Jose Geovani Rodriguez - Ramirez v. MERRICK B. GARLAND , Attorney General

FOR PUBLICATION
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
J OSE GEOVANI RODRIGUEZ -
RAMIREZ ,
Petitioner,
v.
M ERRICK B. GARLAND , Attorney
General,
Respondent.
No. 19-70506
Agency No.
A208-894-008
OPINION
On Petition for Review of an Order of the
Board of Immigration Appeals
Submitted April 15, 2021*
Pasadena, California
Filed September 1, 2021
Before: Richard A. Paez and Lawrence VanDyke, Circuit
Judges, and Sharon L. Gleason,** District Judge.
* The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
** The Honorable Sharon L. Gleason, United States District Judge
for the District of Alaska, sitting by designation.

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2 RODRIGUEZ -RAMIREZ V. GARLAND
Per Curiam Opinion;
Concurrence by Judge VanDyke
SUMMARY***
Immigration
Denying Jose Rodriguez-Ramirez’s petition for review
of a decision of the Board of Immigration Appeals, the panel
held that substantial evidence supported the Board’s denial
of asylum and withholding of removal on adverse credibility
grounds.
The panel explained that the agency was permitted to
afford substantial weight to inconsistencies that bore directly
on Rodriguez-Ramirez’s claim of persecution. First,
Rodriguez-Ramirez testified that he was threatened by gang
members outside his daughter’s school in February 2016, but
the report he provided from a prosecutor twice stated the
threats occurred in January 2016, and the IJ found that
Rodriguez-Ramirez did not have a convincing explanation
for the discrepancy. The panel explained that an IJ may rely
upon an inconsistency in a “crucial date” concerning the
very event upon which a petitioner predicated his claim for
asylum.
Second, Rodriguez-Ramirez testified on direct
examination that the gang members showed him a weapon
when they made the threat, yet he did not provide this
*** This summary constitutes no part of the opinion of the court. It
has been prepared by court staff for the convenience of the reader.

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RODRIGUEZ -RAMIREZ V. GARLAND 3
information to the prosecutor or in his written asylum
application. The panel explained that although omissions
are less probative of credibility than inconsistencies created
by direct contradictions in evidence and testimony, this
omission concerned the events and circumstances that
Rodriguez-Ramirez experienced directly, and the additional
information was provided on direct, not cross,
examination. The panel wrote that in the context of this
case, in which this specific event prompted Rodriguez-
Ramirez to flee to the United States, the IJ was allowed to
afford substantial weight to discrepancies associated with
the threat and the documentation Rodriguez-Ramirez
personally procured and then submitted to the IJ.
The panel wrote that the adverse credibility
determination was also supported by the IJ’s demeanor
findings. The panel explained that the IJ is in the best
position to consider a petitioner’s demeanor, candor, and
responsiveness. The panel concluded that the IJ did not err
in relying on Rodriguez-Ramirez’s evasive and
unresponsive demeanor while testifying after providing
examples of his evasiveness.
Considering the totality of the circumstances, the panel
concluded that these grounds were sufficient to conclude that
substantial evidence supported the adverse credibility
determination. The panel therefore did not address the other
grounds relied upon by the BIA and IJ. The panel noted that
although the BIA and IJ also pointed to a lack of
corroborating evidence, the IJ was not required to give
Rodriguez-Ramirez notice and an opportunity to provide
additional corroborating evidence because substantial
evidence supported the adverse credibility determination.

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4 RODRIGUEZ -RAMIREZ V. GARLAND
Judge VanDyke fully concurred with the denial of
Rodriguez-Ramirez’s petition for review and joined the
majority per curiam opinion. Judge VanDyke wrote
separately, however, to explain in more detail how the highly
deferential standard of review—which is especially
deferential to adverse credibility determinations—dictates
the denial of Rodriguez-Ramirez’s petition. Judge VanDyke
also addressed the intersection between adverse credibility
determinations and the agency’s reliance on Rodriguez-
Ramirez’s evasiveness, demeanor, and lack of corroborating
evidence.
Judge VanDyke wrote that administrative findings of
fact are conclusive unless any reasonable adjudicator would
be compelled to conclude to the contrary. Thus, this court
must deny the petition unless the petitioner has presented
evidence so compelling that no reasonable factfinder could
find that he was not credible. Judge VanDyke wrote that
layered on top of this already extremely deferential standard
of review, Congress further significantly restricted review of
adverse credibility determinations with the passage of the
Real ID Act. Under the Act, there is no presumption that a
petitioner is credible, and only the most extraordinary
circumstances will justify overturning an adverse credibility
determination. The Act allows the IJ to base an adverse
credibility determination on any relevant factor that,
considered in light of the totality of the circumstances, can
reasonably be said to have a bearing on a petitioner’s
veracity, and when inconsistencies that weaken a claim for
asylum are accompanied by other indications of
dishonesty—such as a pattern of clear and pervasive
inconsistency or contradiction—an adverse credibility
determination may be supported by substantial
evidence. Judge VanDyke concluded that under the
appropriate standard of review, the agency’s adverse

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RODRIGUEZ -RAMIREZ V. GARLAND 5
credibility determination is easily supported by substantial
evidence given Rodriguez-Ramirez’s: (1) discrepancies
surrounding the District Attorney’s report, (2) embellished
testimony, (3) evasive demeanor, and (4) failure to provide
corroborative evidence. Judge VanDyke wrote that even if
reasonable minds might disagree, there is nothing “most
extraordinary” about the agency’s determination that would
compel a contrary conclusion.
COUNSEL
Areg Kazaryan, Glendale, California, for Petitioner.
Jennifer P. Levings, Senior Litigation Counsel; Erik R.
Quick, Trial Attorney; Office of Immigration Litigation,
Civil Division, United States Department of Justice,
Washington, D.C.; for Respondent.

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6 RODRIGUEZ -RAMIREZ V. GARLAND
OPINION
PER CURIAM:
Jose Geovani Rodriguez-Ramirez, a native and citizen of
El Salvador, petitions for review of the Board of
Immigration Appeals’s (“BIA”) dismissal of his appeal of an
immigration judge’s (“IJ”) denial of his application for
asylum and withholding of removal. Where, as here, the
BIA partially adopts the IJ’s decision but contributes its own
reasoning, we review the BIA’s decision along with the IJ’s
decision, to the extent the BIA adopted it. Sinotes-Cruz v.
Gonzales, 468 F.3d 1190, 1194 (9th Cir. 2006); Zhi v.
Holder, 751 F.3d 1088, 1091 (9th Cir. 2014). We review the
agency’s factual findings for substantial evidence.
Mukulumbutu v. Barr, 977 F.3d 924, 925 (9th Cir. 2020).
We have jurisdiction under 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a), and we deny
the petition.
The IJ denied Rodriguez-Ramirez’s application on the
basis that he was not credible. On appeal to the BIA, the
BIA affirmed. Substantial evidence supports the agency’s
adverse credibility determination.
The BIA and IJ were permitted to afford substantial
weight to inconsistencies that “bear[] directly on
[Rodriguez-Ramirez]’s claim of persecution.” Manes v.
Sessions, 875 F.3d 1261, 1264 (9th Cir. 2017) (per curiam).
Rodriguez-Ramirez testified that he fled to the United States
after gang members threatened him outside his daughter’s
school. He testified that he reported this threat to the local
prosecutor the next day, and that the prosecutor prepared a
report based on the information Rodriguez-Ramirez
provided. Rodriguez-Ramirez also testified that he fled to
the United States just days after making the report.
Rodriguez-Ramirez did not provide any other corroborating

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RODRIGUEZ -RAMIREZ V. GARLAND 7
evidence concerning the threats he received. Among other
matters, the IJ relied on two inconsistencies concerning the
threat and the report, which were supported by the record.
First, despite Rodriguez-Ramirez’s testimony in October
2017 that this threat occurred in February 2016, the report he
provided from the prosecutor twice stated, on different
pages, that the threats occurred in January 2016, and the IJ
found that Rodriguez-Ramirez did not have a convincing
explanation for the discrepancy. We have recognized that
an IJ may rely upon an inconsistency in a “crucial date”
concerning “the very event upon which [a petitioner]
predicated his claim for asylum.” Don v. Gonzales, 476 F.3d
738, 741 (9th Cir. 2007).
Second, Rodriguez-Ramirez testified on direct
examination that the gang members showed him a weapon
when they made the threat. He did not provide this
information to the prosecutor or in his written asylum
application. Although “omissions are less probative of
credibility than inconsistencies created by direct
contradictions in evidence and testimony,” this omission
concerned the “events and circumstances that . . .
[Rodriguez-Ramirez] experienced directly,” and the
additional information was provided on direct, not cross,
examination. Lai v. Holder, 773 F.3d 966, 971, 973–74 (9th
Cir. 2014); see also Iman v. Barr, 972 F.3d 1058, 1067–69
(9th Cir. 2020). In the context of this case, in which this
specific event prompted Rodriguez-Ramirez to flee to the
United States, the IJ was allowed to afford substantial weight
to discrepancies associated with the threat and the
documentation Rodriguez-Ramirez personally procured and
then submitted to the IJ. See Manes, 875 F.3d at 1264.
The adverse credibility determination is also supported
by the IJ’s demeanor findings. We have previously

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8 RODRIGUEZ -RAMIREZ V. GARLAND
explained that the IJ is in the best position to consider a
petitioner’s demeanor, candor, and responsiveness.
Shrestha v. Holder, 590 F.3d 1034, 1041 (9th Cir. 2010).
The BIA and IJ did not err in relying on Rodriguez-
Ramirez’s evasive and unresponsive demeanor while
testifying after providing examples of his evasiveness. See
Jin v. Holder, 748 F.3d 959, 965 (9th Cir. 2014) (requiring
the IJ to “identify the instances where the petitioner is non-
responsive”).
Considering the totality of the circumstances, see
8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(1)(B)(iii); Shrestha, 590 F.3d at 1040,
the above grounds are sufficient to conclude that substantial
evidence supports the adverse credibility determination.
Therefore, we need not address the other grounds relied upon
by the BIA and IJ. And although the BIA and IJ also pointed
to a lack of corroborating evidence, “the IJ was not required
to give [Rodriguez-Ramirez] notice and an opportunity to
provide additional corroborating evidence” because
substantial evidence supports the adverse credibility
determination. Mukulumbutu, 977 F.3d at 927; see also
Wang v. Sessions, 861 F.3d 1003, 1008–09 (9th Cir. 2017).
Substantial evidence also supports the BIA’s conclusion that
without credible testimony, Rodriguez-Ramirez failed to
establish eligibility for asylum or withholding of removal.
See Farah v. Ashcroft, 348 F.3d 1153, 1156 (9th Cir. 2003).
PETITION FOR REVIEW DENIED.

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RODRIGUEZ -RAMIREZ V. GARLAND 9
VANDYKE, Circuit Judge, concurring:
I fully concur with the denial of Petitioner Rodriguez-
Ramirez’s petition for review and join the majority per
curiam opinion. I write separately, however, to explain in
more detail how the highly deferential standard of review—
which is especially deferential to adverse credibility
determinations—dictates the denial of Rodriguez-Ramirez’s
petition. I also address the intersection between adverse
credibility determinations and the agency’s reliance on
Rodriguez-Ramirez’s evasiveness, demeanor, and lack of
corroborating evidence.
I.
In March 2016, Rodriguez-Ramirez, a native and citizen
of El Salvador, unlawfully entered the United States. Nearly
a year later, he applied for asylum, withholding of removal,
and relief under the Convention Against Torture (CAT).
Rodriguez-Ramirez later testified before the IJ, where he
alleged that Salvadoran gangs extorted him for money due
to his status as a small business owner. But some of his
details didn’t add up, and, as the IJ observed, he proffered
several evasive and unresponsive answers.
At the outset, Rodriguez-Ramirez provided inconsistent
information about his past residences. In his asylum
application, Rodriguez-Ramirez wrote that he attended a
university in the El Salvador department of La Libertad from
2000 to 2005. But before the IJ, Rodriguez-Ramirez
testified that he only lived in La Libertad until 1999. When
questioned about the discrepancy, Rodriguez-Ramirez
explained that he listed the La Libertad address while
attending a university “just in case there were anything they
were going to send by mail” and that “[i]t was the address of
[his] mom’s.” He further explained that he lived in

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10 RODRIGUEZ -RAMIREZ V. GARLAND
“[Z]arago[z]a for a time,” (a city in La Libertad), but then
moments later stated that he did not live in La Libertad after
he was 18 because “he lived in San Salvador” (a department
neighboring La Libertad). After Rodriguez-Ramirez
provided several apparently contradictory answers without
further explanation, the IJ observed that “[t]he conflict is
clear from the [asylum application].”
Rodriguez-Ramirez also added new details of
harassment for the first time while testifying. In his asylum
application, Rodriguez-Ramirez listed a previous job he held
as a sales supervisor without providing any details. But
when cross-examined before the IJ, Rodriguez-Ramirez
stated that during this job, he was “frequently . . . daily
assaulted or threatened” and “kicked out of the area [he] was
selling in.” When asked if there was a reason that he omitted
details of continued assault in his asylum application—the
very document instructing applicants to list such incidents—
Rodriguez-Ramirez replied, “[n]o. There’s no reason”
because he “felt like . . . it’s common knowledge everywhere
the social situation there.”
Rodriguez-Ramirez also conceded that he could not
provide evidence of the documented threats he received
while operating his business in El Salvador. He testified
that, beginning in March 2015, he owned and operated a fast-
food restaurant where the gangs extorted him for money. He
explained that he would regularly receive threatening notes
at his house reminding him to pay the extortion demands.
But then he said that he didn’t know what he did with those
notes, and he didn’t report the extortion demands to the
authorities. And when asked if “there [are] any records, any
documentation that you have about what you say was the
fast[-]food business,” he replied “[j]ust a type of lease

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RODRIGUEZ -RAMIREZ V. GARLAND 11
contract.” But he failed to include this lease in his
application, despite submitting numerous other documents.
Finally, Rodriguez-Ramirez provided inconsistent
testimony about the very encounter that instigated his
departure from El Salvador. In November 2015, after
months of allegedly receiving threatening notes and in-
person visits at his fast-food restaurant, Rodriguez-Ramirez
closed shop. He also moved and changed his phone number
to avoid future contact with the gangs. But in February 2016
(or so he repeatedly claimed), he received a threatening note
reminding him about his “debts.” Like the previous notes,
he neither saved this note nor reported it to the police.
Around that same time, he claimed that several people
approached him at his daughter’s school, showed him a gun,
and demanded payment. The next day, Rodriguez-Ramirez
reported this incident directly to the District Attorney and
left El Salvador shortly thereafter.
But according to Rodriguez-Ramirez, it was the District
Attorney’s office who, after taking the time to complete a
report, told him that “they couldn’t do anything” and that he
should “find [his] own way, make [his] own choice, whether
[he] was going to move from that place, leave the country,
[he] just had to find a way.” He later reiterated that the
District Attorney’s office stressed “that it was [his] choice
and it was up to [him] to either move away from the place or
flee the country or find [his] own way.”
He also claimed that the District Attorney’s office
provided him with a copy of his report, but then he couldn’t
recall if he brought it with him to the United States or if he
received a copy of it by mail. In response to his
equivocation, the IJ exasperatingly exclaimed that “I’m not
understanding why you can’t remember the basic question
of whether that was mailed to you in the United States or

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12 RODRIGUEZ -RAMIREZ V. GARLAND
whether you brought it along with you. This is an official
document. I think you would remember that.” Rodriguez-
Ramirez immediately replied, “[i]f I’m not mistaken I
remember that I brought those documents with me because
the day I left from El Salvador I went to the DA’s office.”
He continued with his sudden recall: “Now I remember that
that was the last [official] thing I did . . . before leaving. I
went [to the District Attorney’s office] around 11:00 in the
morning.”
More red flags surrounded this report. The report twice
stated that the school incident occurred in January 2016—
not February, as he had repeatedly testified. When asked
about the discrepancy, Rodriguez-Ramirez only suggested
that “[m]aybe there was a mistake on the page” and “at no
time . . . [did] I focus[] so much on the dates.” And when
asked why the report contains no mention of him being
shown a weapon at the school—which was one of the key
facts that drove him to the District Attorney’s office in the
first place—he explained “that[] [it’s] very common and
everyone knows about weapons there and then they want
to—if I would have mentioned about weapons they would
have asked me what type of weapons and since I don’t know
about guns . . . .”
After Rodriguez-Ramirez’s testimony concluded, the IJ
found him not credible. The IJ first found that Rodriguez-
Ramirez was “extremely evasive as a witness,” noting that
he “would not respond to direct questions, even concerning
something so simple a matter as whether the University or
technical college that he had attended was located in La
Libertad.” The IJ also found that Rodriguez-Ramirez’s
claims “suffer[ed] from a lack of corroborating evidence,”
but noted that he was “not denying the . . . application due to
a lack of corroboration.” Instead, the IJ found that “the

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RODRIGUEZ -RAMIREZ V. GARLAND 13
absence of corroboration, and [Rodriguez-Ramirez]’s
careless testimony and faulty memory about the existence of
corroborative evidence, reflects adversely on his
credibility.” The IJ also relied on the discrepancies
surrounding Rodriguez-Ramirez’s report to the District
Attorney, including his inability to recall how he obtained
the document, the inconsistent dates, the report’s omission
of the weapon brandishing during the school incident, and
the implausibility of the District Attorney’s office taking the
time to fill out a report while simultaneously advising
Rodriguez-Ramirez that nothing could be done and that he
should leave the country. Given the adverse credibility
finding, the IJ denied Rodriguez-Ramirez’s claims for
asylum, withholding of removal, and protection under CAT.
The BIA affirmed the IJ and dismissed Rodriguez-
Ramirez’s appeal. It first concluded that the IJ’s adverse
credibility determination was not clearly erroneous, and
proceeded to cite several specific and cogent reasons
supporting that determination, including Rodriguez-
Ramirez’s: (1) lack of evidence pertaining to his fast-food
restaurant or extortion notes, (2) inconsistent dates described
in Rodriguez-Ramirez’s testimony and the District
Attorney’s report, (3) inability to recall simple details, such
as whether he brought the report with him or received a copy
of it in the mail, (4) key omissions pertaining to the weapon
brandishing during the school incident and the mistreatment
he experienced at prior jobs, and (5) contradictory testimony
regarding his residence in La Libertad. The BIA also relied
on the IJ’s demeanor findings, as well as other reasons
“articulated by the [IJ] in his decision.”
Rodriguez-Ramirez petitioned this court for review,
challenging the agency’s determinations pertaining to his
adverse credibility and lack of corroborating evidence.

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14 RODRIGUEZ -RAMIREZ V. GARLAND
II.
Rodriguez-Ramirez’s insufficient, varying, and at times
contradictory testimony sufficiently supported the agency’s
adverse credibility determination—especially given the
extremely high deferential standard of review for adverse
credibility determinations. “We review factual findings,
including adverse credibility determinations, for substantial
evidence.” Mukulumbutu v. Barr, 977 F.3d 924, 925 (9th
Cir. 2020). “The standard of review is extremely deferential:
administrative findings of fact are conclusive unless any
reasonable adjudicator would be compelled to conclude to
the contrary.” Farah v. Ashcroft, 348 F.3d 1153, 1156 (9th
Cir. 2003) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted).
“[T]his court must deny [the] petition unless [the petitioner]
has presented evidence so compelling that no reasonable
factfinder could find that he was not credible.” Id. (citation
and internal quotation marks omitted).1
Layered on top of this already extremely deferential
standard of review, Congress further significantly restricted
our review of adverse credibility determinations with the
passage of the Real ID Act (Act). See Kaur v. Gonzales,
418 F.3d 1061, 1064 n.1 (9th Cir. 2005); see also Jibril v.
1 See also Don v. Gonzalez, 476 F.3d 738, 745 (9th Cir. 2007)
(“Although a reasonable factfinder could have found Petitioner credible,
no such finding is compelled by the evidence. Because a reasonable
factfinder could have reached this result, we must uphold the IJ’s
decision.”); Singh v. INS, 134 F.3d 962, 969 n.14 (9th Cir. 1998) (“[W]e
may not reweigh the evidence . . . . We merely determine whether the
evidence compels such a conclusion.”); Aruta v. INS, 80 F.3d 1389, 1393
(9th Cir. 1996) (“[W]e do not reverse the BIA simply because we
disagree with its evaluation of the facts, but only if we conclude that the
BIA’s evaluation is not supported by substantial evidence.” (citation and
internal quotation marks omitted)).

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RODRIGUEZ -RAMIREZ V. GARLAND 15
Gonzales, 423 F.3d 1129, 1138 n.1 (9th Cir. 2005) (granting
a petition while noting that, had the Act been in effect at the
time of that decision, the panel “would be obliged to deny
[it]”—even though the IJ in that case relied on
inconsistencies in arguably minor facts, implausible
accounts, and evasive demeanor that was not specifically
reflected in the record). “Under the [Act], there is no
presumption that [a petitioner] is credible,” and “only the
most extraordinary circumstances will justify overturning an
adverse credibility determination.” Silva-Pereira v. Lynch,
827 F.3d 1176, 1185 (9th Cir. 2016) (citations and internal
brackets removed). The Act provides that:
Considering the totality of the circumstances,
and all relevant factors, a trier of fact may
base a credibility determination on the
demeanor, candor, or responsiveness of the
applicant or witness, the inherent plausibility
of the applicant’s . . . account, the
consistency between the applicant’s . . .
written and oral statements (whenever made
and whether or not under oath, and
considering the circumstances under which
the statements were made), the internal
consistency of each such statement, the
consistency of such statements with other
evidence of record . . . and any inaccuracies
or falsehoods in such statements, without
regard to whether an inconsistency,
inaccuracy, or falsehood goes to the heart of
the applicant’s claim, or any other relevant
factor. There is no presumption of credibility
. . . .

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8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(1)(B)(iii). In short, the Act allows the IJ
to “base an adverse credibility determination on any relevant
factor that, considered in light of the totality of the
circumstances, can reasonably be said to have a bearing on a
petitioner’s veracity.” Ren v. Holder, 648 F.3d 1079, 1084
(9th Cir. 2011) (emphasis added) (citation and internal
quotation marks omitted). So “when inconsistencies that
weaken a claim for asylum are accompanied by other
indications of dishonesty—such as a pattern of clear and
pervasive inconsistency or contradiction—an adverse
credibility determination may be supported by substantial
evidence.” Kaur, 418 F.3d at 1067. Moreover, “an IJ must
be allowed to exercise common sense in rejecting a
petitioner’s testimony even if the IJ cannot point to specific,
contrary evidence in the record to refute it.” Jibril, 423 F.3d
at 1135.
Under the appropriate standard of review, the agency’s
adverse credibility determination is easily supported by
substantial evidence given Rodriguez-Ramirez’s:
(1) discrepancies surrounding the District Attorney’s report,
(2) embellished testimony, (3) evasive demeanor, and
(4) failure to provide corroborative evidence. Rodriguez-
Ramirez has thus necessarily failed the meet the high
threshold of showing an “extraordinary circumstance[]”
necessary to overturn the agency’s adverse credibility
determination. Silva-Pereira, 827 F.3d at 1185 (citation
omitted).
1. The Discrepancies Surrounding the District Attorney’s
Report Reasonably Support the Agency’s Adverse
Credibility Determination.
First, substantial evidence supports the agency’s adverse
credibility determination given the numerous discrepancies
surrounding the District Attorney’s report, which included

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RODRIGUEZ -RAMIREZ V. GARLAND 17
contradictory dates as to when the school incident occurred,
the omission of the weapon brandishing during that incident
(although Rodriguez-Ramirez brought up the gang’s use of
weapons in threatening him at his daughter’s school for the
first time in his merits hearing) and Rodriguez-Ramirez’s
inability to recall how he obtained the report. The agency
relied on these discrepancies for good reason: the report
documents the only time Rodriguez-Ramirez says he sought
help from Salvadoran authorities, and it concerned the
preeminent incident that he says caused him to flee the
country. The circumstances surrounding the report are
therefore central to his claims, which bolsters the
reasonableness of the agency’s adverse credibility
determination. Each one of these inconsistencies or
embellishments independently casts doubt on Rodriguez-
Ramirez’s story. See 8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(1)(B)(iii); Don,
476 F.3d at 741–43 (inconsistency regarding a “crucial date”
went to the heart of a claim); Iman v. Barr, 972 F.3d 1058,
1068 (9th Cir. 2020) (“[O]missions are probative of
credibility to the extent that later disclosures, if credited,
would bolster an earlier, and typically weaker, asylum
application.”). The agency was not unreasonable in
concluding that, taken together, the discrepancies tip the
scale against Rodriguez-Ramirez’s credibility. Based on the
record, substantial evidence supports the agency’s adverse
credibility determination given the discrepancies
surrounding the report.
2. Rodriguez-Ramirez’s Embellished Testimony
Reasonably Supports the Agency’s Adverse Credibility
Determination.
Even if the discrepancies surrounding the report did not
alone provide enough support for the agency’s adverse
credibility finding, the agency also reasonably relied on

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18 RODRIGUEZ -RAMIREZ V. GARLAND
Rodriguez-Ramirez’s other embellished testimony.
Rodriguez-Ramirez testified that he was harassed at a prior
job, but he made no reference to this harassment in his
asylum application. Considering that Rodriguez-Ramirez
claims he left his country to avoid ongoing harassment—and
the fact that his application specifically called for such
information—omitting any mention of ongoing harassment
at a prior job, but then later relying on such claimed
harassment during his testimony, reasonably suggests that
Rodriguez-Ramirez embellished his testimony during his
merits hearing in an attempt to further support his claims.
The fact that Rodriguez-Ramirez embellished his
testimony by merely adding key information previously
omitted (as opposed to contradictory testimony), or that his
embellishment occurred during cross-examination, is of no
moment. Embellishment by its nature usually isn’t
contradictory; when it is, it means you just got caught in a
bald-faced lie, not that you were merely embellishing. And
there is no reason that a witness wouldn’t be just as tempted
to embellish during cross-examination; indeed, perhaps
more so, since the witness is usually under more pressure
under cross-examination. Ultimately, Rodriguez-Ramirez,
under the pressure of cross-examination, tried to bolster his
claim that he was harassed by bringing up new instances of
harassment that he hadn’t mentioned before. That is the
paradigm of embellishment, which reflects adversely on
credibility—not because it is necessarily inconsistent with
anything the petitioner said before, but because it can appear
to the factfinder that the petitioner is making things up to
bolster his claim. And if the petitioner is willing to do that,
then he isn’t trustworthy. Nothing in the record compels the
conclusion that the agency wrongly relied on Rodriguez-
Ramirez’s embellished testimony about harassment as
supporting an adverse credibility finding.

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RODRIGUEZ -RAMIREZ V. GARLAND 19
3. Rodriguez-Ramirez’s Evasive Demeanor Reasonably
Supports the IJ’s Adverse Credibility Finding.
In addition to the numerous discrepancies already
discussed, Rodriguez-Ramirez’s evasive demeanor also
supports the agency’s determination. The IJ found
Rodriguez-Ramirez to be “extremely evasive as a witness,”
and findings pertaining to a petitioner’s demeanor are
afforded special deference. See Singh-Kaur v. INS, 183 F.3d
1147, 1151 (9th Cir. 1999) (“We give ‘special deference’ to
a credibility determination that is based on demeanor.”
(citation omitted)). The IJ observed that Rodriguez-Ramirez
would not squarely respond to direct questions about the
location of his university, or why his asylum application did
not include details of harassment from his prior job.
Simply because the record reflects that Rodriguez-
Ramirez did, in fact, eventually provide some answer to the
questions does not undermine the IJ’s finding of
evasiveness. The IJ’s demeanor findings are afforded
special deference precisely because they are uniquely based
on in-person observations that often, and understandably,
cannot be captured entirely by the record. Qui v. Barr,
944 F.3d 837, 843 (9th Cir. 2019) (“The reason why we give
special deference to an IJ’s credibility determination is that
the IJ himself or herself had the opportunity to evaluate the
petitioner’s behavior in person.” (emphasis omitted)). If, as
a court reviewing the cold record, we rigidly required
objective indicia of demeanor findings, it would be directly
at odds with the very reason we give special deference to
such findings. See 8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(1)(B)(iii); Jibril,
423 F.3d at 1137 (“Few, if any, of these ephemeral indicia
of credibility can be conveyed by a paper record of the
proceedings and it would be extraordinary for a reviewing
court to substitute its second-hand impression of the

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petitioner’s demeanor, candor, or responsiveness for that of
the IJ.”). Here, the record shows that the colloquy regarding
the location of Rodriguez-Ramirez’s university was lengthy
and convoluted, with the IJ concluding that “the conflict is
clear.”
The IJ’s conclusion that Rodriguez-Ramirez was evasive
as a witness is especially important in conjunction with the
IJ’s other bases for finding him not credible—his
embellishment and inconsistencies. We know by common
experience that, when we see and hear someone change their
story or suddenly recall a supposedly forgotten fact, it is
precisely their demeanor during those moments that we find
most revealing as to whether they were being dishonest—
not merely their words that end up in a transcript. Here, the
IJ obviously came away with the distinct impression that
Rodriguez-Ramirez was not an honest witness based, no
doubt, on the interplay of both what he said (which we can
read in the transcript), and how he said it (which we can’t).
Again, there is nothing in the record that compels the
conclusion that the IJ’s impression was wrong. He was
there; we were not.
Moreover, in his convoluted testimony, Rodriguez-
Ramirez apparently contradicted his asylum application by
providing inconsistent dates as to when he left the area where
his university was located. Rodriguez-Ramirez provides no
explanation for these inconsistencies in his petition. And
while one could argue that someone can live and attend a
university in two different cities, Rodriguez-Ramirez’s
inability to proffer any explanation only strengthens the IJ’s
concerns about Rodriguez-Ramirez’s evasiveness when
questioned on this topic. Again, sometimes a witness who
is lying misses the simple and obvious answer to a direct
question because he is so worried about being caught in an

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RODRIGUEZ -RAMIREZ V. GARLAND 21
inconsistency that every answer he gives is evasive, vague,
or convoluted. Here, the IJ and DHS’s attorney were both
obviously confused about how Rodriguez-Ramirez could
have moved away from La Libertad and yet still attended
school there, and so questioned him at length about it. But
he never gave them a straight answer for this facial
discrepancy, and it wasn’t because he wasn’t given an
opportunity.
4. The Lack of Corroborative Evidence Reasonably
Supports the Agency’s Adverse Credibility
Determination.
Finally, the agency’s adverse credibility determination is
confirmed by the lack of corroborating evidence. In
affirming the IJ, the BIA noted Rodriguez-Ramirez’s
inability to provide any documentation of his fast-food
business or the threatening notes he received. There is
nothing impermissible about the agency pointing to the lack
of corroborating evidence as additional support for an
adverse credibility determination. See Mukulumbutu,
977 F.3d at 927 (“Because the IJ found [the petitioner’s]
testimony not credible, the IJ was not required to give [the
petitioner] notice and an opportunity to provide additional
corroborating evidence.”); Wang v. Sessions, 861 F.3d 1003,
1005 (9th Cir. 2017) (“Because the IJ’s adverse credibility
determination was supported by substantial evidence, and
because the IJ had no obligation to give [the petitioner] an
opportunity to provide additional evidence, we deny the
petition.”); 8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(1)(B)(ii) (“Where the trier of
fact determines that the applicant should provide evidence
that corroborates otherwise credible testimony, such
evidence must be provided . . . .”); Ren, 648 F.3d at 1091
n.11. This comports with the text of the Act, which allows
the agency to evaluate the totality of the circumstances and

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“all relevant factors”—which would logically include
whether the petitioner’s eyebrow-raising testimony is
otherwise substantiated by other evidence. See 8 U.S.C.
§ 1158(b)(1)(B)(iii). And for all the reasons discussed
above, the totality of the circumstances in this case shows
that substantial evidence supports the agency’s adverse
credibility determination, without even taking the lack of
corroboration into account. The agency reasonably
considered the lack of corroborating evidence, which further
supported its adverse credibility determination.
III.
Considering the totality of the circumstances, substantial
evidence supports the agency’s adverse credibility
determination. Even if reasonable minds might disagree,
there is nothing “most extraordinary” about the agency’s
determination that would compel a contrary conclusion. See
Jibril, 423 F.3d at 1138 n.1; Don, 476 F.3d at 745. Under
the extremely deferential standard of review we apply, I
concur in the denial of Rodriguez-Ramirez’s petition.

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