Peo v Helzer

23CA1997 Peo v Helzer 10-15-2026
COLORADO COURT OF APPEALS
Court of Appeals No. 23CA1997
El Paso County District Court No. 22CR6292
Honorable Marcus Henson, Judge
The People of the State of Colorado,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v.
Jefferey George Helzer,
Defendant-Appellant.
JUDGMENT AFFIRMED
Division VII
Opinion by JUDGE BROWN
Pawar and Moultrie, JJ., concur
NOT PUBLISHED PURSUANT TO C.A.R. 35(e)
Announced October 15, 2026
Philip J. Weiser, Attorney General, Carmen Moraleda, Senior Assistant
Attorney General, Denver, Colorado, for Plaintiff-Appellee
Megan A. Ring, Colorado State Public Defender, Kira L. Suyeishi, Deputy State
Public Defender, Denver, Colorado, for Defendant-Appellant

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¶ 1 Defendant, Jefferey George Helzer, appeals the judgment of
conviction entered on a jury verdict finding him guilty of attempted
first degree murder, attempted first degree assault, and two crime of
violence sentence enhancers. He contends that (1) the district court
erred by rejecting his proposed jury instruction concerning
self-defense against multiple assailants; (2) the prosecutor
committed misconduct in rebuttal closing argument; and (3) the
alleged errors cumulatively deprived him of a fair trial. We affirm.
I. Background
¶ 2 One evening in December 2022, Fedor Komarov was parked on
the side of the road in a black Nissan, sleeping in the car with the
door ajar. Surveillance footage from a nearby business captured a
blue pickup truck driving the opposite direction before slowing to a
brief stop as it passed Komarov’s parked car. The driver of the blue
truck, later identified as Helzer, continued driving down the street
away from Komarov’s car and rounded a corner out of view of the
camera. But then he reappeared and sped back up the street
toward Komarov’s car, squealing the truck’s tires as he drove.
Helzer rammed the front of his truck into the side of Komarov’s car,
started to drive away, and stopped again. As Komarov exited the

2
vehicle to see what had happened, Helzer reversed and drove the
truck backward toward Komarov’s car. Komarov quickly moved out
of the way and ran across the street as Helzer hit the side of the car
a second time, causing a tire and debris to fly into the street.
Helzer drove forward again, this time toward Komarov, who was still
running across the street into a parking lot. Helzer narrowly
missed hitting Komarov before driving away.
¶ 3 Two days later, police officers located Helzer’s truck, which
had extensive physical damage to the front and back ends, and
approached Helzer as he sat in the front seat. The encounter was
captured on an officer’s body-worn camera. The officer asked
Helzer about the incident two nights before, and Helzer said that he
was a “deputized cooperating witness in an ongoing federal law
enforcement investigation” and that “the crash” was related to that
investigation. Helzer claimed that Komarov1 was under “federal
felony indictment for threatening to murder” him, that he had
1 In the bodycam footage, Helzer refers to “Theodore Fedov a/k/a
the Russian” as the person under investigation. The parties appear
to agree that Helzer intended to identify Fedor Komarov. Although
they do not direct us to anything in the record making that clear,
for purposes of resolving this appeal, we accept that Komarov was
the person Helzer referenced.

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reported the threat to police, and that police had not done anything
about it. He told the officer that he recorded a video of Komarov
threatening to kill him with a gun on the night of the incident. But
Helzer did not provide police with that video, claiming it was in a
federal law enforcement storage facility. He also did not provide the
name of an investigating officer or a case number associated with
the federal investigation. Helzer told the officer that the damage to
the rear end of his truck was from when Komarov tried to kill him
before but could not “comment on” the damage to the front end.
¶ 4 The prosecution charged Helzer with one count each of
attempted first degree murder and attempted first degree assault,
as well as two crime of violence sentence enhancers. Helzer
asserted self-defense. Essentially, he argued that Komarov had
threatened to murder him with a gun, that there was a second
person in Komarov’s car, that he reasonably feared that Komarov or
the other person intended to harm him, and that he used
reasonable force to defend against the threat. In the end, the jury
found Helzer guilty as charged, and the district court sentenced him
to sixteen years in the custody of the Department of Corrections.

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II. Multiple Assailants Jury Instruction
¶ 5 Helzer contends that the district court erred by rejecting his
proposed jury instruction concerning self-defense against multiple
assailants. We disagree.
A. Standard of Review and Generally Applicable Law
¶ 6 The trial court has a duty to instruct the jury correctly on all
matters of law applicable to the case. Riley v. People, 266 P.3d
1089, 1092 (Colo. 2011). We review de novo whether the
instructions, read together, adequately informed the jury of the law.
Id. If the jury was adequately instructed, we review the court’s
decision whether to give a particular instruction for an abuse of
discretion. People v. Roberts-Bicking, 2021 COA 12, ¶ 17. A court
abuses its discretion if its ruling is manifestly arbitrary,
unreasonable, or unfair or if it misapplies the law. See id.; Rains v.
Barber, 2018 CO 61, ¶ 8.
¶ 7 A defendant is entitled to an instruction on an affirmative
defense if there is “some credible evidence” to support it. Galvan v.
People, 2020 CO 82, ¶ 24 (“[O]ur appellate courts have understood
‘some credible evidence’ to be interchangeable with ‘some evidence,’
‘any credible [even if highly improbable] evidence,’ ‘a scintilla of

5
evidence,’ a ‘small quantum of evidence,’ and ‘any evidence.’”); see
§ 18-1-407(1), C.R.S. 2026. We review de novo whether there was
sufficient evidence to support an affirmative defense instruction,
Castillo v. People, 2018 CO 62, ¶ 32, viewing the evidence in the
light most favorable to giving the instruction, People v. Newell, 2017
COA 27, ¶ 19.
¶ 8 Under section 18-1-704, C.R.S. 2026, a person is justified in
using “a degree of force which he reasonably believes to be
necessary” for the purpose of defending himself “from what he
reasonably believes to be the use or imminent use of unlawful
physical force by [another] person.” When “evaluating the
reasonableness of the accused’s belief in the necessity of defensive
action and the reasonableness of force used by him to repel the
apparent danger,” the jury must consider “the number of persons
reasonably appearing to be threatening the accused.” People v.
Jones, 675 P.2d 9, 14 (Colo. 1984). But a trial court need not “give
a specific multiple assailants instruction in every case involving
both multiple assailants and self-defense.” Riley, 266 P.3d at 1094.
Rather, “so long as the given instructions properly direct the jury to
consider the totality of the circumstances during its deliberations

6
on reasonableness,” the instructions adequately inform the jury of
the governing law. Id.
B. The District Court Did Not Err by Declining Helzer’s
Proposed Multiple Assailants Instruction
¶ 9 The district court gave a standard self-defense instruction
(Instruction No. 17) informing the jury that Helzer was “legally
authorized to use physical force upon another person” if “he used
that physical force in order to defend himself from what he
reasonably believed to be the use or imminent use of unlawful
physical force by that other person” and “he used a degree of force
which he reasonably believed to be necessary for that purpose.”
¶ 10 Helzer asked the court to give the jury the following additional
instruction:
In determining whether Mr. Helzer’s beliefs
were reasonable regarding his fear and actions
in response to that fear as required in [the
self-defense instruction], you must consider
the totality of the circumstances shown by the
evidence, including the number of persons
reasonably appearing to be threatening Mr.
Helzer.
¶ 11 The court declined the proposed instruction, reasoning that it
conflated legal concepts and that there was insufficient evidence of
“multiple assailants coming at Mr. Helzer at the time that he

7
engaged in what has been argued . . . was his legally authorized use
of force.” Nonetheless, the court agreed to instruct the jury to
consider the totality of the circumstances when evaluating the
reasonableness of Helzer’s beliefs and use of force. To that end,
Instruction No. 19 provided as follows:
In determining whether Mr. Helzer’s beliefs
were reasonable regarding his fear and actions
in response to that fear as required in
Instruction No. 17, you must consider the
totality of the circumstances shown by the
evidence.
¶ 12 Helzer contends that the court erred by rejecting his proffered
instruction because it was required to instruct the jury to consider
the number of persons reasonably appearing to be threatening
Helzer. For two reasons, we disagree.
¶ 13 First, we conclude, as did the district court, that there was no
credible evidence that multiple persons reasonably appeared to be
threatening Helzer. See Riley, 266 P.3d at 1094; Galvan, ¶ 24;
Castillo, ¶ 32. We acknowledge that, despite Komarov’s testimony
that he was the only person in the vehicle when Helzer crashed into
it, the record contains a scintilla of evidence that there may have
been another person in or near Komarov’s car. An eyewitness

8
testified that Komarov was the only person she saw exit the car
after Helzer hit it. But on cross-examination, she conceded that
she could see a “shadow” — which defense counsel suggested was a
second person getting out of the car — in the top corner of the
video. Still, the witness could not “say that [the shadow] was a
clearly defined person.” And another witness who talked with
Komarov after the incident testified that Komarov said that he was
not in the car when Helzer hit it but that his girlfriend was.
¶ 14 But to warrant an instruction on self-defense against multiple
assailants, it is not enough for the record to show that other
persons may have been present; instead, the evidence must show
that the other persons who were present reasonably appeared to be
threatening the defendant. See Jones, 675 P.2d at 11, 14 (multiple
assailants instruction was warranted when defendant testified that
four people attacked him at the same time); see also Ordway v.
Commonwealth, 391 S.W.3d 762, 794 (Ky. 2013) (“The multiple
assailants self-defense instruction serves an important function
when there is an uncertain situation in which a person, authorized
to act in self-defense, finds it difficult to ascertain exactly who
among a number of threatening adversaries poses the immediate

9
threat to his life.”); State v. Coffin, 1999-NMSC-038, ¶ 12 (“While it
is true that a person may act in self-defense against multiple
attackers acting in concert, this principle applies only to the extent
that each accomplice poses an immediate danger of death or great
bodily harm, thereby necessitating an act of self-defense.”); Juarez
v. State, 886 S.W.2d 511, 514 (Tex. App. 1994) (the defendant was
not entitled to a multiple assailants instruction when evidence
showed only that the victim posed a threat and was “silent about
the conduct of the seven or eight other men” present). Even
assuming there was another person in or near Komarov’s car when
Helzer crashed into it, the record does not contain any evidence
that the second person posed a threat to Helzer.
¶ 15 Helzer did not testify at trial, so the only statements the jury
heard from him were reflected in the bodycam recording from his
encounter with police two days after the incident. In that recording,
Helzer stated that Komarov had threatened to murder him with a
gun on the date of the incident, but he made no claim that anyone
else threatened him or that anyone else was present when Komarov
made the threat or when Helzer crashed his truck into Komarov’s
car. Because the shadow “person” was not identified, it would be

10
speculative to assume either that Helzer knew that “person” was
present or that the “person” threatened unlawful physical force
upon Helzer. And the evidence revealed nothing about Komarov’s
girlfriend, even if she existed and was there that night.
¶ 16 In short, nothing in the record shows that anyone other than
Komarov reasonably appeared to be threatening Helzer. Thus,
there was insufficient evidence to support the proposed instruction.
See O’Shaughnessy v. People, 2012 CO 9, ¶ 13 (“[I]f the trial court
determines as a matter of law that no evidence exists in the record
to support an affirmative defense, then the instruction need not be
presented to the jury because there is no issue of fact for the jury to
resolve.”); People v. Reed, 695 P.2d 806, 808 (Colo. App. 1984)
(Because “[t]here was no evidence to support” the defendant’s
requested instruction, “the trial court correctly refused to give it.”).
¶ 17 Second, we conclude that the instructions, when read
together, adequately informed the jury that it was to consider the
totality of the circumstances when evaluating the reasonableness of
Helzer’s beliefs and use of force. See Riley, 266 P.3d at 1094.
Indeed, Instruction No. 19 specifically told the jury that it must
“consider the totality of the circumstances” when determining

11
whether “Helzer’s beliefs were reasonable regarding his fear and
actions in response to that fear as required in Instruction No. 17.”
¶ 18 We are not persuaded by Helzer’s argument that the language
of Instruction No. 19 did not go far enough. Helzer points us to
Roberts-Bicking, ¶ 26, which held that the pattern self-defense
instruction at the time did not satisfy Riley’s requirement that the
jury be instructed to consider the totality of the circumstances in
multiple assailant cases. But the Roberts-Bicking division
concluded that the trial court’s supplemental instruction — that the
jury must consider “what a reasonable person in [the defendant’s]
situation would have believed or done under those circumstances”
and, in making that determination, it must “consider the totality of
the circumstances shown by the evidence” — cured the deficiency.
Id. at ¶ 27. Helzer contends that because Instruction No. 19 did
not include “key language that the jury must consider what a
reasonable person in that situation would have believed or done,” it
was inadequate.
¶ 19 Even though Roberts-Bicking approved of the supplemental
instruction given in that case, it did not mandate the use of any
specific language. On the contrary, it clarified that “[a]ll that is

12
required is that the jury be instructed to consider the
reasonableness of the defendant’s beliefs and actions under the
totality of the circumstances.” Id. at ¶ 28. Instruction No. 19
accomplished that objective.
¶ 20 For these reasons, we conclude that the district court did not
err by declining to give Helzer’s proposed multiple assailants jury
instruction. See Riley, 266 P.3d at 1092; Roberts-Bicking, ¶ 17.
III. Prosecutorial Misconduct
¶ 21 Helzer contends that the prosecutor committed misconduct
during rebuttal closing argument by (1) shifting the burden of proof
to the defense; (2) denigrating defense counsel; and (3) imploring
the jury to hold Helzer accountable for his conduct. We discern no
basis to reverse.
A. Applicable Law and Standard of Review
¶ 22 We engage in a two-step analysis when reviewing claims for
prosecutorial misconduct. Wend v. People, 235 P.3d 1089, 1096
(Colo. 2010). First, we determine whether the prosecutor’s conduct
was improper based on the totality of the circumstances. Id.
Second, we decide whether such actions warrant reversal under the
proper standard. Id.

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¶ 23 While prosecutors can use every legitimate means to bring
about a just conviction, they have a duty to avoid using improper
methods designed to obtain an unjust result. Domingo-Gomez v.
People, 125 P.3d 1043, 1048 (Colo. 2005). When evaluating claims
of prosecutorial misconduct in closing argument, we consider the
challenged statements in the context of the argument as a whole
and in light of the evidence before the jury. People v. McMinn, 2013
COA 94, ¶ 60. Prosecutors have wide latitude in the language and
style they employ and in replying to opposing counsel’s argument.
Id. And “because arguments delivered in the heat of trial are not
always perfectly scripted,” we give prosecutors “the benefit of the
doubt when their remarks are ambiguous or simply inartful.” Id.
B. The Prosecutor Did Not Shift the Burden of Proof
¶ 24 Helzer contends that the prosecutor improperly shifted the
burden of proof to the defense when he argued, “[Helzer] said he’s a
federal witness when there’s no evidence that there’s any federal
people involved.” Although it is improper for a prosecutor to shift
the burden of proof through argument, People v. Santana, 255 P.3d
1126, 1130 (Colo. 2011), we perceive no burden shifting here.
Instead, the prosecutor simply highlighted the absence of evidence

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supporting Helzer’s explanation for why he claimed to have acted in
self-defense. See id. at 1132 (a prosecutor may comment on the
lack of evidence supporting a defendant’s theory of the case without
shifting the burden of proof). The prosecutor did not express or
imply that Helzer had a duty to prove anything.
¶ 25 Moreover, the district court properly instructed the jury, both
verbally and in writing, that the prosecution alone had the burden
of proof at trial. See People v. Larsen, 2023 COA 28, ¶ 35 (we
presume the jury followed the court’s instructions). And the
prosecutor reminded the jury that it was his burden to prove the
charges beyond a reasonable doubt in his closing argument. On
this record, we conclude that the prosecutor’s statement was not
improper. See Wend, 235 P.3d at 1096.
C. The Prosecutor Did Not Denigrate Defense Counsel
¶ 26 Helzer contends that the prosecutor improperly denigrated
defense counsel when he referred to Helzer’s self-defense theory as
a “house of cards.” Although a prosecutor may not make
arguments that are intended to denigrate the defense, People v.
Curtis, 2021 COA 103, ¶ 48, a prosecutor may attack the theory of
defense as unsupported by the evidence, see People v. Herold, 2024

15
COA 53, ¶ 97, and may employ rhetorical devices and engage in
oratorical embellishment and metaphorical nuance in doing so, see
People v. Samson, 2012 COA 167, ¶ 31.
¶ 27 The prosecutor here attacked Helzer’s theory of defense — that
Komarov had threatened to kill him and that he was acting in
self-defense — by pointing to the absence of evidence supporting
Helzer’s story about the federal investigation involving Komarov and
calling Helzer’s credibility into question. The prosecutor did not
personally attack the prosecutor or dwell on the “house of cards”
metaphor. Viewed in context, the statement was not improper. See
Wend, 235 P.3d at 1096.
D. The Prosecutor Did Not Commit Misconduct by
Asking the Jury to Hold Helzer Responsible
¶ 28 Finally, Helzer contends that the prosecutor engaged in
improper argument when he stated that the jury should “[h]old
[Helzer] responsible.” He argues that the prosecutor pressured the
jury to return a guilty verdict on an impassioned basis. True, a
prosecutor may not “pressure jurors by suggesting that guilty
verdicts are necessary to do justice for a sympathetic victim.”
People v. Marko, 2015 COA 139, ¶ 221 (citation omitted), aff’d on

16
other grounds, 2018 CO 97. But a prosecutor may ask the jury to
hold the defendant accountable based on the evidence. See People
v. Tran, 2020 COA 99, ¶ 68. That is what the prosecutor did here.
¶ 29 Before asking the jury to hold Helzer responsible, the
prosecutor highlighted the absence of evidence supporting Helzer’s
version of events and asserted instead that Helzer “chose to attack
Mr. Komarov. And he did. Multiple times.” The prosecutor argued
that because Helzer had not acted in self-defense, he was
“responsible for trying to hurt Mr. Komarov,” so the jury should
“[h]old him responsible.” When considered in context, the
prosecutor told the jury to “[h]old [Helzer] responsible” only after
explaining how the evidence proved Helzer’s guilt. We are not
persuaded that the prosecutor’s statement was improper.
¶ 30 Even so, “[t]he prosecutor’s appeal to justice was so minimally
prejudicial that reversal [would] not [be] required under any
standard.” People v. Garcia, 2021 COA 80, ¶ 40, aff’d, 2023 CO 30.
Specifically, “[t]he prosecutor’s argument was brief and a small part
of summation.” Id. And although the statement was the last thing
the jury heard before deliberations, we trust that the jury

17
understood the statement in the context we have explained. See id.
We discern no reversible misconduct. See Wend, 235 P.3d at 1096.
IV. Cumulative Error
¶ 31 Helzer contends that even if the individual alleged errors do
not require reversal, their cumulative prejudicial impact does. But
the doctrine of cumulative error requires that numerous errors be
committed, not merely alleged. People v. Whitman, 205 P.3d 371,
387 (Colo. App. 2007). Because we have not found any errors, the
cumulative error doctrine does not apply. People v. Feldman, 2024
COA 119, ¶ 50.
V. Disposition
¶ 32 We affirm the judgment of conviction.
JUDGE PAWAR and JUDGE MOULTRIE concur.