Peo v. Brooks

23CA0479 Peo v Brooks 02-06-2025

COLORADO COURT OF APPEALS

Court of Appeals No. 23CA0479
Arapahoe County District Court Nos. 19CR3108 & 19CR3199
Honorable Joseph Whitfield, Judge

The People of the State of Colorado,

Plaintiff-Appellee,

v.

Loretta Irene Brooks,

Defendant-Appellant.

ORDER AFFIRMED

Division IV
Opinion by JUDGE GROVE
Harris and Pawar, JJ., concur

NOT PUBLISHED PURSUANT TO C.A.R. 35(e)
Announced February 6, 2025

Philip J. Weiser, Attorney General, John T. Lee, First Assistant Attorney
General, Denver, Colorado, for Plaintiff-Appellee

Megan A. Ring, Colorado State Public Defender, Mark Evans, Deputy State
Public Defender, Denver, Colorado, for Defendant-Appellant
¶1 Defendant, Loretta Irene Brooks, appeals the district court’s

order revoking her probation and sentencing her to a total of six

years in the custody of the Department of Corrections (DOC). We

affirm.

I. Background

¶2 As part of a plea agreement, Brooks pleaded guilty to charges

in two separate cases. In the first case (the burglary case), the

arrest affidavit alleged Brooks tried to use a large rock to break a

pawnshop’s glass display case containing a handgun. Later that

day, Brooks entered an unoccupied home, where she stole a

checkbook and a vehicle. The next day, she attempted to cash one

of the stolen checks. In the second case (the menacing case), the

arrest affidavit alleged that Brooks had gotten into a verbal and

physical altercation with her twelve-year-old son during which she

choked and hit him.

¶3 As a result of her guilty pleas, Brooks was convicted of one

count of criminal mischief, one count of second degree burglary,

and one count of menacing. Acknowledging that Brooks was

struggling with substance use when the crimes occurred, the

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district court sentenced Brooks to four years of probation for each

case, to be served concurrently.

¶4 Approximately one year later, the probation department filed a

complaint for revocation in both cases, alleging Brooks had

(1) missed six appointments with her probation officer, (2) failed to

submit eight urinalysis tests, (3) tested positive for alcohol or drugs

on four occasions, and (4) failed to make court-ordered payments.

The probation department recommended that Brooks be screened

for community corrections.

¶5 At the revocation hearing, Brooks admitted violating the terms

of her probation. Although Brooks entered an “open plea,” the

prosecutor acknowledged that she had made progress on her

substance abuse issues while the revocation complaint was

pending, so the parties reached an agreement to request revocation

and reinstatement of Brooks’s sentence to probation.

¶6 The district court resentenced Brooks to four years in the DOC

for the burglary case and two years in the DOC for the menacing

case, but it suspended both sentences pending the successful

completion of three years of probation — one year less than

Brooks’s original term. The court imposed all of the same terms

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and conditions of probation while adding a requirement that she

complete a sober living facility program. The terms included

“submit[ting] to drug and alcohol testing as directed by the

probation officer” and “report[ing] to the probation officer for

appointments, as directed by the Court or the probation officer.”

Brooks agreed to these terms.

¶7 At the hearing, the district court emphasized the level of

compliance that Brooks would need to demonstrate in order to be

successful with the reinstated term of probation. The court ordered

Brooks to “routinely check in with probation at their request and at

their order,” underscoring that the manner and frequency of these

routine checks was up to the probation department. It also

emphasized Brooks must “strict[ly] compl[y]” with her probation

terms. Strict compliance included fulfilling

simple requests like checking in, or [urinalysis
tests], or any other form of condition that
probation has. The defendant must comply
with these terms in order to be successful on
probation . . . . So if she fails to comply, she
will face the terms of each case [and] any
prison sentences suspended will be deemed
available to the Court to run concurrent or
consecutive . . . .

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¶8 While the court expressed hope that Brooks would comply

with probation, it left open the possibility of imposing the

suspended DOC sentences consecutively in the event of a second

revocation.

¶9 The probation department filed a second petition for

revocation less than two months later. It alleged four violations: (1)

a new Arapahoe County case alleging motor vehicle theft, (2) a

missed probation appointment, (3) a missed urinalysis test, and (4)

failure to make timely court-ordered payments. The probation

department again recommended Brooks be screened for community

corrections.

¶ 10 At the outset of the revocation hearing, the prosecution

withdrew the motor vehicle theft allegations. At the conclusion of

the hearing, the court found that the prosecution had proved that

Brooks missed a probation appointment and a urinalysis test, but it

found that the prosecution had not proved that Brooks was behind

on payments. The court revoked Brooks’s probation and imposed

the suspended sentences — two years for the menacing case and

four years for the burglary case — ordering them to be served

consecutively.

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¶ 11 Brooks appeals the revocation order. She claims the court

erred by (1) basing its decision to revoke her probation in part on

the motor vehicle theft allegations that the prosecution withdrew

before the hearing, and (2) finding that she had, in fact, missed a

urinalysis test.

II. Standard of Review and Applicable Law

¶ 12 The district court must decide two issues in a revocation

proceeding: (1) whether the probationer has violated a valid

condition of her probation and, if so, (2) what action is appropriate

in light of the violation. People v. Ickler, 877 P.2d 863, 866 (Colo.

1994); § 16-11-206(5), C.R.S. 2024.

¶ 13 The court may revoke probation when a probationer violates

any condition of probation. Ickler, 877 P.2d at 866. Generally, the

prosecution must prove the probationer has violated the condition

by a preponderance of evidence standard. § 16-11-206(3).

However, if the alleged violation is the commission of a criminal

offense, then the prosecution must establish the violation beyond a

reasonable doubt unless the defendant has already been convicted

of the offense. Id. A probationer’s violation of the conditions of

probation serves as an indication that she is either unwilling to

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rehabilitate or incapable of reintegration into society at that point,

and remedial action by the court might be necessary in the interest

of the probationer and society. People v. Moses, 64 P.3d 904, 907

(Colo. App. 2002).

¶ 14 A probationer is entitled to certain procedural due process

rights in revocation proceedings. People v. Elder, 36 P.3d 172, 174

(Colo. App. 2001). Due process in the revocation setting only

requires (1) written notice of the alleged probation violations; (2)

disclosure to the probationer of evidence against her; (3) an

opportunity to be heard in person and to present witnesses and

documentary evidence; (4) the right to confront and cross-examine

adverse witnesses; and (5) a written or oral statement on the record

made by the fact finder as to the evidence relied on and the reasons

for revoking probation. Byrd v. People, 58 P.3d 50, 55-56 (Colo.

2002).

¶ 15 Whether a court adequately stated its reasons for revoking

probation and the evidence it relied on is a legal question we review

de novo. People v. Lientz, 2012 COA 118, ¶ 43. However, once a

violation is found, the decision to revoke probation is within the

district court’s discretion. Elder, 36 P.3d at 173; see also § 16-11-

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206(5). A decision to revoke probation will not be disturbed unless

the district court’s judgment is against the manifest weight of the

evidence. Elder, 36 P.3d at 174.

III. Motor Vehicle Theft

¶ 16 Brooks contends the district court violated her due process

rights by basing its revocation order in part on an allegation that

she had committed aggravated motor vehicle theft. Even though

the prosecution agreed not to proceed on this count at the

revocation hearing and presented no evidence supporting it, Brooks

argues that the district court nonetheless relied on the allegation

when revoking her probation and deciding to impose consecutive

sentences. We perceive no error.

A. District Court’s Findings

¶ 17 At the conclusion of the second revocation hearing, the court

ruled in two distinct phases. First, after acknowledging that the

prosecution had withdrawn Count 1 (the motor vehicle theft count),

it found that the prosecution had proved Counts 2 (missed

appointment) and 3 (missed urinalysis). The court found that the

prosecution had not proved Count 4 (insufficient payments).

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¶ 18 The court then “turn[ed] to the parties for any sentencing

record either wishes to make.” After considering arguments from

both counsel, the court announced its decision to impose the

previously suspended sentences consecutively. While explaining its

decision, the court mentioned the motor vehicle theft allegations.

[W]hether it’s missed tests, again, or missed
appointments or anything else that I find --
and, in this case, this Court is aware that
there is a new law violation or that the
allegations are that the Defendant, within a
month’s time or so of our sentencing in
November, after she heard from me, after she
heard my voice, after she stood and looked me
in the eye and heard what I was going to say
and what I ultimately did say and order, was
somehow found in a stolen vehicle, alleged to
have jumped in a moving vehicle -- running
vehicle -- pardon me -- that was being driven
by a security officer who responded to some
location.

And when law enforcement found her, she was
not far from this vehicle, found in the back
seat of an Uber with a dog that had been --
belonged to the owner of the vehicle, and the
Defendant, upon being Mirandized and spoken
to by law enforcement, admitted it.

¶ 19 Defense counsel objected (and asked that the judge recuse

himself), arguing that the court had “relied on evidence not in the

record, including allegations of a new law violation,” in reaching its

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decision. The court denied the motion, confirming that it “relied on

information that it heard in the hearing for the hearing,” and that,

at sentencing, it was permitted to look to “anything presented by

the parties,” as well as “the Court’s own file.”

B. Analysis

¶ 20 Based on our review of the record, we do not agree with

Brooks’s claim that the court based its decision to revoke her

probation — even in part — on an uncharged and unproven

criminal allegation. To the contrary, the court acknowledged that

the prosecution had withdrawn Count 1 — and, when defense

counsel questioned whether the facts associated with Count 1 had

factored into its revocation decision, the court confirmed that it had

only considered the motor vehicle theft allegations for the purposes

of sentencing. Even if the court did not make clear its reasons for

mentioning the motor vehicle theft allegations during the

sentencing colloquy itself, any ambiguity was resolved by the

court’s subsequent statement that it had only raised the issue for

the purposes of sentencing. See People v. Newman, 91 P.3d 369,

372 (Colo. 2004) (holding that sentencing court may, in evaluating

the character of the offender, consider conduct for which the

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offender was never charged). We are not in a position to second-

guess the court’s on-the-record characterization of its own decision-

making process, especially when it explained its process mere

moments after it had ruled.

¶ 21 Still, Brooks points to People v. Janke, 720 P.2d 613, 616

(Colo. App. 1986), for the proposition that the court violates a

defendant’s due process rights when it considers an uncharged and

unproven crime as part of its sentencing decision. Janke is

distinguishable for several reasons, the first of which is that it was

not a probation revocation case. In Janke, the sentencing court

surmised, without any supporting evidence, that the defendant had

raped other victims, and as a result of that supposition imposed a

sentence outside the presumptive range. Id. Here, in contrast,

Brooks was sentenced in the presumptive range. When deciding to

impose a sentence in that range, the court was permitted to

consider conduct for which Brooks was never charged. See

Newman, 91 P.3d at 372. Indeed, once the court found a violation,

it had the discretion to “impose any sentence or grant any

probation” that “might originally have been imposed or granted.”

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§ 16-11-206(5); see also People v. Santana, 961 P.2d 498, 500

(Colo. App. 1997).

¶ 22 Therefore, the trial court did not err by considering the

allegations of new criminal conduct for the limited purpose of

sentencing on the violations.

IV. Sufficiency of the Evidence

¶ 23 Brooks argues that the prosecution did not prove Count 3 of

the revocation complaint, which alleged that she violated a

condition of her probation by failing to properly submit a urinalysis

test. We need not resolve this question because we conclude that

any error was harmless.

¶ 24 “Where one or more bases for revoking probation are set aside

on appeal, the revocation remains valid provided at least one

violation is sustained.” People v. Loveall, 231 P.3d 408, 416 (Colo.

2010). We may affirm a revocation order when “the record clearly

shows the trial court would have reached the same result even

without consideration of the improper factors.” Id.

¶ 25 The record clearly shows that the district court would have

revoked Brooks’s probation regardless of its finding on Count 3.

There is no dispute that Brooks violated the terms and conditions of

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her reinstated probation by missing the first appointment of her

second term because she relapsed and had been “kicked out” of her

sober living facility. And while one missed appointment or one

relapse, in isolation, might not have been enough to support a

revocation, the court made clear that Brooks’s missed appointment

was part of a pattern of noncompliance stretching back to her first

term of probation that included many missed appointments along

with missed and failed urinalysis tests. This pattern of

noncompliance, the court explained, had given it “reservations

about accepting the disposition” at the first revocation hearing and,

consistent with that disposition, reinstating Brooks’s probation.

But the court agreed to do so on the condition that Brooks would

strictly comply going forward. Despite the court’s admonitions,

Brooks almost immediately violated the terms of her reinstated

probation by failing to appear for her first appointment.

¶ 26 Given the court’s expressed reluctance to accept the first

reinstatement, its requirement that Brooks strictly comply with the

conditions of her second probationary term, and Brooks’s failure to

strictly comply from the outset, we conclude that the district court

would have revoked Brooks’s probation based on her failure to

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attend the first appointment of her second probation term

regardless of her compliance with urinalysis testing requirements.

Accordingly, we will not disturb the district court’s revocation

decision. See id.

V. Disposition

¶ 27 The order is affirmed.

JUDGE HARRIS and JUDGE PAWAR concur.

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