Peo v. Campos

22CA1978 Peo v Campos 02-20-2025

COLORADO COURT OF APPEALS

Court of Appeals No. 22CA1978
Arapahoe County District Court No. 21CR1380
Honorable Eric B. White, Judge

The People of the State of Colorado,

Plaintiff-Appellee,

v.

Jose Gonzalez Campos,

Defendant-Appellant.

JUDGMENT AFFIRMED IN PART AND REVERSED IN PART,
AND CASE REMANDED WITH DIRECTIONS

Division II
Opinion by JUDGE LUM
Fox and Gomez, JJ., concur

NOT PUBLISHED PURSUANT TO C.A.R. 35(e)
Announced February 20, 2025

Philip J. Weiser, Attorney General, Lisa Michaels, Senior Assistant Attorney
General, Sue Kim, Senior Assistant Attorney General, Denver, Colorado, for
Plaintiff-Appellee

Megan A. Ring, Colorado State Public Defender, Dilyn K. Myers, Deputy State
Public Defender, Denver, Colorado, for Defendant-Appellant
¶1 Defendant, Jose Gonzalez Campos, appeals the judgment of

conviction entered on a jury verdict finding him guilty of driving

while ability impaired — fourth or subsequent offense (felony DWAI)

and a taillight violation. We affirm in part and reverse in part.

I. Background

¶2 On the night of June 18, 2021, Campos was pulled over by

Deputy Brady Wood for driving with his vehicle’s rear taillights off.

While interacting with Campos, Deputy Wood noticed that Campos

smelled of alcohol. Campos admitted to Deputy Wood that he had

been driving home from a bar and had consumed more than one

beer that night.

¶3 Throughout his encounter with Deputy Wood, Campos showed

signs of intoxication, including swaying while upright, glassy and

watery eyes, and slurred speech. He struggled to produce

identification and vehicle documents when Deputy Wood requested

them and had difficulty recalling his own phone number. After

Campos refused to take any sobriety tests, he was arrested.

¶4 Campos was charged with driving under the influence —

fourth or subsequent offense (felony DUI), failure to present a law

enforcement officer with proof of vehicle insurance, and a taillight

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violation. After trial, a jury found Campos guilty of felony DWAI (a

lesser included offense of felony DUI) and a taillight violation.1

Campos was sentenced to three years of probation and ninety days

in jail.

II. Sufficiency of the Evidence

¶5 Campos argues that there was insufficient evidence to convict

him of felony DWAI because the prosecution failed to prove his prior

convictions. We agree.

A. Additional Facts

¶6 At trial, the prosecution presented conviction records allegedly

showing that Campos had previously been convicted of three DUI

offenses. The records each contained the offender’s name and birth

date, and one of them showed identifying characteristics, such as

height, weight, and eye color.

¶7 Deputy Wood testified about the documentary evidence of the

prior DUI convictions:

Q. Deputy Wood, when you were interacting
with the defendant during the initial contact,
did you view the defendant’s driver’s license?

1 The charge relating to proof of insurance was eventually

dismissed.

2
A. I did.

Q. Were you aware of the defendant’s full
name?

A. I was.

Q. Were you aware of the defendant’s date of
birth?

A. I was.

Q. When you’re looking at the documents in
front of you . . . do those documents have the
defendant’s full name on them?

A. Yes, they do.

Q. Does it also have the defendant’s date of
birth?

A. Yes, they do.

Q. During your interaction with the defendant,
did you also review the defendant’s criminal
history?

A. I did.

Q. Based on your interaction with the
defendant, as well as your review of the
documents in front of you, are you aware of
whether or not the defendant has three prior
convictions for driving under the influence or
driving while ability impaired?

A. Yes, I am.

¶8 Defense counsel moved for a judgment of acquittal with

respect to felony DWAI, arguing that a name and birth date match

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was insufficient to prove prior convictions. Defense counsel added

that Deputy Wood lacked personal knowledge of Campos’s alleged

prior convictions:

[The prosecution] asserted that Deputy Wood’s
knowledge of these convictions came from the
certified convictions in front of [the court], not
that he has any additional knowledge. While
Deputy Wood stated he reviewed Mr. Campos’
criminal history, he did not testify that in that
review he discovered these three DUI
convictions.

The court concluded that the records provided “more than a

modicum of relevant evidence” from which the jury could draw

reasonable inferences that Campos had three prior convictions, and

it denied the motion.

B. Standard of Review

¶9 We review the sufficiency of the evidence de novo. McCoy v.

People, 2019 CO 44, ¶ 63. We examine the evidence as a whole to

determine whether the evidence is substantial and sufficient for a

reasonable mind to find the essential elements of the crime beyond

a reasonable doubt. Id.

¶ 10 “This analysis requires us to ‘give the prosecution the benefit

of every reasonable inference which might be fairly drawn from the

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evidence.’” People v. Perez, 2016 CO 12, ¶ 25 (quoting People v.

Gonzales, 666 P.2d 123, 128 (Colo. 1983)). However, “there must

be a logical and convincing connection between the facts

established and the conclusion inferred.” Clark v. People, 232 P.3d

1287, 1292 (Colo. 2010). “If the evidence is such that reasonable

jurors must necessarily have a reasonable doubt, then the evidence

is insufficient to sustain the defendant’s conviction.” Id.

C. Applicable Law

¶ 11 As relevant here, a conviction for DWAI is a felony “if the

violation occurred after three or more prior convictions . . . for DUI,

DUI per se, or DWAI.” § 42-4-1301(1)(a), C.R.S. 2024. Because

prior convictions are an element of a felony DWAI, a prosecutor

must prove those prior convictions to a jury beyond a reasonable

doubt. People v. Herold, 2024 COA 53, ¶ 19.

¶ 12 To prove the identity of the defendant in prior conviction

records, “the prosecution must establish an essential link between

the prior conviction and the defendant, and this requires the

prosecution to present some documentary evidence combined with

specific corroborating evidence of identification.” Gorostieta v.

People, 2022 CO 41, ¶26. “[T]he mere fact that the defendants in

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the present and prior cases have the same name and date of birth,

without more, will generally be insufficient.” Id. at ¶ 28; see also

Herold, ¶ 18 (applying Gorostieta to a felony DUI conviction).

Specific corroborating evidence includes but is not limited to

(1) evidence specifically identifying the
defendant; (2) unique identifiers such as a
driver license, prison identification number, or
social security number; (3) photographs or
fingerprints from the prior case that link that
case to the current defendant; (4) a physical
description from the prior case that can be
compared to the defendant in the present case;
(5) distinguishable features of the defendant
such as tattoos; or (6) testimony of probation
officers or others with personal knowledge
positively identifying the defendant as being
the same person who had previously been
convicted.

Gorostieta, ¶ 27.

D. Analysis

¶ 13 We agree with Campos that the evidence was insufficient to

establish that he had three prior alcohol-related convictions beyond

a reasonable doubt. Other than providing the offender’s name and

birth date, two of the three prior conviction records don’t have any

“unique identifiers” or any other information that could be used to

link Campos to the convictions. Id. Thus, the records alone are

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insufficient. See id. at ¶ 26. That one of the three records

contained a physical description doesn’t matter; the prosecution

needed to prove all three convictions beyond a reasonable doubt to

convict Campos of felony DWAI. See § 42-4-1301(1)(a).

¶ 14 We reject the People’s contention that Deputy Wood

established the necessary link because his testimony didn’t

demonstrate that he had “personal knowledge positively identifying

the defendant as being the same person who had previously been

convicted.” Gorostieta, ¶ 27. During the first part of the

questioning, Deputy Wood simply compared Campos’s name and

birth date to the conviction records that had been admitted into

evidence. Then, the prosecutor asked Deputy Wood, “are you

aware of whether or not the defendant has three prior convictions

for [DUI] or [DWAI]?.” (Emphasis added.) Deputy Wood responded,

“Yes I am.” While that answer communicates that Deputy Wood

believed he knew “whether or not” Campos had previously been

convicted of DUI or DWAI, it doesn’t demonstrate that Campos

actually had three prior convictions for those crimes. The

prosecution didn’t ask any additional questions that might have

clarified what Deputy Wood knew about Campos’s conviction

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history or the source of his knowledge (and whether it was based on

anything other than the records already admitted into evidence).

Accordingly, the evidence presented at trial was insufficient to link

Campos to the prior convictions. See id. at ¶ 26. As a result,

Campos cannot be retried for the felony DWAI conviction. See

People v. Lybarger, 700 P.2d 910, 916 (Colo. 1985).

¶ 15 The parties agree, as do we, that the appropriate remedy is to

reverse Campos’s felony DWAI conviction and remand for entry of a

judgment of conviction for misdemeanor DWAI. See Herold, ¶ 27.

III. Juror Challenge

¶ 16 Campos contends that the court erred when it denied his

challenge for cause to Juror R and his request for additional time

for voir dire. We disagree.

A. Additional Facts

¶ 17 At the beginning of trial, the court informed the parties that

they each had thirty minutes for voir dire and that additional time

would not be granted. During voir dire, the prosecution asked the

prospective jurors if they had any past DUI-related experiences that

might affect their ability to judge the case. Defense counsel

followed up with jurors who had raised their hands in response to

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the prosecutor’s question, including Juror R. Juror R told defense

counsel, “I did have a DUI. And so it would not prevent me from

listening to the case, I don’t think. And I don’t know that it would

make it more or less difficult for me.” Defense counsel further

questioned Juror R:

DEFENSE COUNSEL: Right. And do you think
your personal experiences are going to mean
that, even if the district attorney meets that
beyond a reasonable doubt standard, you’re
not going find [sic] a guilty verdict?

JUROR R: No, I quit drinking after that DUI.
So —

DEFENSE COUNSEL: Okay.

JUROR R: So kind of overall positive for me.

DEFENSE COUNSEL: Okay. And do you
think, essentially, will you hold [the
prosecutor] to a lesser standard, that even if
he doesn’t meet that beyond a reasonable
doubt threshold, you know, it’s almost there
but you do have some reasonable doubt, do
you think you still might render a guilty
verdict.

JUROR R: No, I don’t think so. I would like to
think that I would be able to separate out my,
you know, biases, you know, whatever they
may be —

DEFENSE COUNSEL: Okay.

JUROR R: — and just listen to the facts.

9
...

DEFENSE COUNSEL: So similar to what I
asked [Juror S], you don’t think it will impact
your decision-making . . . . [C]an you be sure
it’s not going to affect how you hold the district
attorney to their burden of proof?

JUROR R: I think so, yeah.

DEFENSE COUNSEL: Okay. Thank you.

JUROR R: That’s the short answer.

¶ 18 Defense counsel then asked the prospective jurors, by a show

of hands, whether evidence of a defendant’s prior convictions

increased the likelihood of guilt in the present case:

You all did hear that there are allegations that
there are past DUI convictions. . . . [I]f you
hear evidence in this case that . . . there are
past DUI convictions, does . . . that make it
more likely that Mr. Campos would be guilty of
this DUI?

Juror R was among the eleven prospective jurors who raised their

hands. After questioning one juror about why they raised their

hand, defense counsel then explained, “[E]ven though . . . you

might hear evidence of past convictions of driving under the

influence, you actually can’t use that as evidence that it’s more

likely Mr. Campos is driving under the influence in this case. . . .

10
Does anyone have trouble with that rule?” Five jurors raised their

hands in response to that question, but Juror R did not.

¶ 19 Time ran out before defense counsel could question Juror R

individually regarding his views on prior convictions. Defense

counsel moved to exclude Juror R because he agreed with the

statement, “[I]f someone has past DUI convictions, it means they’re

more likely to be guilty now.” The court denied the challenge,

concluding,

I think [Juror R] is particularly balanced in
light of his statement that he had received a
DUI, that he made some decisions regarding
not drinking and how important that was. So I
think that actually reflects a great deal of
balance in his ability to be fair. I don’t think
he crossed the threshold for not being
entrenched in a particular position.

¶ 20 Defense counsel then requested additional time to question

the jurors who had earlier raised their hands “to really reveal

whether or not they are biased.” The court denied the request.

Juror R served on the jury.

B. Standard of Review

¶ 21 A trial court’s denial of a juror challenge for cause and

restrictions on voir dire are reviewed for an abuse of discretion.

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People v. Oliver, 2020 COA 97, ¶ 7; People v. Reaud, 821 P.2d 870,

871 (Colo. App. 1991). A trial court abuses its discretion when its

decision is manifestly arbitrary, unreasonable, or unfair. People v.

Stewart, 55 P.3d 107, 122 (Colo. 2002). To determine whether an

abuse of discretion occurred, we review the entire voir dire of the

prospective juror in question. Carrillo v. People, 974 P.2d 478, 486

(Colo. 1999).

¶ 22 “The abuse of discretion standard gives deference to the trial

court’s credibility assessments, recognizing that court’s unique

perspective in evaluating the demeanor and body language of live

witnesses, and it serves to discourage an appellate court from

second-guessing the trial court’s assessments based on a cold

record.” People v. Conyac, 2014 COA 8M, ¶ 13.

¶ 23 Allowing a biased or incompetent individual to serve on a jury

violates the defendant’s right to an impartial jury and requires

reversal. People v. Marciano, 2014 COA 92M-2, ¶ 10.

C. Applicable Law

¶ 24 The United States and Colorado Constitutions guarantee

criminal defendants the right to a trial by an impartial jury. U.S.

12
Const. amends. VI, XIV; Colo. Const. art. II, § 16. A trial court

must sustain a challenge for cause if it finds

a state of mind in the juror evincing enmity or
bias toward the defendant or the state;
however, no person summoned as a juror shall
be disqualified by reason of a previously
formed or expressed opinion with reference to
the guilt or innocence of the accused, if the
court is satisfied, from the examination of the
juror or from other evidence, that he will
render an impartial verdict according to the
law and the evidence submitted to the jury at
the trial.

§ 16-10-103(1)(j), C.R.S. 2024.

¶ 25 “[W]here a potential juror’s statements compel the inference

that he or she cannot decide crucial issues fairly, a challenge for

cause must be granted in the absence of rehabilitative questioning

or other counter-balancing information.” People v. Maestas, 2014

COA 139M, ¶ 18 (quotation omitted). However, a prospective juror’s

“expression of concern,” “preconceived belief as to some facet of the

case,” or misunderstanding of the law is not automatically

disqualifying. People v. Drake, 748 P.2d 1237, 1243 (Colo. 1988);

People v. Clemens, 2017 CO 89, ¶ 17. If the prospective juror is

willing to apply the law as instructed after the trial judge explains

13
the correct legal principles during voir dire, the prospective juror is

rehabilitated and may serve. People v. Lopez, 2018 COA 119, ¶ 8.

¶ 26 To determine whether a juror has been rehabilitated, the court

may consider the juror’s own statements that they can serve

impartially on the case. People v. Gilbert, 12 P.3d 331, 334 (Colo.

App. 2000). Additionally, a juror’s silence in response to questions

posed to the venire may indicate rehabilitation when the context

shows that the juror will render an impartial verdict in accordance

with the law and evidence presented at trial. Clemens, ¶¶ 12, 19.

D. Analysis

¶ 27 Campos contends that the trial court erred by failing to excuse

Juror R because he agreed that a prior DUI conviction makes the

defendant more likely to be guilty in a present DUI case. We

disagree.

¶ 28 Though Juror R had prior experiences with DUI and indicated

that he viewed his conviction as a “positive” because it motivated

him to become sober, nothing about his initial responses to

questioning evinced any unwillingness or “hesitation to follow [the

law]” or indicated that he could not evaluate the case fairly.

Clemens, ¶ 23. In fact, Juror R made assurances to the contrary,

14
saying, “I would like to think that I would be able to separate out

my . . . biases . . . and just listen to the facts.” And he twice

answered affirmatively when asked if he was sure that his prior

experiences would not interfere with his ability to hold the

prosecution to its burden of proof. See Gilbert, 12 P.3d at 334 (the

court may consider a juror’s assurances that they can serve

impartially). To the extent Campos contends that Juror R’s initial

statements were too equivocal for the court to consider them

assurances of impartiality, we disagree. See Carrillo, 974 P.2d at

487 (“[T]he trial judge is . . . ‘able to assess fully the attitudes and

state of mind of a potential juror by personal observation of the

significance of what linguistically may appear to be . . . self-

contradictory responses to difficult questions.’” (quoting People v.

Sandoval, 733 P.2d 319, 321 (Colo. 1987))).

¶ 29 We agree that Juror R indicated a bias (or perhaps a

misunderstanding of the law) when he raised his hand in response

to defense counsel’s question about prior convictions. However,

Juror R was rehabilitated when he heard defense counsel explain

the rule that past DUI offenses cannot be used to determine

Campos’s guilt and then was silent in response to defense counsel’s

15
question asking whether any juror had “trouble with” that rule.

Juror R’s silence indicated that he understood the rule and would

follow it, and it was consistent with his earlier statements that he

would set biases aside, consider the facts, and require proof of guilt

beyond a reasonable doubt. Moreover, Juror R had previously been

forthcoming when counsel asked the venire about DUI-related

experiences and biases, indicating that his silence was not

attributable to a fear of speaking up or general lack of participation.

See Clemens, ¶ 2 (a “juror has been rehabilitated when, in light of

the totality of the circumstances, the context of that silence

indicates that the juror will render an impartial verdict according to

the law and the evidence submitted to the jury at the trial”).

Though the trial court did not rely on Juror R’s rehabilitation-by-

silence in denying the challenge for cause, we may affirm for any

reason supported by the record. See People v. Heisler, 2017 COA

58, ¶ 44.

¶ 30 We reject Campos’s assertion that Juror R’s silence wasn’t

rehabilitative because defense counsel (rather than the court)

explained the rule and conducted the questioning. Rehabilitation

need not be conducted by the court; defense counsel’s legal

16
explanation and rehabilitative questioning regarding the prior

conviction rule was sufficient to rehabilitate Juror R in this case.

Cf. Clemens, ¶ 24 (rehabilitative questioning conducted by the court

and defense counsel).

¶ 31 Finally, to the extent Campos contends that the court abused

its discretion by not providing additional time to question Juror R,

we disagree. “The right to an impartial jury does not . . . require

that counsel be granted unlimited voir dire examination.” People v.

O’Neill, 803 P.2d 164, 169 (Colo. 1990). “In recognition of the

undue length of time consumed by some counsel in their voir dire

examination and the possibility of abuse of the right granted by

Crim. P. 24(a)(2), the trial court is vested with considerable

discretion in limiting both the length of the questioning, and its

nature.” Reaud, 821 P.2d at 871.

¶ 32 We don’t perceive the court’s time limit as an abuse of

discretion in this case. On multiple occasions at the beginning of

trial, the court informed the parties that voir dire examination

would be restricted to thirty minutes per side. Moreover, the length

of the voir dire gave defense counsel sufficient time to identify Juror

R’s potential biases or misunderstandings, obtain assurances from

17
Juror R that his past experiences wouldn’t affect his ability to fairly

decide the case, and — as described above — conduct adequate

rehabilitative questioning about Juror R’s views of prior convictions.

See People v. Rodriguez, 786 P.2d 472, 474 (Colo. App. 1989) (time

restriction on voir dire was reasonable and did not “impinge upon

defendant’s intelligent exercise of [juror] challenges” where counsel

had “sufficient opportunity to examine the prospective jurors in a

manner that would reveal any improper bias”).

IV. Disposition

¶ 33 Campos’s felony DWAI conviction is reversed, and the case is

remanded to the district court for entry of conviction for

misdemeanor DWAI and resentencing. The taillight conviction is

unaffected by this appeal and remains undisturbed.

JUDGE FOX and JUDGE GOMEZ concur.

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