re Marriage of

Salby, 126 P.3d 291, 294 (Colo. App. 2005).

¶7 In his response to the show cause order, Morales contends

that we should view the magistrate’s finding of a common law

marriage akin to a declaratory judgment claim that can be treated

as a final judgment. See C.R.C.P. 57 (Declaratory judgments “shall

have the force and effect of a final judgment or decree.”). We are

unpersuaded.

¶8 Neither party asserted a claim for declaratory judgment

regarding the status of their marriage. And we decline to adopt

Morales’s argument that such a claim is implied in Navarro-Garfio’s

petition for dissolution of marriage simply because the magistrate

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had to find that a common law marriage existed to proceed to

dissolve the marriage.

¶9 But even if we treated the finding of common law marriage as

a declaratory judgment claim (and assumed such a claim was

proper), we would still not have a final judgment. See Musick, 136

P.3d at 249. To constitute a final judgment in an action involving

multiple claims against multiple parties, an order (or a combination

of orders) must fully and finally resolve all claims against all

parties. See Wolf v. Brenneman, 2024 CO 31, ¶ 10 (“A judgment is

typically not ‘final’ until the court has ruled on all outstanding

claims.”); Kempter v. Hurd, 713 P.2d 1274, 1277 (Colo. 1986)

(“[C]laims adjudicated early in the litigation must await the final

determination of all issues, as to all parties, before a final and

appealable judgment can be obtained.”).

¶ 10 Notably, C.R.C.P. 54(b) permits a court in an action involving

multiple claims against multiple parties to “direct the entry of a

final judgment as to one or more but fewer than all of the claims or

parties” when certain conditions are satisfied. Certification under

C.R.C.P. 54(b) operates as “an exception to the general rule that an

entire case must be decided” before a judgment is final. Harding

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Glass Co. v. Jones, 640 P.2d 1123, 1126 (Colo. 1982). But the

district court did not certify the common law marriage finding as

separately appealable under C.R.C.P. 54(b). And even if it had, we

would have an independent obligation to assess the propriety of

that certification. See Harding Glass Co., 640 P.2d at 1126.

¶ 11 Morales’s reliance on In re Marriage of Best, 886 N.E.2d 939

(Ill. 2008), is misplaced for the same reason. In that case, the court

concluded that a declaratory judgment regarding a premarital

agreement was final and appealable under Illinois Supreme Court

Rule 304(a) although the dissolution of marriage claim remained

pending. See id. at 942-43. But Rule 304(a) operates like C.R.C.P.

54(b) and provides that “an appeal may be taken from a final

judgment as to one or more but fewer than all of the . . . claims only

if the trial court has made an express written finding that there is

no just reason for delaying . . . appeal.” Again, no such certification

exists here.

¶ 12 Morales also cites Stone v. Thompson, 826 S.E.2d 868, 868

(S.C. 2019), which held that a “family court order finding a

common-law marriage was immediately appealable.” But the

governing South Carolina statute grants the appellate court

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jurisdiction over appeals from “[a]ny intermediate judgment, order

or decree in a law case involving the merits in actions.” S.C. Code

Ann. § 14-3-330(1) (2024). In Colorado, the court of appeals does

not have jurisdiction over appeals from an “intermediate judgment,”

id.; we only have jurisdiction over appeals from “a final judgment,”

C.A.R. 1(a). See § 13-4-102(1); Musick, 136 P.3d at 249.

¶ 13 Lastly, because Morales acknowledged the issue in a footnote,

and because the issue is likely to arise on remand, see In re

Marriage of Simon, 856 P.2d 47, 51 (Colo. App. 1993), we note that

the magistrate’s common law marriage finding itself was not a final

order subject to district court review. See C.R.M. 7(a)(3) (“Only a

final order or judgment of a magistrate is reviewable under this

Rule.”). Even if the magistrate’s finding fully resolved the issue of

whether a common law marriage existed, see C.R.M. 7(a)(3) (“A

[magistrate’s] final order or judgment is that which fully resolves an

issue or claim.”) (emphasis added), the magistrate never entered a

written, dated, and signed order, see C.R.M. 7(a)(4) (“A final order or

judgment is not reviewable until it is written, dated, and signed by

the magistrate.”). Thus, the magistrate’s order was not final.

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¶ 14 Although this defect by itself does not deprive us of

jurisdiction to review the district court’s order, see In re Marriage of

Malewicz, 60 P.3d 772, 774 (Colo. App. 2002) (a district court’s

adoption, rejection, or modification of a magistrate’s order creates a

final order for appellate review), the only disposition we could reach

were we to address this appeal on the merits would be to vacate the

district court’s order because it lacked jurisdiction to consider

Morales’s C.R.M. 7 petition.

III. Disposition

¶ 15 The appeal is dismissed.

JUDGE WELLING and JUDGE MOULTRIE concur.

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