Peo v. Stevens

24CA0532 Peo v Stevens 01-23-2025

COLORADO COURT OF APPEALS

Court of Appeals No. 24CA0532
El Paso County District Court Nos. 95CR3067 & 95CR3461
Honorable David Shakes, Judge

The People of the State of Colorado,

Plaintiff-Appellee,

v.

Shane Stevens,

Defendant-Appellant.

ORDER AFFIRMED

Division II
Opinion by JUDGE GOMEZ
Fox and Lum, JJ., concur

NOT PUBLISHED PURSUANT TO C.A.R. 35(e)
Announced January 23, 2025

Philip J. Weiser, Attorney General, William G. Kozeliski, Senior Assistant
Attorney General, Denver, Colorado, for Plaintiff-Appellee

Shane Stevens, Pro Se
¶1 Defendant, Shane Stevens, appeals the district court’s order

denying his pro se Crim. P. 35(a) motion to correct an illegal

sentence. We affirm.

I. Background

A. Plea Disposition and Sentencing

¶2 In 1995, Stevens, then a juvenile, entered into a plea

disposition resolving two separate, unrelated cases in El Paso

County District Court. In Case No. 95CR3067, he pleaded guilty to

attempted first degree assault, and in Case No. 95CR3461, he

pleaded guilty to first degree sexual assault and escape.

¶3 Stevens was initially sentenced to twelve years in prison for

the attempted assault count, consecutive to a four-year prison term

for the escape count. Those sentences were suspended on the

condition that Stevens complete six years in the Youthful Offender

System (YOS). For the sexual assault count, the court sentenced

Stevens to a six-year term of probation to be served consecutively to

his YOS sentence.

¶4 In 1997, Stevens escaped from YOS. The district court

revoked his YOS sentence and imposed a sixteen-year prison

sentence in Case No. 95CR3067, consecutive to a sixteen-year

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prison sentence in Case No. 95CR3461. The minute orders don’t

reflect a consideration of the originally imposed probationary

sentence, and there are no corresponding updated mittimuses.

¶5 Stevens filed a motion to reconsider his thirty-two-year

sentence. Among other things, he asserted that, during the

providency hearing, the district court repeatedly told him he would

receive a maximum of sixteen years in prison if he failed to

successfully complete YOS. The court granted the motion and

amended Stevens’ prison sentences to run concurrently with one

another. While the amended judgments reflected concurrent

sixteen-year prison sentences for each count, they still made no

mention of the originally imposed probationary term for sexual

assault.

B. Previous Crim. P. 35(c) Proceedings and Appeals

¶6 In 1998, Stevens filed a pro se Crim. P. 35(c) motion seeking to

have his guilty pleas and corresponding convictions in both cases

vacated on various grounds. The public defender initially appointed

to investigate Stevens’ request for postconviction relief withdrew,

concluding that the claims lacked merit. The district court agreed

and denied Stevens’ motion. On appeal, a division of this court

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reversed and remanded the case with directions to appoint

conflict-free counsel “for the purpose of pursuing . . . any arguably

meritorious claims [Stevens] may have.” People v. Stevens, (Colo.

App. No. 00CA1817, Aug. 30, 2001) (not published pursuant to

C.A.R. 35(f)) (Stevens I).

¶7 In 2002 and 2003, postconviction counsel filed an amended

Crim. P. 35(c) motion and a memorandum of law in support of the

amended motion. Relying on Chae v. People, 780 P.2d 481 (Colo.

1989), counsel claimed, as relevant here, that Stevens’ plea

agreement was invalid because it contained an illegal sentence — a

probation sentence ordered to be served consecutively to a prison

sentence — and that the illegal portion of the sentence couldn’t be

“severed from the plea agreement without a resulting material

compromise of the same.”

¶8 The district court denied Stevens’ claim. However, after

determining that it had erroneously revoked the previously imposed

sentence to probation when it revoked Stevens’ YOS term and

hadn’t adequately advised Stevens about mandatory parole, the

court (1) vacated Stevens’ sixteen-year prison sentence for sexual

assault; (2) reinstated the six-year probation term for that offense,

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to be served consecutively to Stevens’ prison terms; and

(3) amended the two remaining prison sentences to thirteen years

each, to be served concurrently.

¶9 Stevens appealed the district court’s order denying his guilty

plea challenge, and a division of this court affirmed, reasoning that

the district court had discretion to impose consecutive prison and

probation sentences. People v. Stevens, slip op. at 3-6 (Colo. App.

No. 04CA0289, Dec. 1, 2005) (not published pursuant to C.A.R.

35(f)) (Stevens II).

¶ 10 Several years later, in 2021, Stevens filed another pro se

postconviction motion citing Crim. P. 35(a) and Crim. P. 35(c). He

argued that, although he had served his sentences, the supreme

court’s holding in Allman v. People, 2019 CO 78, ¶¶ 33, 40 — that a

court may not impose sentences to both imprisonment and

probation for multiple offenses in the same case — rendered the

sentencing scheme provided in his plea agreement illegal and that

he should therefore be permitted to withdraw from the plea

agreement and, thus, withdraw his guilty plea. Concluding that

Stevens’ sentence was not prohibited by Allman, the district court

denied the motion without a hearing.

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¶ 11 A division of this court affirmed the district court’s denial on

different grounds. People v. Stevens, (Colo. App. No. 21CA1829,

Jan. 26, 2023) (not published pursuant to C.A.R. 35(e)) (Stevens III).

The division concluded that, although Allman rendered Stevens’

original sentences to prison and probation illegal, the issue was

moot because he had fully served his sentences. Id. at ¶¶ 18-19.

The division also concluded that Stevens’ challenge to the validity of

his plea, properly construed under Crim. P. 35(c), was successive

because it was raised and resolved in Stevens II and because Allman

didn’t provide an exception to the bar on successive motions. Id. at

¶¶ 20-28.

C. Current Postconviction Proceedings

¶ 12 In 2024, Stevens filed the pro se Crim. P. 35(a) motion at

issue. He again argued that his mixed prison and probation

sentences were illegal, which rendered his plea agreement invalid.

He also argued that he wasn’t procedurally barred from raising the

claim because illegal sentence claims can be raised at any time.

Acknowledging that he had fully served his sentences in these

cases, Stevens asserted that the sentences imposed were “void ab

initio” and required “the judgment of conviction [to] be vacated.” He

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further asserted that he had a “present need” to challenge the

sentences because he is required to register as a sex offender for

life. Thus, Stevens asked the district court to rule that his plea was

invalid, “vacate the guilty plea,” and allow him to “plead anew.”

¶ 13 The district court denied Stevens’ motion as follows: “The

motion to correct illegal sentence is denied. The issue is moot and

was addressed in the Court of Appeals decision in 21CA1829 on

January 26, 2023 at pages 8 and 9.”

II. Analysis

¶ 14 On appeal, Stevens contends that the district court erred by

denying his Crim. P. 35(a) motion. He maintains that his mixed

prison and probation sentences were illegal under Allman, which

rendered his plea agreement invalid. He again asserts that (1) he

has a “present need” to challenge his sentences because he is

required to register as a sex offender, (2) his plea agreement should

be vacated, and (3) he should be allowed to plead anew.

¶ 15 As to Stevens’ claim that his prison and probation sentences

were illegal under Allman, the division in Stevens III previously

ruled that, while the sentences were indeed illegal, such a claim

was moot because Stevens had fully served his sentences. This

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determination is the law of the case, and we see no reason to depart

from it. See People v. Tolbert, 216 P.3d 1, 5 (Colo. App. 2007)

(successive Crim. P. 35(a) claims are subject to the law of the case

doctrine, under which courts follow earlier rulings from the same

case unless it would result in error or the rulings are no longer

sound due to changed conditions).

¶ 16 Stevens’ claim that his illegal sentence rendered his plea

agreement invalid, thereby requiring vacatur of the plea agreement,

is cognizable under Crim. P. 35(c), not Crim. P. 35(a). See People v.

Rockwell, 125 P.3d 410, 414 (Colo. 2005) (“[M]otions that challenge

the validity of a defendant’s plea or the manner in which it was

taken are properly brought under Crim. P. 35(c).”). With certain

exceptions not argued here, Crim. P. 35(c)(3)(VI) and (VII) require a

district court to deny a Crim. P. 35(c) claim as successive if the

issue was or could’ve been raised and resolved in a prior appeal or

postconviction proceeding.

¶ 17 Here, Stevens’ precise claim was raised and resolved in

Stevens III and is therefore successive. He cannot merely change

the caption of his motion to one under Crim. P. 35(a) in order to

re-raise the claim. Nor may he use postconviction motions as a

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means of obtaining perpetual review of his convictions. See People

v. Rodriguez, 914 P.2d 230, 249 (Colo. 1996).

III. Disposition

¶ 18 The order is affirmed.

JUDGE FOX and JUDGE LUM concur.

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