APARTMENT ASSOCIATION OF LOS ANGELES COUNTY , INC., DBA Apartment Association of… v. City of Los Angeles

FOR PUBLICATION
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
APARTMENT ASSOCIATION OF LOS
ANGELES COUNTY , I NC., DBA
Apartment Association of Greater
Los Angeles,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v.
CITY OF LOS ANGELES ; ERIC
GARCETTI , in his official capacity as
Mayor of Los Angeles; CITY
COUNCIL OF THE CITY OF LOS
ANGELES , in its official capacity;
DOES , 1 through 25, inclusive,
Defendants-Appellees,
and
ALLIANCE OF CALIFORNIANS FOR
COMMUNITY EMPOWERMENT
ACTION; STRATEGIC A CTIONS FOR A
J UST ECONOMY ,
Intervenor-Defendants-Appellees.
No. 20-56251
D.C. No.
2:20-cv-05193-
DDP-JEM
OPINION
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Central District of California
Dean D. Pregerson, District Judge, Presiding

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2 APARTMENT ASS ’ N OF LA CNTY . V. CITY OF LA
Argued and Submitted May 12, 2021
Pasadena, California
Filed August 25, 2021
Before: Jay S. Bybee and Daniel A. Bress, Circuit Judges,
and Kathleen Cardone,* District Judge.
Opinion by Judge Bress
SUMMARY**
Civil Rights
The panel affirmed the district court’s order denying
plaintiff’s request for preliminary injunctive relief in an
action brought by a trade association of Los Angeles
landlords challenging the City’s eviction moratorium,
imposed in response to the COVID-19 pandemic.
Plaintiff sought to enjoin key provisions of the eviction
moratorium as violating the Contracts Clause. The panel
held that the district court did not abuse its discretion in
concluding that plaintiff had not shown the required
likelihood of success on the merits.
* The Honorable Kathleen Cardone, United States District Judge for
the Western District of Texas, sitting by designation.
** This summary constitutes no part of the opinion of the court. It
has been prepared by court staff for the convenience of the reader.

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APARTMENT ASS ’ N OF LA CNTY . V. CITY OF LA 3
Applying the two-step test set forth in Sveen v. Melin,
138 S. Ct. 1815 (2018), the panel held that even if the
eviction moratorium was a substantial impairment of
contractual relations, the district court did not err in
determining that the moratorium’s provisions were likely
“reasonable” and “appropriate” given the circumstances of
the COVID-19 pandemic. The City fairly tied the
moratorium to its stated goal of preventing displacement
from homes, which the City reasonably explained could
exacerbate the public health–related problems stemming
from the COVID-19 pandemic. In turn, each of the
provisions of the eviction moratorium that plaintiff
challenged could be viewed as reasonable attempts to
address that valid public purpose.
The panel stated that whatever force plaintiff’s challenge
may have had in a much earlier era of Contracts Clause
jurisprudence, more contemporary Supreme Court case law
has severely limited the Contracts Clause’s potency. The
panel held that, given the deferential standard established by
the Supreme Court and this court, it was compelled to
conclude that the City’s enactments passed constitutional
muster under the Contracts Clause. And whatever other
constitutional challenges plaintiff may seek to bring against
the Los Angeles eviction moratorium, there was no apparent
basis under modern cases to find the challenged provisions
unconstitutional under the Contracts Clause—the only issue
before the panel.
COUNSEL
Doug J. Dennington (argued), Peter J. Howell, Kelsey Quist,
and Jayson Parsons, Rutan & Tucker LLP, Irvine, California,
for Plaintiff-Appellant.

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4 APARTMENT ASS ’ N OF LA CNTY . V. CITY OF LA
Jonathan H. Eisenman (argued), Deborah Breithaupt, Elaine
Zhong, and Matthew A. Scherb, Deputy City Attorneys;
David Michaelson, Chief Assistant City Attorney; Michael
N. Feuer, City Attorney; Office of the City Attorney, Los
Angeles, California; for Defendants-Appellees.
Rohit D. Nath (argued), Marc Seltzer, and Krysta Kauble
Pachman, Susman Godfrey LLP, Los Angeles, California;
Nisha N. Vyas and Richard Rothschild, Western Center on
Law and Poverty, Los Angeles, California; Kathryn A.
Eidmann, Faizah Malik, Gigi Lam, Alisa Randell, and
Lauren Zack, Public Counsel, Los Angeles, California;
Michael Rawson and Craig Castellanet, Public Interest Law
Project, Oakland, California; for Intervenor-Defendants-
Appellees.
June Babiracki Barlow, Senior Vice President and General
Counsel; Neil D. Kalin and Jenny Li, Assistant General
Counsel; California Association of Realtors, Los Angeles,
California; for Amicus Curiae California Association of
Realtors.
James R. Parrinello and Christopher E. Skinnell, Nielsen
Merksamer Parrinello Gross & Leoni, San Rafael,
California, for Amicus Curiae California Apartment
Association.
Ethan W. Blevins, Pacific Legal Foundation, Seattle,
Washington, for Amici Curiae El Papel LLC, Berman 2
LLC, Karvell Li, and Pacific Legal Foundation.
Lucia Choi, Tiffany L. Nocon, and Navneet K. Grewal,
Disability Rights California, Los Angeles, California, for
Amici Curiae Disability Rights California, Disability Rights

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APARTMENT ASS ’ N OF LA CNTY . V. CITY OF LA 5
Education and Defense Fund, and Disability Rights Legal
Center.
Celia Meza, Acting Corporation Counsel; Benna Ruth
Solomon, Stephen J. Kane, and Rebecca Hirsch, Assistant
Corporation Counsel; City of Chicago Department of Law,
Chicago, Illinois; Jonathan B. Miller and LiJia Gong, Public
Rights Project, Oakland, California; Yibin Shen, City
Attorney, Alameda, California; Esteban A. Aguilar Jr., City
Attorney, Albuquerque, New Mexico; Anne L. Morgan, City
Attorney, Austin, Texas; Farimah Faiz Brown, City
Attorney, Berkeley, California; Nancy E. Glowa, City
Solicitor, Cambridge, Massachusetts; Cheryl Watson Fisher,
City Solicitor, Chelsea, Massachusetts; Zach Klein, City
Attorney, Columbus, Ohio; Christopher J. Caso, City
Attorney, Dallas, Texas; Barbara J. Doseck, City Attorney,
Dayton, Ohio; Rodney Pol Jr., City Attorney, Gary, Indiana;
Cara E. Silver, Interim City Attorney, Menlo Park,
California; Barbara J. Parker, City Attorney, Oakland,
California; Robert Taylor, Interim City Attorney, Portland,
Oregon; Susana Alcala Wood, City Attorney, Sacramento,
California; James R. Williams, Santa Clara County Counsel,
San Jose, California; George S. Cardona, Interim City
Attorney, Santa Monica, California; Lyndsey M. Olson, City
Attorney, Saint Paul, Minnesota; Peter S. Holmes, City
Attorney, Seattle, Washington; Francis X. Wright Jr., City
Solicitor, Somerville, Massachusetts; Judith R. Baumann,
City Attorney, Tempe, Arizona; Delia Garza, Travis County
Attorney, Austin, Texas; Michael Rankin, City Attorney,
Tucson, Arizona; for Amici Curiae Local Governments.
Raymond P. Tolentino and Molly K. Webster, Kaplan
Hecker & Fink LLP, New York, New York, for Amici
Curiae Constitutional Law Scholars.

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6 APARTMENT ASS ’ N OF LA CNTY . V. CITY OF LA
Adrienna Wong, ACLU Foundation of Southern California,
Los Angeles, California, for Amici Curiae UCLA Luskin
Institute on Inequality & Democracy, UCLA Center for
Neighborhood Knowledge, Professor Ananya Roy, and
Professor Paul Ong.
Eric Dunn, National Housing Law Project, Richmond,
Virginia, for Amicus Curiae National Housing Law Project.
Jamie Crooks, Elk Hills Research, Washington, D.C., for
Amicus Curiae American Medical Asosciation, California
Medical Association, and Other Public Health Associations
and Professionals.
David A. King Jr., Reichman Jorgensen LLP, Washington,
D.C., for Amicus Curaie Southern California Association of
Nonprofit Housing.
Eleanor Morton, Leonard Carder LLP, San Francisco,
California, for Amicus Curiae United Teachers Los Angeles.
Robert Lapsley, President, California Business Roundtable,
Sacramento, California, as and for Amicus Curiae.

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APARTMENT ASS ’ N OF LA CNTY . V. CITY OF LA 7
OPINION
BRESS, Circuit Judge:
Following the outbreak of COVID-19 in early 2020, the
City of Los Angeles imposed an eviction moratorium with
the stated purposes of ensuring housing security and
promoting public health during the pandemic. The
moratorium operates during a “Local Emergency Period” to
bar certain evictions. Related provisions delay applicable
tenants’ rent payment obligations and prohibit landlords
from charging late fees and interest. Plaintiff, a trade
association of Los Angeles landlords, sued the City, arguing
that the moratorium and its related provisions violate the
Constitution’s Contracts Clause. U.S. Const. art. I, § 10,
cl. 1. The district court denied plaintiff’s request for
preliminary injunctive relief, and plaintiff now appeals that
ruling.
Other courts, including the Supreme Court, have recently
considered a variety of constitutional and statutory
challenges to COVID-19 eviction moratoria. The appeal
before us, however, is limited only to the Contracts Clause.
We hold that under modern Contracts Clause doctrine, the
district court did not err in determining that the moratorium’s
provisions were likely “reasonable” and “appropriate” given
the circumstances of the COVID-19 pandemic. Whatever
force plaintiff’s challenge may have had in a much earlier
era of Contracts Clause jurisprudence, more contemporary
Supreme Court case law has severely limited the Contracts
Clause’s potency. And whatever other constitutional
challenges plaintiff may seek to bring against the Los
Angeles eviction moratorium, there is no apparent basis
under modern cases to find the challenged provisions
unconstitutional under the Contracts Clause—the only issue
before us.

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8 APARTMENT ASS ’ N OF LA CNTY . V. CITY OF LA
The district court thus did not abuse its discretion in
concluding that plaintiff had not shown the required
likelihood of success on the merits. We therefore affirm.
I
A
Following the spread of COVID-19 to the United States,
the Secretary of Health and Human Services on January 31,
2020 declared a nationwide public health emergency.
California’s Governor likewise proclaimed a state of
emergency some weeks later. Soon after that, and as
relevant here, the City of Los Angeles enacted an ordinance
imposing a series of restrictions on residential landlords.
L.A., Cal., Ordinance No. 186,585 (Mar. 31, 2020). A
subsequent ordinance created further restrictions. L.A., Cal.,
Ordinance No. 186,606 (May 12, 2020). We will refer to
these ordinances, which subsequently were codified at
sections 49.99 through 49.99.9 of the Los Angeles
Municipal Code, as the “eviction moratorium.”
The eviction moratorium made plain its motivations and
purpose. It described the City Council’s finding that “[t]he
COVID-19 pandemic threatens to undermine housing
security and generate unnecessary displacement of City
residents and instability of City businesses.” L.A., Cal.,
Municipal Code § 49.99. It also referenced public health
measures that called for many individuals to stay at home, as
well as the loss of income and increased expenses
anticipated as a result of governmental directives to “self-
isolate” and shut down nonessential businesses. Id. Noting
the relationship between housing and physical health during
the pandemic, the City Council found it necessary to “take
measures to protect public health, life, and property” by

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APARTMENT ASS ’ N OF LA CNTY . V. CITY OF LA 9
enacting the eviction moratorium. Id.; L.A., Cal., Ordinance
No. 186,585 pmbl.
To achieve these goals, the eviction moratorium curtails
the rights of residential landlords in various ways. Most
significantly, it substantially alters the grounds that
landlords may invoke against tenants in eviction actions
(known in California as “unlawful detainer” actions).
Specifically, landlords are barred from “endeavor[ing] to
evict or evict[ing] a residential tenant for” any of three
reasons. L.A., Cal., Municipal Code § 49.99.2(A)–(C).
First, “[d]uring the Local Emergency Period and for
12 months after its expiration,” tenants cannot be evicted
“for non-payment of rent . . . if the tenant is unable to pay
rent due to circumstances related to the COVID-19
pandemic.” Id. § 49.99.2(A). “[C]ircumstances related to
the COVID-19 pandemic” include:
loss of income due to a COVID-19 related
workplace closure, child care expenditures
due to school closures, health-care expenses
related to being ill with COVID-19 or caring
for a member of the tenant’s household or
family who is ill with COVID-19, or
reasonable expenditures that stem from
government-ordered emergency measures.
Id. Although these tenants’ payment obligations were
deferred (an issue we discuss further below), the moratorium
did not relieve tenants of their ultimate obligations to pay
rent. Id.
Second, during the Local Emergency Period, tenants
cannot be evicted for a “no-fault reason.” Id. § 49.99.2(B).
Those reasons include an owner or owner’s family intending

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10 APARTMENT ASS ’ N OF LA CNTY . V. CITY OF LA
to occupy the property; withdrawal of the property from the
rental market; the owner’s compliance with laws or
governmental orders requiring vacating of the property; and
intent to demolish or remodel the property. Id. § 49.99.1(D);
see also Cal. Civ. Code § 1946.2(b)(2). Finally, tenants
during the Local Emergency Period cannot be evicted “based
on the presence of unauthorized occupants or pets, or for
nuisance related to COVID-19.” Id. § 49.99.2(C).
The “Local Emergency Period” was defined as “the
period of time from March 4, 2020, to the end of the local
emergency as declared by the Mayor.” Id. §§ 49.99.1(C).
The Local Emergency Period remains ongoing as of the time
of this opinion. The eviction moratorium does not require
tenants to provide any evidence, such as a written attestation,
that any claimed inability to pay rent, presence of
“unauthorized occupants or pets,” or “nuisance” existed or
was COVID-19-related.
Additionally, the eviction moratorium alters tenants’
payment obligations by providing them “up to 12 months
following the expiration of the Local Emergency Period to
repay any rent deferred during the Local Emergency
Period.” Id. § 49.99.2(A). By its terms, however, it does not
“eliminate[] any obligation to pay lawfully charged rent.”
Id. For covered tenants, the moratorium also prohibits
landlords from “charg[ing] interest or a late fee on rent not
paid.” Id. § 49.99.2(D).
Landlords may continue to seek to evict tenants based on
their good-faith belief that the tenants are not protected
under the eviction moratorium. But the eviction

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APARTMENT ASS ’ N OF LA CNTY . V. CITY OF LA 11
moratorium’s protections create an affirmative defense for
tenants in an unlawful detainer action.1 Id. § 49.99.6.
The eviction moratorium also creates a private right of
action for residential tenants who believe their landlords
have aggrieved them. Id. § 49.99.7. If the landlord was
given an opportunity to cure and did not do so, a prevailing
tenant is potentially entitled to “injunctive relief, direct
money damages,” “reasonable attorney’s fees and costs,”
and “an award of a civil penalty up to $10,000 per violation
depending on the severity of the violation” (and up to an
additional $5,000 per violation for elderly or disabled
tenants). Id. However, an “[o]wner who prevails in any such
action and obtains a Court determination that the tenant’s
action was frivolous” also may recover “reasonable
attorney’s fees and costs.” Id.2
1 The Supreme Court recently temporarily enjoined Part A of the
COVID Emergency Eviction and Foreclosure Prevention Act
(CEEFPA), 2020 N.Y. Laws ch. 381. Chrysafis v. Marks, No. 21A8,
slip op. at 1 (U.S. Aug. 12, 2021). Under the New York law, “[i]f a
tenant self-certifies financial hardship” due to COVID-19, CEEFPA
“generally precludes a landlord from contesting that certification and
denies the landlord a hearing.” Id. The Supreme Court concluded that
“[t]his scheme violates the Court’s longstanding teaching that ordinarily,
‘no man can be a judge in his own case’ consistent with the Due Process
Clause.” Id. (quoting In re Murchinson, 349 U.S. 133, 136 (1955)).
Although there are apparent differences between the Los Angeles and
New York eviction moratoria, AAGLA in any event does not raise
before us any Due Process challenge, whether to the procedures
governing unlawful detainer proceedings or otherwise.
2 We grant the City’s motion for judicial notice of related COVID-
19 measures. We also note that the eviction moratorium contains other
provisions not at issue in this appeal, such as requirements that landlords
notify tenants of their rights under the moratorium and restrictions on

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12 APARTMENT ASS ’ N OF LA CNTY . V. CITY OF LA
B
Plaintiff Apartment Association of Los Angeles County,
Inc., dba Apartment Association of Greater Los Angeles
(“AAGLA”), is a trade association “comprised of thousands
of owners and managers of rental housing units, including
over 55,000 properties within the City of Los Angeles.”
AAGLA’s members did not react positively to the City’s
eviction moratorium, viewing it as laying on their shoulders
the burdens of maintaining affordable housing during the
pandemic. On June 11, 2020, AAGLA, on behalf of its
members, challenged the eviction moratorium in a lawsuit
against the City, its Mayor, and the City Council. We will
refer to these parties collectively as the “City.”
AAGLA alleged that the eviction moratorium violated
the Contracts Clause, the Takings Clause, and the Tenth and
Fourteenth Amendments. Later, AAGLA moved for a
preliminary injunction. As relevant here, AAGLA sought to
enjoin key provisions of the eviction moratorium as violating
the Contracts Clause.3 In support of its motion, AAGLA
submitted declarations from four of its members who own or
manage properties in Los Angeles, detailing the harms the
eviction moratorium was allegedly causing them. These
harms include loss of rental income, inability to perform
background checks on unauthorized occupants, and being
removing residential property from the rental market. See, e.g., L.A.,
Cal., Municipal Code §§ 49.99.2(E), .4.
3 AAGLA did not request preliminary injunctive relief based on the
Takings Clause. And although it did invoke the Fourteenth
Amendment’s Due Process Clause, AAGLA does not appeal the district
court’s rejection of that claim. We therefore have no occasion to decide
whether AAGLA has a valid claim under either the Takings Clause or
the Fourteenth Amendment.

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APARTMENT ASS ’ N OF LA CNTY . V. CITY OF LA 13
forced to use retirement savings to cover expenses on the
properties.
The district court denied AAGLA’s request for
preliminary injunctive relief. The district court first
determined that AAGLA was unlikely to succeed on its
Contracts Clause claim. The court found that AAGLA was
likely to show that the eviction moratorium would be “a
substantial impairment of its contractual rights,” in part
because no landlord could have anticipated the COVID-19
pandemic and “the public health measures necessary to
combat it.” But the district court also determined that
AAGLA could not show that the eviction moratorium was
not “reasonable” and “appropriate” under the deferential
standard in Contracts Clause cases. Furthermore, the district
court found that AAGLA had not shown a likelihood of
irreparable harm or that the balance of the equities and the
public interest favored granting relief.
AAGLA timely appealed the district court’s order
denying preliminary injunctive relief. On appeal, AAGLA
pursues its Contracts Clause challenge only with respect to
the provisions of the eviction moratorium governing
restrictions on the grounds for evictions, rent deferment, and
the elimination of late fees and interest.
II
We “review the district court’s decision to . . . deny a
preliminary injunction for abuse of discretion.” Sw. Voter
Registration Educ. Project v. Shelley, 344 F.3d 914, 918 (9th
Cir. 2003) (en banc) (per curiam). “The district court’s
interpretation of the underlying legal principles, however, is
subject to de novo review.” Id. Factual findings are
reviewed for clear error. Shell Offshore, Inc. v. Greenpeace,
Inc., 709 F.3d 1281, 1286 (9th Cir. 2013).

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14 APARTMENT ASS ’ N OF LA CNTY . V. CITY OF LA
A preliminary injunction is “an extraordinary and drastic
remedy, one that should not be granted unless the movant,
by a clear showing, carries the burden of persuasion.” Lopez
v. Brewer, 680 F.3d 1068, 1072 (9th Cir. 2012) (emphasis in
original) (quoting Mazurek v. Armstrong, 520 U.S. 968, 972
(1997) (per curiam)); accord Winter v. Nat. Res. Def.
Council, Inc., 555 U.S. 7, 22 (2008). To obtain injunctive
relief, a plaintiff “must establish [1] that he is likely to
succeed on the merits, [2] that he is likely to suffer
irreparable harm in the absence of preliminary relief, [3] that
the balance of equities tips in his favor, and [4] that an
injunction is in the public interest.” City & County of San
Francisco v. USCIS, 944 F.3d 773, 788–89 (9th Cir. 2019)
(quoting Winter, 555 U.S. at 20) (alterations in original).
“Likelihood of success on the merits is the most important
factor.” California v. Azar, 911 F.3d 558, 575 (9th Cir.
2018) (quotations omitted).
III
A
The Contracts Clause provides that “No State shall . . .
pass any . . . Law impairing the Obligation of Contracts.”
U.S. Const. art. I, § 10, cl. 1. As a historical matter, the
“primary focus” of the Contracts Clause “was upon
legislation that was designed to repudiate or adjust pre-
existing debtor-creditor relationships that obligors were
unable to satisfy.” Keystone Bituminous Coal Ass’n v.
DeBenedictis, 480 U.S. 470, 503 (1987); see generally Home
Bldg. & Loan Ass’n v. Blaisdell, 290 U.S. 398, 453–65
(1934) (Sutherland, J., dissenting) (recounting the history of
the Contracts Clause). Yet “the text is not so limited, and
historical context suggests that the Clause was aimed at all
retrospective, redistributive schemes in violation of vested
contractual rights.” Ass’n of Equip. Mfrs. v. Burgum,

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APARTMENT ASS ’ N OF LA CNTY . V. CITY OF LA 15
932 F.3d 727, 732 (8th Cir. 2019) (quotations omitted). For
the first 150 years of American legal history, the Contracts
Clause imposed consequential limitations that federal courts
routinely deployed to invalidate state and local legislation.
See Blaisdell, 290 U.S. at 465–72 (Sutherland, J., dissenting)
(collecting and discussing cases).
All of that changed with Home Building & Loan Ass’n v.
Blaisdell, 290 U.S. 398 (1934), the “watershed decision . . .
on which the modern interpretation of the [Contracts Clause]
rests.” Richard A. Epstein, Toward a Revitalization of the
Contract Clause, 51 U. Chi. L. Rev. 703, 735 (1984). There,
the Court “upheld Minnesota’s statutory moratorium against
home foreclosures, in part, because the legislation was
addressed to the ‘legitimate end’ of protecting ‘a basic
interest of society.’” Keystone Bituminous, 480 U.S. at 503
(quoting Blaisdell, 590 U.S. at 445).
Blaisdell marked the beginning of the Supreme Court
significantly curtailing the Contracts Clause’s prohibitive
force. As a result, the relevant cases today primarily consist
of Blaisdell and its progeny, which set forth a very different
conception of the Contracts Clause than in earlier cases.
E.g., Sveen v. Melin, 138 S. Ct. 1815 (2018); Keystone
Bituminous, 480 U.S. 470; Exxon Corp. v. Eagerton,
462 U.S. 176 (1983); Energy Reserves Grp. v. Kan. Power
& Light Co., 459 U.S. 400 (1983). Perhaps most
prominently, in Energy Reserves Group v. Kansas Power &
Light Co., 459 U.S. 400 (1983), the Court clarified the
modern approach to the Contracts Clause post-Blaisdell,
articulating the flexible considerations courts must consider
in a Contracts Clause case. Id. at 410–13.
Recently, in Sveen v. Melin, 138 S. Ct. 1815 (2018), the
Supreme Court restated the inquiry as a “two-step test.” Id.
at 1821–22. Under Sveen’s formulation, “[t]he threshold

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16 APARTMENT ASS ’ N OF LA CNTY . V. CITY OF LA
issue is whether the state law has ‘operated as a substantial
impairment of a contractual relationship.’” Id. (quoting
Allied Structural Steel Co. v. Spannaus, 438 U.S. 234, 244
(1978)). Factors relevant to that consideration include “the
extent to which the law undermines the contractual bargain,
interferes with a party’s reasonable expectations, and
prevents the party from safeguarding or reinstating his
rights.” Id. at 1822.
If the law is a substantial impairment, then “the inquiry
turns to the means and ends of the legislation.” Id. At that
point, a court must determine whether the law is drawn in an
“‘appropriate’ and ‘reasonable’ way to advance ‘a
significant and legitimate public purpose.’” Id. (quoting
Energy Reserves, 459 U.S. at 411–12). A heightened level
of judicial scrutiny is appropriate when the government is a
contracting party. U.S. Trust Co. of N.Y. v. New Jersey,
431 U.S. 1, 25–26 (1977). But when the government is not
party to the contract being impaired, “courts properly defer
to legislative judgment as to the necessity and
reasonableness of a particular measure.” Energy Reserves,
459 U.S. at 413 (quotations omitted); see also Keystone
Bituminous, 480 U.S. at 505; Lazar v. Kroncke, 862 F.3d
1186, 1199 (9th Cir. 2017).
Thus, the eviction moratorium must be upheld, even if it
is a substantial impairment of contractual relations, if its
“adjustment of the rights and responsibilities of contracting
parties is based upon reasonable conditions and is of a
character appropriate to the public purpose justifying the
legislation’s adoption.” Energy Reserves, 459 U.S. at 412
(quotations omitted and alterations accepted). And because
the government is not “the party asserting the benefit of the
statute,” AAGLA bears the burden of showing that the

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APARTMENT ASS ’ N OF LA CNTY . V. CITY OF LA 17
ordinances are unreasonable. Seltzer v. Cochrane (In re
Seltzer), 104 F.3d 234, 236 (9th Cir. 1996).
B
We need not decide whether the eviction moratorium is
a substantial impairment of contractual relations because
even assuming it is, given the challenges that COVID-19
presents, the moratorium’s provisions constitute an
“appropriate and reasonable way to advance a significant
and legitimate public purpose.” Sveen, 138 S. Ct. at 1822
(quotations omitted); see also Snake River Valley Elec. Ass’n
v. PacifiCorp, 357 F.3d 1042, 1051 n.9 (9th Cir. 2004) (“We
need not address the question of substantial impairment, for
we have no doubt that the [statute] reflects significant and
legitimate public purposes . . . .”). AAGLA does not dispute
that the eviction moratorium was enacted for a permissible
public purpose. Therefore, it can prevail, if at all, only if it
can show that the provisions it challenges were not
“appropriate and reasonable.” Sveen, 138 S. Ct. at 1822.
AAGLA’s challenge meets its end here because the
district court properly deferred to local officials in the
reasonableness analysis under modern Contracts Clause
precedent. See Energy Reserves, 459 U.S. at 413.
Therefore, assuming without deciding that the eviction
moratorium is a substantial impairment of contracts, and
undertaking a “careful examination” of its provisions, Allied
Structural, 438 U.S. at 245, we conclude that AAGLA is
unlikely to show that the eviction moratorium is an
unreasonable fit for the problems identified.
Case law supports this conclusion: repeatedly in modern
times, both the Supreme Court and this court have upheld as
reasonable various laws that nonetheless may have affected
private contracts. See, e.g., Keystone Bituminous, 480 U.S.

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18 APARTMENT ASS ’ N OF LA CNTY . V. CITY OF LA
at 505–06; Exxon Corp., 462 U.S. at 191–94; Energy
Reserves, 459 U.S. at 416–19; Snake River, 357 F.3d at 1051
n.9; Seltzer, 104 F.3d at 236–37. For instance, despite
finding that the law challenged in Keystone Bituminous Coal
Ass’n v. DeBenedictis, 480 U.S. 470 (1987), was a
substantial impairment, the Court upheld it, “refus[ing] to
second-guess” the legislature’s identification of “the most
appropriate ways of dealing with the problem.” Id. at 506.
Given such precedents, AAGLA is unlikely to show that
the challenged provisions of the eviction moratorium are
constitutionally impermissible under the Contracts Clause.
The City fairly ties the moratorium to its stated goal of
preventing displacement from homes, which the City
reasonably explains can exacerbate the public health-related
problems stemming from the COVID-19 pandemic. See
L.A., Cal., Municipal Code § 49.99 (“The COVID-19
pandemic threatens to undermine housing security and
generate unnecessary displacement of City residents and
instability of City businesses. Therefore, the City of Los
Angeles has taken and must continue to take measures to
protect public health, life, and property.”); L.A., Cal.,
Ordinance No. 186,585 pmbl. (“[I]n the interest of
protecting public health and preventing transmission of
COVID-19, it is essential to avoid unnecessary housing
displacement to protect the City’s affordable housing stock
and to prevent housed individuals from falling into
homelessness[.]”). As mentioned, AAGLA does not dispute
that this purpose is a legitimate one.
In turn, each of the provisions of the eviction moratorium
that AAGLA challenges may be viewed as reasonable
attempts to address that valid public purpose. See Energy
Reserves, 459 U.S. at 418–19. As the City explains in its
briefing, the eviction protections are “necessary to avoid

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APARTMENT ASS ’ N OF LA CNTY . V. CITY OF LA 19
displacing residential tenants amidst a pandemic”; late fees
and interest “could compound COVID-19 affected tenants’
dilemmas, causing them to self-evict or be evicted”; and
“economic hardship may cause consolidation of households
and an increase in the number of inhabitants in some units,
which could include additional inhabitants’ pets” (citations
and quotations omitted).
Thus, given the deferential standard that precedent
constrains us to apply, we are compelled to conclude that the
City’s enactments pass constitutional muster under the
Contracts Clause. Under current doctrine, we must “refuse
to second-guess” the City’s determination that the eviction
moratorium constitutes “the most appropriate way[] of
dealing with the problem[s]” identified. Keystone
Bituminous, 480 U.S. at 506. That is particularly so, based
on modern Contracts Clause cases, in the face of a public
health situation like COVID-19. See Blaisdell, 290 U.S. at
440–41, 444–45.
C
AAGLA does not seriously argue that the City’s chosen
mechanisms are not reasonably related to the legitimate
public purpose of ensuring health and security during the
pandemic. Instead, AAGLA relies on a line of cases,
beginning in the antebellum period and culminating in
Blaisdell, that considered various laws imposing moratoria
on evictions and foreclosures. Citing those earlier cases,
AAGLA avers that “the Supreme Court has established a
standard for reasonableness in the context of moratoria
delaying a property owner’s right to possession: ensuring
fair rental compensation contemporaneous with the
extended occupation during the pendency of a moratorium.”

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20 APARTMENT ASS ’ N OF LA CNTY . V. CITY OF LA
AAGLA correctly observes that the Court in those
Contracts Clause cases often appears to have referenced in
its discussion whether the law provided for some sort of
reasonable rental value to be paid to the property owner
during the moratoria’s interim. In Blaisdell, for example, the
Court upheld a moratorium on foreclosures, at least in part
because it “secure[d] to the mortgagee the rental value of the
property” during the emergency period. 290 U.S. at 432.
The other cases AAGLA discusses appear to have viewed
reasonable rent as a relevant consideration as well.4
But AAGLA’s assertion that, as a matter of
constitutional law, eviction moratoria require fair rental
compensation in the interim fails for two main reasons.
First, even in the more Contracts Clause-friendly era in
which some of these cases were decided, the authorities
AAGLA cites do not clearly impose AAGLA’s preferred
inflexible rent payment rule. While these cases treated
reasonable rent as a relevant criterion in the analysis, they do
not purport to impose such a requirement as a categorical
matter. Indeed, even AAGLA in its opening brief
acknowledges that its desired contemporaneous rent
4 Compare Block v. Hirsh, 256 U.S. 135, 153–54 (1921) (upholding
a law allowing tenants to remain in possession after the expiration of the
terms of their leases at least in part because “[m]achinery is provided to
secure to the landlord a reasonable rent”), with Bronson v. Kinzie,
42 U.S. (1 How.) 311, 319–22 (1843) (striking down a law limiting
certain foreclosures, in part because—as the court later explained—
unlike in Blaisdell, “there was no provision . . . to secure to the
mortgagee the rental value of the property during the extended period,”
Blaisdell, 290 U.S. at 432); and W.B. Worthen Co. v. Kavanaugh,
295 U.S. 56, 61 (1935) (invalidating a law limiting foreclosures that did
not condition relief “upon payment of interest and taxes or the rental
value of the premises”).

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APARTMENT ASS ’ N OF LA CNTY . V. CITY OF LA 21
requirement “may not have been elevated to a hard and fast
‘rule’ in every case.”
In other words, there is no apparent ironclad
constitutional rule that eviction moratoria pass Contracts
Clause scrutiny only if rent is paid during the period of the
moratoria. Instead, each of the cases AAGLA cites turned
on its own facts and circumstances. That reasonable rent
may have been a relevant consideration in some cases thus
does not make it a constitutional floor in all cases. And it
does not thereby create a Contracts Clause constitutional
baseline in a case involving a public health situation like
COVID-19. See Matsuda v. City & County of Honolulu,
512 F.3d 1148, 1152 (9th Cir. 2008) (“[T]he Supreme Court
has construed [the Contracts Clause] prohibition narrowly in
order to ensure that local governments retain the flexibility
to exercise their police powers effectively.”).
In claiming that any eviction moratorium is
constitutional only if rent is contemporaneously paid,
AAGLA relies most heavily on Blaisdell. But Blaisdell
shows why AAGLA’s attempt to divine a bright-line
“reasonable rent” rule is unpersuasive. Blaisdell identified
several factors that supported the state law’s
constitutionality. As the Court later explained, these
included that the law contained a declaration of emergency,
“protect[ed] a basic societal interest,” was “appropriately
tailored,” and imposed “reasonable” conditions “limited to
the duration of the emergency.” Allied Structural, 438 U.S.
at 242; see also Blaisdell, 290 U.S. at 444–47. Nothing in
Blaisdell suggests that a “reasonable rent” requirement was
dispositive. Indeed, Blaisdell specifically rejected the notion
that Contracts Clause analysis should proceed with a “literal
exactness like a mathematical formula.” 290 U.S. at 428.

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22 APARTMENT ASS ’ N OF LA CNTY . V. CITY OF LA
Instead, “[e]very case must be determined upon its own
circumstances.” Id. at 430 (quotations omitted).
Second, the outmoded approach in the pre-Blaisdell
cases AAGLA cites does not resemble the Supreme Court’s
modern Contracts Clause doctrine. See U.S. Trust, 431 U.S.
at 22 n.19 (explaining that to the extent prior cases had
imposed strict limitations, “[l]ater decisions abandoned
these limitations as absolute requirements”). Indeed, the
Supreme Court has clarified, even “the existence of an
emergency and the limited duration of a relief measure . . .
cannot be regarded as essential in every case.” Id. at 23 n.19.
As discussed above, Energy Reserves provided for
considerable deference to state and local legislatures in
assessing the reasonableness of legislation. 459 U.S. at 412–
13. Even twenty-five years ago, we “specifically recognized
the shift in the law created by Energy Reserves,” when the
Supreme Court “retreated from its prior case law” and
“indicated a renewed willingness to defer to the decisions of
state legislatures regarding the impairment of private
contracts.” Seltzer, 104 F.3d at 236 (quotations omitted and
alterations accepted). Under current precedent, this court
therefore does not engage in an analysis as demanding as that
of the pre-Blaisdell cases that AAGLA invokes.
Further weakening AAGLA’s challenge is the fact that
the eviction moratorium is but one aspect of a broader
remedial framework applicable to landlords during the
pandemic. In response to AAGLA’s concerns, appellees
fairly argue that the City’s creation of an Emergency Rental
Assistance Program supports the eviction moratorium’s
reasonableness. That Program initially made available about
$103 million (of which $100 million was funded by the
federal government) to provide up to $2,000 in rent
payments per eligible household, though only tenants were

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APARTMENT ASS ’ N OF LA CNTY . V. CITY OF LA 23
able (but were not required) to apply for such assistance.
Subsequently, federal and state funds allowed the City to
expand that program by an additional $235.5 million.
Moreover, the City more recently has indicated that it
expects to receive an additional $193 million “for rental
assistance directly from the federal government,” along with
a portion of the $1.2 billion in federal funds allocated to
California from the most recent legislation. The City points
to recent state legislation directing the funds to be “used to
pay all of the rental debt accumulated on or after April 1,
2020 by a household making up to 80% of the area median
income.” See Cal. Health & Safety Code § 50897.1(b),
(d)(1).
And finally, the City notes that other government
agencies, including within the City, have given landlords
flexibility in meeting their obligations, such as payment
plans for utilities and penalty waivers for property taxes.
Although the interaction between these various programs is
a matter of some complexity, the availability of such relief,
while not dispositive, remains relevant in assessing the
overall reasonableness of the City’s actions. See Energy
Reserves, 459 U.S. at 418 (“To analyze properly the Kansas
Act’s effect, . . . we must consider the entire state and federal
gas price regulatory structure.”). That other government
programs provide some relief to landlords thus further
undermines AAGLA’s Contracts Clause challenge.
Lastly, we note that although we appear to be the first
court of appeals to have addressed a challenge to the
constitutionality of a COVID-19-related eviction
moratorium under the Contracts Clause, our result today is
consistent with those of the district courts that have
confronted—and uniformly rejected—these challenges. See
Heights Apartments, LLC v. Walz, 510 F. Supp. 3d 789, 808–

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24 APARTMENT ASS ’ N OF LA CNTY . V. CITY OF LA
10 (D. Minn. 2020), appeal docketed, No. 21-1278 (8th
Cir.); Baptiste v. Kennealy, 490 F. Supp. 3d 353, 381–87
(D. Mass. 2020); El Papel LLC v. Inslee, No. 2:20-cv-
01323-RAJ-JRC, 2020 WL 8024348, at *6–12 (W.D. Wash.
Dec. 2, 2020), report and recommendation adopted, 2021
WL 71678, at *3 (Jan. 8, 2021); HAPCO v. City of
Philadelphia, 482 F. Supp. 3d 337, 349–35 (E.D. Pa. 2020);
Auracle Homes, LLC v. Lamont, 478 F. Supp. 3d 199, 223–
26 (D. Conn. 2020); Elmsford Apartment Assocs., LLC v.
Cuomo, 469 F. Supp. 3d 148, 168–72 (S.D.N.Y. 2020).5
5 We note that AAGLA’s Contracts Clause challenge involves a
different analysis than the statutory and constitutional challenges to the
nationwide eviction moratorium imposed by the Centers for Disease
Control and Prevention (CDC), which recently reached the Supreme
Court. See Ala. Ass’n of Realtors v. U.S. Dep’t of Health & Hum. Servs.,
No. 20-cv-3377 (DLF), — F. Supp. 3d —, 2021 WL 1779282, at *4–9
(D.D.C. May 5, 2021), motion to stay granted, — F. Supp. 3d —, 2021
WL 1946376, at *5 (May 14, 2021), motion to vacate stay denied, No.
21-5093, 2021 WL 2221646, at *1 (D.C. Cir. June 2, 2021) (per curiam),
application to vacate stay denied sub. nom. Ala. Ass’n of Realtors v.
Dep’t of Health & Hum. Svcs., 141 S. Ct. 2320, 2320 (2021) (mem.); see
also Ala. Ass’n of Realtors, 141 S. Ct. at 2320–21 (Kavanaugh, J.,
concurring); Tiger Lily, LLC v. U.S. Dep’t of Hous. & Urb. Dev., 992
F.3d 518, 522–24 (6th Cir. 2021) (order); Terkel v. Ctrs. for Disease
Control & Prevention, No. 6:20-cv-00564, — F. Supp. 3d —, 2021 WL
742877, at *4–10 (E.D. Tex. Feb. 25, 2021), appeal docketed, No. 21-
40137 (5th Cir.). Those cases concern the federal government’s powers
to enact national eviction moratoria under the Public Health Service Act
and the Constitution. See Tiger Lily, 992 F.3d at 522–23; Ala. Ass’n of
Realtors, 2021 WL 1779282, at *4; Terkel, 2021 WL 742877, at *4. We
have no occasion to opine on those issues here.
The issues presented here are also different than those in Chrysafis,
discussed above, in which the Supreme Court partially enjoined New
York’s eviction moratorium based on a Due Process challenge relating
to landlords’ lack of access to hearing procedures. No. 21A8, slip op.

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APARTMENT ASS ’ N OF LA CNTY . V. CITY OF LA 25
Because AAGLA has not demonstrated a likelihood of
success on its claim, we need not address the other
preliminary injunction factors that AAGLA also would have
needed to establish. See California ex rel. Becerra v. Azar,
950 F.3d 1067, 1083 (9th Cir. 2020) (en banc) (“If a movant
fails to establish likelihood of success on the merits, we need
not consider the other factors.”).
* * *
We are tasked only with evaluating the constitutionality
of the eviction moratorium under the forgiving standard of
modern Contracts Clause analysis. A faithful application of
that standard requires us to conclude that the district court
did not err in denying AAGLA’s request for preliminary
injunctive relief.
AFFIRMED.
at 1. The Supreme Court in Chrysafis was not considering a Contracts
Clause challenge.

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