Suresh Kumar Sharma v. MERRICK B. GARLAND , Attorney General

FOR PUBLICATION
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
SURESH K UMAR SHARMA,
Petitioner,
v.
M ERRICK B. GARLAND , Attorney
General,
Respondent.
No. 20-70238
Agency No.
A200-157-160
OPINION
On Petition for Review of an Order of the
Board of Immigration Appeals
Submitted March 9, 2021*
San Francisco, California
Filed August 17, 2021
Before: M. Margaret McKeown, Sandra S. Ikuta, and
Daniel A. Bress, Circuit Judges.
Opinion by Judge Bress
* The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).

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2 SHARMA V . GARLAND
SUMMARY**
Immigration
Denying in part and dismissing in part Suresh Sharma’s
petition for review of a decision of the Board of Immigration
Appeals, the panel held that substantial evidence supported
the Board’s determinations that the harm Sharma suffered
did not rise to the level of persecution, his fear of future
persecution was not objectively reasonable, and he failed to
establish eligibility for CAT relief. The panel also held that
it lacked jurisdiction to consider the denial of voluntary
departure relief.
The panel discussed the non-exhaustive list of factors the
court considers in evaluating whether past harm
cumulatively rises to the level of persecution, including
physical violence and resulting serious injuries, frequency of
harm, specific threats combined with confrontation, length
and quality of detention, harm to family and close friends,
economic deprivation, and general societal turmoil.
Considering those factors, the panel held that the harm
Sharma suffered did not rise to the level of past persecution.
The panel held that substantial evidence supported the
Board’s determination that Sharma’s fear of future
persecution was not objectively reasonable. First, the panel
concluded that the evidence did not compel the conclusion
that the individuals who targeted Sharma would have a
continuing interest in him, where it had been decades since
** This summary constitutes no part of the opinion of the court. It
has been prepared by court staff for the convenience of the reader.

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SHARMA V . GARLAND 3
his last personal interaction, and his wife’s most recent
interactions were years ago and involved vague threats that
led to no harm. Second, Sharma’s wife and son continue to
reside safely in India. Although Sharma argued that his
family members’ safety was irrelevant because they were not
similarly situated, the panel determined that the agency
could reach a different conclusion, given the general
similarities between the pattern of threats leveled against
Sharma and his family. Likewise, the panel concluded that
Sharma had not demonstrated that his family’s safety bore
any necessary relationship to his presence in (or absence
from) India. Third, the panel concluded that Sharma’s
voluntary return to India undermined his reasonable fear of
persecution.
The panel held that substantial evidence supported the
Board’s denial of CAT relief. The panel explained that
because the harm Sharma suffered did not rise to the level of
persecution, it necessarily fell short of the definition of
torture. The panel also explained that Sharma failed to
establish an objectively reasonable basis for his fear.
The panel concluded that Sharma did not raise any
constitutional or legal challenges to the denial of voluntary
departure, and that it therefore lacked jurisdiction to review
that portion of Sharma’s petition.
COUNSEL
Manpreet Singh Gahra, Law Office of Manpreet S. Gahra,
Berkeley, California, for Petitioner.
Ethan P. Davis, Acting Assistant Attorney General; Timothy
G. Hayes, Senior Litigation Counsel; Sarai M. Aldana, Trial

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Attorney; Office of Immigration Litigation, Civil Division,
United States Department of Justice, Washington, D.C.; for
Respondent.
OPINION
BRESS, Circuit Judge:
We consider a recurring issue in immigration law:
whether an applicant for asylum or withholding of removal
has shown mistreatment that rises to the level of past
persecution. We conclude that the record does not compel
the conclusion that petitioner Suresh Sharma experienced
past persecution in India. We also hold that Sharma’s other
arguments are without merit and therefore deny his petition
for review.
I
Suresh Sharma entered the United States on July 22,
1997, on a nonimmigrant visitor visa. On August 30, 2011,
the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) served Sharma
with a Notice to Appear, charging him as removable for
remaining in the United States longer than authorized.
Sharma conceded removability and filed an application for
asylum, withholding of removal, and relief under the
Convention Against Torture (CAT). Sharma’s application
was based on the following facts, which were set forth in a
sworn declaration and in Sharma’s testimony at a hearing
before the Immigration Judge (IJ).
Before coming to the United States, Sharma lived in
Punjab, India. Sharma owned a finance company that made
loans to automotive dealers. One of Sharma’s clients was
Vinod Kumar, whom the parties refer to as Vinod. Sharma

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SHARMA V . GARLAND 5
gave Vinod an unsecured loan of 2.5 million rupees, with
payment due in March 1994. When Vinod failed to pay back
the loan on time, Sharma discovered that Vinod, Vinod’s
brother-in-law, and Vinod’s driver had gone missing,
reportedly “under the instructions of Sumedh Saini,” the
Senior Superintendent of the Ludhiana, Punjab Police. In an
effort to recover his loan to Vinod, Sharma began
investigating. He learned that Saini had ordered police
officials to kidnap the three men because of a personal
dispute.
Sharma then began to receive anonymous phone calls
instructing him to stop inquiring into Vinod’s disappearance,
or he “would be in big trouble.” Sharma received many
similar calls over the next several months. Sharma was
scared by these calls, but he nevertheless continued to stay
apprised of the situation, encouraging his friends to join him
in “tak[ing] a stand” against Saini.
In May 1995, Sharma received a call from Saini himself.
Saini told Sharma to stop investigating the disappearance of
the men, “otherwise you will find yourself in a much bigger
problem than them.” Saini threatened to “eliminate” Sharma
and his family if Sharma “ask[ed] any further question[s].”
Afraid for his family’s safety, Sharma moved his wife and
children more than 300 miles away to Jaipur.
In January 1997, Sharma traveled to South Korea for a
week to pursue a business opportunity, leaving his family
behind in Jaipur. Sharma testified that he had the resources
to relocate his family outside of India. But he instead
decided to return to India because the business opportunity
in South Korea failed to “mature[],” and he was unable to
“get some kind of settlement” there.

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In March 1997, Sharma organized a protest of Saini
outside the Punjab Parliament building, which a group of
business and political associates attended. Sharma spoke to
the crowd about Saini’s corruption and called for his
suspension from the government. Within 45 minutes, the
police broke up the protest, beating attendees with batons
and chasing them away. Sharma does not specifically claim
he was physically injured by police during that encounter.
A few days later, the police came to Sharma’s office and
accused him of loaning money to terrorists. They demanded
his files, but Sharma refused. An officer “beat” and
“slapped” Sharma with a baton. The officer then told
Sharma that he was “finished” and had “made a big mistake
crossing paths with” Saini.
The officers took Sharma’s files, tied Sharma’s hands,
blindfolded him, and put him in a van. While driving, the
officers made veiled threats, saying things like, “now we will
show you how we work,” and “do not worry about your
family[;] we know they are in Jaipur.” The van took Sharma
to a facility where Sharma was locked in a room, still bound.
Sharma was kept in the room all night. Officers would
intermittently enter to “verbally abuse” him, “beat” and
“slap” him, and “shove [him] around.”
The next day, a police inspector came into the room
where Sharma was being held and threatened that “worse
could happen” if Sharma “continued to raise [his] voice
against” Saini. The inspector held a phone to Sharma’s ear.
Saini told Sharma to “worry about [his] family,” and if he
continued to investigate Vinod’s disappearance, he “would
be dealt with in a manner like others.”
Saini hung up, and the inspector informed Sharma that
Saini had “taken pity on” him and that Saini was letting him

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SHARMA V . GARLAND 7
go. But Sharma was warned not to investigate Saini or he
“would [be] permanently finished,” with the inspector
adding that “[w]e know that your family is in Jaipur.”
Sharma was then put back in the van, driven around, and
pushed out on the side of the road. In total, Sharma’s
captivity lasted around 18 to 19 hours. He does not identify
any physical injuries resulting from this ordeal.
Sharma returned home but his business was ruined
because the police had stolen his files and instructed
Sharma’s clients not to pay back their loans. Sharma was
too afraid to leave the house after the encounter. He also
continued to receive “occasional” anonymous phone calls
warning him that his “actions were being watched.”
Sharma decided he would leave India. In July 1997,
Sharma received his visitor visa for the United States and
departed India. After he left India, the police “initially
harassed” Sharma’s wife (who was still in India), asking her
about Sharma’s whereabouts and warning her “not to speak
up or take any action.” Sharma’s wife showed the police
proof that Sharma was in the United States. They responded
that “it was best that [Sharma] stay away and not return to
India.”
In spring 2012, Saini was promoted to Director General
of Police Punjab, “the highest post of the police force of a
state.” Around the same time, Indian authorities pressed
forward with legal action against Saini related to the Vinod
disappearance. Meanwhile, two policemen visited Sharma’s
wife and “threatened her[,] saying that it was best [Sharma]
stays out and not return or else [he] would not be spared.”
Sharma filed his application for asylum, withholding of
removal, and CAT relief on May 29, 2012, after living in the
United States for approximately 15 years. As of Sharma’s

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hearing before the IJ, Saini still worked for the Punjabi
government as Chairman of the Punjab Police Housing
Corporation. Although Sharma’s two daughters live in
Australia, Sharma’s wife splits her time between India and
Australia, with extended visits to the United States as well.
Sharma testified that his wife travels back and forth between
India, Australia, and this country without incident. Sharma’s
son still lives in India full-time. None of Sharma’s family
members has ever been physically harmed.
The IJ found Sharma’s application timely, given
changed circumstances, and his testimony “generally”
credible, even though “portions of his story are implausible.”
The IJ then concluded that Sharma’s past harm did not rise
to the level of persecution, noting that there was no evidence
of the severity of Sharma’s injuries or him receiving medical
care; his detention was “less than one full day”; and,
although Sharma’s business was ruined, there was no
evidence that Sharma “was unable to continue making a
living.”
The IJ also found that Sharma was unlikely to suffer
future persecution. She noted that neither Sharma’s wife nor
their son has ever been harmed, despite both continuing to
reside in India, and that more than twenty years had passed
since Sharma’s last encounter with Saini.
The IJ rejected Sharma’s CAT claim for largely the same
reasons she denied asylum and withholding of removal. And
the IJ denied voluntary departure “as a matter of discretion,”
based on Sharma’s 2011 conviction for driving under the
influence and a lack of evidence of Sharma’s ties to the
United States.
The Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) adopted and
affirmed the IJ’s decision and dismissed the appeal. The

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SHARMA V . GARLAND 9
BIA agreed that Sharma failed to establish past persecution.
It also agreed that Sharma failed to establish a well-founded
fear of future persecution, noting specifically the family’s
“travel history” and that Sharma’s wife and son continue to
reside in India unharmed. The BIA also affirmed the IJ’s
rejection of Sharma’s CAT claim and the discretionary
denial of voluntary departure. Sharma then filed this timely
petition for review.
II
Because the BIA agreed with the IJ’s reasoning and
added some of its own, we review the BIA’s decision and
those parts of the IJ’s decision upon which it relied. See
Duran-Rodriguez v. Barr, 918 F.3d 1025, 1027–28 (9th Cir.
2019).
To be eligible for asylum, a petitioner has the burden to
demonstrate a likelihood of “persecution or a well-founded
fear of persecution on account of race, religion, nationality,
membership in a particular social group, or political
opinion.” 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(42)(A). To be eligible for
withholding of removal, the petitioner must discharge this
burden by a “clear probability.” Alvarez-Santos v. INS,
332 F.3d 1245, 1255 (9th Cir. 2003); see 8 U.S.C.
§ 1231(b)(3).
One way to satisfy this burden is by showing past
persecution, which gives rise to a rebuttable presumption of
future persecution. See, e.g., Velasquez-Gaspar v. Barr,
976 F.3d 1062, 1064 (9th Cir. 2020). Proving past
persecution requires the petitioner to show, among other
elements, that “his treatment rises to the level of
persecution.” Hussain v. Rosen, 985 F.3d 634, 645 (9th Cir.
2021) (citation omitted).

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We review for substantial evidence the BIA’s
determination that a petitioner has failed to establish
eligibility for asylum or withholding of removal. See id. at
641–42. We also review for substantial evidence the BIA’s
particular determination that a petitioner’s past harm “do[es]
not amount to past persecution.” Villegas Sanchez v.
Garland, 990 F.3d 1173, 1179 (9th Cir. 2021); see also
Prasad v. INS, 47 F.3d 336, 339 (9th Cir. 1995).
Because “the law entrusts the agency to make the basic”
eligibility determinations, INS v. Orlando Ventura, 537 U.S.
12, 16 (2002) (per curiam), “[t]he substantial evidence
standard of review is ‘highly deferential’ to the [BIA],”
Pedro-Mateo v. INS, 224 F.3d 1147, 1150 (9th Cir. 2000)
(citation omitted). Consistent with this level of deference,
we may grant a petition only if the petitioner shows that the
evidence “compels the conclusion” that the BIA’s decision
was incorrect. Ming Xin He v. Holder, 749 F.3d 792, 795
(9th Cir. 2014) (quoting Gu v. Gonzales, 454 F.3d 1014,
1018 (9th Cir. 2006)). In other words, we ask not whether
“a reasonable factfinder could have found” the harm the
petitioner experienced “sufficient to establish persecution,”
but whether “a factfinder would be compelled to do so.”
Prasad, 47 F.3d at 340.
A
Sharma contends that the incidents of harm he
experienced in India “cumulatively compel a finding of past
persecution.” Sharma’s time in India, we acknowledge,
involved condemnable mistreatment. But under the
deferential substantial evidence standard and our precedents
on the past persecution requirement, the record does not
compel the conclusion that Sharma suffered hardship in
India that rose to the level of persecution.

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SHARMA V . GARLAND 11
1
“Persecution,” we have repeatedly held, “is an extreme
concept that means something considerably more than
discrimination or harassment.” Donchev v. Mukasey,
553 F.3d 1206, 1213 (9th Cir. 2009) (quotation omitted); see
also, e.g., Halim v. Holder, 590 F.3d 971, 975 (9th Cir.
2009); Gormley v. Ashcroft, 364 F.3d 1172, 1180 (9th Cir.
2004); Mansour v. Ashcroft, 390 F.3d 667, 672 (9th Cir.
2004); Fisher v. INS, 79 F.3d 955, 961 (9th Cir. 1996). That
conception of persecution, rooted in the term’s plain
meaning and in the historical objectives of our immigration
laws, see, e.g., Desir v. Ilchert, 840 F.2d 723, 726–27 (9th
Cir. 1988); Kovac v. INS, 407 F.2d 102, 107 (9th Cir. 1969),
grounds our evaluation of cases like Sharma’s.
Because it is an extreme concept, persecution “does not
include every sort of treatment our society regards as
offensive.” Ghaly v. INS, 58 F.3d 1425, 1431 (9th Cir. 1995)
(citation omitted); see also Al-Saher v. INS, 268 F.3d 1143,
1146 (9th Cir. 2001), amended, 355 F.3d 1140 (9th Cir.
2004). This means that “some circumstances that cause
petitioners physical discomfort or loss of liberty do not
qualify as persecution, despite the fact that such conditions
have caused the petitioners some harm.” Mihalev v.
Ashcroft, 388 F.3d 722, 729 (9th Cir. 2004). Simply stated,
“not all negative treatment equates with persecution.” Lanza
v. Ashcroft, 389 F.3d 917, 934 (9th Cir. 2004).
Determining whether the facts compel a conclusion of
past persecution is ultimately a fact-bound endeavor that is
not reducible to a set formula. The inquiry is “heavily fact-
dependent.” Singh v. INS, 134 F.3d 962, 967 (9th Cir. 1998).
In each case, however, “[t]he key question is whether,
looking at the cumulative effect of all the incidents that a
Petitioner has suffered, the treatment he received rises to the

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level of persecution.” Gormley, 364 F.3d at 1176–77
(quoting Singh, 134 F.3d at 967) (alterations omitted).
Although each case turns on its own facts, there are
several factors that often arise in these types of cases and that
guide our analysis. These factors, we emphasize, are not to
be considered on their own. Under our cases, they must be
evaluated in combination with each other to form a
sufficiently negative portrait of the petitioner’s experience in
his or her own country that not only allows a finding of past
persecution but requires it. See INS v. Elias-Zacarias,
502 U.S. 478, 481 n.1 (1992); Gormley, 364 F.3d at 1176–
77; Prasad, 47 F.3d at 339.
The first, and often a significant consideration, is
whether the petitioner was subject to “significant physical
violence,” and, relatedly, whether he suffered serious
injuries that required medical treatment. Nagoulko v. INS,
333 F.3d 1012, 1016–17 (9th Cir. 2003). We have
repeatedly denied petitions for review when, among other
factors, the record did not demonstrate significant physical
harm. See, e.g., Gu v. Gonzales, 454 F.3d 1014, 1020 (9th
Cir. 2006) (“Gu was detained and beaten on only one
occasion, . . . [and] did not require medical treatment.”);
Nahrvani v. Gonzales, 399 F.3d 1148, 1153 (9th Cir. 2005)
(“Nahrvani suffered no physical harm nor was he ever
detained.”); Nagoulko, 333 F.3d at 1016 (“[I]t is significant
that Nagoulko never suffered any significant physical
violence.”); Al-Saher, 268 F.3d at 1146 (“While we do not
know if Al-Saher would have been beaten if he had remained
in custody, nothing that occurred prior to his escape from the
third detention rises to the level of persecution.”); Prasad,
47 F.3d at 339 (holding that when petitioner “did not require
medical treatment,” the attack on him was not “so
overwhelming as to necessarily constitute persecution”).

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SHARMA V . GARLAND 13
Conversely, when we have granted petitions for review
because the record compelled a finding of past persecution,
the petitioner often experienced serious physical violence,
among other indicators of persecution. See, e.g., Lopez v.
Ashcroft, 366 F.3d 799, 802–03 (9th Cir. 2004) (“Lopez
testified credibly that guerrillas in 1988 locked him in a
warehouse and set it on fire,” and he “suffered burns on his
hands and back as a result of this attempt on his life.”);
Chanchavac v. INS, 207 F.3d 584, 589 (9th Cir. 2000)
(“Chanchavac’s persecutors . . . violently attacked
Chanchavac himself on one occasion . . . and beat him so
severely that he was bedridden for two days.”); Salaam v.
INS, 229 F.3d 1234, 1236 (9th Cir. 2000) (per curiam)
(“Salaam was held incommunicado for several days and
tortured by flogging. Salaam bears scars from these beatings
. . . .”).
Another factor we consider is whether the petitioner’s
harm was an isolated incident or, conversely, part of an
ongoing pattern of serious maltreatment. See Gu, 454 F.3d
at 1020. In combination with other indicia of persecution,
serious maltreatment that is sustained and recurring is more
likely to compel the conclusion of past persecution, whereas
sporadic incidents, unaccompanied by an ongoing pattern of
harm, less so. Id. We have thus explained that “an isolated
criminal incident . . . does not begin to resemble
persecution.” Lata v. INS, 204 F.3d 1241, 1245 (9th Cir.
2000); see also Prasad, 47 F.3d at 339–40 (single attack on
petitioner did not compel a finding of past persecution).
The length and quality of a petitioner’s detention, if any,
is also a relevant consideration. “We have recognized that,
in some circumstances, detentions combined with physical
attacks which occur on account of a protected ground can
establish persecution.” Gu, 454 F.3d at 1019. For example,

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when a petitioner was severely beaten and detained twice,
once for fifteen days, we found that the record, in
combination with other factors, compelled a finding of past
persecution. See Guo v. Ashcroft, 361 F.3d 1194, 1197–98
(9th Cir. 2004). Similarly, when the petitioner was arrested
four times, and on each arrest “held incommunicado for
several days and tortured by flogging,” we held that based
on these and other circumstances, he had established past
persecution. Salaam, 229 F.3d at 1236, 1240. But when a
petitioner was detained for only five or six days and “was
not beaten, tortured, or threatened,” we held that he did not
establish past persecution. Al-Saher, 268 F.3d at 1146. We
similarly denied petitions when the periods of detention,
even if frequent, were “short,” Khourassany v. INS, 208 F.3d
1096, 1098, 1100 (9th Cir. 2000), or “brief,” and the
petitioner sustained no injuries, Prasad, 47 F.3d at 339.
Petitioners often point to threats made against them in
support of their claims of past persecution. Threats are
relevant to the past persecution analysis. But “[m]ere
threats, without more, do not necessarily compel a finding of
past persecution.” Villegas Sanchez, 990 F.3d at 1179; see
also Nahrvani, 399 F.3d at 1153 (“[M]ost threats do not rise
to the level of persecution.”). That is because “[t]hreats
themselves are sometimes hollow and, while uniformly
unpleasant, often do not effect significant actual suffering or
harm.” Hoxha v. Ashcroft, 319 F.3d 1179, 1182 (9th Cir.
2003) (quotations omitted). Instead, “[w]e have been most
likely to find persecution where threats are repeated, specific
and combined with confrontation or other mistreatment.”
Duran-Rodriguez, 918 F.3d at 1028 (quotations omitted).
Another recurring factor that arises in our cases is harms
that have befallen a petitioner’s family members or close
friends. A petitioner who is seeking asylum or withholding

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SHARMA V . GARLAND 15
of removal of course does so on his own behalf and not on
behalf of others. In recognition of that basic point, we have
explained that “although harm to a petitioner’s close
relatives, friends, or associates may contribute to a
successful showing of past persecution,” it must be “part of
‘a pattern of persecution closely tied to’ [the petitioner]
himself.” Wakkary v. Holder, 558 F.3d 1049, 1060 (9th Cir.
2009) (quoting Arriaga-Barrientos v. INS, 937 F.2d 411, 414
(9th Cir. 1991)); see also, e.g., Nagoulko, 333 F.3d at 1017
(“[T]hat Nagoulko witnessed the beating of some of her co-
workers does not compel a factfinder to conclude that
Nagoulko suffered from past persecution.”).
Economic harm can also factor into the past persecution
analysis. But its relevance again depends on the severity of
the deprivation in connection with the record as a whole.
Thus, “substantial economic deprivation that constitutes a
threat to life or freedom can constitute persecution.” Zehatye
v. Gonzales, 453 F.3d 1182, 1186 (9th Cir. 2006). But at the
same time, “mere economic disadvantage alone does not rise
to the level of persecution.” Hussain, 985 F.3d at 647
(quoting Gormley, 364 F.3d at 1178). We thus held that the
record did not compel a finding of past persecution when a
petitioner was “fired from her job as a kindergarten teacher
because of her religious beliefs.” Nagoulko, 333 F.3d
at 1016. “[W]hile discriminatory,” this incident was “not the
type of economic deprivation that rises to the level of
persecution.” Id.
Finally, political and social turmoil in the petitioner’s
home country can provide relevant context for the
petitioner’s personal experiences. We have thus “held that
an asylum applicant’s claim of persecution is further
strengthened when evidence that the applicant was
physically beaten and threatened with his life is presented in

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conjunction with evidence of the country’s ‘political and
social turmoil.’” Aden v. Wilkinson, 989 F.3d 1073, 1083
(9th Cir. 2021) (quoting Korablina v. INS, 158 F.3d 1038,
1045 (9th Cir. 1998)). That said, adverse country conditions
are not sufficient evidence of past persecution, for the
obvious reason that “[t]o establish past persecution, an
applicant must show he was individually targeted on account
of a protected ground rather than simply the victim of
generalized violence.” Hussain, 985 F.3d at 646 (citing
cases). As we explained in Prasad v. INS, 101 F.3d 614 (9th
Cir. 1996), to establish past persecution, “[i]t is not sufficient
to show [the petitioner] was merely subject to the general
dangers attending a civil war or domestic unrest.” Id. at 617.
The factors we have identified here—physical violence
and resulting serious injuries, frequency of harm, specific
threats combined with confrontation, length and quality of
detention, harm to family and close friends, economic
deprivation, and general societal turmoil—are not
exhaustive. But they are ones that routinely arise in petitions
for review of BIA decisions denying applications for asylum
and withholding of removal. Our cases do not consider these
factors individually, but cumulatively. Singh, 134 F.3d
at 967; see also Hussain, 985 F.3d at 647; Guo, 361 F.3d
at 1203. Nevertheless, these factors are a good starting point
for determining whether substantial evidence supports the
BIA’s resolution of the issue.
2
In this case, and considering the factors we identified
above, the harm perpetrated against Sharma, while
disgraceful, does not compel a finding of past persecution.
Therefore, substantial evidence supports the BIA’s decision.
Ming Xin He, 749 F.3d at 795–96.

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SHARMA V . GARLAND 17
Perhaps most significantly, there is no indication Sharma
experienced significant physical harm in India. A few days
after the protest, police came to Sharma’s office and “beat”
and “slapped” him, apparently with a baton. The police then
took Sharma into custody and placed him in a room, where
they “beat[],” “slap[ped],” and “shove[d]” him throughout
the night. Sharma’s physical harm was thus limited to one
episode of arrest and detention. See Gu, 454 F.3d at 1020
(denying petition where petitioner “was detained and beaten
on only one occasion”). Sharma also has not identified any
injuries he suffered, nor does he claim he needed medical
treatment. Thus, “[w]hile we certainly condemn the attack
on [Sharma], it is not, in our judgment, so overwhelming as
to necessarily constitute persecution.” Prasad, 47 F.3d
at 339.
As we have described, Sharma was detained in
connection with the one episode of physical harm that he
identifies. While police blindfolded and bound Sharma
when they took him, Sharma’s detention was an isolated
event, and it lasted only 18–19 hours. Although Sharma
experienced verbal abuse and some physical abuse during
his detention, he was ultimately released with no indication
of injuries, serious or otherwise. Sharma’s period of
incarceration of less than one day, the fact that he was only
detained once, and the lack of any resulting serious bodily
harm support our view that, under the substantial evidence
standard, the record does not compel a finding of past
persecution. See Gu, 454 F.3d at 1017, 1021 (holding that
record did not compel a finding of past persecution despite
three-day detention); Al-Saher, 268 F.3d at 1146 (holding
that record did not compel a finding of past persecution
despite five- or six-day detention).

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Sharma also points to the threats he received. It is true
that Sharma did receive threatening phone calls over a period
of years. But the threats were generally anonymous and
vague, such as warning Sharma of “big trouble” if he
continued his investigation of Vinod’s disappearance.
While no doubt “unpleasant,” the threats evidently did not
cause “significant actual suffering or harm.” Lim v. INS,
224 F.3d 929, 936 (9th Cir. 2000). In fact, it is not apparent
the earlier threats affected Sharma’s behavior because he
continued publicly investigating the case against Saini,
encouraged his friends to join him, and even organized a
protest. After the threats, Sharma was also still able to leave
India for a business opportunity in South Korea and later
willingly returned.
Sharma was threatened again in the course of his
detention. But these threats did not lead to any further
physical harm, substantial or otherwise, against Sharma or
his family. See Hussain, 985 F.3d at 647 (“Unfulfilled
threats are very rarely sufficient to rise to the level of
persecution . . . .”); Lim, 224 F.3d at 936. Indeed, Sharma’s
wife and son continue to live in India, and his wife regularly
travels between India, Australia, and the United States. See
Khourassany, 208 F.3d at 1101. And Sharma testified that
the Indian government is, in fact, actively investigating a
case against Saini related to the Vinod disappearance.
Sharma points out that his business was ruined because
the police stole his files and told his clients not to pay back
their loans. We agree with the BIA that police interference
with Sharma’s business was “reprehensible.” But we cannot
say it compels a finding of persecution in light of the rest of
the record. The police did not threaten Sharma’s life if he
returned to his business, and Sharma does not contend that
he was foreclosed from finding other employment. See

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SHARMA V . GARLAND 19
Nagoulko, 333 F.3d at 1016 (holding that the petitioner’s
termination from her employment did not “rise[] to the level
of persecution” where she found alternative “steady work”).
We disagree with Sharma’s assertion that his case
resembles Guo, 361 F.3d 1194, in which we granted a
petition for review. In Guo, the petitioner was arrested while
attending a church service and detained at the police station
for a day and a half. Id. at 1197. He was “punched” twice
in the face and ordered “to do push ups until he could no
longer stand it.” Id. at 1197, 1202. “While he lay on the
floor, he was kicked in the stomach.” Id. at 1197. He was
released after being “coerced to sign a paper” stating that he
would forsake his religion. Id. at 1197, 1202.
The petitioner was then re-arrested less than a week after
his release. Id. at 1197–98. He was “subdue[d]” with an
“electrically-charged baton,” kicked in the legs, hit in the
face “seven or eight times,” and “tied to a chair and beaten
with a plastic pole.” Id. at 1198. He was then detained for
fifteen days before police let him go. Id. As a result, he was
fired from his job and was “unable to procure other
employment.” Id. We held that “[t]his treatment rises to the
level of persecution on account of his religion.” Id. at 1203.
The level of mistreatment at issue in Guo, however, is simply
not comparable to what Sharma experienced.
Instead, this case is more analogous to ones in which we
denied petitions for review after concluding that a finding of
past persecution was not compelled. See Singh, 134 F.3d
at 967–68 (noting that the past persecution analysis is
informed “by comparing the facts of Petitioner’s case with
those of similar cases”). For example, in Prasad, the
petitioner was detained once for four to six hours, hit in the
stomach, kicked from behind, and interrogated. 47 F.3d
at 339. At other times, he had rocks thrown at his house, and

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20 SHARMA V . GARLAND
his wife testified she was harassed by the army. Id. at 340.
Although we “condemn[ed]” the attack on the petitioner, we
observed that the detention was brief; the petitioner did not
require medical treatment; he was not charged with any
crime; there was no evidence that the government had any
“continuing interest” in him; and his relatives still lived in
his home country “apparently without incident.” Id. at 339.
Similarly instructive to Sharma’s case is Lanza, 389 F.3d
917, in which we held that substantial evidence supported
the BIA’s determination that the petitioner had not shown
past persecution. Id. at 934. In Lanza, the petitioner was
“blacklisted” by the government and fired from her job. Id.
at 920. On one occasion, three men broke into her house,
pushed her, punched her, called her names, and threatened
her and her young daughter with death. Id. at 920–21, 934.
After she fled the country, they visited her father and
inquired regarding her whereabouts. Id. at 921. Again, we
deemed the actions “reprehensible.” Id. at 934. But we
concluded that the harm the petitioner suffered was “not so
overwhelming” as to “compel reversal on this issue.” Id.
(quotations omitted).
These past precedents support our view that, even if the
BIA could have concluded otherwise, the record at the same
time does not compel the conclusion that Sharma established
past persecution in India. Thus, substantial evidence
supports the BIA’s decision.
B
There remains the question whether Sharma has
nonetheless shown the record compels a finding of future
persecution, because “[a] petitioner who cannot show past
persecution might nevertheless be eligible for relief if he
instead shows a well-founded fear of future persecution.”

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SHARMA V . GARLAND 21
Hussain, 985 F.3d at 645–46 (quotations omitted). We thus
consider next whether Sharma “adduc[ed] credible, direct,
and specific evidence in the record of facts that would
support a reasonable fear of persecution.” Mansour,
390 F.3d at 673. That fear must be objectively reasonable.
Id.; see also Nagoulko, 333 F.3d at 1016. The BIA agreed
with the IJ that Sharma failed to carry his burden on this
issue, and we hold that substantial evidence supports that
determination.
First, as the IJ noted, there is an insufficient basis in the
record to conclude that Saini and his followers would have a
continuing interest in Sharma. At the least, the record does
not compel that conclusion. Sharma left India in July 1997.
As the IJ observed, it has been decades since his last personal
interaction with Saini. The most recent interaction between
the police and Sharma’s wife occurred in 2012, and it
involved only vague threats that led to no harm.
Under all of these circumstances, the record does not
require the finding that Saini and his forces will persecute
Sharma if he returns to India; the possibility that this would
occur is speculative on this record. See, e.g., Lanza,
389 F.3d at 934–35 (“There is no reason in the record to
warrant a belief that Lanza’s alleged persecutors would still
be interested in her” when the “alleged persecution occurred
more than ten years ago.”); Prasad, 47 F.3d at 339 (denying
petition where “[t]here is no evidence that the Fijian
Government had any continuing interest in Prasad”).
Second, and as the BIA pointed out, Sharma’s wife and
son continue to reside safely in India. The ongoing safety of
family members in the petitioner’s native country
undermines a reasonable fear of future persecution. See
Mansour, 390 F.3d at 673 (denying petition for review after
observing that the petitioners “have several family members

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22 SHARMA V . GARLAND
who continue to live in Egypt and who have been able to
obtain university educations and employment”); Aruta v.
INS, 80 F.3d 1389, 1395 (9th Cir. 1996) (holding that
evidence that “similarly situated members of the petitioner’s
family continued to reside without incident” in petitioner’s
native country “strongly supports” the BIA’s denial of
asylum).
Sharma does not dispute that his family members have
never been harmed. But he argues their safety is irrelevant
because they did not investigate Saini and therefore are not
similarly situated. The IJ and BIA could reach a different
conclusion, however. Given the general similarities between
the pattern of threats leveled against Sharma and his family,
substantial evidence supports the BIA’s reliance on
Sharma’s family’s continued well-being.
Sharma alternatively argues that his family’s safety is
contingent upon him staying out of India, a claim that the IJ
considered and rejected. Substantial evidence supports this
determination. Sharma’s family was safe in Jaipur when
Sharma was present in India, while he was away in South
Korea, after he returned from South Korea, after the protest,
and after Sharma’s departure to the United States. Sharma
has not demonstrated that his family’s safety bears any
necessary relationship to his presence in (or absence from)
India.
Third, Sharma traveled to South Korea without
interference and then voluntarily returned to India. The
ability to “travel freely” and to “leave . . . without hindrance”
undermines a reasonable fear of future persecution.
Khourassany, 208 F.3d at 1101; see also Gu, 454 F.3d
at 1022 (“[Gu] traveled freely without interference from the
Chinese authorities.”). So, too, does Sharma’s voluntary
return. Loho v. Mukasey, 531 F.3d 1016, 1017–18 (9th Cir.

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SHARMA V . GARLAND 23
2008) (“It is well established in this court that an alien’s
history of willingly returning to his or her home country
militates against a finding of past persecution or a well-
founded fear of future persecution.”).
Sharma argues that the BIA failed to recognize that his
travel occurred before his issues with Saini had “escalated.”
But even before the trip to South Korea, Sharma claimed he
was “very concerned” by Saini’s threats and scared for his
family’s safety. Sharma also failed to present evidence that
he made any effort to relocate his family out of India, despite
testifying that he had the resources to do so.
These aspects of the record provide further support for
the BIA’s determination that Sharma has not demonstrated a
well-founded fear of future persecution. And “[b]ecause
[Sharma] has not met the lesser burden of establishing his
eligibility for asylum, he necessarily has failed to meet the
more stringent ‘clear probability’ burden required for
withholding of [removal].” Molina-Morales v. INS,
237 F.3d 1048, 1052 (9th Cir. 2001).
C
Our last task is to determine whether substantial
evidence supports the BIA’s rejection of Sharma’s claim for
CAT relief. Hussain, 985 F.3d at 641–42 (standard of
review). We hold that it does.
To qualify for CAT protection, a petitioner must show it
is “more likely than not he or she would be tortured if
removed to the proposed country of removal.” 8 C.F.R.
§ 208.16(c)(2). Torture is “any act by which severe pain or
suffering, whether physical or mental, is intentionally
inflicted on a person . . . for any reason based on
discrimination of any kind, when such pain or suffering is

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24 SHARMA V . GARLAND
inflicted by or at the instigation of or with the consent or
acquiescence of a public official . . . .” Id. § 208.18(a)(1).
“The same ‘more likely than not’ standard applies to CAT
protection as it does to withholding of removal; however, for
CAT protection, the harm feared must meet the definition of
torture.” Tamang v. Holder, 598 F.3d 1083, 1095 (9th Cir.
2010).
Because the BIA could reasonably conclude that
Sharma’s past harm did not rise to the level of persecution,
it necessarily falls short of the definition of torture. See
Hussain, 985 F.3d at 650. Moreover, CAT relief “is based
entirely on an objective basis of fear.” Tamang, 598 F.3d
at 1095. Sharma has not shown an objectively reasonable
fear of future torture for the reasons identified above. See
id. (citing 8 C.F.R. § 208.16(c)(3)).
* * *
Sharma does not raise any constitutional or legal
challenges to the denial of voluntary departure. We thus lack
jurisdiction to review this portion of Sharma’s petition.
Corro-Barragan v. Holder, 718 F.3d 1174, 1177 (9th Cir.
2013). The petition is therefore
DENIED IN PART AND DISMISSED IN PART.

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