Student A, by v. San Francisco Unified School District

FOR PUBLICATION
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
STUDENT A, by and through Parent
A, her Guardian; STUDENT B, by and
through Parent B, his Guardian;
STUDENT C, by and through Parent
C, his Guardian; STUDENT D, by and
through Parent D, her Guardian;
STUDENT E, by and through Parent
E, her Guardian, On Behalf of
Themselves and All Others Similarly
Situated,
Plaintiffs-Appellants,
v.
SAN FRANCISCO UNIFIED SCHOOL
DISTRICT; VINCENT MATTHEWS, In
his Official Capacity as the
Superintendent for the San Francisco
Unified School District,
Defendants-Appellees.
No. 20-15386
D.C. No.
3:19-cv-03101-
WHO
OPINION
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Northern District of California
William Horsley Orrick, District Judge, Presiding
Argued and Submitted June 15, 2021
San Francisco, California

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STUDENT A V. SFUSD 2
Filed August 18, 2021
Before: Mary M. Schroeder, Milan D. Smith, Jr., and
Lawrence VanDyke, Circuit Judges.
Opinion by Judge Schroeder
SUMMARY*
Individuals with Disabilities Education Act
The panel affirmed the district court’s dismissal, for
failure to exhaust administrative remedies, of an action under
the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act.
Plaintiffs claimed that San Francisco Unified School
District failed in its responsibilities to students under the
IDEA by not timely identifying and evaluating students with
disabilities, and, after identifying them, by providing them
with insufficiently individualized, “cookie-cutter”
accommodations and services.
The panel held that plaintiffs did not satisfy any of the
limited exceptions to the exhaustion requirement contained in
20 U.S.C. § 1415(l). Plaintiffs argued that exhaustion was
not required because they challenged district-wide policies
that only a court could remedy, but they were unable to
identify any such policies. The panel agreed with the district
court that plaintiffs challenged what amounted to failures in
* This summary constitutes no part of the opinion of the court. It has
been prepared by court staff for the convenience of the reader.

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STUDENT A V. SFUSD 3
practice by SFUSD, rather than policies or practices of
general applicability.
COUNSEL
Guy B. Wallace (argued), Schneider Wallace Cottrell
Konecky LLP, Emeryville, California; Shawna L. Parks, Law
Office of Shawna L. Parks, Los Angeles, California; Jinny
Kim and Alexis Alvarez, Legal Aid at Work, San Francisco,
California; Jose R. Allen and Christina M. Krokee, Skadden
Arps Slate Meagher & Flom LLP, Palo Alto, California; for
Plaintiffs-Appellants.
Don Willenburg (argued), Gordon Rees Scully Mansukhani
LLP, Oakland, California; Mark S. Posard and Judith A.
Cregan, Gordon Rees Scully Mansukhani LLP, Sacramento,
California; for Defendants-Appellees.
Neeraj Kumar, Ramaah Sadasivam, Suge Lee, and Melinda
Bird, Disability Rights California, Oakland, California, for
Amici Curiae Disability Rights California, The ARC of the
United States, Arizona Center for Disability Law, Council of
Parent Attorneys and Advocates Inc., Disability Law Center
of Alaska, Disability Rights Advocates, Disability Rights
Education and Defense Fund, Disability Rights Oregon, and
Learning Rights Law Center.

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STUDENT A V. SFUSD 4
OPINION
SCHROEDER, Circuit Judge:
Most Americans, at least those who have had children in
our public schools in the last 50 years, are familiar with the
landmark legislation of the 1970s ensuring that our schools
educate those of our children who have disabilities. Titled
the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act, 20 U.S.C.
§ 1400 et seq., and known simply as the IDEA, it has
generated litigation in many areas, not the least of which
concerns when plaintiffs must exhaust administrative
remedies before seeking broader relief in federal court.
In this case, Plaintiffs claim the San Francisco Unified
School District (SFUSD) is failing its responsibilities to
students under the IDEA by not timely identifying and
evaluating students with disabilities, and, after identifying
them, by providing them with insufficiently individualized,
“cookie-cutter” accommodations and services. The district
court dismissed the complaint because none of the plaintiffs
had exhausted administrative remedies.
Plaintiffs argue on appeal that exhaustion was not
required because they are challenging district-wide policies
that only a court can remedy. Yet Plaintiffs are unable to
identify any such policies. We agree with the district court
that Plaintiffs have not satisfied any of the limited exceptions
recognized by our caselaw to the exhaustion requirement
contained in 20 U.S.C. § 1415(l).

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STUDENT A V. SFUSD 5
BACKGROUND
The primary purpose of the IDEA is to ensure a free
appropriate public education (FAPE) to every child with a
disability. Id. § 1400(d)(1)(A). As part of its statutory design
for achieving this purpose, the IDEA requires states to
provide an opportunity for an impartial due process hearing
to any parent who disputes what services must be provided to
a child. See id. § 1415(f)–(i). A parent must generally
exhaust this due process hearing procedure before filing a
lawsuit seeking relief available under the IDEA. 20 U.S.C.
§ 1415(i)(2)(A) (“Any party aggrieved by the findings and
decision made under [the IDEA’s due process hearing
procedures] . . . shall have the right to bring a civil action
. . . .”); 20 U.S.C. § 1415(l) (“[B]efore the filing of a civil
action under such laws seeking relief that is also available
under this subchapter, [the IDEA’s due process hearing]
procedures . . . shall be exhausted . . . .”). Because other
federal statutes also bear on students’ access to education, the
Supreme Court has clarified that exhaustion is required when
the gravamen of the complaint is seeking relief for the denial
of a FAPE, even if the complaint does not invoke the IDEA.
Fry v. Napoleon Cmty. Sch., 137 S. Ct. 743, 755 (2017).
In California, the Office of Administrative Hearings
(OAH) oversees the formal hearing process mandated by the
IDEA. See Cal. Educ. Code. § 56000 et seq. The OAH
provides administrative resolution of an individual student’s
identification, evaluation, placement, and FAPE provision.
See Cal. Educ. Code. § 56501.
California also provides another, less formal process,
known as a complaint resolution proceeding (CRP), through
which a parent may bring a complaint directly to the

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STUDENT A V. SFUSD 6
California Department of Education. See Cal. Educ. Code
§ 56500.2. The CRP process is more flexible than the OAH
process: a CRP complaint may contain any allegation that a
school district has violated the IDEA or its implementing
regulations, and it need not involve allegations limited to a
specific student. See Cal. Educ. Code § 56500.2(a)(1), (c)(4).
This court has stated that the CRP process may, on a case-by-
case basis, serve as a substitute for the OAH process for
purposes of the IDEA’s exhaustion requirement. Porter v.
Bd. of Trs. of Manhattan Beach Unified Sch. Dist., 307 F.3d
1064, 1073–74 (9th Cir. 2002).
Plaintiffs are five current or former SFUSD students who
have been diagnosed with dyslexia, autism, or speech and
language impairments. In their class-action complaint,
Plaintiffs alleged that SFUSD has systematically failed and
refused to fulfill its obligations to (1) timely identify and
evaluate students who qualify for special education services,
(2) offer appropriately tailored special education services to
students with disabilities, and (3) provide sufficient resources
for its special education program. None of the Plaintiffs have
initiated either the OAH or the CRP process.
On motion by the school district, the district court
dismissed Plaintiffs’ complaint for failure to exhaust
administrative remedies. The district court concluded that
Plaintiffs had not alleged facts sufficient to support their
contention that an exception to the exhaustion requirement
applied to their claims. The district court granted Plaintiffs
leave to amend.
Plaintiffs did so, asserting in their amended complaint
that, since they sought systemic, district-wide reforms that the
OAH process could not achieve, exhausting the OAH process

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STUDENT A V. SFUSD 7
would be useless. Plaintiffs also cited data to show
unacceptably poor performance from SFUSD students with
disabilities. Defendants moved to dismiss.
The district court again granted dismissal for failure to
exhaust, this time with prejudice. Plaintiffs’ amended
complaint did not challenge policies or practices of general
applicability as contrary to law, the district court wrote, but
rather challenged what amounted to “failures in practice” by
SFUSD. The district court observed that Plaintiffs
“repeatedly characterize[d] their claims as challenging
‘systemic’ problems and seeking ‘structural’ relief.” But
such characterizations could not excuse failure to exhaust, the
district court concluded, in the absence of “facts showing that
exhaustion should be excused . . . or that the reform they seek
is anything other than increased funding and greater
adherence to existing policies at SFUSD.” The district court
also noted that the CRP process was an option, and one that
“appear[ed] to be a much better fit for satisfying the
exhaustion requirement,” given Plaintiffs’ claims and
requested relief. The district court concluded by
summarizing the purposes that exhaustion would serve in this
case:
Simply put, in light of IDEA’s exhaustion
requirement[,] plaintiffs need to do something
to make their case and their broad allegations
more concrete, and in the process develop a
record containing administrative expertise as
well as responses from the District or State to
allow a court to effectively move forward on
exhausted claims.
Plaintiffs appealed. We affirm.

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STUDENT A V. SFUSD 8
ANALYSIS
The IDEA’s exhaustion requirement applies in cases
where the plaintiff seeks a remedy for failure to provide a
FAPE. 20 U.S.C. § 1415(i)(2)(A), (l) (“[B]efore the filing of
a civil action . . . seeking relief that is also available under
this subchapter, [the IDEA’s due process hearing] procedures
. . . shall be exhausted . . . .”). In cases where plaintiffs bring
education-related suits under additional federal laws, such as
the Americans with Disabilities Act or the Rehabilitation Act,
a court must inquire as to whether the complaint’s gravamen
seeks redress for failure to provide a FAPE. Fry, 137 S. Ct.
at 755. If so, the exhaustion requirement applies. Here,
Plaintiffs acknowledge that they seek redress for failure to
provide a FAPE. Plaintiffs’ central allegation, in fact, is that
SFUSD engaged in “unlawful policies and practices [that]
have led to the widespread denial of FAPE to students with
disabilities.” The declaratory and injunctive relief Plaintiffs
seek aims to ensure that class members receive a FAPE.
Plaintiffs further acknowledge that none have exhausted any
administrative process.
Even when there has been no exhaustion, however, a
claim may qualify for one of the exceptions that we have
recognized to the IDEA’s exhaustion requirement. Our
seminal case is Hoeft v. Tucson Unified Sch. District,
967 F.2d 1298 (9th Cir. 1992). We have summarized Hoeft’s
exceptions to mean
that exhaustion is not required when
(1) use of the administrative process would be
futile,

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STUDENT A V. SFUSD 9
(2) the claim arises from a policy or practice
of general applicability that is contrary to
law, or
(3) it is improbable that adequate relief can be
obtained by pursuing administrative
remedies (e.g. the hearing officer lacks the
authority to grant the relief sought).
Paul G. v. Monterey Peninsula Unified Sch. Dist., 933 F.3d
1096, 1100 (9th Cir. 2019) (citing and quoting Hoeft,
967 F.2d at 1303–04) (line breaks added and internal
quotation marks omitted).
The exceptions describe limited situations where pursuit
of administrative remedies under the facts of a given case
would serve no purpose. In such cases, exhaustion would not
“further the general purposes of exhaustion and the
congressional intent behind the administrative scheme.”
Hoeft, 967 F.2d at 1303. An exhaustion requirement reflects
Congress’s judgment that “agencies, not the courts, ought to
have primary responsibility for the programs that Congress
has charged them to administer.” Id. (quoting McCarthy v.
Madigan, 503 U.S. 140, 145 (1992)). Exhaustion is
particularly important with respect to the IDEA because it
deals with public education, which is provided on a local
level. We have recognized “the traditionally strong state and
local interest in education” as well as the relevant expertise
possessed by educational agencies as opposed to generalist
judges. Id. These considerations are reflected in the structure
of the IDEA, where primary responsibility for ensuring
compliance is given to the state agencies, not to the courts.
Id. (citing 20 U.S.C. §§ 1412, 1414). Exhaustion assists
courts when they are called upon to enforce the IDEA’s

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STUDENT A V. SFUSD 10
provisions. Exhaustion “promotes judicial efficiency by
giving [state educational] agencies the first opportunity to
correct shortcomings” and aids reviewing courts by
“further[ing] development of a complete factual record.” Id.
Plaintiffs seek to avoid the exhaustion requirement
altogether. Primarily invoking the exception for unlawful
policies or practices of general applicability, see Paul G.,
933 F.3d at 1100, they claim to challenge district-wide
policies that apply generally to all SFUSD students with
disabilities and that result in their failing to receive FAPEs.
Plaintiffs thus contend exhaustion would serve no purpose.
Yet Plaintiffs have not identified any policy, much less one
of general applicability that the administrative process could
not address.
The district court concluded that the unlawful-policy-or-
practice exception did not apply because Plaintiffs were “not
challenging policies or practices” but rather “failures in
practice” by SFUSD. Yet Plaintiffs had made no attempt to
seek redress for such failings through the OAH or CRP
processes. There was thus no administrative record to help
the district court understand how the school district may have
failed their students and how only a court, not the
administrative agency, could remedy such failings.
Plaintiffs contend that there would be no point in going to
the state administrative agencies, because Plaintiffs seek to
change the SFUSD special educational system. We have at
times used the words “systemic” and “structural” to describe
challenges where exhaustion is not required. See Paul G.,
933 F.3d at 1101–02 (describing “systemic” claims as
“entitled to the general applicability exception”); Hoeft,

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STUDENT A V. SFUSD 11
967 F.2d at 1309 (“Administrative remedies are generally
inadequate where structural, systemic reforms are sought.”).
Our seminal decision on exhaustion is Hoeft. In that case,
as in this one, the plaintiffs sought class-action relief to
change local school district policy. 967 F.2d at 1299–1300.
We nonetheless held that exhaustion was required. Id. We
explained that describing problems as broad and far-reaching
is not enough to meet the standard; a policy or practice is not
necessarily “systemic” or “of general applicability” simply
because it “applie[s] to all students” or because “the
complaint is structured as a class action seeking injunctive
relief.” Id. at 1304, 1308. We concluded that in the absence
of an administrative record, the district court was “ill-
equipped” to determine whether students were receiving a
FAPE. Id. at 1310.
To our knowledge, no published opinion in this circuit has
ever found that a challenge was “systemic” and exhaustion
not required. A comprehensive discussion of what such a
claim might look like can be found in Doe ex rel. Brockhuis
v. Arizona Department of Education, 111 F.3d 678 (9th Cir.
1997). There, we defined a systemic claim as one that either
“implicates the integrity or reliability of the IDEA dispute
resolution procedures themselves, or requires restructuring
the education system itself in order to comply with the
dictates of the Act.” Id. at 682. We cited, as an example of
such a claim, a case from the Second Circuit where the
plaintiffs challenged the process for appointing IDEA hearing
officers. Id. (citing and discussing Heldman on Behalf of
T.H. v. Sobol, 962 F.2d 148, 159 (2d Cir. 1992)). In
Heldman, because the legitimacy of the hearing officers’
authority was challenged, the integrity of the dispute
resolution procedure itself was the issue; requiring the

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STUDENT A V. SFUSD 12
plaintiffs to utilize the procedure would have accomplished
nothing. See id. at 682–83.
Plaintiffs here are not challenging the integrity of the
state’s administrative procedures; they simply seek to bypass
them. Although Plaintiffs contend they are seeking a
restructuring of the education system, their complaint neither
identifies the policies or practices that need to be addressed
nor explains why the pursuit of administrative remedies could
not correct their deficiencies. We agree with the district court
that merely characterizing a school district’s problems as
“systemic” and the relief sought as “structural” does not
provide the facts necessary to show that the allegedly needed
reform is, as the court trenchantly put it, “anything other than
increased funding and greater adherence to existing policies.”
An administrative record could shed needed light on what is
going right, what is going wrong, and remedies for the latter.
To be sure, Plaintiffs do contend that their claims identify
three specific unlawful policies or practices. But what they
amount to are assertions of delay in providing services, denial
of sufficiently individualized services, and arbitrary limits on
services. These are allegations of bad results, not
descriptions of unlawful policies or practices. Plaintiffs’
claims are accompanied by general statistics documenting
poor performance by students with disabilities. While these
results, if true, are all unfortunate, they are not policies or
practices that a court could grasp, much less change, without
the benefit of any factually developed administrative record.
As we said in Hoeft, exhaustion “allows for the exercise of
discretion and educational expertise by state and local
agencies,” “furthers development of a complete factual
record, and promotes judicial efficiency.” 967 F.2d at 1303.

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STUDENT A V. SFUSD 13
All of these important interests could be furthered by
exhaustion in this case.
There is another important interest that exhaustion would
serve in this case, since this case represents a challenge to the
practices of a local school district. Exhaustion would give the
state of California a reasonable opportunity to investigate and
correct the district’s failures prior to judicial intervention. In
Hoeft, we emphasized the importance of giving the state
department of education an opportunity to investigate and
correct local district failures in the first instance. We
explained that this is because the state bears “ultimate
responsibility for ensuring . . . compl[iance] with the IDEA.”
Id. at 1307. As we said there, allowing plaintiffs to
“circumvent[] this scheme” when challenging local policies
would “undermine[] the IDEA’s enforcement structure.” Id.
For all of these reasons, the judgment of the district court
in favor of the defendants must be AFFIRMED. Plaintiffs’
motion for judicial notice of past OAH orders is GRANTED.
CONCLUSION
The district court correctly entered judgment in favor of
the defendants, because Plaintiffs’ claims did not fall within
any recognized exception to the IDEA’s requirement that
plaintiffs exhaust administrative remedies.
The judgment of the district court is AFFIRMED.

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