United States v. 2020-10-13 | 20-16932 | MI FAMILIA VOTA V. KATIE HOBBS | precedential | opinion |

FOR PUBLICATION
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
MI FAMILIA VOTA; ARIZONA
COALITION FOR CHANGE;
ULISES VENTURA,
Plaintiffs-Appellees,
v.
KATIE HOBBS, in her official
capacity as Arizona Secretary of
State,
Defendant-Appellant,
REPUBLICAN NATIONAL
COMMITTEE; NATIONAL
REPUBLICAN SENATORIAL
COMMITTEE,
Intervenor-Defendants-
Appellants,
STATE OF ARIZONA,
Intervenor-Pending.
Nos.20-16932
20-17000
D.C. No.
2:20-cv-01903-SPL
ORDER
Filed October 13, 2020
Before: William A. Fletcher, Marsha S. Berzon, and
Jay S. Bybee, Circuit Judges.

MI FAMILIA VOTA V. HOBBS2
Order;
Partial Dissent by Judge Bybee
SUMMARY
*
Civil Rights
The panel granted the Arizona Secretary of State’s
specific request for a prospective stay pending appeal, with a
two-day grace period, of the district court’s preliminary
injunction which (1) enjoined the enforcement of Arizona’s
October 5, 2020 deadline for registering to vote; and (2)
extended the deadline by eighteen days to October 23, 2020.
Plaintiffs alleged that the COVID-19 pandemic and
related government restrictions disrupted their efforts to
register voters. The district court enjoined the Secretary’s
enforcement of the October 5, 2020 deadline prescribed in
Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 16-120(A), holding that it was
unconstitutional as applied during the COVID-19 pandemic.
The Secretary appealed, requesting a prospective stay of the
injunction. The panel granted the stay effective two days
from the date of its order.
The panel held that the factors set forth in Nken v. Holder,
556 U.S. 418, 434 (2009), weighed in favor of a stay pending
appeal. Applying the first factor, the panel determined that
there was a sufficiently high likelihood of the Secretary’s
success on appeal. The panel noted that there had been no
*
This summary constitutes no part of the opinion of the court. It has
been prepared by court staff for the convenience of the reader.

MI FAMILIA VOTA V. HOBBS3
facial challenge to the statutory registration deadline.
Plaintiff-Appellees argued only that the deadline was
unconstitutional as applied because of the effect of COVID-
19 on their attempts to register voters. The panel held that
although the Governor’s emergency restrictions in response
to COVID-19 had the effect of limiting voter registration
efforts, the restrictions were more than amply justified on
grounds of public health.
The panel held that the statutory deadline did not impose
a “severe burden” on Plaintiff-Appellees’ asserted rights and
did not trigger strict scrutiny. The panel noted that more than
six months transpired between the March 30 date, when the
governor implemented restrictions, and the October 5
statutory deadline. And the Secretary and the Governor took
steps to mitigate the difficulties. The panel further held that
the administrative burdens on the state imposed by an
October 23 registration deadline were significant and that the
Plaintiff-Appellees’ extremely late filing relative to the
deadline was a factor supporting the government’s likelihood
of success on the merits.
The panel held that the remaining three Nken factors
governing the issuance of a stay also weighed in the
Secretary’s favor. Thus, the Secretary was likely to be
irreparably injured absent a stay because the injunction made
it considerably more difficult for her and other election
officials to fulfill their statutory obligations in administering
the election. The stay would not substantially injure the other
parties interested in the proceeding. And the public interest
favored the orderly administration of the election.
Concurring in the stay, but dissenting from the remedy,
Judge Bybee stated that the district court’s order was an

MI FAMILIA VOTA V. HOBBS4
obvious abuse of discretion, for all the reasons described in
the per curiam opinion. Judge Bybee wrote that at the very
last minute, on a thin complaint and record, the district court
thrust itself into the election by altering the eligibility
requirements for voting in Arizona. Judge Bybee would
require the Secretary of State to enforce the October 5
deadline as required by Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 16-120(A).
COUNSEL
Kory A. Langhofer and Thomas J. Basile, Statecraft PLLC,
Phoenix, Arizona, for Intervenor-Defendants-Appellants.
Roopali H. Desai, D. Andrew Gaona, and Kristen Yost,
Coppersmith Brockelman PLC, Phoenix, Arizona, for
Defendant-Appellant.
Matthew D. Brinckerhoff, Jonathan S. Abady, Zoe Salzman,
and Nick Bourland, Emery Celli Brinckerhoff Abady Ward
& Maazel LLP, New York, New York; Mary R. O’Grady and
Joshua D. Bendor, Osborn Maledon P.A., Phoenix, Arizona;
John Bonifaz, Gillian Cassel-Stiga, Ben Clements, and
Ronald Fein, Free Speech for People, Newton,
Massachusetts; for Plaintiffs-Appellees.
Drew C. Ensign and Michael S. Catlett, Deputy Solicitors
General; Jennifer J. Wright and Robert J. Makar, Assistant
Attorneys General; Brunn W. Roysden III, Solicitor General;
Joseph A. Kanefield, Chief Deputy & Chief of Staff; Mark
Brnovich, Attorney General; Office of the Attorney General,
Phoenix, Arizona; for Intervenor-Pending.

MI FAMILIA VOTA V. HOBBS5
ORDER
Since 1990, Arizona law has required that residents
wishing to participate in an election submit their voter
registration no later than 29 days prior to election day in order
to vote in that election. See Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 16-120(A).
Based on the November 3, 2020 date for the general election
this year, the registration cut-off date prescribed by § 16-
120(A) was October 5, 2020.
Plaintiff-Appellees are Mi Familia Vota and Arizona
Coalition for Change, two nonprofit organizations that
register voters, and Ulises Ventura, an employee of Mi
Familia Vota who registers voters. In March 2020, the
COVID-19 pandemic hit the United States. The pandemic
and related government restrictions over the ensuing months
disrupted Plaintiff-Appellees’ efforts to register voters.
Before a state-mandated shutdown on March 30, Plaintiff-
Appellees were registering over 1,523 voters a week. This
number dropped to as low as 282 a week during the several
months of restrictions.
The district court enjoined the Secretary’s enforcement of
the October 5, 2020 deadline prescribed in § 16-120(A),
holding that it was unconstitutional as applied during the
COVID-19 pandemic. The Secretary appealed, requesting a
prospective stay of this injunction. We grant this stay
effective two days from today.
I. Factual and Procedural Background
On September 30, 2020—only five days before the
deadline set under § 16-120(A)—Plaintiff-Appellees filed a
complaint in federal district court for the District of Arizona

MI FAMILIA VOTA V. HOBBS6
against the Arizona Secretary of State Katie Hobbs (“the
Secretary”), the chief state elections officer. See Ariz. Rev.
Stat. § 16-142. Their complaint alleged a violation of their
First Amendment “rights to associate and engage in free
speech to register voters and get out the vote,” and their
Fourteenth Amendment due process right incorporating the
First Amendment. They sought a declaratory judgment that
the deadline was unconstitutional as applied, and an
injunction requiring the Secretary to extend the deadline. On
October 2, 2020, the Secretary, represented by the Attorney
General of Arizona, filed a Response in Opposition. On that
same day, Intervenor-Defendants Republican National
Committee and National Republican Senatorial Committee
(collectively, “the RNC”) filed a Motion to Intervene, which
the district court granted. The district court also granted
leave for several amici to file briefs. On October 5, 2020, the
court held oral argument.
On October 5, 2020—the day of the registration deadline
in § 16-120(A), the day of oral argument, and five days after
the filing of the lawsuit—the district court issued a
preliminary injunction against the Secretary’s enforcement of
§ 16-120(A) and delaying the registration deadline. See Mi
Familia Vota, No. CV-20-01903, 2020 WL 5904952 (D.
Ariz. Oct. 5, 2020). The injunction extended the registration
deadline by eighteen days to October 23, 2020, and ordered
that anyone registering by that date be allowed to vote in the
November 3 election.
Initially, the Secretary indicated that she would not
appeal. Intervenor RNC filed a notice of appeal on
October 5, an emergency motion for an administrative stay on
October 6, and a motion for stay pending appeal on
October 8. Plaintiff-Appellees filed a motion to dismiss

MI FAMILIA VOTA V. HOBBS7
RNC’s appeal on October 6, arguing that because it is a non-
state party the RNC has no standing to appeal. See
Hollingsworth v. Perry, 570 U.S. 693, 715 (2013) (declining
to uphold “the standing of a private party to defend the
constitutionality of a state statute when state officials have
chosen not to [defend it]”). Also on October 6, the Attorney
General moved to intervene, purporting to represent the State
of Arizona. The Attorney General had represented the
Secretary during the litigation in the district court but now no
longer did so. Our court asked for expedited briefing and set
oral argument for October 12. We invited the Secretary to
express whatever views she might have. On October 11, the
Secretary, now represented by outside counsel, notified us
that she would appeal the district court’s injunction and
would appear at oral argument.
On the morning of October 12, 2020, the Secretary filed
a notice of appeal. We held oral argument in the afternoon on
October 12, 2020. Plaintiff-Appellees, the Secretary, the
Attorney General, and the RNC all argued.
At our invitation after oral argument, Plaintiff-Appellees,
the Secretary, the Attorney General, and the RNC entered
into settlement negotiations with the assistance of a mediator
of our court. This afternoon, Plaintiff-Appellees and the
Secretary entered into a stipulation agreeing to a prospective
stay that would take effect on October 16, 2020 at 11:59 p.m.
The Secretary did not agree to withdraw her appeal, and
intervenor RNC therefore continues to be a proper party
before our court. The RNC did not join the stipulation.
Because the RNC did not join the stipulation, we do not
regard it as settling whether a stay pending appeal should be
granted; whether, if granted, the stay should be prospective;

MI FAMILIA VOTA V. HOBBS8
and when, if prospective, the stay should take effect. We
decide all of those questions independent of the stipulation.
II. Discussion
Given the Secretary’s decision to appeal, questions as to
the RNC’s right to appeal as a non-state party, and the
authority of the Attorney General to bring an appeal on behalf
of the State, have now been mooted for present purposes.
Questions as to the Attorney General’s authority to represent
the State on the merits of the appeal, and to intervene in the
Secretary’s appeal, remain. However, in the present posture
of the appeal, we need not resolve those questions.
In deciding whether to grant a stay pending appeal, we
apply the factors set forth in Nken v. Holder, 556 U.S. 418,
434 (2009). See Al Otro Lado v. Wolf, 952 F.3d 999,
1006–07 (9th Cir. 2020). We consider the following four
factors: “(1) whether the stay applicant has made a strong
showing that he is likely to succeed on the merits; (2) whether
the applicant will be irreparably injured absent a stay;
(3) whether issuance of the stay will substantially injure the
other parties interested in the proceeding; and (4) where the
public interest lies.” Id. (citing Nken, 556 U.S. at 434). “The
first two factors . . . are the most critical.” Id. at 1007.
We conclude that the factors weigh in favor of a stay
pending appeal.
The first factor, likelihood of success on the merits, is the
most important. We conclude that there is a sufficiently high
likelihood of success on appeal.

MI FAMILIA VOTA V. HOBBS9
First, there has been no facial challenge to the statutory
registration deadline. Plaintiff-Appellees argue only that the
deadline is unconstitutional as applied because of the effect
of COVID-19 on their attempts to register voters. We
recognize that the Governor imposed restrictions based on the
public health emergency created by COVID-19 and that they
had the effect of limiting voter registration efforts. But those
restrictions were more than amply justified on grounds of
public health. See South Bay United Pentecostal Church v.
Newsom, 140 S. Ct. 1613, 1613 (2020) (Roberts, C.J.,
concurring in denial of application for injunctive relief)
(stating that, when politically accountable officials
“undertake[ ] to act in areas fraught with medical and
scientific uncertainties, their latitude must be especially
broad” (internal quotation marks omitted)).
Second, the statutory deadline does not impose a “severe
burden” on Plaintiff-Appellees’ asserted rights and does not
trigger strict scrutiny. See Burdick v. Takushi, 504 U.S. 428,
434 (1992). More than six months transpired between the
March 30 date, when the governor implemented restrictions,
and the October 5 statutory deadline. While the restrictions
made it more difficult for Plaintiff-Appellees to help voters
to register, it was quite possible for them to do so during this
period. Registration could be accomplished online or by
mail, so in-person contact with potential registrants was
unnecessary. And the Secretary and the Governor took steps
to mitigate the difficulties. For example, Governor Ducey’s
stay-at-home order expressly exempted constitutionally
protected speech activities such as voter registration efforts.
Ariz. Exec. Order No. 2020-18 (Mar. 30, 2020), at 3.
Third, the administrative burdens on the state imposed by
an October 23 registration deadline are significant. As the

MI FAMILIA VOTA V. HOBBS10
Secretary noted in her brief to us, the injunction has suddenly
forced the County Recorders in local election offices—some
with limited staffs of only two or three people in rural
counties—to process voter registrations while at the same
time mailing and processing early ballots. By statute, early
voting began on October 7. See Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 16-542.
The Secretary also noted that the extended deadline makes
more difficult compliance with other statutory deadlines to
which officials must adhere, including (1) a deadline to
complete precinct registers and e-pollbooks by October 24,
and (2) a deadline for filing computer programs with the
Secretary’s office by October 17. See Ariz. Rev. Stat. §§ 16-
168(A), 16-445(A). The extended deadline also interferes
with county officials’ ability to begin tabulating early ballots
before election day.
Finally, even if the burden on voter registration were
greater and the burden on the government less, courts
“weigh,” when contemplating ordering last-minute changes
to state election rules, the consideration that “[c]ourt orders
affecting elections, especially conflicting orders, can
themselves result in voter confusion,” and the risk increases
“[a]s an election draws closer.” Purcell v. Gonzalez,
549 U.S. 1, 4–5 (2006). Just last week, a motions panel of
our court observed that “as we rapidly approach the election,
the public interest is well served by preserving Arizona’s
existing election laws, rather than by sending the State
scrambling to implement and administer” a district court’s
order. Ariz. Democratic Party v. Hobbs, 20-16759, 2020 WL
5903488, at *2 (9th Cir. Oct. 6, 2020). As in Purcell itself,
this consideration need not be “controlling” and does not
supervene other relevant legal considerations applicable when
reviewing the grant or denial of preliminary relief. 549 U.S.
at 5. There may well be cases where a state election rule is so

MI FAMILIA VOTA V. HOBBS11
constitutionally problematic because of events such as a
pandemic or natural disaster that a federal court must
intervene, even shortly before an election. But this is not
such a case, so Plaintiff-Appellees’ extremely late filing
relative to the deadline is a factor supporting the
government’s likelihood of success on the merits.
The remaining factors governing issuance of a stay also
weigh in the Secretary’s favor. As to the second factor, the
Secretary is likely to be irreparably injured absent a stay
because, as noted above, the injunction makes it considerably
more difficult for her and other election officials to fulfill
their statutory obligations in administering the election. By
October 24, the County Recorders are required to compile
four printed lists or two e-pollbooks of all registered voters.
See Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 16-168(A). Only one day after the
court-ordered registration deadline, it would be incredibly
difficult for officials to accurately process all
registrations—particularly paper registrations that contain
nontraditional addresses in rural areas or on tribal lands—to
create the lists required by statute. The Secretary has
demonstrated that, absent a stay, she will have great difficulty
in “achiev[ing] and maintain[ing] the maximum degree of
correctness, impartiality, uniformity and efficiency on the
procedures for early voting and voting, and [in] producing,
distributing, collecting, counting, tabulating and storing
ballots.” Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 16-452(A). She has therefore
made a strong showing on the first two factors, which are the
“most critical,” Nken, 556 U.S. at 434.
The final two factors also support issuance of a stay. As
to the third factor, the stay will not substantially injure the
other parties interested in the proceeding. The facial
constitutionality of the statutory deadline is unchallenged,

MI FAMILIA VOTA V. HOBBS12
and as applied does not impose a severe burden on Plaintiff-
Appellees. As to the fourth factor, the public interest favors
orderly administration of the election. States have “an
interest in protecting the integrity, fairness, and efficiency of
their ballots and election processes.” Timmons v. Twin Cities
Area New Party, 520 U.S. 351, 364 (1997).
We therefore conclude that a stay pending appeal is
appropriate. Neither the Secretary nor the Attorney General
seek a stay that would require the Secretary to forbid citizens
who have already registered pursuant to the district court’s
order from voting. In their briefs to us, both the Secretary
and the Attorney General have requested a prospective stay.
The Secretary and the Attorney General both reiterated their
requests during oral argument. The Secretary seeks a
prospective stay that would allow registration through the
date of this order, plus a grace period. The Attorney General
seeks a prospective stay that would allow registration only
through the date of this order.
In support of a prospective rather than retroactive stay, the
Secretary maintains that a retroactive stay would be unfair
and might “cause irreparable harm to Arizona’s voters[] and
damage the public interest.” Further, a retroactive stay would
replicate some of the injuries that the injunction itself
produced. The district court’s order required officials to
accept additional voter registrations while trying at the same
time to complete statutorily required tasks. Much the same
thing would happen under a retrospective stay, for officials
would be required to undo what has been in compliance with
the district court’s order on top of those same tasks. Finally,
a retrospective stay would be problematic given that early
voting has begun, with the likely result that some of those

MI FAMILIA VOTA V. HOBBS13
who have registered after October 5 have already cast their
ballots.
Second, the Supreme Court has recently employed the
remedy of a prospective stay in similar election-law cases.
Last week, the Court issued a prospective stay of a district
court injunction that had invalidated South Carolina’s witness
requirement for absentee ballots. Andino v. Middleton,
__ S. Ct. __, 2020 WL 5887393, at *1 (U.S. Oct. 5, 2020).
The Court’s remedial order held that “any ballots cast before
this stay issues and received within two days of this order
may not be rejected for failing to comply with the witness
requirement.” Id.
Finally, the Supreme Court’s election law jurisprudence
counsels for deference to politically accountable state
officials charged with the responsibility for conducting
elections. Both of the state officials who have appeared
before us seek only a prospective stay. The Secretary is the
“chief state elections officer,” and is in charge of “achiev[ing]
and maintain[ing] the maximum degree of correctness,
impartiality, uniformity and efficiency” in elections. Ariz.
Rev. Stat. § 16-142; id. § 16-152. We need not decide
whether the Attorney General is authorized in this case to
represent the interests of the State. We will assume without
deciding that he is so authorized. Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 41-
193(A)(3). When state parties subject to a court order accede
to that order, there is little cause for the court to disturb such
an arrangement. See Republican Nat’l Comm. v. Common
Cause Rhode Island, __ S. Ct. __, 2020 WL 4680151, at *1
(U.S. Aug. 13, 2020) (denying an application for a stay by
intervenors because “here the state election officials support
the challenged decree, and no state official has expressed
opposition”).

MI FAMILIA VOTA V. HOBBS14
The Secretary of State also requests a prospective stay
that would not take effect until a “reasonable grace period”
after the date of our order. We agree, but find reasonable a
shorter period than the five days the Secretary suggests. As
the Secretary recognizes, citizens who have begun the process
of registering to vote but have not yet completed their
registration have every reason to be relying on the district
court’s extension of the registration deadline in the same way
as those who began and already completed the process during
the pendency of the district court’s order. And the conflicting
orders are certainly confusing to potential registrants: The
Secretary of State’s website in compliance with the district
court’s order currently informs the citizenry that “[t]he voter
registration deadline for the General Election has been
extended to 5 p.m. on October 23, 2020 by a court order.”
But it also says that because “[t]his decision is subject to
additional legal action . . . Arizonans should update or
complete their registration as soon as possible.” Given that
admonition and the Supreme Court’s recent ruling in Andino,
a two-day grace period is sufficient.
We thus grant the Secretary of State’s specific request for
a prospective stay, with a two-day grace period.
So ORDERED.
BYBEE, Circuit Judge, concurring in the stay but dissenting
from the remedy:
Under Arizona law, an otherwise qualified elector “shall
not vote in an election called pursuant to the laws of this
state unless the elector has been registered to vote . . . before

MI FAMILIA VOTA V. HOBBS15
midnight of the twenty-ninth day preceding the date of the
election.” Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 16-120(A). That means that
anyone registering by October 5, 2020 is eligible to vote in
the November 2020 state and national elections. Anyone in
Arizona who registered after that date is not eligible to vote
in November, but may vote in the following elections.
Days before the deadline, two non-profit organizations,
Mi Famila Vota and Arizona Coalition for Change
(collectively, “MFV”) sought a declaratory order and a
preliminary injunction extending the deadline for registering
for the November election. MFV claimed its own standing
and did not represent potential voters. It complained that,
because of COVID-19, enforcing the registration deadline
would “frustrate [MFV’s] mission to register as many voters
as possible.” Compl. ¶ 91. MFV did not allege that Arizona
had imposed any particular COVID-19 restrictions that
interfered with its registration activities; its complaint was
based on the general inconvenience we have all had to deal
with. The district court found § 16-120(A) unconstitutional
as applied, and it entered a preliminary injunction extending
the October 5 deadline by eighteen days to October 23 and
ordered the state to deem those who register by October 23
eligible to vote in the November election. Mi Familia Vota
v. Hobbs, No. CV-20-01903, 2020 WL 5904952 (D. Ariz.
Oct. 5, 2020).
The district court’s order was an obvious abuse of
discretion, for all the reasons described in our per curiam
opinion. At the very last minute, on a thin complaint and
record, the district court thrust itself into the election by
altering the eligibility requirements for voting in Arizona.
Now, according to MFV, in the days after the district court’s
order, thousands of Arizonans have registered, expecting to

MI FAMILIA VOTA V. HOBBS16
vote in the November election. MFV estimated that if the
injunction remained in place, tens of thousands new electors
could be added to rolls. Aside from the question of ineligible
electors suddenly becoming eligible, the Secretary of State
advised us how the injunction was interfering with counties
responsible for registering voters and preparing the precinct
registers, and that the injunction might delay the reporting of
the election results.
Arizona’s deadline fully complies with the National Voter
Registration Act, 52 U.S.C. § 20501 et seq.,
1
and, as such, it
is a generally-applicable and “evenhanded restriction[] that
protect[s] the integrity and reliability of the election process
itself.” Crawford v. Marion Cty Election Bd., 553 U.S. 181,
189–90 (2008) (plurality opinion) (quoting Anderson v.
Celebrezze, 460 U.S. 780, 788 n.9 (1983)). “Deadlines are
inherently arbitrary; fixed dates, however, are often essential
to accomplish necessary results.” United States v. Boyle,
469 U.S. 241, 249 (1985). “The difficulty is that every
electoral law and regulation necessarily has some impact on
the right to vote, yet to strike down every electoral regulation
that has a minor impact on the right to vote would prevent
states from performing the important regulatory task of
ensuring that elections are fair and orderly.” Weber v.
Shelley, 347 F.3d 1101, 1106 (9th Cir. 2003). It is, thus, an
“aimless journey” to “decide whether some date other than
the one set out in the statute” might better serve some goal,
1
In the National Voter Registration Act, Congress declared among its
purposes “to protect the integrity of the electoral process” and “to ensure
that accurate and current voter registration rolls are maintained.”
52 U.S.C. § 20501(b)(3)–(4). In § 20507, Congress instructed the states
to “ensure that any eligible applicant is registered to vote in an election”
and required states to accept registrations filed “not later than the lesser of
30 days . . . before the date of the election.” Id. § 20507(a)(1)(A)–(D).

MI FAMILIA VOTA V. HOBBS17
“for the purpose of a filing deadline would be just as well
served by nearly any date a court might choose as by the date
[the legislature] has in fact set out in the statute.” United
States v. Locke, 471 U.S. 84, 93 (1985). Improving Arizona’s
election code is not our business, and when we undermine
long-established, neutral rules, we threaten the confidence the
electorate demands in the integrity of our elections.
I concur in the stay, but I disagree with the remedy.
There are no good solutions here. I am sympathetic to
Arizona’s election administrators, who are in a tough
position, but I cannot agree to the relief the Secretary of State
has requested and the majority approves: Issuing (with a
grace period) a stay of the district court’s preliminary
injunction, but allowing those who registered after the
October 5 cutoff to vote in the upcoming election. By law,
those who registered after October 5 “shall not vote” because
their registration was not received “before midnight of the
twenty-ninth day preceding the date of the election.” Ariz.
Rev. Stat. § 16-120(A). They are not eligible to vote in this
election, and adding thousands of ineligible voters to the rolls
compromises Arizona’s election. I would require the
Secretary of State to enforce Arizona law.
The Secretary of State has argued that those who
registered after October 5 did so in reliance on the district
court’s order. I don’t see a strong reliance issue here. It is
true that those who registered late will be disappointed not to
vote in the November election, but they are now registered to
vote in subsequent elections. Their registration has not been
in vain. On the other hand, the citizens of Arizona have a
powerful reliance interest in the evenhanded enforcement of
their election code. Arizona set forth its rules in advance, in
accordance with the U.S. Constitution, federal statutes, and

MI FAMILIA VOTA V. HOBBS18
the Arizona Constitution. In the long run, it is more
important that we be able to rely on the integrity of
elections—that the rules be announced in advance and be
fairly and equally administered—than that we declare the
rules suspended for this election because of a judicial
misstep.
I concur in the per curiam opinion insofar as it grants the
stay pending appeal. I respectfully dissent as to the remedy.
I would require Arizona officials to enforce § 16-120(A).