in Re Cliven Bundy, Cliven Bundy v. United States District Court for the District of Nevada, Las Vegas

FOR PUBLICATION
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
IN RE CLIVEN BUNDY,
CLIVEN BUNDY,
Petitioner,
v.
UNITED STATES DISTRICT
COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF
NEVADA, LAS VEGAS,
Respondent,
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Real Party in Interest.
No. 17-70700
D.C. No.
2:16-cr-00046-GMN-
PAL-1
OPINION
Petition for Writ of Mandamus
Submitted March 24, 2017*
Filed March 30, 2017
Before: William A. Fletcher, Ronald M. Gould,
Jay S. Bybee, Circuit Judges.
Per Curiam Opinion;
Dissent by Judge Gould
* The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).

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IN RE BUNDY 2
SUMMARY**
Mandamus/Pro Hac Vice
The panel denied Cliven Bundy’s emergency petition to
issue a writ of mandamus to the district court for its failure
sua sponte to admit attorney Larry Klayman pro hac vice in
Bundy’s criminal trial.
The panel held that the district court’s failure sua sponte
to grant Klayman pro hac vice status as of March 2017 was
neither an abuse of discretion nor clear error. The panel
wrote that Bundy’s claimed “changed circumstances” since
this court’s October 2016 denial of Bundy’s emergency
mandamus petition to force the district court to admit
Klayman have nothing but the most attenuated connections
with the denial of Klayman’s pro hac vice application, and
that none of them come close to demonstrating that the
district court abused its discretion in a manner so obvious that
the error is clear to all. The panel wrote that this is
particularly so when Bundy failed to present his case for
“changed circumstances” to the district court.
Dissenting, Judge Gould wrote that his reasons are
essentially the same as for his dissent to the majority’s
decision denying the first mandamus petition. He wrote that
sometimes representation by multiple attorneys is a key to a
robust defense, and that Bundy’s needs for experienced
defense counsel of his choosing are more important than the
articulated concerns about Klayman’s ethics, where he has
** This summary constitutes no part of the opinion of the court. It has
been prepared by court staff for the convenience of the reader.

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IN RE BUNDY 3
not been disbarred or suspended by another bar association or
proven to have engaged in unethical conduct that could
justify disbarment.
COUNSEL
Larry Klayman, Washington, D.C., for Petitioner.
Elizabeth O. White, Appellate Chief and Assistant United
States Attorney; Steven W. Myhre, Acting United States
Attorney; United States Attorney’s Office, Reno, Nevada; for
Real Party in Interest.
OPINION
PER CURIAM:
Attorney Larry Klayman applied to be admitted pro hac
vice in the high-profile criminal trial of Cliven Bundy. The
district court denied his application without prejudice. Bundy
filed an emergency petition with us for a writ of mandamus
to force the district court to admit Klayman. We declined to
do so in October 2016. See In re Bundy, 840 F.3d 1034 (9th
Cir. 2016). We wrote then:
Under our decisions, the district court had
more than ample cause to turn down
Klayman’s application: he is involved in an
ethics proceeding before the District of
Columbia Bar, and he was not candid with the
court about the status of those proceedings; he
disclosed that he was twice barred in

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IN RE BUNDY 4
perpetuity from appearing pro hac vice before
judges in the Central District of California and
the Southern District of New York, but he
failed to list numerous cases—all available on
Westlaw or LEXIS—in which he has been
reprimanded, denied pro hac vice status, or
otherwise sanctioned for violating various
local rules; and he has a record of going after
judges personally, and shortly after Chief
Judge Gloria Navarro denied his application,
Bundy filed a frivolous Bivens action against
her in her own court. This litany of reasons
for denying Klayman pro hac vice status
demonstrates that the district court did not
abuse its discretion, much less commit clear
error.
Id. at 1036. Bundy petitioned for en banc review, but his
petition was denied on December 13, 2016. Bundy then
petitioned the Supreme Court for a writ of mandamus, but
that petition, too, was denied on February 27, 2017. In re
Bundy, No. 16-908, 2017 WL 237570 (U.S. Feb. 27, 2017)
(mem.).
Barely a week later, Bundy, through Klayman, filed the
instant emergency petition for a writ of mandamus. Bundy
cites to “fundamentally changed circumstances that
underscore [his] compelling need to have a full legal defense
team, including Klayman, ready and able to represent him at
trial.” Emergency Pet. for Writ of Mandamus at 6–7, Mar. 9,
2017, ECF No. 1 [hereinafter Petition]. The petition is
procedurally irregular in a number of respects. First,
Klayman purports to be representing Bundy in his request for
a writ of mandamus. Bundy has counsel of record, Nevada

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IN RE BUNDY 5
attorney Bret O. Whipple. Whipple, however, did not sign
the motion, file an affidavit, or otherwise join in any way
Bundy’s latest motion. Indeed, Bundy, in his reply filed on
March 23, explains that his current attorney refused to file a
new pro hac vice application on behalf of Klayman because
Whipple did not want to “tarnish his reputation.” Appellant’s
Br. in Reply to Hon. Gloria Navarro’s Answer and Real Party
in Interest’s Answer at 11, Mar. 23, 2017, ECF No. 8
[hereinafter Reply]. We have no affidavit or other evidence
that Bundy authorized Klayman to file this motion or still
wants Klayman to join his defense team. Nevertheless,
Klayman, purporting to represent Bundy, represents that “Mr.
Klayman had no other recourse but to file [the] instant
Emergency Petition for Writ of Mandamus.” Id. Mr.
Klayman’s “recourse” is his own affair; it is not clear that he
represents Bundy in anything he has presented to us. Why
Bundy (or Klayman) thinks that Whipple had to file a pro hac
vice application on behalf of Klayman, but that Klayman
could file a petition for a writ of mandamus on behalf of
Bundy, we do not understand.
The motion is irregular for a second reason. It is not clear
what Bundy wants us to do, so it is not clear what standards
we must apply to the request. If Bundy is asking us to
reconsider our prior decision, the request is late. We have
already denied Bundy’s petition for rehearing en banc, and
the Supreme Court has denied certiorari. If, as Bundy claims,
there are “fundamentally changed circumstances,” then
Klayman’s renewed request for admission pro hac vice
should have been addressed to the district court in the first
instance. It was not, which means—we think—that Bundy or
Klayman is asking this court to issue a writ of mandamus to
the district court for its failure sua sponte to admit Klayman
pro hac vice. So construing Bundy’s motion, and because the

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IN RE BUNDY 6
district court and government filed answers to the petition, we
will proceed to the merits.
I
There are no merits. The standards by which we
approach a petition for a writ of mandamus to direct a district
court to admit an out-of-state attorney pro hac vice have not
changed since October:
Mandamus “is a ‘drastic and
extraordinary’ remedy ‘reserved for really
extraordinary causes.’” Cheney v. U.S. Dist.
Court, 542 U.S. 367, 380 (2004) (quoting Ex
parte Fahey, 332 U.S. 258, 259–60 (1947)).
“As the writ is one of ‘the most potent
weapons in the judicial arsenal,’ three
conditions must be satisfied before it may
issue.” Id. (citation omitted). “First, ‘the
party seeking issuance of the writ [must] have
no other adequate means to attain the relief he
desires . . . .’” Id. (first alteration in original)
(quoting Kerr v. U.S. Dist. Court, 426 U.S.
394, 403 (1976)). Second, the petitioner must
show that “[his] right to issuance of the writ is
‘clear and indisputable.’” Id. at 381
(alteration in original) (quoting Kerr, 426 U.S.
at 403). “Third, even if the first two
prerequisites have been met, the issuing court,
in the exercise of its discretion, must be
satisfied that the writ is appropriate under the
circumstances.” Id.

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IN RE BUNDY 7
In re Bundy, 840 F.3d at 1040 (alterations in original). We
further explained:
Because, on direct appeal, we “normally
review a denial of a motion to appear pro hac
vice for abuse of discretion,” United States v.
Walters, 309 F.3d 589, 591 (9th Cir. 2002),
our review in mandamus proceedings is
“especially deferential,” In re United States,
[791 F.3d 945, 955 (9th Cir. 2016)]. On
petition for a writ of mandamus, we look to
see if the district court abused its discretion in
a manner so obvious that the error is “clear”
to all.
Id. at 1041.
II
We hold that the district court’s failure sua sponte to
grant Klayman pro hac vice status as of March 2017 was
neither an abuse of discretion nor clear error. Bundy raises
three claims of “changed circumstances”: (1) the district
court’s refusal to dismiss all charges against Bundy in light of
the issuance of a report that may cast doubt on the credibility
of one of the government’s potential witnesses; (2) a hearing
at which defense counsel agreed to strike the district court’s
husband, Brian Rutledge, who is a deputy district attorney in
Clark County, from its potential witness list; and (3) the lack
of federal criminal experience of Bundy’s current counsel of
choice, Bret Whipple. The circumstances cited by Bundy
have nothing but the most attenuated connections with the
denial of Klayman’s pro hac vice application. And none of
them come close to demonstrating that the “district court

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IN RE BUNDY 8
abused its discretion in a manner so obvious that the error is
‘clear’ to all.” In re Bundy, 840 F.3d at 1041. This is
particularly so when Bundy failed to present his case for
“changed circumstances” to the district court in the first
place. We will address each “circumstance” in turn.
A
First, Bundy complains that alleged prosecutorial
misconduct occurred when the government did not promptly
turn over a report on ethical misconduct by a Bureau of Land
Management (BLM) official who may or may not testify for
the government. The misconduct was related to an event at
the Burning Man Festival in Northern Nevada, and does not
involve Bundy. See Office of Inspector Gen., U.S. Dep’t of
the Interior, Investigative Report of Ethical Violations and
Misconduct of Bureau of Land Management Officials (2017)
https://www.doioig.gov/sites/doioig.gov/files/EthcialViolat
ionsAndMisconductByBLMOfficials_Public.pdf. Bundy
argues that the district court should have dismissed the
charges against Bundy, and further alleges that earlier
disclosure of the report would at least have allowed Bundy
and his co-defendants “to conduct a meaningful investigation,
move for discovery, and effectively impeach the credibility
of [the official].” Reply at 4. At first blush, it is unclear how
this possibly constitutes a changed circumstance related to
Klayman’s pro hac vice admission and the district court’s
determination (as well as our own) that Klayman’s admission
would be a substantial impediment to the “ethical and orderly
administration of justice.” In re Bundy, 840 F.3d at 1042
(quoting United States v. Ries, 100 F.3d 1469, 1471 (9th Cir.
1996)).

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IN RE BUNDY 9
Bundy, likely recognizing this logical gap, claims that
only if Klayman is immediately recognized as counsel will
Bundy’s ability to respond properly to this late-disclosed
report be constitutionally adequate. Bundy further argues
that, by not dismissing the action entirely as a result of the
allegedly-late-disclosed report, the district court erred. See
Petition at 8. In fact, he claims this is but one in a seemingly
never-ending series of “severely prejudicial ruling[s]” by the
district court. Id. at 9; Reply at 4. Bundy asserts that only
Klayman will be able to properly fight these prejudicial
rulings.
Bundy’s claim of district court error in refusing to dismiss
the charges on the basis of the report is not, absent clear error,
remediable at this stage of the proceedings through
mandamus. See DeGeorge v. U.S. Dist. Court, 219 F.3d 930,
935 (9th Cir. 2000) (“[D]irect appeal after trial, as opposed to
immediate review, is the typically adequate means of
review.”). There will be ample opportunity for Bundy to
renew his claim before the district court in advance of trial.
He may preserve his argument by raising his claim again at
trial, which is not scheduled until April, at the earliest. And,
failing that, Bundy may appeal to this court. Similarly,
Bundy is free to argue that the report may be used to impeach
the BLM official at trial, if he testifies. It is premature for us
to grant mandamus at this point.
B
Bundy further complains about the manner by which the
district court struck the district court judge’s husband
(Rutledge) from Bundy’s proposed witness list. Upon seeing
Rutledge on Bundy’s witness list, the district court held an ex
parte hearing in which Bundy and three of his co-defendants

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IN RE BUNDY 10
were ordered to “produce an offer of proof that complies with
Federal Rule of Evidence 602 regarding their listing of the
husband of the presiding judge as a witness” on their witness
lists. Minute Order in Chambers, United States v. Bundy,
No. 2:16-cr-00046-GMN-PAL-1 (D. Nev. Mar. 8, 2017),
ECF No. 1691; see Fed. R. Evid. 602 (requiring a witness to
have personal knowledge). Bundy characterizes the district
court’s issuance of this show-cause order as “threatening to
hold Whipple in contempt” and as an “attempt to neutralize
anyone who even attempts to represent [Bundy].” Petition at
17.
As evidence, Bundy states that Ms. Bundy said that
Whipple told her that the district court, at the ex parte
hearing, told Whipple that he would be sanctioned unless he
agreed to withdraw Rutledge. The district court informs us
that it never threatened Whipple with contempt. District Ct.
Judge Navarro’s Answer at 2, Mar. 21, 2017, ECF No. 7
[hereinafter Dist. Ct. Answer]. (And the sealed brief filed by
Whipple in response to the district court’s show-cause order
where Whipple effectively concedes removing the name calls
into question the veracity of Bundy’s double-hearsay
evidence and supports the district court’s recollection of
events.) Bundy had wanted to call Rutledge because he
worked in the district attorney’s office and the Bundys had
asked the district attorney’s office to investigate what they
claimed were abuses by federal agents. Petition at 17. When
Whipple admitted that he could not satisfy Rule 602 for
Rutledge and had no good faith basis for leaving the name on
the list, the district court struck Rutledge’s name from the
witness list. Dist. Ct. Answer at 3–4. Complaints about
properly enforcing the rules of evidence are not the proper
subjects of petitions for writs of mandamus.

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IN RE BUNDY 11
C
Bundy’s real complaint—or, at least, Klayman’s
complaint—is that these adverse rulings, combined with other
factors, demonstrate that Whipple is not able to defend Bundy
adequately. Bundy claims that Whipple is not fully prepared
to defend Bundy because “Whipple has no federal criminal
defense experience.” Petition at 9. He adds, “Klayman has
extensive experience in complex, contentious federal criminal
defense, and Petitioner’s local counsel, [Whipple], has none.”
Id. at 10; see also id. at 14 (“Klayman . . . has federal
criminal defense experience . . . .”); id. at 17 (“Klayman [is]
the only defense counsel with federal criminal experience that
[Bundy] has been able to find . . . .”); id. Ex. I ¶ 9 (Bundy
Aff.) (“[Whipple] does not have comparable experience to
Larry Klayman who is a former federal prosecutor in any
event.”).
The assertions made by Bundy about his counsel are
demonstrably false. Either Klayman has failed to ascertain
the facts by, for example, talking with Whipple or looking at
Whipple’s website, or he has deliberately misled this court.
Neither option paints Klayman in a good light. At best,
Klayman has shown such a casual acquaintance with the facts
that he is guilty of at least gross negligence in his
representations to this court. As both the government and the
district court point out to this court in their responses to
Bundy’s petition, Whipple is well qualified to serve as
Bundy’s counsel. Dist. Ct. Answer at 4; Answer from the
United States at 13, Mar. 20, 2017, ECF No. 6. Whipple has
been a member of the Nevada Bar for more than twenty
years. For six years, he was a public defender in Clark
County, including three years in the Special Public
Defender’s Office, which has responsibility for capital cases

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IN RE BUNDY 12
in Nevada state courts. The district court verified that
Whipple, now in private practice, has extensive experience in
federal criminal cases. For some thirteen years, Whipple has
accepted federal appointment under the Criminal Justice Act,
where he has defended some 99 criminal cases, including
complex, multi-defendant cases. At least one of his recent
cases was the subject of a high-profile, multi-defendant,
fourteen-day trial. Dist. Ct. Answer at 4.1
Confronted with these facts, Bundy shifted his argument
in his reply. First, Klayman now candidly admits in an
affidavit that he “did not check Mr. Whipple’s PACER
history prior to preparing the Emergency Petition for Writ of
Mandamus.” Reply at 7. (PACER is our public, electronic
database, which would have informed Klayman of Whipple’s
substantial federal criminal experience.) Klayman offered no
explanation for missing Whipple’s six years as a public
defender. According to Klayman’s affidavit, he now
“believes that Mr. Whipple is a highly competent attorney,”
but that “Mr. Whipple, on his own, does not have the
necessary federal criminal defense experience or the
resources to mount a zealous and effect [sic] defense.” Id.;
id. Ex. C ¶¶ 11–12, 16 (Klayman Aff.).
By contrast, although Klayman repeatedly assures us that
he has “extensive experience in complex, contentious
1 This court had little difficulty confirming most of these facts from
Whipple’s website, his LinkedIn account, and PACER. See Bret Whipple,
LinkedIn, https://www.linkedin.com/in/bret-whipple-67441117 (last
visited Mar. 30, 2017); Las Vegas Nevada Attorney Bret Whipple, Just. L.
Ctr., http://mylasvegaslawyer.com/las-vegas-nevada-attorney-bret-whipple
(last visited Mar. 30, 2017). That Klayman, evidently, failed to use the
most primitive modern tools to verify his serious accusations that counsel
of record was not qualified is inexcusable.

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IN RE BUNDY 13
criminal defense,” he has provided us no evidence in support.
Not a single example. As we noted in our prior opinion, we
are well aware of Klayman’s substantial experience in federal
and state courts, but from what we can tell, it is almost
entirely civil in nature. See, e.g., In re Bundy, 840 F.3d at
1045–46. Klayman claims that he is a “former prosecutor
with the U.S. Department of Justice.” Klayman Aff. ¶ 3. But
the only example he identifies by name is United States v.
AT&T, where he was “an instrumental part of the team that
helped break up AT&T.” Id. The AT&T litigation was, of
course, an enormously complex case brought by the Antitrust
Division, but it was a civil, not a criminal, case.2 See, e.g.,
United States v. AT&T, 552 F. Supp. 131 (D.D.C. 1982). It
may well be that Klayman has extensive criminal trial
experience, and perhaps even federal criminal trial
experience, but we cannot verify this from anything Klayman
has provided us.
Even if the record would support Klayman’s claim to
have extensive criminal defense experience, that would not be
sufficient to warrant the issuance of a writ of mandamus. As
we explained in our prior decision, Bundy has not offered any
explanation for why, if he needs additional counsel, he cannot
secure the services of attorneys in Nevada or out-of-state
attorneys who can satisfy Nevada’s pro hac vice rules. See In
re Bundy, 840 F.3d at 1048 (“[W]e do not have an affidavit
from anyone—Bundy, Klayman, [Bundy’s former attorney],
2 We have also consulted Klayman’s own website. Although he says
he “was a Justice Department prosecutor,” his sole example is that he
“was on the trial team that succeeded in breaking up the telephone
monopoly of AT&T, thereby creating competition in the
telecommunications industry.” Biography, Larry Klayman,
http://www.larryklayman.com/about.php (last visited Mar. 30, 2017).

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IN RE BUNDY 14
or anyone else—telling us of unsuccessful efforts to find
counsel.”). Bundy offers no case for why Klayman is the
only attorney who can help him or why Nevada must bend its
pro hac vice rules to accommodate him in the courtroom.3
Even if the district court’s sole obligation while
considering whether to grant pro hac vice admission to an
attorney was to maximize the defendant’s chances of
receiving the best trial outcome, the district court would not
have abused its discretion or clearly erred in finding that
Whipple could handle Bundy’s case. But that is not the
district court’s sole obligation. Instead, as we discussed in In
re Bundy, district courts have other legitimate policy
considerations that bear on a pro hac vice admission decision,
such as the ethical practice of the law and the orderly
administration of justice. See id. at 1041–42.4 And
3 We do not understand the dissent to support Klayman’s reckless
claims against Whipple. We understand our dissenting colleague to
maintain the position he took in the initial action—that Bundy has a Sixth
Amendment right to counsel of his own choosing. Dissent at 16 & n.1;
see In re Bundy, 840 F.3d at 1052 (Gould, J., dissenting).
4 Lest there be any doubt, we agree with the dissent that a defendant’s
Sixth Amendment right to counsel “is not exhausted once [the defendant]
has one competent criminal defense lawyer.” Dissent at 17; see United
States v. Lillie, 989 F.2d 1054, 1056 (9th Cir. 1993) (“[T]he defendant
can’t be denied his choice of retained counsel just because . . . the court
thinks current counsel is doing an adequate job.”), overruled on other
grounds by United States v. Garrett, 179 F.3d 1143 (9th Cir. 1999) (en
banc). But the adequacy of a defendant’s alternatives is a relevant
consideration in making a pro hac vice decision that necessarily weighs
a criminal defendant’s Sixth Amendment right to counsel against
competing policy considerations. Cf. United States v. Nolen, 472 F.3d
362, 376 (5th Cir. 2006) (remanding to the district court “specifically for
it to conduct and verbalize the necessary balancing analysis” before
denying pro hac vice status). We do not evaluate constitutional rights in

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IN RE BUNDY 15
evaluating the decision to deny Klayman pro hac vice status
against the backdrop of these competing interests, the
documents filed with this court in support of the petition for
a writ of mandamus—by themselves and without looking to
our earlier decision’s consideration of Klayman’s
record—entirely support the district court’s decision. The
petition and reply contain patently false assertions and lack
the most basic of due diligence in fact checking.
* * *
The district court did not err, much less “clearly err”
when it failed sua sponte to admit Klayman pro hac vice.
Future motions from Bundy must be filed by counsel of
record. Future filings from Klayman personally should be
accompanied by either an affidavit from counsel of record or
Bundy in support of the motion.
The petition for a writ of mandamus is DENIED.
a vacuum. Bundy may add whatever counsel he wishes so long as they
satisfy Nevada’s minimal pro hac vice rules. Klayman has not satisfied
those rules, so Bundy will have to look to other Nevada-qualified counsel
to aid his defense.

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IN RE BUNDY 16
GOULD, Circuit Judge, dissenting:
I respectfully dissent from the court’s denial of the
Emergency Petition for Writ of Mandamus filed March 9,
2017. The reasons for my dissent are essentially the same as
for my earlier dissent to the majority’s published decision
denying the first mandamus petition.1 See In re Bundy,
840 F.3d 1034, 1049 (9th Cir. 2016) (Gould, J., dissenting).
So far as I can discern, Defendant Cliven Bundy’s high-
profile political status and prospects for retaining a skilled
and aggressive defense team have not substantially changed
since my prior dissent. I do not doubt that attorney Bret
Whipple is a fine lawyer who has some federal criminal case
experience. But the long course of American justice shows
that sometimes representation by multiple attorneys is key to
a robust defense.2 And I continue to believe that Bundy’s
needs for experienced defense counsel of his choosing are
more important than the articulated concerns about Larry
Klayman’s ethics, where he has not been disbarred or
1 I might have instead written a concurring opinion, accepting as
circuit law the prior decision of this panel from which I previously
dissented, but I think it makes my views clearer to understand when my
views are framed as a dissent.
2 It is not uncommon for a high-profile criminal defendant to have a
team of skilled defense lawyers. Well-known examples include O.J.
Simpson’s defense to the charged 1994 murders of Nicole Brown Simpson
and Ronald Goldman, and Dzhokhar Tsarnaev’s defense to charges related
to the 2013 bombing at the site of the Boston Marathon. Another famous
case involving a defense team, this one without charges of violent crimes,
was the so-called Scopes “Monkey” trial in 1925. There, Clarence
Darrow and a team of several other distinguished lawyers defended a
school teacher in Tennessee who had been charged with a crime for
teaching evolution. See Scopes Trial, Histo ryNet,
http://www.historynet.com/scopes-trial.htm (last visited Mar. 28, 2017).

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IN RE BUNDY 17
suspended by another bar association or proven to have
engaged in unethical conduct that could justify disbarment.
See In re Evans, 524 F.2d 1004, 1007 (5th Cir. 1975);
Schlumberger Techs., Inc. v. Wiley, 113 F.3d 1553, 1561
(11th Cir. 1997). Attorney Klayman has told the district court
and our appellate panel that he will in this case abide by all
orders of the district court. I take him at his word on this.
This is a complex, multi-defendant proceeding, and the
stakes could not be higher for Defendant Cliven Bundy.
Bundy could spend the rest of his life in prison if convicted.
To be sure, Klayman’s aggressive tactics are likely to irritate
the district court judge. But in a tough case with experienced
prosecutors, forceful advocacy can be necessary to a full
defense. And concerns over Klayman’s aggressive style must
yield to a superordinate concern: that Bundy have the counsel
of his choice to receive a fair shake at this most critical trial.
The government has chosen to marshal its massive resources
towards convicting Bundy. We ought to let Bundy marshal
the defense team he chooses. I rest my decision on the
fundamental premise that Bundy has a Sixth Amendment
right to counsel of his choice and that that right is not
exhausted once he has one competent criminal defense
lawyer. So long as he is footing the bill, the Sixth
Amendment protects Bundy’s right to convene a defense
team of his choosing. See United States v. Walters, 309 F.3d
589, 592 (9th Cir. 2002) (Sixth Amendment violation for pro
hac vice denial where defendant was represented by other
competent counsel). A system of extreme deference to a
district court’s decisions on pro hac vice admission of an
experienced lawyer long-admitted to other bars is not a valid
reason to deny Bundy his counsel of choice in the
circumstances of this case. I respectfully dissent.

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