K. John Corrigan v. DEB HAALAND,∗ Secretary of the U.S. Department of the Interior

FOR PUBLICATION
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
K. J OHN C ORRIGAN; M. M ARTHA
C ORRIGAN ; HANLEY R ANCH
P ARTNERSHIP ; M ICHAEL F. HANLEY
IV; LINDA LEE HANLEY ,
Plaintiffs-Appellants,
v.
DEB HAALAND,∗ Secretary of the
U.S. Department of the Interior;
WILLIAM P ERRY P ENDLETON ,
Director of the BLM; J OHN R UHS ,
Idaho State Director of the BLM;
LARA DOUGLAS , Boise District
Manager in her capacity as manager
for the Boise District of the BLM;
DONN C HRISTIANSEN, Owyhee Field
Office Manager in his official
capacity as manager for the Owyhee
FO of the Boise District of the BLM,
Defendants-Appellees,
and
No. 20-35393
D.C. No.
1:18-cv-00512-
BLW
OPINION
∗ Pursuant to Rule 43(c)(2) of the Federal Rules of Appellate
Procedure, the Court substitutes as defendant the current Secretary of the
U.S. Department of the Interior, Deb Haaland, for the former Secretary,
David Bernhardt.

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WESTERN WATERSHEDS P ROJECT,
Intervenor-Defendant-Appellee.
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the District of Idaho
B. Lynn Winmill, District Judge, Presiding
Argued and Submitted May 3, 2021
Seattle, Washington
Filed September 2, 2021
Before: Morgan Christen and Mark J. Bennett, Circuit
Judges, and Paul L. Friedman,** District Judge.
Opinion by Judge Friedman
** The Honorable Paul L. Friedman, United States District Judge for
the District of Columbia, sitting by designation.

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SUMMARY***
Grazing Permits
The panel affirmed the district court’s grant of summary
judgment in favor of the Department of the Interior and
Intervenor Western Watersheds Project in appellants’ action
challenging the Bureau of Land Management’s denial of
their request to transfer a “preference” to receive a permit to
graze on certain federal land allotments.
Appellants Michael Hanley, IV, Linda Hanley, and
Hanley Ranch Partnership sought to transfer to Appellants
K. John Corrigan and M. Martha Corrigan the preference.
The BLM denied the preference transfer application based
on its conclusion that Hanley Ranch Partnership did not hold
any preference that it could transfer. The Department of the
Interior’s Interior Board of Land Appeals (“IBLA”) upheld
the BLM’s denial.
The panel upheld the IBLA’s decision at step one of the
Chevron framework because the IBLA correctly applied the
clear and unambiguous language of the Taylor Grazing Act
of 1934 and the Federal Land Policy and Management Act
of 1976, which established that a grazing preference could
not be exercised after the corresponding grazing permit was
not renewed for bad behavior. The panel rejected the
ranchers’ contention that a grazing preference remains
attached to base property until separately cancelled.
Because the IBLA correctly interpreted and applied the
*** This summary constitutes no part of the opinion of the court. It
has been prepared by court staff for the convenience of the reader.

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4 C ORRIGAN V . H AALAND
statutory authorities, and therefore did not act “contrary to
law,” the decision was not arbitrary and capricious in
violation of the Administrative Procedure Act. The panel
noted that it was clear that the ranchers would fare no better
under the Grazing Regulations, which were wholly
consistent with the statutes they implemented.
COUNSEL
W. Alan Schroeder (argued), Schroeder Law, Boise, Idaho;
Laura A. Schroeder, Schroeder Law Offices P.C., Portland,
Oregon; for Plaintiffs-Appellants.
Christine G. England (argued) and Robert B. Firpo,
Assistant United States Attorneys; Bart M. Davis, United
States Attorney; United States Attorney’s Office, Boise,
Idaho; for Defendants-Appellees.
Talasi B. Brooks (argued), Western Watersheds Project,
Boise, Idaho; Paul D. Ruprecht, Western Watersheds
Project, Reno, Nevada; for Intervenor-Defendant-Appellee.
OPINION
FRIEDMAN, District Judge:
Appellants Michael F. Hanley, IV, Linda Lee Hanley,
and Hanley Ranch Partnership sought to transfer to
Appellants K. John Corrigan and M. Martha Corrigan a
“preference” to receive a permit to graze on certain federal
land allotments. The Bureau of Land Management (“BLM”)
denied the preference transfer application, concluding that
Hanley Ranch Partnership did not hold any preference that

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C ORRIGAN V . H AALAND 5
it could transfer. The Interior Board of Land Appeals
(“IBLA”), an appellate tribunal within the Department of the
Interior, upheld the BLM’s denial, concluding that after
Hanley Ranch Partnership’s grazing permit expired, and the
BLM declined to issue a new permit due to unsatisfactory
performance, Hanley Ranch Partnership did not hold any
residual preference. The district court agreed.
Appellants now ask us to reverse the district court’s
decision, arguing that a grazing preference survives the
expiration of a corresponding permit and continues to exist
until the BLM cancels it. Because the BLM never canceled
their grazing preference through any formal process,
Appellants ask us to conclude that they retained a preference
even after their grazing permit expired.
We have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We
affirm the district court’s grant of summary judgment in
favor of Appellee the Department of the Interior and
Intervenor-Appellee Western Watersheds Project (“WWP”).
I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
Beginning in 1934, Congress has passed laws that
govern grazing privileges on the public rangelands. The
Taylor Grazing Act of 1934 (“TGA”), 43 U.S.C. § 315 et
seq., seeks to “promote the highest use of the public lands”
and “stop injury” from “overgrazing and soil deterioration.”
43 U.S.C. § 315; see generally Pub. Lands Council v.
Babbitt, 529 U.S. 728, 731–33 (2000). Under the system
established by the TGA, the Secretary of the Interior is
authorized to divide public rangelands into grazing districts
and to issue permits to private parties to graze livestock on
the land. The TGA and its companion statute, the Federal
Land Policy and Management Act of 1976 (“FLPMA”),
43 U.S.C. § 1701 et seq., provide that individuals who

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control land within or near a grazing district may receive a
“preference” or “priority” to stand first in line in applying
for a grazing permit. See Pub. Lands Council, 529 U.S.
at 733–38.
Since at least 1988, Hanley Ranch Partnership (“HRP”)
received a series of ten-year permits to graze on two
allotments in southwestern Idaho: the Trout Springs
Allotment and the Hanley Fenced Federal Range Allotment.
HRP also held preferences based on its control of private
land adjoining the two allotments. On March 12, 2002, the
BLM issued HRP’s last ten-year permit, which authorized
HRP to graze on the allotments through February 28, 2012.
In 2009, the BLM informed HRP that it would not renew
HRP’s permit pursuant to 43 C.F.R. § 4110.1(b), explaining
that it had “identified numerous and continuous instances of
non-compliance with the terms and conditions of the existing
federal grazing permit, as well as a number of violations
(trespasses) in the Trout Springs Allotment.” HRP appealed
the BLM’s decision to two appellate tribunals within the
Department of the Interior, first to the Departmental Cases
Hearings Division (“Hearings Division”), and next to the
IBLA. Both tribunals affirmed, and HRP did not seek
review in federal court.
On August 1, 2013, HRP leased several plots of “base
property” attached to the Trout Springs and Hanley Fenced
Federal Range Allotments to K. John and M. Martha
Corrigan, for a period extending through February 28,
2024.1 Relying on this lease, the Corrigans submitted an
application to the BLM to transfer a grazing preference from
1 Ms. Corrigan is the daughter of Michael F. Hanley, IV, one of the
partners in HRP.

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C ORRIGAN V . H AALAND 7
HRP to the Corrigans. The BLM denied the application on
November 22, 2013, explaining that HRP no longer
possessed any grazing preference. The Hanleys and the
Corrigans (collectively, “Ranchers”) appealed the BLM’s
decision to the Hearings Division, which affirmed on
January 25, 2016. Ranchers subsequently appealed to the
IBLA.
On August 10, 2017, the IBLA issued the opinion that is
the subject of this appeal, affirming the ruling of the
Hearings Division and the underlying decision by the BLM
to deny the preference transfer application. The IBLA
analyzed the TGA, the FLPMA, and the Department of the
Interior’s grazing regulations, codified at 43 C.F.R. 4100 et
seq. (“the Grazing Regulations”).2 The IBLA concluded that
“there is no basis in law supporting appellants’ view that
Hanley Ranch’s grazing preference . . . can exist in a
vacuum, without a grazing permit.” The IBLA determined
that once a permit expires and the BLM declines to renew it,
the BLM need not separately cancel the associated
preference, which expires alongside the permit. As a result,
the IBLA concluded that the BLM correctly rejected the
Corrigans’ preference transfer application.
Ranchers sought judicial review of the IBLA’s decision.
On February 26, 2020, the U.S. District Court for the District
2 The Department of the Interior last amended the Grazing
Regulations in 2006. 71 Fed. Reg. 39402, 39503 (July 12, 2006). In
2008, however, the U.S. District Court for the District of Idaho enjoined
those amendments from taking effect. See W. Watersheds Project v.
Kraayenbrink, 538 F. Supp. 2d 1302 (D. Idaho 2008), aff’d in relevant
part, vacated in part, remanded, 632 F.3d 472 (9th Cir. 2011). All
citations in this opinion to the Grazing Regulations are to the version in
effect prior to the 2006 amendments. See Grazing Administration—
Exclusive of Alaska, 60 Fed. Reg. 9894, 9901 (Feb. 22, 1995).

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of Idaho denied Ranchers’ motion for summary judgment
and granted summary judgment in favor of the Department
of the Interior and WWP. This appeal followed.
II. STANDARDS OF REVIEW
A. Summary Judgment
“We review de novo a challenge to a final agency action
decided on summary judgment and pursuant to Section 706”
of the Administrative Procedure Act (“APA”). Ctr. for
Biological Diversity v. Esper, 958 F.3d 895, 903 (9th Cir.
2020). “De novo review of a district court judgment
concerning a decision of an administrative agency means the
court views the case from the same position as the district
court,” Turtle Island Restoration Network v. Nat’l Marine
Fisheries Serv., 340 F.3d 969, 973 (9th Cir. 2003), and
“review[s] directly the agency’s action under the
Administrative Procedure Act’s [] arbitrary and capricious
standard,” Alaska Wilderness League v. Jewell, 788 F.3d
1212, 1217 (9th Cir. 2015) (quotation marks omitted). The
Court “may affirm on any ground supported by the record.”
Lima v. U.S. Dep’t of Educ., 947 F.3d 1122, 1125 (9th Cir.
2020).
Under the APA, we “will reverse the IBLA’s decision
only if that decision is arbitrary, capricious, not supported by
substantial evidence, or contrary to law.” Hjelvik v. Babbitt,
198 F.3d 1072, 1074 (9th Cir. 1999). An agency decision
construing a statute is not in violation of the APA where the
agency accurately applies an unambiguous statute, or
permissibly construes an ambiguous statute, and its
conclusion is “well supported by substantial evidence in the
record.” Akootchook v. United States, 271 F.3d 1160, 1168
(9th Cir. 2001); see also W. Watersheds Project v. Interior
Bd. of Land Appeals, 624 F.3d 983, 986–87 (9th Cir. 2010).

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C ORRIGAN V . H AALAND 9
B. Chevron Framework
Ranchers’ argument calls into question the IBLA’s
interpretation of the TGA and the FLPMA. When a party
challenges agency action as inconsistent with the terms of a
statute, courts apply the familiar analytical framework set
forth in Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense
Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984).
In step one, a court must determine “whether Congress
has directly spoken to the precise question at issue,” or,
instead, whether the statute is ambiguous. Chevron,
467 U.S. at 842. In determining whether Congress has
directly spoken, a court uses “traditional tools of statutory
construction,” including an examination of the statute’s text,
the structure of the statute, and (as appropriate) legislative
history. Id. at 843 n.9. “Whether statutory language is
sufficiently plain or not is ‘determined by reference to the
language itself, the specific context in which the language is
used, and the broader context of the statute as a whole.’” W.
Watersheds Project, 624 F.3d at 987 (quoting Robinson v.
Shell Oil Co., 519 U.S. 337, 341 (1997)). “If the intent of
Congress is clear, that is the end of the matter; for the court,
as well as the agency, must give effect to the unambiguously
expressed intent of Congress.” Chemehuevi Indian Tribe v.
Jewell, 767 F.3d 900, 903 (9th Cir. 2014) (quoting Chevron,
467 U.S. at 842–43).
If a court determines that the “statute is silent or
ambiguous with respect to the specific issue,” Chevron,
467 U.S. at 843 – that is, if the disputed language is
“reasonably susceptible of different interpretations,” Nat’l
R.R. Passenger Corp. v. Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe Ry.
Co., 470 U.S. 451, 473 n.27 (1985) – the court must proceed
to step two. At step two, “the question for the court is
whether the agency’s [action] is based on a permissible

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construction of the statute.” Chevron, 467 U.S. at 843. At
this step, a court need not determine that an agency’s
construction is “the best interpretation of the statute,” United
States v. Haggar Apparel Co., 526 U.S. 380, 394 (1999)
(quoting Atl. Mut. Ins. Co. v. Comm’r, 532 U.S. 382, 389
(1998)), or that it is “the only [construction that the agency]
permissibly could have adopted,” Rust v. Sullivan, 500 U.S.
173, 184 (1991) (quoting Chevron, 467 U.S. at 843 n.11).
Instead, courts defer to an agency’s construction “if it is a
reasonable one,” even if “it is not the [construction the court]
would arrive at.” Dep’t of Treasury, I.R.S. v. Fed. Lab. Rels.
Auth., 494 U.S. 922, 928 (1990).
III. STATUTORY FRAMEWORK
Two statutes at issue in this case govern grazing
privileges on public lands: the TGA and the FLPMA.
A. Taylor Grazing Act of 1934
The TGA authorizes the Secretary of the Interior “to
divide the public range-lands into grazing districts, to
specify the amount of grazing permitted in each district, to
issue leases or permits ‘to graze livestock,’ and to charge
‘reasonable fees’ for use of the land.” Pub. Lands Council,
529 U.S. at 733 (quoting 43 U.S.C. §§ 315, 315a, 315b). It
provides in relevant part:
The Secretary of the Interior is authorized to
issue or cause to be issued permits to graze
livestock on such grazing districts . . . .
Preference shall be given in the issuance of
grazing permits to those within or near a
district who are landowners engaged in the
livestock business, bona fide occupants or
settlers, or owners of water or water rights, as

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C ORRIGAN V . H AALAND 11
may be necessary to permit the proper use of
lands, water or water rights owned, occupied,
or leased by them . . . . Such permits shall be
for a period of not more than ten years,
subject to the preference right of the
permittees to renewal in the discretion of the
Secretary of the Interior.
43 U.S.C. § 315b.
B. Federal Land Policy and Management Act of 1976
The FLPMA reinforced the Department of the Interior’s
authority “to remove or add land from grazing use . . . while
specifying that existing grazing permit holders would retain
a ‘first priority’ for renewal so long as the land use plan
continued to make land ‘available for domestic livestock
grazing.’” Pub. Lands Council, 529 U.S. at 738 (quoting
43 U.S.C. § 1752(c)). At the time HRP sought to transfer its
grazing preference to the Corrigans, the relevant portion of
the FLPMA provided:
So long as (1) the lands for which the permit
or lease is issued remain available for
domestic livestock grazing in accordance
with land use plans prepared pursuant to
section 1712 of this title or section 1604 of
title 16, (2) the permittee or lessee is in
compliance with the rules and regulations
issued and the terms and conditions in the
permit or lease specified by the Secretary
concerned, and (3) the permittee or lessee
accepts the terms and conditions to be
included by the Secretary concerned in the
new permit or lease, the holder of the

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expiring permit or lease shall be given first
priority for receipt of the new permit or lease.
43 U.S.C. § 1752(c).3 The FLPMA did not eclipse the
previously enacted TGA but rather “strengthened the
Department[ of the Interior]’s existing authority” under the
TGA. Pub. Lands Council, 529 U.S. at 738. The two
statutes are therefore consistent and should be read together.
IV. DISCUSSION
Ranchers ask us to conclude that a grazing preference
does not automatically expire when an associated permit
3 Congress amended the FLPMA in 2014, after the BLM denied
Ranchers’ preference transfer application. See National Defense
Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2015, Pub. L. No. 113-291, § 3023,
128 Stat. 3229, 3762–63. Ranchers’ contention that the IBLA and the
district court should have considered this revised version of the FLPMA
is misguided. “A reviewing court must review the administrative record
before the agency at the time the agency made its decision.” Nat’l
Wildlife Fed’n v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng’rs, 384 F.3d 1163, 1170 (9th
Cir. 2004). The 2014 amendments to the FLPMA include no indication
that they were intended to apply retroactively to the BLM’s 2013
decision. See Bowen v. Georgetown Univ. Hosp., 488 U.S. 204, 208
(1988) (“[C]ongressional enactments and administrative rules will not be
construed to have retroactive effect unless their language requires this
result.”). We therefore analyze the pre-2014 version of the FLPMA, and
all references in this opinion are to the FLPMA as it was in effect
in 2013.
Even if the amended version of the FLPMA applied, this would not
alter the outcome. The revised language still limits the “first priority”
for renewal to the “holder of the expiring permit or lease” who “is in
compliance with the rules and regulations issued and the terms and
conditions in the permit or lease.” 43 U.S.C. § 1752(c)(1) (2014). As
discussed infra in part IV(A), this unambiguously precludes Ranchers’
theory that a former permittee’s preference continues to exist indefinitely
until it is formally canceled.

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C ORRIGAN V . H AALAND 13
expires, and therefore, that the IBLA’s decision upholding
the denial of the Corrigans’ preference transfer application
contravenes applicable law. They maintain that the TGA,
the FLPMA, and the Grazing Regulations unambiguously
support their position, but that if we find ambiguity, we
should not defer to the IBLA’s interpretation. The
government and WWP counter that the IBLA correctly
interpreted the unambiguous statutes and regulations in
reaching its conclusions, but that if we find ambiguity, we
should defer to the IBLA.
We agree with the government and WWP. The facts are
undisputed and the IBLA’s decision rests on its
interpretation of the TGA, the FLPMA, and the Grazing
Regulations.4 Whether to uphold the IBLA’s decision
therefore depends in the first instance on whether the IBLA
correctly interpreted and applied the statutes, which we
evaluate under the Chevron framework. Here, our analysis
begins and ends with Chevron step one. The TGA and the
FLPMA are unambiguous and are consistent with the
IBLA’s conclusions.
4 The parties’ briefs raise a single point of factual dispute. The
government and WWP assert that the Corrigans submitted an invalid
permit with their preference transfer application, which they say shows
that the Corrigans believed a valid permit must accompany any
preference. Ranchers respond that the Corrigans attached this document
only “to show the terms that they would likely need to accept should their
Grazing permit application be approved.” The Corrigans’ true motive
for attaching this document is immaterial; it does not alter the outcome
of this case when the statutes are properly construed and applied to the
other, undisputed facts.

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A. Chevron Step One: The Statutes are Unambiguous
The “precise question at issue” in this case, Chevron,
467 U.S. at 842, is whether a former permittee’s preference
continues to exist after the associated grazing permit expires
and is not renewed due to bad behavior. The TGA and the
FLPMA unambiguously answer this question in the
negative. After a permit expires, a former permittee does not
retain any preference to stand first in line for a future permit.
1. Plain Text
In construing “what Congress has enacted,” a court must
“begin, as always, with the language of the statute.” Navajo
Nation v. HHS, 325 F.3d 1133, 1136 (9th Cir. 2003) (en
banc) (quoting Duncan v. Walker, 533 U.S. 167, 172
(2001)). The TGA provides that “[p]reference shall be given
in the issuance of grazing permits to those within or near a
district who are landowners engaged in the livestock
business,” and that “permits shall be for a period of not more
than ten years, subject to the preference right of the
permittees to renewal in the discretion of the Secretary of the
Interior.” 43 U.S.C. § 315b. This language neither states
nor implies that a preference may exist as a stand-alone
interest or be held by a former permittee. Instead, it
describes a preference as something that informs the
agency’s decision concerning issuance of a grazing permit,
suggesting that a preference is first and foremost a means by
which the agency determines a permittee’s relative place in
line.
This language also indicates that, following the very first
round of permits issued upon passage of the TGA, Congress
anticipated that “preference” would be a privilege exercised
in conjunction with the renewal process and alongside a
valid permit. The TGA provides that “permits shall be for a

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period of not more than ten years, subject to the preference
right of the permittees to renewal.” 43 U.S.C. § 315b
(emphasis added). This statutory language supports the
IBLA’s conclusion, because applicants are only
“permittees” and only have something to “renew[]” if they
hold valid permits at the time they seek to exercise their
preferences.
The text of the TGA becomes even clearer when read in
conjunction with the subsequently enacted FLPMA, which
reinforces Congress’s intent to limit renewal preferences to
existing permit holders. The FLPMA sets forth three
requirements for the exercise of a preference or “first
priority”: (1) the lands for which a permit was previously
issued “remain available for domestic livestock grazing”;
(2) “the permittee or lessee is in compliance with the rules
and regulations issued and the terms and conditions in the
permit or lease”; and (3) “the permittee or lessee accepts the
terms and conditions to be included by the Secretary
concerned in the new permit or lease.” 43 U.S.C. § 1752(c).
If these conditions are satisfied, “the holder of the expiring
permit or lease shall be given first priority for receipt of the
new permit or lease.” Id.
The second and third requirements of Section 1752(c) of
the FLPMA make explicit that only an existing permittee
may exercise a preference right as part of the permit renewal
process. Both refer in the present tense to “the permittee or
lessee,” underscoring that Congress expected renewal
priority to be exercised by individuals who hold valid
permits or leases at the time of application. The second
requirement refers to “the terms and conditions in the permit
or lease,” pointing to the existence of a still-valid permit or
lease. The second requirement also mandates that an
applicant be “in compliance” with the terms of the permit,

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underscoring that a former permittee such as HRP, whose
permit was not renewed after the BLM determined it was not
in compliance with the terms and conditions of its permit, is
ineligible to exercise a priority for renewal. Finally, the
language that follows the three requirements confirms that
the priority for renewal may be exercised by “the holder of
the expiring permit or lease.” 43 U.S.C. § 1752(c)
(emphasis added).
Ranchers fail to offer any textually grounded explanation
of how a former permittee whose permit expired and was not
renewed for bad behavior could exercise a preference.
Ranchers make much of the fact that the statutes do not
explicitly state that a preference expires upon non-renewal
of a permit. Yet the statutes also do not require the agency
to formally cancel a preference, separate and apart from its
non-renewal decision. This latter omission is more
significant, because the other statutory language discussed
above supports the conclusion that a preference cannot be
exercised after a permit expires.
Ranchers’ view “would require us to assume that
Congress chose a surprisingly indirect route to convey an
important and easily expressed message.” Landgraf v. USI
Film Prods., 511 U.S. 244, 262 (1994). The Supreme Court
has “frequently cautioned that it is at best treacherous to find
in congressional silence alone the adoption of a controlling
rule of law,” United States v. Wells, 519 U.S. 482, 496
(1997) (citations, brackets, and quotation marks omitted),
and we “avoid reading in unstated statutory requirements”
concerning cancellation of a preference, Chemehuevi Indian
Tribe v. Newsom, 919 F.3d 1148, 1153 (9th Cir. 2019).

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2. Statutory Structure
In making the threshold determination under Chevron
step one, “a reviewing court should not confine itself to
examining a particular statutory provision in isolation.
Rather, the meaning – or ambiguity – of certain words or
phrases may only become evident when placed in context.”
Nat’l Ass’n of Home Builders v. Defs. of Wildlife, 551 U.S.
644, 666 (2007) (citations, brackets, and quotation marks
omitted). Here, the statutory scheme that the TGA and the
FLPMA establish further supports the IBLA’s conclusion
that a preference does not survive non-renewal of a permit.
The TGA introduces the concept of “preference” in a
section entitled “Grazing permits; fees; vested water rights;
permits not to create right in land.” 43 U.S.C. § 315b. This
title reinforces the view that a preference is not a stand-alone
entitlement, but instead a concept that has meaning only as
part of the permitting process. The FLPMA refers to “first
priority” for renewal, a term which is interchangeable with
the term “preference” in the TGA. See Pub. Lands Council,
529 U.S. at 738. As the Supreme Court has explained, the
FLPMA expanded upon the framework in the TGA by
“specifying that existing grazing permit holders would retain
a ‘first priority’ for renewal.’” Id. (quoting 43 U.S.C.
§ 1752(c)) (emphasis added). In so doing, the FLPMA tied
the “first priority” associated with a previously issued permit
to the permit renewal process.
Neither the TGA nor the FLPMA mention a process for
canceling a grazing preference. Yet both statutes do address
circumstances under which the agency may cancel a permit
prior to its scheduled expiration. See 43 U.S.C. § 315q;
43 U.S.C. § 1752(g). The explicit provision for cancellation
of a permit, and the omission of any corresponding provision
for cancellation of a preference, is “imbued with legal

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significance,” Pit River Tribe v. Bureau of Land Mgmt.,
939 F.3d 962, 971 (9th Cir. 2019) (quoting SEC v.
McCarthy, 322 F.3d 650, 656 (9th Cir. 2003)), for “it is
generally presumed that Congress acts intentionally and
purposely in the disparate inclusion or exclusion,” id.
(quoting Barnhart v. Sigmon Coal Co., 534 U.S. 438, 452
(2002)). If Congress intended grazing preferences to exist
indefinitely until canceled, as Ranchers urge, we would
expect the statutes to at least mention cancellation of
preferences. This is particularly true because the drafters of
the statutes made express provision for cancellation of
grazing permits.
Several “words [and] phrases” of the TGA and the
FLPMA, “when placed in context,” Nat’l Ass’n of Home
Builders, 551 U.S. at 666 (quoting FDA v. Brown &
Williamson Tobacco Corp., 529 U.S. 120, 132 (2000)),
illuminate a defining characteristic of the statutory scheme:
to preserve the agency’s discretion over grazing privileges
and to avoid establishing any indefinite entitlements for
private parties. The TGA specifies that the agency retains
“discretion” over whether to grant a permit even when an
applicant seeks renewal subject to a preference, and
admonishes that grazing privileges “shall not create any
right, title, interest, or estate in or to the lands.” 43 U.S.C.
§ 315b. The FLPMA reinforces this theme, clarifying that
permits are “subject to such terms and conditions the
Secretary concerned deems appropriate and consistent with
the governing law, including, but not limited to, the authority
of the Secretary concerned to cancel, suspend, or modify a
grazing permit . . . or to cancel or suspend a grazing permit
or lease for any violation of a grazing regulation or of any
term or condition of such grazing permit or lease.”
43 U.S.C. § 1752(a). Both statutes also clarify that permits

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C ORRIGAN V . H AALAND 19
grant only temporary grazing privileges. See 43 U.S.C.
§ 315b; 43 U.S.C. § 1752(a).
Ranchers nonetheless contend that “the Grazing
preference remains attached to base property until separately
canceled,” suggesting that a grazing preference is a stand-
alone interest that runs with the base property. This is
incorrect. As the Supreme Court has explained, the statutory
scheme reflects a congressional decision to vest the agency
with control over the public lands, including discretion to
revoke use of those lands. See Pub. Lands Council, 529 U.S.
at 742–43 (“[T]he Secretary has always had the statutory
authority under the Taylor Act and later FLPMA to
reclassify and withdraw rangeland from grazing use . . . .
[and] has consistently reserved the authority to cancel or
modify grazing permits accordingly.”); United States v.
Fuller, 409 U.S. 488, 494 (1973) (“The provisions of the
Taylor Grazing Act . . . make clear the congressional intent
that no compensable property might be created in the permit
lands themselves as a result of the issuance of the permit.”).
This Court and other federal courts have likewise
underscored that the agency’s discretion over public lands
supersedes any preference right. See United States v. Est. of
Hage, 810 F.3d 712, 717 (9th Cir. 2016) (ownership of water
rights adjacent to an allotment “has no effect on the
requirement that a rancher obtain a grazing permit” which
“‘has always been a revocable privilege’ and is not a
‘property right[]’” (quoting Swim v. Bergland, 696 F.2d 712,
719 (9th Cir. 1983))); Fed. Lands Legal Consortium ex rel.
Robart Est. v. United States, 195 F.3d 1190, 1198 (10th Cir.
1999) (“Although FLLC may have a priority during renewal,
this court has repeatedly held that the decision whether to
issue or deny a permit is a discretionary one[.]”), abrogated
on other grounds as recognized in Onyx Props. LLC v. Bd.

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20 C ORRIGAN V . H AALAND
of Cnty. Comm’rs of Elbert Cnty., 838 F.3d 1039, 1043 n.2
(10th Cir. 2016); Alves v. United States, 133 F.3d 1454, 1457
(Fed. Cir. 1998) (“[T]he distinction between grazing
‘permits’ and grazing ‘preferences’ is irrelevant because
neither constitutes a property interest compensable under the
Fifth Amendment.”).
Ranchers’ argument that a grazing preference runs with
the base property also misses the mark because it overlooks
the fact that this appeal stems from the BLM’s denial of the
Corrigans’ preference transfer application. As the IBLA
correctly concluded, with no valid permit, there was no
preference to transfer, irrespective of who controlled the
base property.5
3. Statutory Purpose
In interpreting a statute, a court must also account for
that statute’s history and purpose. See Zuni Pub. Sch. Dist.
No. 89 v. Dep’t of Educ., 550 U.S. 81, 90–93 (2007). The
stated purpose of the TGA is to “promote the highest use of
the public lands.” 43 U.S.C. § 315. Congress described the
specific objectives of the TGA as being “[t]o stop injury to
the public grazing lands by preventing overgrazing and soil
deterioration, to provide for their orderly use, improvement,
and development, [and] to stabilize the livestock industry
dependent upon the public range.” TGA, 48 Stat. 1269
(1934). These objectives are consistent with Congress’s
reservation of discretion in the agency. In order to carry out
the purpose of the TGA by acting as “landlord of the public
5 We leave open the possibility that if a permit terminates and the
base property is sold in an arm’s length transaction, the new owner of
the base property might be entitled to a preference in applying for a new
grazing permit.

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C ORRIGAN V . H AALAND 21
range,” Pub. Lands Council, 529 U.S. at 735, the Secretary
of the Interior must be able to prevent former permittees
from continuing any pattern of conduct that causes “injury
to the public grazing lands,” 48 Stat. 1269.
Ranchers’ proposed interpretation contravenes this
purpose. It would empower those private parties who have
acted in a manner that causes damage to the lands to reserve
certain grazing privileges, even after the agency has
determined that their bad behavior justifies denying them the
privileges of receiving new grazing permits. As WWP
points out, “[a]ccepting Ranchers’ theory would mean that a
rancher whose record of performance disqualifies it from
holding a grazing permit nevertheless could hold a
transferable, non-expiring privilege to stand first in line for
a new permit.” According to WWP, this would enable HRP
to “dictate use of the public lands despite its abuse of its
grazing privileges,” and “would interfere with the
Secretary’s exclusive discretion granted by Congress to
determine who may graze the public lands and under which
conditions.”
We agree; this interpretation makes no sense. Where
Congress has expressly empowered the Secretary of the
Interior to manage the public lands and has declined to limit
the Secretary’s discretion to revoke grazing privileges, it
strains credulity that a former permittee such as HRP –
whose permit the BLM declined to renew after “numerous
and continuous instances of non-compliance” – should retain
a preference right that it can transfer to a party of its
choosing.
In sum, the text, structure, and purpose of the TGA and
the FLPMA, when viewed together, make clear that
Congress intended preferences for renewal to be exercised
only by individuals who hold valid grazing permits and are

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in compliance with the terms of those permits. Ranchers
“offer[] no persuasive authority compelling [their] preferred
conclusion.” W. Watersheds Project, 624 F.3d at 989. The
intent of Congress is clear, and we affirm at Chevron step
one.
B. The Grazing Regulations do not Support Ranchers’
Position
Because a plain reading of the statutory language of the
TGA and the FLPMA resolve this case, there is no reason
for the Court to consider the Grazing Regulations. But it is
clear that Ranchers would fare no better under the
Regulations, which – contrary to Ranchers’ argument – are
wholly consistent with the statutes they implement.
Ranchers’ theory depends on their reading of Section
4110.1(b)(1)(i) and Section 4170.1-1(a) of the Grazing
Regulations. Section 4110.1(b)(1)(i) describes the
qualifications for permit renewal, and Section 4170.1-1(a)
describes a process by which the agency may cancel a
grazing permit before its scheduled expiration. 43 C.F.R.
§§ 4110.1(b)(1)(i), 4170.1-1(a). According to Ranchers,
Section 4170.1-1(a) shows that, in some instances, the BLM
formally cancels a grazing preference, but here, the BLM
relied only on Section 4110.1(b)(1)(i) in declining to renew
HRP’s grazing permit. Because Section 4110.1(b)(1)(i)
makes no mention of grazing preferences, Ranchers would
have us conclude that the decision pursuant to Section
4110.1(b)(1)(i) did not cancel HRP’s grazing preference.
This argument is unpersuasive. Not only is there a
complete absence of authority for the notion that a
preference exists until it is canceled under
Section 4170.1-1(a), but Section 4170.1-1(a) is not even at
play in this case. Ranchers ask the Court to elide the

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C ORRIGAN V . H AALAND 23
distinction between non-renewal of a permit and
cancellation of a permit. But the distinction they ask us to
ignore bears directly on the continued existence of a
preference.
As the government explained at oral argument, when the
BLM issues a grazing permit, that permit may include a
preference for renewal. When the term of that permit is set
to expire, the permittee may exercise its preference in
applying for a new permit. If the BLM grants this
application, the new permit may be accompanied by a new,
separate preference for future renewal. Whether or not the
BLM issues a new permit, however, the original preference
disappears after being exercised. Within the context of non-
renewal of a permit, therefore, the Grazing Regulations
make no specific provision for cancellation of a preference,
because that preference ceases to exist in the normal course.
By contrast, where the BLM cancels a permit prior to the
normal expiration of its term – and before the permittee has
had an opportunity to exercise the associated preference – a
question might arise as to whether the preference continues
to exist even after the BLM cancels the permit. For this
reason, Section 4170.1-1(a) specifically provides for
cancellation of a preference in conjunction with cancellation
of a permit.
The BLM did not cancel HRP’s permit pursuant to
Section 4170.1-1(a); rather, it declined to renew the permit
upon the expiration of its term pursuant to
Section 4110.1(b)(1)(i). Accordingly, we agree with the
government’s statement that “the Grazing Regulations’
cancellation procedures were not applicable in this case,”
because of the simple fact that neither HRP’s permit nor
HRP’s preference was canceled prior to their scheduled
expiration. As the district court correctly explained, the

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24 C ORRIGAN V . H AALAND
statutory and regulatory framework make clear that “once
the permit is not renewed due to noncompliance, the
preference disappears at the same moment the permit
disappears.”6
Even if Section 4170.1-1(a) were at all relevant, it would
not have been possible for the BLM to cancel HRP’s grazing
preference pursuant to that provision, which provides for
cancellation of a “grazing permit or lease and grazing
preference.” 43 C.F.R. § 4170.1-1(a) (emphasis added).
Because of the conjunction “and,” Section 4170.1-1(a) is
most naturally read to mean that the BLM only cancels a
preference when it simultaneously also cancels a permit or
lease. HRP did not retain any grazing permit after February
28, 2012, so the BLM could not have canceled HRP’s
preference pursuant to this provision after HRP’s permit
expired.
V. CONCLUSION
We uphold the IBLA’s decision at Chevron step one
because the IBLA correctly applied the clear and
unambiguous language of the TGA and the FLPMA, which
6 Ranchers contend that the BLM’s conduct in an unrelated case
contradicts this conclusion because it shows that in at least one instance,
the BLM canceled a former permittee’s preference after the
corresponding permit had expired. In that case, E. Wayne Hage declined
to sign a permit renewal that the BLM sent to him in 1997 and the BLM
therefore did not renew his permit. Twelve years later, the BLM issued
a separate decision formally canceling Mr. Hage’s preference pursuant
to 43 C.F.R. § 4170.1-1(b). Yet Ranchers present no evidence that this
decision was ever appealed to or affirmed by the IBLA, whose decisions
represent the agency’s official position. See 43 C.F.R. §§ 4.403(a),
4.1(b)(2). This is much more akin to an “ad hoc statement not reflecting
the agency’s views,” Kisor v. Wilkie, 139 S. Ct. 2400, 2416 (2019), and
does not carry the force of law.

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establish that a grazing preference cannot be exercised after
the corresponding grazing permit is not renewed for bad
behavior. Because the IBLA correctly interpreted and
applied the statutory authorities, and therefore did not act
“contrary to law,” it follows that the decision is not arbitrary
and capricious in violation of the APA. The district court’s
grant of summary judgment was therefore proper.
The judgment of the district court is AFFIRMED.

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