Peo v. Martinez

22CA1703 Peo v Martinez 02-13-2025

COLORADO COURT OF APPEALS

Court of Appeals No. 22CA1703
City and County of Denver District Court No. 14CR10285
Honorable Edward D. Bronfin, Judge

The People of the State of Colorado,

Plaintiff-Appellee,

v.

Teresa Martinez,

Defendant-Appellant.

ORDER AFFIRMED

Division I
Opinion by JUDGE YUN
J. Jones and Brown, JJ., concur

NOT PUBLISHED PURSUANT TO C.A.R. 35(e)
Announced February 13, 2025

Philip J. Weiser, Attorney General, Carmen Moraleda, Senior Assistant
Attorney General, Denver, Colorado, for Plaintiff-Appellee

Patrick R. Henson, Alternate Defense Counsel, Andrew Gargano, Alternate
Defense Counsel, Denver, Colorado, for Defendant-Appellant
¶1 Teresa Martinez appeals the postconviction court’s order

denying her Crim. P. 35(c) motion after a hearing. She contends

that the court erred by finding that her conviction from a guilty plea

was not barred by the statute of limitations and that the court

abused its discretion by denying her request for discovery

sanctions. We reject these contentions and affirm the order.

I. Background

¶2 In 2006 and 2007, Martinez and her family ran a fraudulent

mortgage scheme through their business, Worldwide Mortgage, Inc.,

and related family-run business entities (collectively, Worldwide).

The scheme generally worked as follows:

(1) Worldwide would purchase a residential property by

securing a mortgage in a straw buyer’s name (often

through false representations on the loan application).

Worldwide would cover the down payment and handle

closing on the property; the straw buyer would not live in

the home, take possession of the keys, or pay the

mortgage.

(2) Several weeks later, Worldwide would locate a second

straw buyer to purchase the property from the original

1
straw buyer at an inflated price. Worldwide would again

secure a mortgage, cover the down payment, and handle

the closing process.

(3) The profits from the sale would be diverted away from the

first straw buyer via “a private payoff letter” — a

document directing the title company to pay a portion of

the proceeds from the sale to somebody other than the

seller — and into the bank account of a member of the

Martinez family (often Martinez herself). The money

would then be rerouted into a different bank account

controlled by Worldwide.

(4) The second straw buyer would not make the required

mortgage payments, and the lender would foreclose on

the property.

Martinez herself acted as the initial straw buyer for two pieces of

property purchased and sold under this scheme.

¶3 In 2011, the Colorado Bureau of Investigation (CBI) began a

lengthy investigation into Worldwide after it received a tip on its

fraud hotline from the bank that refinanced one of Worldwide’s

offices. In 2012, after that bank successfully foreclosed on the

2
office, CBI gained access to over two hundred boxes of transaction

files that were abandoned by Worldwide. Mortgage and financial

fraud specialists with CBI spent months evaluating the documents

and eventually uncovered the straw buyer scheme.

¶4 In 2014, the Martinez family members were each indicted for

their roles in the scheme. Martinez, for her part, was charged with

violations of the Colorado Organized Crime Control Act (COCCA),

theft, and conspiracy to commit theft, all predicated on the

purchase and sale of eleven properties. In exchange for the

dismissal of these charges,1 Martinez pleaded guilty to one count of

criminal mischief.

¶5 Martinez thereafter filed a Crim. P. 35(c)(2)(III) motion alleging,

as relevant here, that the district court was without subject matter

jurisdiction to enter a conviction on her guilty plea because the

statute of limitations barred the charges against her.2 Specifically,

1 The conspiracy to commit theft charge was dismissed for other

reasons before the plea bargain and is not relevant to this appeal.
2 Martinez’s court-appointed counsel did not proceed on any of the

other claims in Martinez’s pro se Crim. P. 35(c) motion.
Accordingly, those claims were abandoned. See People v. Smith,
2024 CO 3, ¶ 20 (“[A] conscious decision not to pursue the omitted
pro se claims . . . constitutes an abandonment of those claims.”).

3
she argued that the victims (the lenders and the straw buyers) and

the State of Colorado — through the Department of Regulatory

Agencies (DORA) and its Division of Real Estate — all knew or

should have known of the facts establishing the criminal charges

against her more than three years before the indictment was filed.

Martinez also moved for sanctions for spoilation of evidence based

on DORA’s response to her postconviction subpoena.

¶6 The postconviction court held an evidentiary hearing.

Martinez called a single witness to authenticate some of the

voluminous records she had submitted to the court — reports from

the CBI’s and DORA’s investigations, transcripts from the grand

jury proceedings, and documents subpoenaed from the lender

victims — but otherwise rested on those exhibits and her

arguments. The People, on the other hand, called an analyst from

CBI who worked on the Worldwide case to testify about how the

investigation unfolded. The evidence admitted during the hearing

and the postconviction court’s rulings are summarized as follows.

(1) DORA

¶7 Between 2009 and 2011, DORA engaged in a regulatory

investigation into Worldwide and its employees in response to

4
consumer complaints filed against the company. These complaints

stemmed from Worldwide’s retention of unearned fees, failure to

provide the keys to a newly purchased home, and the practice of

real estate or loan generation by unlicensed individuals — including

Martinez. As a result of the investigation, multiple Worldwide

employees had their real estate licenses revoked or suspended, and

Martinez was sent an order to cease and desist from unlicensed

activities.

¶8 The postconviction court found that DORA learned during its

investigation that

(1) Worldwide engaged in transactions
involving falsified documents and incomplete
loan applications, (2) unlicensed individuals
worked at Worldwide, (3) Worldwide seemed to
use fraudulent appraisals, fake relative gift
letters, and aliases, (4) sometimes closing costs
were received by Worldwide on the loan, and
(5) . . . a number of the properties were
foreclosed.

One of the DORA reports noted that Worldwide purchased

properties “with the intent to resell to Colorado borrowers” for “a

much higher price (sometimes double) than what they purchased

the property for, usually only months after the property had been

purchased.” Additionally, a DORA investigator’s memorandum

5
specifically about Martinez (drafted more than three years before

the indictment was filed) listed multiple possible regulatory

violations, including a “scheme to defraud,” and requested that the

case be referred to law enforcement agencies.

¶9 Nevertheless, the postconviction court concluded that this

evidence was insufficient to show that DORA “either knew or should

have known of the specific straw buyer scheme(s) at issue” because

it did not include the “bank records of [Martinez,] other family

members, and Worldwide, from which it would have been apparent

that [Martinez] was simply operating as a conduit through whom

Worldwide transferred money received from a bank financing a

home purchase from a second straw buyer to Worldwide via several

layers of transactions.” The court noted that the memorandum

about Martinez did not demonstrate knowledge of the straw buyer

scheme because it “list[ed] suspected violations of mortgage loan

originator licensing requirements” and was “devoid of any details

explaining the facts underlying the suspected

mortgage-loan-originator-based violations,” including the scheme to

defraud.

6
(2) Victims

¶ 10 In 2015, before Martinez accepted her plea agreement, the

People learned that some of the lender victims filed suspicious

activity reports with the federal government for properties included

in the indictment more than three years before the indictment was

filed. These reports documented potential issues with appraisals

and misrepresentations in the mortgage applications. “[B]ased on

the arguable possibility that the [statute of limitations] d[id] in fact

bar their use as part of the prosecution for the substantive [t]heft

charge,” the People moved to dismiss the transactions involving the

properties in the suspicious activity reports from the theft charge.3

¶ 11 In her Rule 35(c) motion, Martinez contended that the “same

recognizable signs of fraud [in the suspicious activity reports] were

present in the sales” of the properties that supported the remaining

charges, and therefore, the victims for those properties knew or

3 The People did not dismiss these transactions as predicate acts for

the COCCA charges. See § 18-17-103(3), C.R.S. 2024; People v.
Davis, 2012 COA 56, ¶ 34 (“[I]f one predicate act falls within its
respective limitations period, other predicate acts occurring within
ten years before the occurrence of the first can be presented as
evidence of racketeering activity even if they could not give rise to a
separate prosecution.”).

7
should have known about the facts underlying the criminal charges

against her. Alternatively, she argued that the lender victims and

straw buyers should have investigated and uncovered those facts

during the properties’ foreclosure proceedings.

¶ 12 At the hearing, the People’s witness testified that title

companies, not the lenders, “handle[d] all the money in and out of

[the] real estate transactions,” and therefore the title companies had

the “bank names and account numbers and owner names that

[CBI] needed” to uncover the straw buyer scheme. She further

testified that the lenders “would have no record or have even asked

about” private payoff letters — the method Worldwide used to

appropriate the profits from their straw buyer scheme. Crediting

this testimony, the postconviction court concluded that, without the

information held exclusively by the title companies, “the victim

lenders and straw buyers did not and could not have reasonably

known that [Martinez] obtained lender funds . . . after the sale to

the second straw buyer which were immediately transferred to

Worldwide.”

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(3) Subpoenaed Documents

¶ 13 In 2010, as part of its investigation into Worldwide, DORA

obtained and audited documents relating to approximately

thirty-nine real estate transactions involving Worldwide. When

Martinez subpoenaed these documents as part of the postconviction

proceedings, DORA’s records custodian informed her that the

documents “were no doubt destroyed long ago.” Martinez moved for

sanctions for spoilation of evidence under both Crim. P. 16 and the

due process clause and argued that the appropriate sanction would

be an adverse inference that the destroyed “documents contained

information showing illegal activity related to the loans for the

properties in question in this matter.”

¶ 14 The postconviction court denied the motion, ruling that,

because Martinez’s conviction “was and is already final, . . . neither

DORA nor the prosecution ha[d] any duty under Crim. P. 16 or due

process principles to disclose the documents from the DORA audit

as part of this Crim. P. 35(c) proceeding.” And even if there was a

disclosure obligation, the court ruled, Martinez “has presented no

evidence that the contents of those documents possessed

9
exculpatory value that was apparent before those documents were

destroyed.”

¶ 15 Martinez now appeals the postconviction court’s rulings on the

applicability of the statute of limitations and her request for

discovery sanctions.

II. Statute of Limitations

¶ 16 Martinez argues that DORA and the victims knew or should

have known of the facts establishing the criminal charges against

her more than three years before the indictment was filed. She

contends, therefore, that the statute of limitations had run and the

district court lacked subject matter jurisdiction to enter her guilty

plea. After discussing the standard of review and applicable law, we

address Martinez’s contentions concerning DORA and the victims in

turn.

A. Standard of Review and Applicable Law

¶ 17 In reviewing the denial of a Rule 35(c) motion after a hearing,

we review conclusions of law de novo but defer to the postconviction

court’s findings of fact if they are supported by the evidence.

People v. Villanueva, 2016 COA 70, ¶ 28. “[W]e presume the validity

of the conviction and the defendant bears the burden of proving

10
h[er] claim[] by a preponderance of the evidence.” Dunlap v. People,

173 P.3d 1054, 1061 (Colo. 2007). “Where the evidence in the

record supports the findings and holding of the court, the judgment

of the court will not be disturbed on review.” Id. at 1062.

¶ 18 Under Rule 35(c)(2)(III), a defendant may seek relief on the

ground that “the court rendering judgment was without jurisdiction

over . . . the subject matter.” In Colorado, a statute of limitations

challenge in a criminal case implicates the court’s subject matter

jurisdiction and cannot be waived. People v. Butler, 2017 COA 117,

¶ 14.

¶ 19 The limitations period for most felony offenses, including theft

and COCCA violations, is three years. § 16-5-401(1)(a), C.R.S.

2024. For the offenses alleged in this case, the applicable

limitations period commences “upon discovery of the criminal act.”

§ 16-5-401(4.5) (emphasis added).

¶ 20 The purpose of the “discovery” provision, section

16-5-401(4.5), is to

extend the limitations period for crimes that
are susceptible to remaining undetected for
extended periods of time, so that prosecution
of such crimes will not be foreclosed as a
result of concealment. . . . [W]ithout the

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discovery tolling provision, our Criminal Code
would provide surreptitious defendants a
windfall for successfully concealing criminal
conduct from their victims, contrary to the
General Assembly’s intent.

People v. McKinney, 99 P.3d 1038, 1044-45 (Colo. 2004) (citation

omitted).

¶ 21 In People v. Cito, 2012 COA 221, a division of this court

interpreted and applied the “discovery” provision of section

16-5-401(4.5). There, an employee was charged with theft by

deception for obtaining money from his employer for unused

personal time, when the employee had actually used that time.

Cito, ¶¶ 4-5. The district court held that “discovery” of the criminal

acts occurred at the time the defendant received the payments from

the employer, rather than when the employer discovered that the

defendant had lied about his time off. Id. at ¶ 9. On appeal, a

division of this court reversed the district court’s decision. In

interpreting the terms “discovery” and “criminal act” in subsection

(4.5), the division held that “‘discovery of the criminal act’ . . . refers

to the point at which the victim or the state knew or through the

exercise of reasonable diligence should have known of the facts

establishing the crime at issue.” Id. at ¶ 31. Noting that “the

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criminal act [there] was theft by deception, not merely the act of

obtaining the money,” the division held that the victims would not

have “discover[ed]” the criminal act until they realized they were

deceived. Id. at ¶¶ 2, 31.

¶ 22 This case, like Cito, involved crimes involving an element of

deception or fraud. See § 18-4-401(1), C.R.S. 2024 (theft by

deception); 18 U.S.C. § 1344 (bank fraud). Thus, “discovery of the

criminal act” in this case refers to the point at which the victims or

the State knew or should have known of facts establishing that

Worldwide was (1) using straw buyers to generate fake profits from

real estate sales (the fraud or deception) and (2) diverting those

profits to itself and its members (obtaining the money). See id. at

¶ 31.

B. DORA

¶ 23 Martinez contends that, given the suspicious activity noted in

the investigative reports, DORA’s investigation triggered the

“discovery of the criminal act” for statute of limitations purposes

because “DORA either knew or, had it exercised reasonable

diligence by further investigating Worldwide, it would have known,

13
of the facts necessary to discover[] the criminal acts in this case.”

We are not persuaded for two reasons.

1. Actual or Constructive Knowledge

¶ 24 First, we discern no error in the postconviction court’s finding

that the submitted evidence did not demonstrate that DORA had

actual or constructive knowledge of the criminal acts underlying the

charges in this case. The court found that there was “no evidence

that any of the properties listed as a basis for the charges in the

Indictment against [Martinez] were included in the files obtained by

DORA” and that DORA was not “aware of the banking records

necessary to disclose that private payoff letters were issued to

[Martinez], or that [Martinez] then immediately deposited those

funds into Worldwide-related accounts.” These findings are

supported by the record, see Dunlap, 173 P.3d at 1062, and

Martinez does not meaningfully contest them.4 And without these

documents, DORA could not have known that Worldwide was

4 Martinez suggests that the destroyed documents might have

included references to the properties in the indictment and that
DORA could have obtained more bank records through its
subpoena powers, but these arguments have no bearing on the
postconviction court’s findings about the evidence submitted for the
Crim. P. 35(c) hearing.

14
obtaining profits from the straw buyer scheme — a necessity for

discovery of the underlying criminal act. See Cito, ¶ 31.

¶ 25 Instead, Martinez contends that DORA’s memorandum listing

her possible regulatory violations (including a “scheme to defraud”)

and requesting the matter be referred to law enforcement

demonstrates that DORA was aware of Worldwide’s scheme. But

evidence in the record shows that no referral was never made, and

we agree with the postconviction court that the “memorandum is

devoid of any details explaining the facts underlying the suspected

mortgage-loan-originator-based violations.” It is therefore mere

speculation that the memorandum’s mention of noncriminal

regulatory offenses referred to the straw buyer scheme here. Thus,

the record supports the postconviction court’s finding that DORA

did not have actual or constructive knowledge of the facts

establishing the criminal acts in this case based on its regulatory

investigation, and we will not disturb it. See id.

2. Duty to Investigate

¶ 26 Second, we reject Martinez’s argument that the suspicious

information mentioned in DORA’s reports obligated DORA to

investigate further and that such an investigation would have

15
uncovered the straw buyer scheme. DORA’s Division of Real Estate

is a civil agency tasked with “the administration and enforcement

of” the civil real estate statutes through “the prosecution of all

persons charged with violating any of their provisions” and by

“conduct[ing] audits of business accounts of licensees.”

§ 12-10-207(2), C.R.S. 2024. It has the authority to issue sanctions

for a licensee’s civil violations, including the severe sanction of

license suspension or revocation. See § 12-10-217(1), C.R.S. 2024.

¶ 27 Here, DORA investigated consumer complaints against

Worldwide based on allegations of civil violations of the real estate

statutes. As a result of its investigation, DORA revoked or

suspended the licenses of several of Worldwide’s employees and

issued cease and desist orders to the unlicensed members whom it

did not have the authority to sanction. Indeed, by 2010, Worldwide

had shut down its mortgage loan origination company (but not its

realty or investment companies).

¶ 28 Section 12-10-217(10) does require the Division of Real Estate

to refer information to law enforcement agencies when it “becomes

aware of facts or circumstances that fall within the jurisdiction of a

criminal justice or other law enforcement authority upon

16
investigation of the activities of a licensee.” But the statute’s plain

language does not require DORA to expand its investigation beyond

violations of the real estate statutes, nor does it require DORA to

take action on mere suspicions.

¶ 29 DORA completed its investigation into the consumer

complaints levied against Worldwide and issued the most severe

sanctions available to it, and Worldwide’s mortgage company (which

caused the complaints) ceased operating. Under these

circumstances, we cannot conclude that it was unreasonable for

DORA to end its investigation without looking into other potentially

suspicious activity. Therefore, the postconviction court did not err

by finding that Martinez “failed to establish by a preponderance of

the evidence that [DORA] knew or should have reasonably known of

the facts establishing the charges against [her] based on its

investigation of real estate and mortgage licensing issues before CBI

began its detailed investigation into Worldwide and Worldwide’s

principals.”

C. Victims

¶ 30 Martinez also contends that the victims — the lenders and the

straw buyers — should have known of the facts establishing the

17
criminal charges in this case more than three years before the

indictment was filed. Specifically, she argues that the victims

should have investigated and would have uncovered the straw

buyer scheme if they were reasonably diligent. We disagree.

¶ 31 Even assuming that, to exercise reasonable diligence under

the circumstances, the victims should have investigated their

transactions with Worldwide, it is speculative that their

investigations would have uncovered Worldwide’s scheme. The

postconviction court found, as supported by the CBI analyst’s

testimony, that the lenders did not have access to the private payoff

letters and bank files needed to discover that Worldwide was

diverting the profits from the straw buyer sales to itself. The straw

buyers also would not have had the means to acquire these

documents. Martinez asserts in conclusory fashion that if the

victims “exercised reasonable diligence, they would have known

about the criminal activity underlying the[] loans,” but she does not

explain how they could have done so without these documents.

¶ 32 Thus, we agree with the postconviction court that, because

Martinez did not present any evidence that the victims had or could

access “information that the profits of the second straw buyer sale

18
were diverted to [Martinez] and Worldwide via a private payoff

letter, . . . [Martinez] has not shown that the victims knew or,

through the exercise of reasonable diligence, should have known of

the facts establishing” the crimes in this case.5 See Cito, ¶ 31.

III. Motion for Sanctions

¶ 33 Martinez contends that the postconviction court abused its

discretion by declining to adopt, as a discovery sanction, her

proposed adverse inference that the documents DORA destroyed

“contained information showing illegal activity related to the loans

for the properties in question in this matter.” She argues that the

court should have made this adverse inference finding based on

(1) Crim. P. 16(III)(g); (2) due process; and (3) the court’s inherent

power.6 We disagree.

5 Martinez also contends that the bank that provided the fraud

hotline tip to CBI knew or should have known about the facts
establishing the crimes in this case earlier. But that bank is not a
victim of any of the criminal acts in this case, nor is it the State, so
its knowledge is immaterial to the statute of limitations. See
People v. Cito, 2012 COA 221, ¶ 2 (referring to “the victim or the
state”).
6 The People contend that these arguments, to the extent that they

relate to conduct occurring before the postconviction proceedings,
were waived by Martinez’s guilty plea. Because we conclude that
the postconviction court did not err by denying the motion for
sanctions, we need not resolve the People’s contention.

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A. Standard of Review

¶ 34 We review a court’s resolution of discovery issues and its

decision whether to impose sanctions for discovery violations for an

abuse of discretion. People v. Acosta, 2014 COA 82, ¶ 10. A court

abuses its discretion when its discovery order is manifestly

arbitrary, unreasonable, or unfair. People v. Tippet, 2023 CO 61,

¶ 35.

¶ 35 But “[w]e review de novo to determine whether the state

violated a defendant’s due process rights” by failing to preserve

potentially exculpatory evidence. People v. Eason, 2022 COA 54,

¶¶ 37, 40.

B. Rule 16(III)(g)

¶ 36 Martinez contends that, by failing to obtain and disclose the

materials from DORA’s audit of Worldwide, the People violated its

discovery obligations under Rule 16(I)(a) and (b)(4) that require

prosecuting attorneys to make available to defendants certain

“material and information which is in the control of the prosecuting

attorney . . . and concerning the pending case” and to “ensure that

a flow of information is maintained between the various

investigative personnel and his or her office sufficient to place

20
within his or her possession or control all material and information

relevant to the accused and the offense charged.” Martinez argues

that the court should have imposed sanctions under Rule 16(III)(g),

which permits a court to remedy a discovery violation by, as

relevant here, entering an “order as it deems just under the

circumstances.”

¶ 37 Martinez’s motion did not clearly identify when this supposed

disclosure violation occurred. But on appeal, Martinez clarifies that

her contention is “that the prosecution never obtained the DORA

files or provided them to [her] while the case was still at the district

court level,” and if they had, “the files would have been available for

the defense during the postconviction proceedings.” Irrespective of

when the violation occurred, we conclude that Rule 16 is

inapplicable here. See People v. Cooper, 2023 COA 113, ¶ 7 (we

may affirm the postconviction court’s order on any ground

supported by the record, whether or not the court relied on or

considered that ground).

¶ 38 To the extent Martinez argues that the violation occurred after

her guilty plea, the district court was correct that Rule 16 does not

apply to postconviction proceedings. See People v. Owens, 2014 CO

21
58M, ¶¶ 13-16; see also People v. Thompson, 2020 COA 117, ¶ 33

(“Crim. P. 35(c) is not a discovery mechanism to find new evidence,

but, rather, prescribes a procedure to present such evidence when

it has been obtained through other sources.”).

¶ 39 As for Martinez’s contention that the violation occurred before

her guilty plea, Rule 16(III)(g) allows a court to enter discovery

sanctions if “at any time during the course of the proceedings it is

brought to the attention of the court that a party has failed to comply

with this rule.” (Emphasis added.) Given that Rule 16 is

inapplicable in postconviction proceedings, Owens, ¶¶ 13-16,

“during the course of the proceedings” does not include the

pendency of a Rule 35(c) motion. Because Martinez’s request for

sanctions under Rule 16 was not made “during the course of the

proceedings,” the postconviction court properly denied the motion.

C. Due Process

¶ 40 Martinez contends that DORA’s destruction of documents

violated her right to due process and therefore warranted discovery

sanctions.

¶ 41 To establish a due process violation based on the State’s

failure to preserve potentially exculpatory evidence, Martinez “must

22
prove that the evidence was suppressed or destroyed by state action

and that the evidence was material.” Eason, ¶ 37 (quoting People v.

Braunthal, 31 P.3d 167, 172 (Colo. 2001)). Specifically, she must

show that “(1) the state suppressed or destroyed the evidence;

(2) the evidence had an exculpatory value that was apparent before

it was destroyed; and (3) [s]he was unable to obtain comparable

evidence by other reasonably available means.” Id.

¶ 42 To the extent that Martinez argues that the violation occurred

after her guilty plea, the postconviction court was correct that

“neither DORA nor the prosecution” had a duty “to disclose the

documents from the DORA audit as part of this Crim. P. 35(c)

proceeding.” The constitutional requirement to preserve and

disclose potentially exculpatory evidence ordinarily ends when a

conviction becomes final. See Dist. Attorney’s Off. v. Osborne,

557 U.S. 52, 68-69 (2009).

¶ 43 Additionally, the postconviction court found that Martinez

“presented no evidence that the contents of [the destroyed]

documents possessed exculpatory value that was apparent before

those documents were destroyed.” The court reasoned that DORA

23
wrote reports based in part on the documents
it collected during the audit, which formed the
basis for agency actions it took against
Worldwide principals under its jurisdiction.
These reports mention specific properties. It is
reasonable to conclude that the properties
included in the reports were associated with
the most inculpatory actions taken by . . .
licensees who worked at Worldwide. Yet, the
properties that form the basis of the
Indictment are not mentioned in these reports.
The Court therefore infers either (1) that the
audited documents did not contain the
properties in the Indictment or (2) that if those
properties were included in the audited
documents, they were not sufficiently
inculpatory (meaning exculpatory for statute of
limitations purposes) for [DORA] to base
agency actions on them.

¶ 44 We agree with the court’s reasoning and defer to the

reasonable inferences it drew from the record. See Dunlap,

173 P.3d at 1062. Martinez’s assertion that the destroyed

documents had exculpatory value because they included

documentation showing obvious signs of fraud regarding the

properties underlying this case is speculative and contrary to the

postconviction court’s findings. Such speculation is insufficient to

establish a due process violation. See Eason, ¶ 48.

24
¶ 45 Under these circumstances, we cannot conclude that

Martinez’s due process rights were violated. The district court thus

did not err by denying her motion for sanctions on that basis.

D. Inherent Powers

¶ 46 Finally, Martinez cites Aloi v. Union Pacific Railroad Corp.,

129 P.3d 999 (Colo. 2006), and Pfantz v. Kmart Corp., 85 P.3d 564

(Colo. App. 2003) — cases addressing a court’s inherent power to

issue sanctions for spoliation of evidence in civil cases — to contend

that the postconviction court should have made an adverse

inference finding. Martinez has not provided any authority, nor are

we aware of any, holding that case law governing sanctions for

spoliation of evidence in civil cases is applicable to Rule 35(c)

proceedings or criminal cases. Accordingly, the postconviction

court did not err by declining to enter sanctions on this basis

either.

IV. Disposition

¶ 47 The order is affirmed.

JUDGE J. JONES and JUDGE BROWN concur.

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