James Nix and Yvonne Davis v. James H. Billington

United States Court of Appeals
FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT
Argued May 4, 2006 Decided May 23, 2006
No. 04-5225
J AMES NIX AND YVONNE DAVIS ,
APPELLANTS
v.
J AMES H. BILLINGTON ,
APPELLEE
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the District of Columbia
(No. 82cv00400)
Forrest Treat, Student Counsel, argued the cause as amicus
curiae in support of appellants. With him on the briefs were
Steven H. Goldblatt, appointed by the court, Alistair E.
Newbern, Supervising Attorney, and Haven G. Ward, Student
Counsel.
Madelyn E. Johnson, Assistant U.S. Attorney, argued the
cause for appellee. With her on the brief were Kenneth L.
Wainstein, U.S. Attorney, and R. Craig Lawrence, Assistant
U.S. Attorney. Michael J. Ryan, Assistant U.S. Attorney,
entered an appearance.

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Before: SENTELLE and BROWN , Circuit Judges, and
EDWARDS , Senior Circuit Judge.
Opinion for the Court filed by Senior Circuit Judge
EDWARDS .
EDWARDS , Senior Circuit Judge: This appeal emanates
from the District Court’s denial of appellants’ motion for a
status hearing on their pending retaliation claims. Those claims
were filed pursuant to a court-approved settlement agreement in
a class action alleging racial discrimination in hiring and
promotion practices by the Library of Congress. The District
Court denied appellants’ motion for want of jurisdiction, finding
that, because its oversight jurisdiction under the settlement
agreement ended on December 1, 2002, the court lacked subject
matter jurisdiction to address appellants’ retaliation claims.
Because we find that the District Court erred in concluding that
it was without jurisdiction to address appellants’ pending claims,
we reverse and remand the case for further proceedings.
I. BACKGROUND
Appellants James Nix and Yvonne Davis were unnamed
members of the plaintiff class in a Title VII suit filed on behalf
of African-American employees of the Library of Congress
(“Library”), which was settled by the parties through a court-
approved settlement agreement (“Settlement Agreement” or
“Agreement”). The order approving the parties’ Agreement
provided that the District Court would retain oversight
jurisdiction “for the four-year period described in the Settlement
Agreement.” Cook v. Billington, CA No. 82-400, Order at 2
(D.D.C. Sept. 22, 1995), reprinted in App. to Br. of Appointed
Amicus Curiae in Supp. of Appellants Nix & Davis (“App.”)
172, 173; see Settlement Agreement ¶¶ 16-17, Cook v.
Billington, CA No. 82-400 (D.D.C. Sept. 22, 1995), reprinted in
App. 74, 89 (“This Settlement Agreement and all provisions
thereof will expire and shall be without force and effect four

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years from Final Court Approval. . . . The District Court shall
retain jurisdiction of this action solely for the purpose of
addressing the parties’ compliance with the provisions of this
Settlement Agreement during the four-year period set forth in
Paragraph 16 above.”).
In July 1997, during this oversight period, the plaintiff class
filed a motion for enforcement, alleging, inter alia, that the
Library was in violation of the terms of the Agreement, because
it had retaliated against appellants for their involvement in the
lawsuit. “The Plaintiff Class [sought] the opportunity to prove
this retaliation” and “request[ed] that the [District] Court
authorize a period of 120 days for discovery on the issue of
retaliation, at the conclusion of which dispositive motions may
be filed or a hearing conducted.” Mem. of P. & A. in Supp. of
Pls.’ Mot. to Enforce Settlement Agreement at 3, Cook v.
Billington, CA No. 82-400 (D.D.C. filed July 25, 1997),
reprinted in App. 177, 179.
On November 10, 1998, the District Court granted the
requested discovery, stating that, “[a]t the conclusion of
discovery, the parties may file dispositive motions and/or the
Court may conduct a hearing.” Cook v. Billington, CA No. 82-
400, Mem. Op. at 15 (D.D.C. Nov. 10, 1998), reprinted in App.
260, 274. The accompanying order required “that any
dispositive motions be filed on or before April 1, 1999.” Cook
v. Billington, CA No. 82-400, Order (D.D.C. Nov. 10, 1998)
(“November 1998 Order”), reprinted in App. 275. On
December 28, 1998, however, the District Court signed a
Stipulation and Order which stayed the November 1998 Order
to enable the parties to pursue settlement negotiations on various
contested issues, including appellants’ retaliation claims. The
new order provided:
[I]n the event that the parties report to the Court that an
impasse has been reached concerning the Davis and Nix
claims, then absent further Order of the Court, the 120-day

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discovery period shall commence on the fifteenth day
following the report of impasse to the Court and any
dispositive motions shall be filed within 30 days of the
conclusion of the discovery period.
Cook v. Billington, CA No. 82-400, Stipulation & Order at 2
(D.D.C. Dec. 28, 1998) (“December 1998 Order”), reprinted in
App. 276, 277.
The parties to the Agreement subsequently resolved their
differences as to all but appellants’ retaliation claims. On
January 18, 2001, the District Court issued an order adopting the
parties’ stipulated agreement on the resolved issues and
extending the court’s oversight jurisdiction as to certain aspects
of the Agreement until December 1, 2002. Cook v. Billington,
CA No. 82-400, Order (D.D.C. Jan. 18, 2001), reprinted in App.
308. There is no question that appellants’ retaliation claims
were still pending when this January 18, 2001 order issued.
On April 18, 2001, appellants notified the District Court
that the parties were unable to resolve the retaliation claims
through negotiation. The discovery period then began to run.
Neither party filed a dispositive motion at the end of the
discovery period, and the District Court did nothing to address
appellants’ pending claims. On December 1, 2002, the four-year
period described in the Settlement Agreement ended. On May
2, 2003, Cook v. Billington was reassigned from the judge who
had issued the November 1998 and December 1998 Orders to a
new District Court Judge. And on September 8, 2003, the newly
assigned trial judge denied a motion filed by the plaintiff class
seeking to extend the court’s oversight jurisdiction under the
Settlement Agreement for an additional year.
In April 2004, appellants filed a motion “for a status hearing
on their retaliation claims” in order “to set a schedule for the
resolution of their retaliation claims.” Am. Req. for a Status
Hr’g on the Retaliation Claims at 1, Cook v. Billington, CA No.

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82-400 (D.D.C. filed Apr. 28, 2004), reprinted in App. 391. The
District Court denied the motion on the grounds that appellants
“failed to comply with the requirements of the November 10,
1998 Order and [the District] Court’s jurisdiction ended on
December 1, 2002.” Cook v. Billington, CA No. 82-400, Order
at 2 (D.D.C. Apr. 30, 2004) (“2004 Order”), reprinted in App.
402, 403. Appellants filed a timely notice of appeal.
II. STANDARD OF REVIEW
We review the District Court’s determination that it lacks
subject matter jurisdiction de novo. See, e.g., Ctr. for Law &
Educ. v. Dep’t of Educ., 396 F.3d 1152, 1156 (D.C. Cir. 2005)
(“A dismissal for lack of subject matter jurisdiction is . . .
reviewed de novo.”). The District Court’s construction of the
court-approved Settlement Agreement is also reviewed de novo.
See Richardson v. Edwards, 127 F.3d 97, 101 (D.C. Cir. 1997)
(district court “decisions interpreting consent decrees and the
agreements underlying them” are reviewed de novo). A district
court’s interpretation and enforcement of its own orders is
typically subject to review only for abuse of discretion. See,
e.g., Gardner v. United States, 211 F.3d 1305, 1308 (D.C. Cir.
2000) (review is for abuse of discretion where court dismisses
action for failure to comply with a court order). In this case, it
is unclear whether such deferential review is appropriate,
because the trial judge’s decision was based on an interpretation
of orders drafted by a different judge. See United States v.
Spallone, 399 F.3d 415, 423 (2d Cir. 2005) (holding that when
the trial judge did not draft the order at issue, the appellate court
“appl[ies] traditional de novo review to his interpretation”). We
need not wrestle with this issue, however. For the reasons
explained below, we hold that the District Court’s interpretation
of the disputed 1998 Orders cannot survive review under either
the de novo or abuse of discretion standard.

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III. APPELLATE JURISDICTION
This court has jurisdiction over this appeal, because the
2004 Order denying appellants’ request for a status hearing was
tantamount to a final judgment on appellants’ claims. The
District Court’s order certainly was not interlocutory. When the
court denied appellants’ request for a status hearing on the
ground that it lacked jurisdiction, it disengaged itself entirely
from the case. In the District Court’s view, the absence of
subject matter jurisdiction meant that the case was over. The
order positively confirmed that the District Court had effectively
removed the case from its docket, thus making the case ripe for
review. See Catlin v. United States, 324 U.S. 229, 233 (1945)
(holding that appellate review may be had on an order disposing
of the case).
In short, there can be no real doubt here that the District
Court’s action was sufficient to afford this court appellate
jurisdiction. See In re Farmers’ Loan & Trust Co., 129 U.S.
206, 213 (1889) (holding that orders resolving matters that arise
“after a decree which disposes of a principal subject of
litigation” “may be appealed” “when they partake of the nature
of final decisions”); accord Jones-El v. Berge, 374 F.3d 541,
543 (7th Cir. 2004) (to determine whether there is jurisdiction,
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291, “[w]e treat a post-judgment
proceeding as if it were a freestanding lawsuit and attempt to
identify the final decision in that proceeding”). Appellants filed
a timely appeal to contest the District Court’s disposition of
their retaliation claims, so the case is now properly before this
court on review.
IV. THE M ERITS OF APPELLANTS ’ CLAIMS
Turning to the merits, we hold that appellants’ claims were
within the jurisdiction of the District Court, because they were
filed during the oversight period and were still pending before
the trial court when its oversight jurisdiction under the

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Agreement expired on December 1, 2002. The District Court
erred in ruling otherwise.
The District Court mistakenly concluded that the
“[November 1998] Order clearly obligated the Plaintiffs to file
a dispositive motion or request a hearing.” 2004 Order at 1,
reprinted in App. 402. The plain text of the orders issued in
1998 is to the contrary. Both orders set a definite time frame for
any dispositive motions that might be filed. Neither order,
however, required dispositive motions to be filed. More
critically, while the record shows that the parties and the court
contemplated the possibility of a hearing, neither order required
plaintiffs to move for a hearing or set a deadline by which a
hearing request should be made. And it is quite unremarkable
that appellants elected not to file a dispositive motion at the
close of discovery, for there is nothing to indicate that appellants
had reason to think that their claims could be resolved pursuant
to post-discovery motions. A dispositive motion is only proper
if it is warranted.
On the record at hand, it is clear that the trial court’s
November 1998 and December 1998 Orders did not require
appellants to file dispositive motions or request a hearing, and
they clearly did not set a deadline for requesting a hearing.
Appellants’ retaliation claims were pending before the District
Court at the time when the Agreement expired on December 1,
2002, and they were still pending when appellants filed their
motion for a status hearing in April 2004. The District Court,
thus, erred in concluding that it lacked jurisdiction to consider
plaintiffs’ request for a status hearing.
The December 1, 2002 expiration of the court’s oversight
jurisdiction did not divest the District Court of jurisdiction over
pending claims. The duration of the District Court’s jurisdiction
was defined by the language of the Agreement. EEOC v. Local
40, Int’l Ass’n of Bridge Workers, 76 F.3d 76, 79-80 (2d Cir.
1996) (holding that the language of a consent decree, as the

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agreement of the parties, defines the court’s jurisdiction); see
Pigford v. Veneman, 292 F.3d 918, 925 (D.C. Cir. 2002) (“[T]he
district court’s interpretive and enforcement authority depends
on the terms of the decree . . . .”). There is no doubt that, under
the parties’ Agreement, no new retaliation claims could be filed
after the expiration date of the Agreement. But the Agreement
cannot plausibly be construed to mean that pending claims must
be dismissed for lack of jurisdiction if those claims remain
unresolved when the Agreement expires. Thomason v. Russell
Corp., 132 F.3d 632, 634 (11th Cir. 1998) (“Neither the parties
in agreeing to the Decree’s provisions, nor the district court in
approving them, could have intended that the court would be
barred from passing on a motion to enforce the Decree simply
because the court could not reach a decision until after the
Decree’s expiration date.”).
Indeed, during oral argument, appellee’s counsel conceded
that, if appellants’ claims were still “pending” when the District
Court denied their motion, then the court undoubtedly had
subject matter jurisdiction over those claims. In other words, the
Library does not doubt that the District Court retains jurisdiction
over claims that were filed within the Agreement’s oversight
period and were still “pending” when the Agreement expired.
Rather, the Library’s position here is that appellants’ claims
were not “pending” on December 1, 2002. We disagree. We
hold that appellants’ claims are still “pending” and awaiting
disposition by the District Court.
V. CONCLUSION
The District Court had jurisdiction to resolve appellants’
pending retaliation claims after the expiration of the Agreement.
Appellants do not seek to reopen or to extend the District
Court’s now-expired oversight of the Cook settlement. They are
not seeking to enforce the Agreement through newly filed
actions. Instead, they have asked the District Court to resolve
their claims, which were filed in 1997 during the court’s

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oversight period. The District Court’s reasons for ending
appellants’ post-judgment proceeding were in error. Its order is
hereby reversed, and the case is remanded to allow appellants’
claims to be addressed and resolved.
So ordered.

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