Peo in Interest of MC

24CA1378 Peo in Interest of MC 03-20-2025

COLORADO COURT OF APPEALS

Court of Appeals No. 24CA1378
Weld County District Court No. 22JV8
Honorable Anita Crowther, Judge

The People of the State of Colorado,

Appellee,

In the Interest of M.C., a Child,

and Concerning H.C.,

Appellant.

JUDGMENT AFFIRMED

Division II
Opinion by JUDGE FOX
Gomez and Lum, JJ., concur

NOT PUBLISHED PURSUANT TO C.A.R. 35(e)
Announced March 20, 2025

Bruce T, Barker, County Attorney, David S. Anderson, Assistant County
Attorney, Greeley, Colorado, for Appellee

Debra W. Dodd, Guardian Ad Litem

Just Law Group LLC, John F. Poor, Denver, Colorado, for Appellant
¶1 H.C. (mother) appeals the juvenile court’s judgment

terminating her parent-child legal relationship with M.C. (the child).

We affirm.

I. Background

¶2 In January 2022, the Weld County Department of Human

Services received a report that mother, who had been serving a

community corrections sentence in Weld County, could not care for

the newborn child. After an emergency placement hearing, the

court ordered the child into the Department’s temporary legal

custody, and the Department placed him in foster care.

¶3 The Department filed a petition in dependency and neglect.

Mother admitted the petition, and the court adopted a treatment

plan for her. It required her to (1) cooperate with case professionals

and stay in touch with the caseworker; (2) attend all scheduled

family time; (3) complete substance abuse and mental health

evaluations and follow all recommendations; (4) submit to

urinalysis testing; and (5) provide for the child’s basic needs and

maintain appropriate housing.

¶4 Four months after the court adopted her treatment plan,

mother transitioned to the Department of Corrections (DOC). In

1
July 2023, the Department moved to terminate mother’s parental

rights. Two months later, mother was released from DOC and

moved to an El Paso County community corrections facility. She

served two months there before her mandatory release date.

¶5 In July 2024, after a multi-day hearing, the court granted the

Department’s motion and terminated mother’s parental rights.

II. Reasonable Efforts

¶6 Mother asserts that the Department failed to make reasonable

efforts to rehabilitate her and reunify her family. We are not

convinced.

A. Preservation

¶7 The child’s guardian ad litem (GAL) contends mother did not

adequately preserve her reasonable efforts challenge and we

therefore should not consider it. See People in Interest of S.N-V.,

300 P.3d 911, 913 (Colo. App. 2011) (recognizing that divisions of

this court disagree on whether a parent may challenge reasonable

efforts for the first time on appeal). Because the outcome is the

same either way, we consider mother’s arguments. See People in

Interest of A.N-B., 2019 COA 46, ¶ 27.

2
B. Applicable Law and Standard of Review

¶8 Before the juvenile court may terminate parental rights under

section 19-3-604(1)(c), the department must make reasonable

efforts to rehabilitate the parent and reunite the family. §§ 19-1-

103(114), 19-3-100.5(1), 19-3-208, 19-3-604(2)(h), C.R.S. 2024.

“Reasonable efforts” means the “exercise of diligence and care” as to

a child who is in out-of-home placement. § 19-1-103(114). This

standard is satisfied by providing services in accordance with

section 19-3-208. Id.; see also People in Interest of C.T.S., 140 P.3d

332, 335 (Colo. App. 2006). Among the services section 19-3-208

contemplates are screenings, assessments, and individual case

plans for the provision of services; home-based family and crisis

counseling; information and referral services to available public and

private assistance resources; family time services; and placement

services. § 19-3-208(2)(b).

¶9 The services must be “appropriate to support the parent’s

treatment plan.” S.N-V., 300 P.3d at 915. Accordingly, the juvenile

court should “consider[] the totality of the circumstances and

account[] for all services and resources provided to a parent to

3
ensure the completion of the entire treatment plan.” People in

Interest of My.K.M. v. V.K.L., 2022 CO 35, ¶ 33.

¶ 10 The parent is ultimately responsible for using the services to

comply with the plan. People in Interest of J.C.R., 259 P.3d 1279,

1285 (Colo. App. 2011). And the court may consider a parent’s

unwillingness to participate in treatment in determining whether

the department made reasonable efforts. See People in Interest of

A.V., 2012 COA 210, ¶ 12.

¶ 11 Whether a juvenile court properly terminated parental

rights — including whether the department satisfied its obligation

to make reasonable efforts — presents a mixed question of fact and

law because it involves application of the termination statute to

evidentiary facts. See People in Interest of A.M. v. T.M., 2021 CO 14,

¶ 15; see also People in Interest of A.S.L., 2022 COA 146, ¶ 8. The

credibility of witnesses; the sufficiency, probative value, and weight

of the evidence; and the inferences and conclusions to be drawn

from the evidentiary facts are within the juvenile court’s discretion.

People in Interest of S.K., 2019 COA 36, ¶ 41. Thus, we will not set

aside a juvenile court’s factual findings if the record supports them.

Id. But we review the juvenile court’s legal conclusions de novo. Id.

4
C. Mother’s Treatment Plan Services Including Family Time

¶ 12 Mother argues that the Department “roundly failed” to make

reasonable efforts to rehabilitate her. Mother also asserts, more

specifically, that the Department failed to provide appropriate family

time. We perceive no basis for reversal.

¶ 13 The court determined that the Department made reasonable

efforts to support mother’s success with each treatment plan

objective, including family time, but that mother did not engage.

The record supports the court’s findings. For instance, the

Department maintained contact with mother throughout the case —

including monthly visits to DOC during her incarceration — despite

mother’s “volatile” behavior when the caseworker made contact.

Months before the termination hearing, mother tested positive for

drugs; she would have therefore been unsuccessfully discharged

from El Paso County Community Corrections had she not reached

her mandatory release date. Mother participated sporadically in

mental health services throughout the case, making little progress.

She provided the caseworker with no evidence that she could meet

the child’s financial needs. And she testified at the termination

hearing that she had no housing.

5
¶ 14 As for mother’s specific claim regarding family time, we

acknowledge that the record does not clearly show that mother

received family time for twelve months of her DOC incarceration.

Under different circumstances, this scenario would constitute a

lack of reasonable efforts. See People in Interest of A.A., 2020 COA

154, ¶¶ 31-35 (where a juvenile court completely cuts off visitation

between a parent and child without showing how it is necessary to

protect the child, there have not been reasonable efforts pursuant

to section 19-3-604(2)(h)). But “accounting for all services and

resources provided to [mother]” over the course of the case, it is

clear mother was offered family time but did not consistently

engage. See My.K.M., ¶ 33.

¶ 15 Mother’s counsel, at a hearing during this period, appears to

inform the court that she was able to make “little video or phone

visit[s]” happen. Nevertheless, at the termination hearing, the

caseworker testified that virtual visits did not occur during the first

twelve months of mother’s DOC sentence. The caseworker

explained that virtual family time was not “allowed” during this

period even though other virtual services were apparently available

to mother — such as virtual appearance at family team meetings.

6
Again the record is not clear about when or how frequently mother

participated in those other virtual services. Relying on the record of

efforts during this portion of mother’s incarceration alone, we would

conclude that the Department did not make reasonable efforts to

provide mother with family time.

¶ 16 However, the record shows that mother was offered family time

before and after her incarceration, and she did not consistently

attend. For instance, when mother was in Weld County Community

Corrections, she had twice-weekly in-person family time with parent

coaching, supervised at a departmental facility. Mother attended

only approximately half of the more than forty visits offered.

¶ 17 While mother attended family time for the last five months of

her incarceration, she was less consistent in the eight months since

her release, ending visits hours early without warning “four or five”

times. During visits mother was unprepared and unable to manage

the child’s behaviors. The caseworker opined that, as of the

termination hearing, despite having in-person visits with mother

since August 2023, the child had no relationship with mother.

¶ 18 Mother argues that her “tense relationship” with the

caseworker undermined her family time, but she waited more than

7
a month to schedule an intake with a parenting time facility in El

Paso County, which would have ended caseworker-supervised

visits. At the time of the termination hearing, a new family time

supervisor and parent coach had supervised mother’s last three

visits in Colorado Springs, even though the child was in Greeley.

¶ 19 Given this record, which supports the court’s findings and

meets the legal standard, reasonable — if imperfect — efforts were

made to provide mother with family time.

D. Mother’s Other Contentions

¶ 20 We are unpersuaded by mother’s claim that the Department

did not make reasonable efforts to reunify her family when it did

not timely inform her of the date of the child’s ear tube surgery.

Assuming without deciding that this communication was required

under reasonable efforts — mother points to no authority to

indicate that it is — we perceive no basis for reversal. The

caseworker testified that it is the Department’s policy to seek

consent from parents when a child living in foster care needs

surgery. And, while the procedure had been discussed multiple

times during family team meetings, the caseworker admitted that

she did not tell mother about the specific date the child’s surgery

8
was scheduled. Nevertheless, the record indicates that mother

twice consented to the child’s surgery, and that the caseworker

informed mother about the child’s progress during and after the

procedure. Even if this was error, it did not impact the outcome of

the case or impair the basic fairness of the proceeding. See People

in Interest of R.J., 2019 COA 109, ¶ 22.

¶ 21 Mother also argues that the caseworker should have provided

her with parent coaching and anger management therapy. But

mother does not explain how the coaching she received before and

after her incarceration does not constitute parent coaching. Nor

does she explain how access to an anger management course would

have made any difference when she only sporadically engaged with

mental health therapy designed to help her cope with the same

issue.

¶ 22 Mother also claims that she should have been provided a

“Boundaries” course, Trust Based Relational Intervention therapy,

and life skills services. The record shows that the caseworker did

not seek out these treatment options for mother — in part due to

the caseworker’s unfamiliarity with the services or whether they

were offered in El Paso County. But a department has “discretion

9
to prioritize certain services or resources to address a family’s most

pressing needs in a way that will assist the family’s overall

completion of the treatment plan.” My.K.M., ¶ 33. So whether a

department made reasonable efforts “must be measured holistically

rather than in isolation with respect to specific treatment plan

objectives.” Id. at ¶ 35.

¶ 23 Overall, the record supports, and we conclude, that the

Department made reasonable efforts to support mother’s treatment

plan objectives.

III. Less Drastic Alternatives

¶ 24 Mother also argues that the juvenile court erred in concluding

that the maternal grandparents (intervenors) were not a viable less

drastic alternative to termination. Thus, mother contends,

termination was not in the child’s best interest. We perceive no

error.

A. Applicable Law and Standard of Review

¶ 25 Implicit in the statutory criteria for termination is the

requirement that the juvenile court consider and eliminate less

drastic alternatives. People in Interest of M.M., 726 P.2d 1108, 1122

(Colo. 1986). When considering less drastic alternatives, the court

10
must base its decision on the best interests of the child, giving

primary consideration to the child’s physical, mental, and emotional

conditions and needs. § 19-3-604(3).

¶ 26 When deciding whether permanent placement with a relative is

a viable less drastic alternative to termination, the court may

consider various factors, including whether an ongoing relationship

with the parent would be beneficial or detrimental to the child.

People in Interest of A.R., 2012 COA 195M, ¶ 38. “[L]ong-term or

permanent placement with a family member or foster family, short

of termination, may not be a viable less drastic alternative if it does

not provide adequate permanence that adoption would provide or

otherwise meet a child’s needs.” Id. at ¶ 41.

¶ 27 For a less drastic alternative to be viable, it must do more than

“adequately” meet a child’s needs; rather, the less drastic

alternative must be in the child’s best interest. A.M., ¶ 27. If the

court considers a less drastic alternative but finds instead that

termination is in the child’s best interests, it must reject the less

drastic alternative and order termination. Id. at ¶ 32.

¶ 28 When the juvenile court considers the availability of a less

drastic alternative and determines that termination of a parent’s

11
rights would be in the child’s best interests, we are bound to affirm

the court’s decision if its findings enjoy record support. People in

Interest of B.H., 2021 CO 39, ¶ 80.

B. Additional Facts

¶ 29 Days before this case opened, maternal grandparents finalized

their adoption of three children, including one of the child’s older

siblings. At that time, maternal grandmother was protected from

mother by a restraining order. Maternal grandparents intervened

when this case opened.

¶ 30 Maternal grandmother later petitioned to have the restraining

order dismissed and she sometimes joined mother during family

time with the child. During those visits, mother and maternal

grandmother would frequently argue, yell, and use inappropriate

language. Nevertheless, maternal grandmother testified that her

relationship with mother was “better than ever,” and maternal

grandmother testified that she would allow mother “unlimited

access” to the child.

¶ 31 The intervenors had been the subject of at least one previous

home study, which resulted in placement being denied for another

child. The Department completed another home study in

12
September 2022, which was also denied. The court granted

mother’s request for a continuance to complete a third home study,

this time by an independent evaluator. Mother found an evaluator,

who did not complete her home study after the Department pointed

out that the evaluator was not state approved. Mother requested a

new independent home study. The court again continued the

termination hearing to give mother time to complete it.

Nevertheless, mother was not “able to conduct a[n independent]

home study.”

¶ 32 One month prior to the termination hearing, mother was

strangled unconscious by maternal grandfather while the children

were present. Maternal grandfather was charged, among other

things, with child abuse. The court issued a restraining order that

initially prevented maternal grandfather from contacting maternal

grandmother or mother. By the time of the termination hearing,

maternal grandmother had amended the restraining order to apply

only between mother and maternal grandfather. Nevertheless, at

the time of the termination hearing, there was an open child welfare

assessment for the children in intervenors’ home.

13
C. Analysis

¶ 33 Mother contends that (1) the court did not properly consider

the child’s bond with intervenors or that the intervenors were

raising other children — including the child’s sibling; (2) the home

study denial was improperly based on minor issues that intervenors

were not given time to remedy; and (3) mother was “prevented . . .

from obtaining a second home study for intervenors in order to

rebut the Department’s conclusions.” First, we are aware of no law,

nor does mother point to any, requiring a court to consider a bond

between the child and proposed placement when determining less

drastic alternatives. Cf. People in Interest of D.P., 181 P.3d 403,

408-09 (Colo. App. 2008) (a court may consider the child’s bond to

a parent). Second, nothing in the record reflects that the court

relied on the challenged home study findings in reaching its

conclusion. And, third, as we describe below, the record supports

the court’s findings.

¶ 34 The court, explicitly considering the child’s mental, physical,

and emotional conditions and needs, determined that intervenors

would not be protective of the child and were therefore not an

appropriate placement. The court expressed concern about the

14
arguments that occurred during maternal grandmother and

mother’s visits with the child. And the court had “concerns that

there [was] continued violence” in intervenors’ home considering the

many restraining orders in the case as well as maternal

grandfather’s recent charges. Finally, the court relied on maternal

grandmother’s testimony that, if she were to be given custody, “that

custody would essentially revert to [mother].” Thus, the record

supports the court’s findings that there were no less drastic

alternatives to termination.

¶ 35 The court’s determination that the child’s best interests were

served by termination is also supported by the record. The

caseworker testified that the child needed “stability and certainty in

his life,” and an allocation of parental responsibilities “would cause

disruption in [the child’s] life as [well as] . . . dysregulation.”

IV. Disposition

¶ 36 The judgment is affirmed.

JUDGE GOMEZ and JUDGE LUM concur.

15