Peo in Interest of OLPA

21CA0325 Peo in Interest of OLPA 10-21-2021

COLORADO COURT OF APPEALS

Court of Appeals No. 21CA0325

City and County of Denver Juvenile Court No. 17JV1110

Honorable Pax L. Moultrie, Judge

The People of the State of Colorado,

Appellee,

In the Interest of O.L.P.A., a Child,

and Concerning M.R.A.,

Appellant.

JUDGMENT AFFIRMED

Division VII

Opinion by JUDGE PAWAR

Navarro and Grove, JJ., concur

NOT PUBLISHED PURSUANT TO C.A.R. 35(e)

Announced October 21, 2021

Kristin M. Bronson, City Attorney, Amy J. Packer, Assistant City Attorney,

Denver, Colorado, for Appellee

Barry Meinster, Guardian Ad Litem

Just Law Group, LLC, John F. Poor, Denver, Colorado, for Appellant

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¶ 1

M.R.A. (father) appeals the judgment terminating the parent-

child legal relationship with O.L.P.A. (the child). We affirm.

I. Background

¶ 2

The Department of Human Services of the City and County of

Denver filed a petition in dependency and neglect regarding the

then-four-year-old child and her half-siblings based on lack of

parental supervision and an unsanitary home. The Department

alleged that father was on parole and not living with the child.

¶ 3

The juvenile court adjudicated the child dependent and

neglected. The court also adopted a treatment plan for father.

¶ 4

The Department later moved to terminate father’s parental

rights. Almost four years after the petition was filed and following a

hearing, the juvenile court granted the motion.

II. Termination of Parental Rights

A. General Law

¶ 5

The juvenile court may terminate parental rights if it finds, by

clear and convincing evidence, that (1) the child has been

adjudicated dependent and neglected; (2) the parent has not

complied with an appropriate, court-approved treatment plan or the

plan has not been successful; (3) the parent is unfit; and (4) the

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parent’s conduct or condition is unlikely to change within a

reasonable time. § 19-3-604(1)(c), C.R.S. 2020; People in Interest of

C.H., 166 P.3d 288, 289 (Colo. App. 2007).

¶ 6

Whether a juvenile court properly terminated parental rights

presents a mixed question of fact and law because it involves

application of the termination statute to evidentiary facts. People in

Interest of A.M. v. T.M., 2021 CO 14, ¶ 15. “We review the juvenile

court’s findings of evidentiary fact — the raw, historical data

underlying the controversy — for clear error and accept them if they

have record support.” People in Interest of S.R.N.J-S., 2020 COA 12,

¶ 10. But we review de novo the juvenile court’s legal conclusions

based on those facts. See id.

B. Sufficiency of the Evidence

¶ 7

Father contends that the juvenile court erred by terminating

his parental rights. Specifically, he asserts that the court erred by

finding that he was an unfit parent who could not become fit within

a reasonable time. We discern no basis for reversal.

¶ 8

Here, the juvenile court found that father had not reasonably

complied with his treatment plan; he was unfit; and his conduct or

condition was unlikely to change within a reasonable time. In

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doing so, the court found that father had not consistently visited

the child, completed a parent-child interactional assessment (PCI),

or established stability. The court noted that father had moved to

Texas during the case without telling the professionals involved in

his case. The court found that the primary issue was that father

did not have and had not built a relationship with the child. The

court next found that father did not understand the importance of

the child’s relationship with her half-siblings or her mental health

needs. The court further found that father was “unable to offer

nurturing and safe parenting adequate to meet [the child’s] needs”

or show “an ability to be consistent in her life.”

¶ 9

The record supports the juvenile court’s findings. Father’s

attendance at the therapeutic supervised visits with the child was

inconsistent; he did not complete a PCI to learn more about his

relationship with the child; and it was unclear whether he had

stable housing or income. Three months before the termination

hearing, the Department discovered that father had moved to Texas.

Father did not tell the Department or other professionals that he

was moving out of state, so there was no plan in place as to how to

let the child know.

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¶ 10

The record shows that father and the child had limited

contact, and therefore, they did not have a strong relationship. The

child’s therapist testified that the child “hasn’t had enough time

with [father] to establish that rapport to feel safe to live with him.”

There were times when the child did not want to engage with father

during visits or attend visits. The caseworker testified that the

child had reported that she wanted contact with father but she did

not want to live with him.

¶ 11

The record further indicates that there were concerns that

father did not understand the child’s mental health needs and her

need to maintain a connection with her half-siblings. The child’s

therapist and the caseworker testified that the child had a strong

bond with her half-siblings and they had an “unbreakable sibling

connection.” The therapist and the caseworker also testified that it

would be “detrimental” to separate the child and her half-siblings.

The caseworker testified that father had not acknowledged “what

the sibling connection means for [the child] and her sisters.”

¶ 12

Lastly, the caseworker opined that father was unfit and would

not become fit within a reasonable time. In particular, the

caseworker testified that father lacked consistency, stability, and an

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understanding of the child’s mental health needs and sibling

connection. The caseworker also testified that the case had been

open for almost four years and father had a reasonable amount of

time to become fit.

¶ 13

Because the record supports the juvenile court’s factual

findings, we will not disturb those findings or the court’s legal

conclusions on appeal.

III. Less Drastic Alternatives

¶ 14

Father contends that the juvenile court erred by finding that

there were no less drastic alternatives to termination. Specifically,

he argues that the court could have allocated parental

responsibilities to the paternal great aunt or the foster family. We

discern no basis for reversal.

¶ 15

The juvenile court must also consider and eliminate less

drastic alternatives before it terminates the parent-child legal

relationship. People in Interest of D.P., 181 P.3d 403, 408 (Colo.

App. 2008). In considering less drastic alternatives, the court bases

its decision on the best interests of the children, giving primary

consideration to their physical, mental, and emotional conditions

and needs. § 19-3-604(3).

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¶ 16

Here, the juvenile court found that there were no less drastic

alternatives to termination. The court considered the paternal great

aunt but found that she had withdrawn her request for placement.

The court found that the child’s relationship with her half-siblings

had “been a significant stabilizing factor” and that she had moved

back and forth between family members during the case. The court

also found that the child needed stability and permanency that

adoption could provide.

¶ 17

The record supports the juvenile court’s findings. The case

had been ongoing for almost four years, and the child needed

permanency. The child’s therapist testified that the child needed

“to know that her everyday needs [were] going to be met.” And

when, as here, the child is less than six years old when a petition in

dependency and neglect is filed, the expedited permanency planning

provisions apply. § 19-1-123(1)(a), C.R.S. 2020. The guidelines in

effect at the time of the termination hearing required the juvenile

court to place the child in a permanent home “as expeditiously as

possible.” § 19-3-702(5)(c), C.R.S. 2020. At the time of the

termination hearing, the child had been in several placements. The

caseworker testified that the case had been open for a long time

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because the Department was exploring various family members and

a possible allocation of parental responsibilities (APR).

¶ 18

The record also indicates that the Department and the foster

family preferred adoption over an APR. The caseworker testified

that the child and her half-siblings had been in a foster-to-adopt

home for the past six months. According to the caseworker, the

child wanted to be adopted with her half-siblings.

¶ 19

As to the paternal great aunt, the record shows that an

Interstate Compact on the Placement of Children home study was

initiated for her. But the home study was denied because the aunt

reported that her apartment was not big enough and she did not

have the financial means to care for the child and her half-siblings.

¶ 20

Because the record supports the juvenile court’s factual

findings, we will not disturb those findings or the court’s legal

conclusions on appeal.

IV. Conclusion

¶ 21

The judgment is affirmed.

JUDGE NAVARRO and JUDGE GROVE concur.