United States of America v. CHRIS REPP , AKA Christopher Sanders

FOR PUBLICATION
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v.
CHRIS REPP , AKA Christopher
Sanders,
Defendant-Appellant.
No. 20-50248
D.C. Nos.
2:12-cr-00722-TJH-5
2:12-cr-00722-TJH
OPINION
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Central District of California
Terry J. Hatter, Jr., District Judge, Presiding
Submitted February 17, 2021*
Pasadena, California
Filed February 17, 2021
Before: Richard C. Tallman and Consuelo M. Callahan,
Circuit Judges, and Dana L. Christensen,** District Judge.
Opinion by Judge Tallman
* The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
** The Honorable Dana L. Christensen, United States District Judge
for the District of Montana, sitting by designation.

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2 UNITED STATES V. REPP
SUMMARY***
Criminal Law
The panel dismissed for lack of jurisdiction Chris Repp’s
appeal from the district court’s denial of his motion for
issuance of a writ of habeas corpus ad prosequendum
directed to his current custodian, the Warden of FCI
Phoenix, to transport him to the Central District of California
for his initial appearance on an arrest warrant for violating
conditions of supervised release, proceedings for which a
detainer has now been lodged against him with the prison.
Repp is serving a custodial sentence at FCI Phoenix for
federal crimes he committed in the Eastern District of
Arkansas while on supervised release from an earlier federal
conviction in the Central District of California.
The panel held that whether Repp’s request in the district
court is characterized as a writ of habeas corpus ad
prosequendum or as a motion to expedite the supervised
release hearing date, the district court’s order is neither (1) a
final order for purposes of 28 U.S.C. § 1291, since it presents
neither a full adjudication of the issues nor the court’s final
act in the matter, nor (2) an effectively unreviewable
collateral order, since Repp may raise his procedural delay
arguments to the California federal court once his California
supervised release proceeding have commenced.
*** This summary constitutes no part of the opinion of the court. It
has been prepared by court staff for the convenience of the reader.

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UNITED STATES V. REPP 3
COUNSEL
Steven A. Brody, Los Angeles, California, for Defendant-
Appellant.
Nicola T. Hanna, United States Attorney; L. Ashley Aull,
Chief, Criminal Appeals Section; Gregg E. Marmaro,
Assistant United States Attorney, General Crimes Section;
United States Attorney’s Office, Los Angeles, California;
for Plaintiff-Appellee.
OPINION
TALLMAN, Circuit Judge:
May an inmate currently serving time on one federal
sentence expedite the resolution of a newly lodged detainer
to answer for a supervised release violation in another
federal district that was triggered by his commission of the
crime for which he is currently incarcerated? Chris Repp
appeals from the district court’s order denying his motion for
issuance of a writ of habeas corpus ad prosequendum
directed to his current custodian, the Warden of FCI
Phoenix, to transport him to Los Angeles for his initial
appearance there on an arrest warrant for violating
conditions of supervised release, proceedings for which a
detainer has now been lodged against him with the prison.
Repp is currently serving a custodial sentence for federal
crimes he committed in the Eastern District of Arkansas
while on supervised release from an earlier federal
conviction in the Central District of California. Because the
denial of Repp’s motion is not a final or appealable collateral
order, we lack jurisdiction over this appeal and must dismiss
it.

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4 UNITED STATES V. REPP
I
In 2013, Repp pled guilty in the Central District of
California to one count of conspiracy to commit Hobbs Act
robbery and one count of possession of a firearm in
furtherance of a crime of violence. After a successful motion
to vacate the firearm conviction, he was resentenced on
November 22, 2017, to time served and a three-year term of
supervised release.
In September 2018, while still subject to his California
supervised release conditions, Repp was indicted for
participating in a conspiracy to distribute narcotics in the
Eastern District of Arkansas. He pled guilty to one count of
use of a communication facility to commit a drug-trafficking
crime and was sentenced to 37 months’ imprisonment and a
one-year term of supervised release. In October 2018, the
U.S. Probation Office petitioned the district court in the
Central District of California for a warrant alleging
violations of Repp’s California conditions of supervised
release, which prohibited him from engaging in criminal
activity while on supervision. An arrest warrant issued, and,
because Repp remains in U.S. Bureau of Prisons custody
serving his Arkansas sentence, the warrant was lodged as a
custodial detainer against him.
Because the Interstate Agreement on Detainers Act,
18 U.S.C. App. 2 § 2, does not apply here, see United States
v. Bottoms, 755 F.2d 1349, 1350 (9th Cir. 1985), in March
2020, Repp, proceeding pro se, filed an ex parte motion,
styled as a petition for a writ of habeas corpus ad
prosequendum, seeking to be brought forthwith to the
Central District of California to commence proceedings on
the California supervised release petition while still serving
his Arkansas federal sentence. After appointing counsel to

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UNITED STATES V. REPP 5
represent Repp, the district court denied Repp’s motion.
Repp timely appealed.
II
We begin with a threshold consideration of our
jurisdiction. We have jurisdiction to consider appeals of
final orders issued by federal district courts. 28 U.S.C.
§ 1291. Under the collateral order doctrine, we may also
consider “a narrow class of decisions that do not terminate
the litigation, but must, in the interest of achieving a healthy
legal system, nonetheless be treated as final.” Digit. Equip.
Corp. v. Desktop Direct, Inc., 511 U.S. 863, 867 (1994)
(internal citations and quotation marks omitted).
Repp asserts that the district court’s order denying his
motion is a final appealable order. It is unclear whether
Repp’s motion is more appropriately characterized as a
petition for writ of habeas corpus ad prosequendum, as it was
captioned when proceeding pro se below, or as a motion to
expedite the supervised release hearing date, as he now
characterizes the motion on appeal. Regardless of how Repp
characterizes his motion though, the district court’s order is
not a final order or a collateral order that would support
appellate review at this time.
“A ruling is final for purposes of § 1291 if it (1) is a full
adjudication of the issues, and (2) clearly evidences the
judge’s intention that it be the court’s final act in the matter.”
Nat’l Distrib. Agency v. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co., 117 F.3d
432, 433 (9th Cir. 1997) (citation and internal quotation
marks omitted). We appreciate that Repp hopes to resolve
the supervised release violation so that he might be able to
serve any additional sentence concurrently with the
undischarged portion of his Arkansas sentence. But there is
no entitlement to that relief under any authority of which we

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6 UNITED STATES V. REPP
are aware. Denial of Repp’s request to expedite
commencement of his California supervised release
proceedings, however characterized, presents neither a full
adjudication of the issues nor the court’s final act in the
matter. Repp will be entitled to commence his supervised
release proceedings in California upon completion of his
Arkansas custodial sentence.
The order Repp seeks here is a precursor to contesting
the alleged supervised release violation which led to the
arrest warrant and the pending detainer. It does not fall
within the rubric of collateral orders which are “effectively
unreviewable on appeal from a final judgment.” Flanagan
v. United States, 465 U.S. 259, 265 (1984) (citation omitted).
Collateral orders involve “an asserted right the legal and
practical value of which would be destroyed if it were not
vindicated before trial.” United States v. MacDonald,
435 U.S. 850, 860 (1978). Repp’s request to expedite his
hearing date does not involve such a right. Repp may raise
his procedural delay arguments to the California federal
court once his California supervised release proceedings
have commenced. We perceive no meaningful harm to Repp
from the denial of his request to expedite pending his
completion of his Arkansas custodial sentence, and we
express no opinion on the validity of his delay argument.
DISMISSED. The pending motion to expedite (ECF
No. 17) is DENIED AS MOOT. Each party to bear its own
costs.

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