Adt Rader, Inc. v. Google LLC

FOR PUBLICATION
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
ADT RADER, I NC.; SPECIALIZED
COLLECTIONS BUREAU, I NC.;
CLASSIC AND FOOD EOOD; LML
CONSULT LTD.; AD CRUNCH LTD.;
Plaintiffs-Appellants,
GAW | POE LLP,
Appellant,
v.
GOOGLE LLC,
Defendant-Appellee.
No. 20-15542
D.C. No.
5:17-cv-07082-
BLF
OPINION
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Northern District of California
Beth Labson Freeman, District Judge, Presiding
Argued and Submitted May 11, 2021
San Francisco, California
Filed July 30, 2021

-- 1 of 17 --

2 ADT RADER V. GOOGLE
Before: J. Clifford Wallace and Daniel P. Collins, Circuit
Judges, and Jed S. Rakoff,* District Judge.
Opinion by Judge Rakoff
SUMMARY**
Attorneys’ Fees/Appellate Jurisdiction
The panel dismissed for lack of appellate jurisdiction an
appeal from the district court’s attorneys’ fee award in a
class action against Google by plaintiff AdTrader Inc. on
behalf of itself and advertisers who used Google advertising
services but did not receive refunds for invalid traffic that
does not represent genuine human activity.
Google informed AdTrader and the district court in April
2019 that Google would issue refunds to the advertisers who
used a Google platform called DoubleClick Bid Manager
(“DBM Advertisers”), but would continue to litigate the
claims asserted by AdTrader on behalf of other putative
advertiser classes and by AdTrader individually. Google
stipulated that it would pay AdTrader’s attorneys’ fees, if
awarded by the Court, out of Google’s own pocket, rather
than have them deducted from any common fund for
payments to class members.
* The Honorable Jed S. Rakoff, United States District Judge for the
Southern District of New York, sitting by designation.
** This summary constitutes no part of the opinion of the court. It
has been prepared by court staff for the convenience of the reader.

-- 2 of 17 --

ADT RADER V. GOOGLE 3
After Google announced that it would provide $65.7
million in refunds to DBM Advertisers for invalid ad traffic
between 2012 and 2017, the district court issued an order
awarding AdTrader some but not all of the attorneys’ fees it
had requested. AdTrader had argued that it was entitled to a
percentage of the monetary benefit it conferred on DBM
Advertisers and moved for attorneys’ fees pursuant to a
California fee-shifting statute or, alternatively, the common
fund doctrine, which permits counsel to recover attorneys’
fees from any settlement account when counsel obtains a
benefit for non-clients through litigation. The district court
denied attorneys’ fees under the fee-shifting statute but
awarded fees under the common fund doctrine. AdTrader
challenged on appeal the amount of the fee award.
The panel reasoned that although in some cases, an order
awarding attorneys’ fees from a common fund can be
appealed immediately under the collateral order doctrine,
this case was neither a traditional common fund case nor one
that met the requirements of the collateral order doctrine.
The panel noted that the litigants and the district court may
have agreed that attorneys’ fees should be determined in
light of common fund principles, but they also agreed that
any award of attorneys’ fees would not come from a sum that
Google has been ordered to pay the class. This alone showed
that this case neither fit the situation under which the
common fund doctrine developed nor met the requirement
of unreviewability that is essential to the limited collateral
order exception to finality. The panel therefore dismissed
the appeal for lack of jurisdiction because the ongoing class
action had reached neither a final judgment on the merits nor
a final settlement, and because no exception to the final
judgment rule here applied.

-- 3 of 17 --

4 ADT RADER V. GOOGLE
COUNSEL
Randolph Gaw (argued), Mark Poe, Samuel Song, Victor
Meng, and Flora Vigo, Gaw Poe LLP, San Francisco,
California, for Plaintiffs-Appellants.
Jeffrey M. Gutkin (argued), Michael G. Rhodes, Kyle C.
Wong, Audrey J. Mott-Smith, and David S. Houska, Cooley
LLP, San Francisco, California, for Defendant-Appellee.
OPINION
RAKOFF, District Judge:
Google LLC (“Google”) operates platforms that help
advertisers find and purchase advertising space on third-
party websites. When Google succeeds in placing such ads,
it receives payments from the advertisers, a portion of which
are passed to the website publishers, with Google keeping
the remainder for itself. Google charges advertisers and pays
publishers based on the number of users who view, click on,
or purchase products in response to the advertisements so
placed. Google represents, however, that it does not charge
advertisers or pay publishers for “invalid traffic,” that is,
traffic that does not represent genuine human activity.
In this case, plaintiff AdTrader, Inc. (“AdTrader”)
brought a class action lawsuit in December 2017 on behalf
of itself and advertisers who used Google advertising
services but did not receive refunds for invalid traffic.
Google informed AdTrader and the district court in April
2019 that Google would issue refunds to the advertisers who
used a Google platform called DoubleClick Bid Manager
(“DBM Advertisers”), but would continue to litigate the

-- 4 of 17 --

ADT RADER V. GOOGLE 5
claims the claims asserted by AdTrader on behalf of other
putative advertiser classes and by AdTrader individually.
Google stipulated that it would pay AdTrader’s attorneys’
fees, if awarded by the Court, out of Google’s own pocket,
rather than have them deducted from any common fund for
payments to class members.
Seeking such an award, AdTrader argued that it was
entitled to a percentage of the monetary benefit it conferred
on DBM Advertisers and moved for attorneys’ fees pursuant
to a California fee-shifting statute or, alternatively, the
“common fund” doctrine, described below. The district court
denied attorneys’ fees under the fee-shifting statute, but
awarded fees under the common fund doctrine. Unsatisfied,
AdTrader now challenges on appeal the amount of the fee
award.
We dismiss the appeal for lack of jurisdiction, because
the class action below has reached neither a final judgment
on the merits nor a final settlement, and because no
exception to the final judgment rule here applies.
BACKGROUND
I. Factual Background
As noted, Google acts as a broker for digital
advertisement sales, operating exchanges that match
advertisers with website publishers that have advertising
space. Google runs three such advertising platforms:
(1) DoubleClick Ad Exchange (“AdX”); (2) AdWords
(“AdWords”); and (3) DoubleClick Bid Manager (“DBM”).
On the buyer side of the exchange, advertisers pay Google
to place their ads on third-party websites. On the seller side,
Google offers website publishers a portion of the revenue
Google receives from the advertisers.

-- 5 of 17 --

6 ADT RADER V. GOOGLE
Advertisers whose advertisements are thus placed on a
third-party website pay Google based on the number of users
who view such ads (“impressions”), click on their ads
(“clicks”), or purchase the products so advertised
(“conversions”). Google does not charge advertisers (or pay
publishers) when Google determines, using automated
filters, that an impression, click, or conversion does not
“reflect genuine user interest,” or when the advertising
traffic is connected to a website publisher’s violation of
Google’s policies. Google refers to false impressions,
conversions, and clicks, as well as violations of its publisher
policies, as “invalid traffic.” When Google spots invalid
traffic during a billing cycle, Google automatically reverses
the charge to the advertiser and stops the corresponding
payment to the publisher. However, if Google detects invalid
traffic only after a billing cycle has ended, Google offers
publishers debits and advertisers credits to cancel out
charges that stem from invalid traffic. Similarly, when a
publisher egregiously violates Google’s publisher policies,
Google’s stated practice is to terminate the publisher’s
account, debit the publisher for all unpaid amounts, and issue
credits to advertisers to offset the charged-for traffic to the
terminated publisher’s website.
AdTrader is an advertising network that uses DBM to bid
on ad space for its clients. AdTrader’s clients include:
Classic and Food EOOD (“Classic”), LML Consult Ltd.
(“LML”), and Fresh Break Ltd. (“Fresh Break”), three
restaurants that use DBM to advertise on AdX publisher
websites; Ad Crunch Ltd. (“Ad Crunch”), a digital
advertising agency that uses DBM to advertise on AdX
publisher websites; and Specialized Collections Bureau, Inc.
(“SCB”), a collections agency that advertises through
AdWords. AdTrader claims that when its advertiser clients
were charged for false clicks, impressions, and conversions,

-- 6 of 17 --

ADT RADER V. GOOGLE 7
“AdTrader sometimes bore the brunt of those overcharges
and had to absorb those costs itself.” AdTrader also sells
advertising space for website publisher clients, and guides
the publishers’ compliance with policies governing online
advertising exchanges. On May 19, 2017, Google terminated
AdTrader’s account, claiming that AdTrader had violated
provisions of Google’s advertising exchange program
policies. AdTrader alleges that Google improperly withheld
earnings that were owed to AdTrader prior to termination.
II. Procedural Background
In December 2017, AdTrader sued Google on behalf of
itself, a putative class of advertisers who did not receive
refunds or credits for transactions that Google represented to
publishers as “invalid traffic,” and a putative subclass of
“[a]ll business and Google-recognized advertising agencies
and advertising networks that had an active AdWords
account as of September 1, 2017.” AdTrader alleged, inter
alia, breach of contract, unjust enrichment, and violations of
California’s unfair competition statute.
In February 2018, Google moved to dismiss the class
action complaint. The motion to dismiss was mooted when
AdTrader filed a First Amended Complaint three weeks
later. Google then moved to dismiss the First Amended
Complaint pursuant to Federal Rules of Civil Procedure
12(b)(1) and 12(b)(6) on April 17, 2018. In July, the district
court dismissed the unjust enrichment claim, but allowed
AdTrader to proceed on its breach of contract, unfair
competition, and false advertising claims.
On August 13, 2018, AdTrader again amended its
Complaint to add Classic, LML Consult, and Ad Crunch,
and SCB as co-plaintiffs. Each of the Plaintiffs brought
individual claims for breach of contract, breach of the

-- 7 of 17 --

8 ADT RADER V. GOOGLE
implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing, and
intentional interference with contract, and sought a
declaration that the limitation of liability clause in the AdX
Publisher Agreement was unenforceable. Plaintiffs also
sought “to represent three classes and one subclass of
advertisers who entered into advertising platform
agreements with Google and who did not receive refunds for
invalid traffic” or had earnings withheld for noncompliance
with a Google policy. On behalf of those classes, Plaintiffs
alleged breach of contract, breach of the implied covenant of
good faith and fair dealing, breach of the implied duty to
perform with reasonable care, and false advertising and
unfair competition under California state statutes.
Google again moved to dismiss and again secured only a
partial victory. On April 22, 2019, the district court
dismissed Plaintiffs’ claims for breach of the implied
covenant of good faith and fair dealing and the implied duty
to perform with reasonable care. The court denied, however,
the motions to dismiss the causes of action based on breach
of the DBM agreement, false advertising, unfair
competition, and, with respect to traffic determined to be
invalid after invoicing, breach of the AdX and AdWords
Agreements. Three days later, Google informed AdTrader
and the district court that it would provide $65.7 million in
refunds to DBM Advertisers for invalid ad traffic between
2012 and 2017. Google ultimately issued two categories of
refunds. “Category I” refunds credited DBM Advertisers for
invalid traffic between 2012 and 2017. “Category II” refunds
credited DBM Advertisers for refunds that could not be
processed because doing so would have resulted in a
negative balance on the recipient’s account. Google
distributed nearly all of those refunds by September 2019.

-- 8 of 17 --

ADT RADER V. GOOGLE 9
On March 13, 2020, the district court certified the
AdWords Advertiser Class for the breach of the AdWords
Agreement, false advertising, and unfair competition claims.
The Court appointed SCB as class representative and Gaw
Poe, the law firm for all Plaintiffs, as class counsel. But the
Court denied certification of the proposed DBM Advertiser
Class and DBM-AdX Advertiser Subclass, because
AdTrader and its clients were not members of the proposed
classes and were therefore inadequate representatives.
Two weeks after class certification, the district court
issued an order, awarding AdTrader some but not all of the
attorneys’ fees it had requested (the “Fee Order”). As the
basis for making an attorneys’ fee award, the court first
denied AdTrader’s request for attorneys’ fees made pursuant
to California’s public-interest litigation fee-shifting statute,
California Code of Civil Procedure § 1021.5. But the district
court awarded some attorneys’ fees “under the common fund
doctrine,” reasoning that AdTrader’s efforts meaningfully
benefitted the relevant class by preserving a common fund
to which others would have a claim. Nevertheless, the
amount of the award was limited because the court
determined that “Google’s legal department approved the
issuance of DBM refunds in May 2018,” and therefore
concluded that only the attorney hours spent before that date
“arguably could have conferred a benefit on others.”
The district court chose to use the lodestar method to
calculate the amount of this fee award. The court declined to
apply Plaintiffs’ requested 4.0 multiplier, explaining that
that the high hourly rates of the partner attorneys on the case
adequately compensated class counsel for their skill. The
district court also excluded from the lodestar calculation
those attorney hours that the court believed to be
unnecessary. The district court then applied a 1.6 multiplier

-- 9 of 17 --

10 ADT RADER V. GOOGLE
to fees incurred before May 2018 and calculated an adjusted
fee award of $725,580.80. The parties disputed whether a
$65.7 million valuation of the common fund, or some other
valuation, should be used to perform a cross-check of the fee
award based on the percentage-of-recovery method.
However, the court confirmed that the fee award was less
than the standard 25% benchmark using either figure for the
common fund. Thus, the court saw no need to make a factual
finding as to the amount of the common fund.
After the entry of the Fee Order, Google continued to
litigate against AdTrader’s individual claims and the
remaining AdWords Advertiser class claims, including
bringing multiple discovery disputes before the Court. While
this continues, however, AdTrader now appeals the Fee
Order.
DISCUSSION
A federal appellate court “has a special obligation to
satisfy itself . . . of its own jurisdiction.” Bender v.
Williamsport Area Sch. Dist., 475 U.S. 534, 541 (1986)
(citation and internal quotation marks omitted). This Court
has jurisdiction over appeals from “final decisions” of
federal district courts pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291. Section
1291’s grant of jurisdiction is given a “practical
construction” rather than a technical one. Cohen v.
Beneficial Indus. Loan Corp., 337 U.S. 541, 546 (1949).
Accordingly, this Court’s jurisdiction extends to a “small
class” of orders that do not bring litigation to a halt. Id.
Under the collateral order doctrine, an appellate court has
jurisdiction over an appeal from an order that conclusively
determines a disputed issue that is separate from the merits
and effectively unreviewable upon final judgment.
Rosenfeld v. United States, 859 F.2d 717, 720 (9th Cir.

-- 10 of 17 --

ADT RADER V. GOOGLE 11
1988); see also Moses H. Cone Memorial Hosp. v. Mercury
Constr. Corp., 460 U.S. 1, 11–12 (1983).
Litigants have “asked many times to expand the ‘small
class’ of collaterally appealable orders,” but courts have
repeatedly rebuffed these requests, upholding the sensible
tenet that a single appeal is preferable to piecemeal litigation.
Will v. Hallock, 546 U.S. 345, 350 (2006). AdTrader
nonetheless argues that orders awarding attorneys’ fees
under the common fund doctrine belong to this “narrow and
selective” club of collaterally appealable orders. See id.
Whether or not this might be true in some cases, we find that
it does not apply here.
I.
The so-called “common fund doctrine” arises when
counsel obtains a benefit for non-clients through litigation,
as is often the case in class actions. In such cases, counsel is
allowed to recover attorneys’ fees from any settlement fund,
so that those class members who benefit from the lawsuit at
no cost to themselves are not unjustly enriched at the
lawyers’ expense. Boeing Co. v. Van Gemert, 444 U.S. 472,
478 (1980); Vincent v. Hughes Air West, Inc., 557 F.2d 759,
769 (9th Cir. 1977) (explaining that “the common fund
doctrine provides that a private plaintiff, or his attorney . . .
is entitled to recover from the fund . . . to spread litigation
costs proportionately among all the beneficiaries so that the
active beneficiary does not bear the entire burden alone and
the ‘stranger’ beneficiaries do not receive their benefits at no
cost to themselves”).
In some cases, an order awarding attorneys’ fees from a
common fund can be appealed immediately under the
collateral order doctrine. As previously noted, to fall within
the collateral order doctrine, an order must:

-- 11 of 17 --

12 ADT RADER V. GOOGLE
(1) “conclusively determine the disputed question,”
(2) “resolve an important issue completely separate from the
merits,” and (3) be “effectively unreviewable on appeal from
a final judgment.” Rosenfeld, 859 F.2d at 720. An order is
“effectively unreviewable on appeal” when “the legal and
practical value of [the asserted right] will be destroyed if not
vindicated” before judgment. United States v. MacDonald,
435 U.S. 850, 860 (1978). For instance, a fee award might
be unreviewable on appeal if the fee recipient’s financial
instability might make return of the award impossible. See,
e.g., Riverhead Sav. Bank v. Nat’l Mortg. Equity Corp.,
893 F.2d 1109, 1114 (9th Cir. 1990) (“A strong likelihood
of insolvency satisfies the third prong of the collateral order
doctrine test.”).
There may be occasions when an attorneys’ fee award
from a common fund might conceivably meet the three
requirements of the collateral order doctrine. For example, if
a district court were to order immediate disbursement of a
common fund, including both awards to class members and
“interim fees” to attorneys, additional fees might not later be
recoverable from that already-disbursed fund if the award
was later determined to have been too low. See Rosenfeld,
859 F.2d at 720–21. Such an order may “threaten[]”
sufficient harm to justify appellate review” under the
collateral order doctrine. Id. at 721. Because it would be
immediately implemented, such an order is, as a practical
matter, not subject to further revision. Cf. Fed. R. Civ P.
54(b) (ordinarily, any interlocutory order “may be revised at
any time before judgment”). Such a fee order would also
presumably be independent from the merits of the ongoing
litigation. And if the payments were made to “class members
[who] might, by the close of the litigation, be insolvent, have
disappeared, or no longer even be parties,” the order may be

-- 12 of 17 --

ADT RADER V. GOOGLE 13
effectively unreviewable on appeal. Rosenfeld, 859 F.2d
at 721.
In AdTrader’s view, however, a fee award is
immediately appealable even when the underlying litigation
is still ongoing and the requirements of the collateral order
doctrine are not met, as long as the district court’s order
invokes the “common fund doctrine.” AdTrader tries to root
this supposed “common fund exception” to the final
judgment rule in case law. First, AdTrader points to Trustees
v. Greenough, 105 U.S. 527 (1881). But that case concerned
an appeal of a fee award when the court below had already
rendered a final decision on the merits and simply left the
case open for “purposes of administration of the [trust]
fund.” Id. at 531. Because the attorneys in Greenough asked
that their fees be paid from the common fund, they faced the
risk that a payment on the claims would exhaust the fund,
leaving nothing to compensate the attorneys for their labor.
Id. at 529.
Second, AdTrader cites Fahey v. Calverley, 208 F.2d
197 (9th Cir. 1953). But Fahey involved the “final
disposition of a fund in controversy” and raised similar
reviewability concerns if the appeal were delayed. 208 F.3d
at 200.
Finally, AdTrader cites American Re-Insurance Co. v.
Insurance Commissioner of State of California, 696 F.2d
1267, 1268 (9th Cir. 1983). But that decision had nothing to
do with the common fund doctrine at all. In that case, this
Court treated as final an order that resolved the merits of the
case, “disposing of all issues other than appellee’s motion
for attorneys’ fees.” Am. Re-Ins. Co., 696 F.2d at 1268.
In short, the case law does not reveal a special “common
fund exception” to § 1291 separate from the collateral order

-- 13 of 17 --

14 ADT RADER V. GOOGLE
doctrine. Rather, the precedents on which AdTrader relies
involve either final judgments on the merits or orders that
actually fit the classic collateral order doctrine.
II.
Because we thus conclude that there is no special and
separate “common fund exception” to 28 U.S.C. § 1291, we
turn to whether the collateral order doctrine is satisfied here.
As noted, this Court has jurisdiction over AdTrader’s appeal
only if the Fee Order “conclusively determined” a disputed
question, resolved an important issue separate from the
merits, and is “effectively unreviewable on appeal from a
final judgment.” Rosenfeld, 859 F.2d at 720. Failure to meet
“any one of these requirements” is fatal. Gulfstream
Aerospace Corp. v. Mayacamas Corp., 485 U.S. 271, 276
(1988). We find that the Fee Order is not a collaterally
appealable order because the order is not effectively
unreviewable on appeal.
AdTrader argues the district court’s order is “definitive,”
because the court knew that Google’s issuance of
$65.7 million in refunds to DBM Advertisers would
extinguish the damages claims of DBM Advertisers.
AdTrader adds that the Fee Order is distinct from the merits,
because the “remaining events of the underlying litigation
will have no impact on whatever fees and expenses are
awarded to AdTrader from this common fund.” But even
assuming arguendo that an order that does not determine the
total amount of attorneys’ fees could be final, contra
Rosenfeld, 859 F.2d at 720, AdTrader’s argument stumbles
at the final hurdle. Unlike the above-described cases on
which AdTrader relies, AdTrader’s request for attorneys’
fees is not effectively unreviewable on appeal, because there
is little risk counsel’s right to fees—whether equitable or

-- 14 of 17 --

ADT RADER V. GOOGLE 15
contractual—will be destroyed if not vindicated before
judgment.
AdTrader suggests that the opportunity to review the
attorneys’ fee award will be lost once the DBM Advertisers’
claims for damages have been mooted. But the mootness of
DBM Advertisers’ claims for damages will not eliminate
AdTrader’s opportunity to recover fees upon final judgment.
While AdTrader will seek recovery from a portion of a fund
that has technically been exhausted (because “about all” of
the DBM refunds were completed by September 2019),
those fees will remain available because Google has
undisputedly agreed to pay whatever amount the district
court ultimately determines AdTrader is entitled to. Indeed,
as this shows, this is really not a classic common fund award,
since payment of the attorneys’ fees will not come from the
fund, but directly from Google. There is, needless to say, no
suggestion that Google will no longer have the $65.7 million
to pay AdTrader’s attorneys’ fees if AdTrader waits to
appeal until after a final disposition on the merits. Delay will
not change “the legal and practical value” of AdTrader’s
asserted right to attorneys’ fees. MacDonald, 435 U.S.
at 860. Thus, there is no risk that deferring review of the fee
award until after final judgment could “imperil a substantial
public interest or some particular value of a high order.”
Copeland, 852 F.3d at 905 (citations and internal quotation
marks omitted).
While AdTrader cites Ninth Circuit decisions reviewing
under the collateral order doctrine awards of attorneys’ fees,
these decisions are, once again, inapposite to the instant case.
In Preston v. United States, 284 F.2d 514 (9th Cir. 1960),
this Court exercised jurisdiction over an appeal of a district
court order denying attorneys’ fees for services rendered to
nonparties to the litigation. Id. at 515–16. Unlike Preston,

-- 15 of 17 --

16 ADT RADER V. GOOGLE
AdTrader does not seek attorneys’ fees from nonparties.
Similarly, in Finnegan v. Director, Office of Worker’s
Compensation Program, 69 F.3d 1039 (9th Cir. 1995), this
Court held that a fee award was immediately appealable
when the district court’s fee award definitively resolved
entitlement to fees for work performed on settled claims,
despite ongoing litigation before an administrative law judge
on other claims. Id. at 1040–41. Unlike Finnegan, however,
the instant case involves ongoing litigation before the same
court, not in a distinct proceeding, and so we cannot say the
action has concluded.
AdTrader also relies on several distinguishable cases
holding that orders directing government litigants to pay
attorneys’ fees may be appealed under the collateral order
doctrine. See United States v. Baker, 603 F.2d 759, 762 (9th
Cir. 1979) (unreviewable because jury acquitted); United
States v. Indep. Med. Servs., Inc., 804 F. App’x 787, 788 (9th
Cir. 2020) (unpublished); Copeland v. Ryan, 852 F.3d 900,
904 (9th Cir. 2017); Sutton v. New York City Transit Auth.,
462 F.3d 157, 160 (2d Cir. 2006). But government litigant
cases invariably rely on the “substantial public interest in
protecting the state fisc against the unauthorized expenditure
of public funds” that may not be easily recoverable. See
Copeland, 852 F.3d at 905. The erroneous denial of fees here
would not be nearly so urgent. Class counsel has not been
ordered to pay a sum they may never recover; rather, they
seek to increase the sum they stand to gain.
III.
In short, this is neither a traditional common fund case
nor one that meets the requirements of the collateral order
doctrine. The litigants and the district court may have agreed
that attorneys’ fees should be determined in light of common
fund principles, but they also agreed that “any award of

-- 16 of 17 --

ADT RADER V. GOOGLE 17
attorneys’ fees here would not come from a sum that Google
has been ordered to pay the class.” This alone shows that this
case neither fits the situation under which the “common
fund” doctrine developed nor meets the requirement of
unreviewability that is essential to the limited collateral
order exception to finality. We have also considered
appellants’ other arguments for an immediate appeal and
find them to be without merit.
Accordingly, we hereby DISMISS this appeal for lack
of appellate jurisdiction.

-- 17 of 17 --