Cassie Cordell Trueblood, next friend of Ara Badayos, an incapacitated person v. Washington State Department of Social

FOR PUBLICATION
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
CASSIE CORDELL TRUEBLOOD,
next friend of Ara Badayos, an
incapacitated person; A. B., by
and through her next friend Cassie
Cordell Trueblood; K. R., by and
through his next friend Marilyn
Roberts; D. D., by and through his
next friend Andrea Crumpler;
DISABILITY RIGHTS
WASHINGTON,
Plaintiffs-Appellees,
v.
WASHINGTON STATE
DEPARTMENT OF SOCIAL AND
HEALTH SERVICES; WESTERN
STATE HOSPITAL; EASTERN STATE
HOSPITAL; KEVIN W. QUIGLEY,
Secretary of the Department of
Social and Health Services, in his
official capacity; RON ADLER,
CEO of Western State Hospital;
DOROTHY SAWYER, Chief
Executive Officer of Eastern State
Hospital in her Official Capacity,
Defendants-Appellants.
No. 15-35462
D.C. No.
2:14-cv-01178-MJP
OPINION

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TRUEBLOOD V. WASH. STATE DSHS 2
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Western District of Washington
Marsha J. Pechman, Chief District Judge, Presiding
Argued and Submitted December 7, 2015
Seattle, Washington
Filed May 6, 2016
Before: Michael Daly Hawkins and M. Margaret
McKeown, Circuit Judges and Sharon L. Gleason,* District
Judge.
Opinion by Judge McKeown
SUMMARY**
Civil Rights
The panel vacated a portion of the district court’s
permanent injunction, entered following a bench trial, and
remanded in a class action brought pursuant to 42 U.S.C.
§ 1983, on behalf of pretrial detainees in Washington State
waiting in jail for court-ordered competency services.
* The Honorable Sharon L. Gleason, District Judge for the U.S. District
Court for the District of Alaska, sitting by designation.
** This summary constitutes no part of the opinion of the court. It has
been prepared by court staff for the convenience of the reader.

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TRUEBLOOD V. WASH. STATE DSHS 3
The district court addressed both initial competency
evaluations and the mental health restoration services that
follow a determination of incompetency to stand trial and
concluded that the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment requires that services for both categories must
be provided within seven days of a court order, absent an
individualized determination of clinical good cause.
Washington appealed only that portion of the permanent
injunction related to initial competency evaluations.
The panel agreed with the district court that the
Department of Social and Health Services must conduct
competency evaluations within a reasonable time following
a court’s order. The panel held, however, that the district
court’s seven-day mandate, imposed a temporal obligation
beyond what the Constitution requires. Therefore, the panel
vacated the injunction with respect to the seven-day
requirement for in-jail competency evaluations and remanded
to the district court to amend the injunction in a manner
consistent with its opinion.
COUNSEL
Noah G. Purcell (argued), Solicitor General; Robert W.
Ferguson, Attorney General; Anne E. Egeler, Deputy
Solicitor General; Amber L. Leaders and Nicholas
Williamson, Assistant Attorneys General; Washington State
Office of the Attorney General, Olympia, Washington, for
Defendants-Appellants.
Anita Khandelwal (argued), Public Defender Association,
Seattle, Washington; La Rond Baker and Margaret Chen,
ACLU of Washington Foundation, Seattle, Washington;

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TRUEBLOOD V. WASH. STATE DSHS 4
David R. Carlson and Emily Cooper, Disability Rights
Washington, Seattle, Washington; Christopher Carney, Sean
Gillespie, and Kenan Isitt, Carney Gillespie Isitt PLLP,
Seattle, Washington, for Plaintiffs-Appellees.
Harry Williams IV, Law Office of Harry Williams, Seattle,
Washington, for Amicus Curiae Disability Rights Network.
OPINION
McKEOWN, Circuit Judge:
Washington State, through its Department of Social and
Health Services (“DSHS”),1 has faced considerable
challenges—both legal and practical—in administering
timely competency evaluation and restoration services to
pretrial detainees in city and county facilities. It is well
recognized that detention in a jail is no substitute for mentally
ill detainees who need therapeutic evaluation and treatment.
Long-standing Supreme Court precedent requires that “a
person whose mental condition is such that he lacks the
capacity to understand the nature and object of the
proceedings against him, to consult with counsel, and to assist
in preparing his defense may not be subjected to a trial.”
Drope v. Missouri, 420 U.S. 162, 171 (1975). To honor its
1 Although the defendants-appellants include Washington State
Department of Social and Health Services; Western State Hospital;
Eastern State Hospital; Kevin Quigley, Secretary of the Department of
Social and Health Services, in his official capacity; Ron Adler, CEO of
Western State Hospital, in his official capacity; and Dorothy Sawyer, CEO
of Eastern State Hospital, in her official capacity, we use “DSHS” or “the
state” by way of collective shorthand.

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TRUEBLOOD V. WASH. STATE DSHS 5
constitutional obligations, Washington law provides that
when “there is reason to doubt [the] competency” of a person
facing criminal charges, the defense counsel or prosecutor
may request an evaluation or a court may sua sponte order an
evaluation to ensure that only those persons competent to
stand trial are prosecuted. Wash. Rev. Code § 10.77.060.
Following a bench trial, the district court detailed
Washington’s shortcomings in providing competency
evaluation and restoration services, the insufficient number of
beds and personnel as a result of inadequate funding and
planning, and the deleterious effects of prolonged
incarceration without evaluation and treatment for mentally
ill detainees. The court addressed both initial competency
evaluations and the mental health restoration services that
follow a determination of incompetency to stand trial and
concluded that the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment requires that services for both categories must be
provided within seven days of a court order, absent an
individualized determination of clinical good cause. The
court entered a permanent injunction to this effect, although
Washington appeals only that portion related to initial
competency evaluations. Thus, the question we address is a
narrow one, focused on the timeliness of the
evaluation—does the Due Process Clause compel the state to
perform a competency evaluation of pretrial detainees within
seven days of a court order requiring evaluation?
We agree with the district court that DSHS must conduct
competency evaluations within a reasonable time following
a court’s order. The district court’s seven-day mandate,
however, imposes a temporal obligation beyond what the
Constitution requires. Therefore, we vacate the injunction
with respect to the seven-day requirement for in-jail

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TRUEBLOOD V. WASH. STATE DSHS 6
competency evaluations and remand to the district court to
amend the injunction in a manner consistent with this
opinion.
BACKGROUND
I. COMPETENCY EVALUATIONS
Consistent with its constitutional obligation, Washington
law provides that “[n]o incompetent person shall be tried,
convicted, or sentenced for the commission of an offense so
long as such incapacity continues.” Wash. Rev. Code
§ 10.77.050. Once a judge, defense counsel, or prosecutor
raises doubt about a criminal defendant’s legal competency,
the court must order an evaluation. Id. § 10.77.060(1)(a).
DSHS is responsible for overseeing both competency
evaluations and any following restorative services. See id.
§§ 10.77.010(5); 10.77.088. The evaluation must be
conducted by a trained evaluator and includes a face-to-face
interview with the individual whose competency is in doubt,
which can occur in one of three settings: a jail, a state
hospital, or in the community. Id. § 10.77.060(1).
Individuals who are in jail (because they have been denied
bail or have not posted bail) generally remain in jail awaiting
performance of the competency evaluation. The court may
order evaluations to take place at a state hospital if “necessary
for the health, safety, or welfare of the defendant.” Id.
§ 10.77.060(1)(d). Nearly ninety percent of the evaluations
occur in a jail or community setting. Detainees retain the
right against self-incrimination during competency
evaluations, have a right to counsel during the interview
process, and may be permitted to have a defense expert for
questions of competency. Id. § 10.77.020(4).

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TRUEBLOOD V. WASH. STATE DSHS 7
Once the requisite information has been gathered, the
evaluator’s report and recommendations are presented to the
court. Id. § 10.77.065. If an individual is found competent,
the criminal prosecution may continue, but if a person is
found incompetent to stand trial, criminal prosecution is
stayed. Id. § 10.77.084(1)(a). At that point, the court may
order restorative services or, if the defendant is charged with
a nonfelony crime that is not a serious offense as defined in
§ 10.77.092, the court may dismiss the case or refer the
defendant for civil commitment. Id. §10.77.088.
Washington law, effective July 24, 2015, sets a
performance target of seven days or less for competency
evaluations, but imposes a fourteen-day maximum time limit,
with the possibility of a seven-day extension for clinical
reasons. Id. § 10.77.068(1)(a).2 The target and time limit
were to be phased in over a one-year period beginning July 1,
2015. Id. The law provides a number of defenses for failing
to meet the deadline, including the inability to obtain
necessary information regarding the defendant’s history,
insufficient private space in the detention facility to conduct
the evaluation, and “lack of availability or participation by
counsel, jail or court personnel, interpreters, or the
defendant,” any of which, if proven by a preponderance of the
evidence, relieve the state of its duty to perform the
evaluation within the time allotted. Id. § 10.77.068(1)(c).
This provision explicitly “does not create any new entitlement
or cause of action” to enforce these deadlines. Id.
§ 10.77.068(5).
2 From 2012 to 2015, Washington law provided for a seven-day
performance target, but no maximum time limits for evaluations. Former
Wash. Rev. Code § 10.77.068(1)(a) (2012).

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TRUEBLOOD V. WASH. STATE DSHS 8
II. DISTRICT COURT PROCEEDINGS
This appeal arises out of a 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action filed
in federal district court against DSHS by Cassie Trueblood,
on behalf of a single plaintiff, Ara Badayos. Badayos had
been found legally incompetent to stand trial and was
detained in solitary confinement in the Snohomish County
Jail awaiting transfer to a hospital for restorative treatment.
The complaint was then amended to include a class of
individuals who were either awaiting a competency
evaluation or had been found incompetent and were awaiting
restorative services. The district court certified the class as:
All persons who are now, or will be in the
future, charged with a crime in the State of
Washington and: (a) who are ordered by a
court to receive competency evaluation or
restoration services through DSHS; (b) who
are waiting in jail for those services; and
(c) for whom DSHS receives the court order.
The district court granted the plaintiffs’ motion for
summary judgment on the question of “whether current in-jail
waiting times for court-ordered competency evaluation and
restoration services violate the Due Process Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment,” finding that “current in-jail wait
time[s] experienced by Plaintiffs and class members [are] far
beyond any constitutional boundary . . . .” Relying
substantially on this court’s reasoning in Oregon Advocacy
Center v. Mink, 322 F.3d 1101 (9th Cir. 2003), the district
court found that substantive due process analysis applied to
the plaintiffs’ liberty interest in freedom from incarceration,
and concluded that “wait times of less than seven days

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TRUEBLOOD V. WASH. STATE DSHS 9
comport with due process, and that anything beyond seven
days is suspect.”
The court held a bench trial to determine the “precise
outer boundary permitted by the Constitution” based on the
specific conditions present in Washington State. During the
trial, the district court heard testimony on three main issues:
the current state of competency evaluations and restorative
services in Washington; the effects of prolonged detention in
jail, rather than a hospital, for mentally ill individuals; and the
feasibility of providing competency evaluation and
restorative services within seven days.
Between 2001 and 2011, demand for competency
evaluations in Washington increased by eighty-two percent.
The district court found that evaluation services were delayed
due to staffing shortages, high evaluator turnover, lack of
accurate data and timely reporting, inadequate planning,
unwillingness to use electronic court records, and long travel
times between jails and evaluators’ offices. Trial testimony
also revealed that class members had suffered serious mental
health consequences as a result of prolonged detention—often
in solitary confinement—pending evaluation or services,
including suicidal behavior, self-harm, and refusal to take
medications. It was no surprise, therefore, that the district
court found “[p]unitive settings and isolation for twenty-three
hours each day exacerbate mental illness and increase the
likelihood that the individual will never recover.”
The district court concluded that “the foundational liberty
interest under the due process clause is freedom from
incarceration.” See Oviatt ex rel. Waugh v. Pearce, 954 F.2d
1470, 1474 (9th Cir. 1992). Because the state defendants had
a “long history of failing to adequately protect the

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TRUEBLOOD V. WASH. STATE DSHS 10
constitutional rights” of the class and had “demonstrated a
consistent pattern of intentionally disregarding court orders,”
the district court ordered a permanent injunction requiring (in
relevant part):
1) In-jail competency evaluations within seven days of the
signing of a court order calling for an evaluation. If such an
evaluation cannot be completed within seven days, then
DSHS must either transfer the individual to a state hospital
pending completion of the evaluation or obtain a court-
ordered extension for “clinical good cause.”
2) Admission of individuals whose competency
evaluations have been ordered to occur in a state hospital to
that hospital within seven days of the signing of the court
order.
3) Admission of individuals ordered to receive restoration
services to a state hospital within seven days of the signing of
the court order.3
DSHS appeals only the first part of the permanent
injunction: the requirement that competency evaluations for
jailed defendants be conducted within seven days, absent a
court-ordered extension for clinical good cause. It does not
appeal the injunction as it applies to individuals ordered to be
evaluated in a state hospital or who have already been found
incompetent and are awaiting restorative services.
3 On February 8, 2016, the district court issued a modified injunction,
which, among other things, moved the deadline for compliance with the
seven-day evaluation requirement to May 1, 2016.

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TRUEBLOOD V. WASH. STATE DSHS 11
ANALYSIS
We first address the applicable constitutional standard and
then turn to the injunction’s remedial scope. Because “[a]
permanent injunction involves factual, legal, and
discretionary components, . . . [w]e review legal conclusions
. . . de novo, factual findings for clear error, and the scope of
the injunction for abuse of discretion.” Vietnam Veterans of
Am. v. C.I.A, 811 F.3d 1068, 1075 (9th Cir. 2016) (citations
omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted).
I. DUE PROCESS REASONABLENESS GOVERNS THE
TIMING OF COMPETENCY EVALUATIONS
We begin with the premise that due process analysis
governs pretrial detention: “Freedom from imprisonment—
from government custody, detention, or other forms of
physical restraint—lies at the heart of the liberty that [the Due
Process] Clause protects.” Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678,
690 (2001) (setting presumptively reasonable time limits on
immigration detention); see also Lopez-Valenzuela v. Arpaio,
770 F.3d 772, 777–80 (9th Cir. 2014) (en banc) (summarizing
case law applying substantive due process to the fundamental
liberty interests of pretrial detainees).
This principle was reinforced in Mink, where we held that
“[p]retrial detainees, whether or not they have been declared
unfit to proceed, have not been convicted of any crime.
Therefore, constitutional questions regarding the . . .
circumstances of their confinement are properly addressed
under the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment
. . . .” 322 F.3d at 1120. Addressing the circumstance of
individuals who had been evaluated and found incompetent,
but were awaiting treatment, we held that waiting “in jail for

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TRUEBLOOD V. WASH. STATE DSHS 12
weeks or months violates . . . due process rights because the
nature and duration of their incarceration bear no reasonable
relation to the evaluative and restorative purposes for which
courts commit those individuals.” Id. at 1122.
Mink adopted the framework set out in two Supreme
Court cases: Jackson v. Indiana, 406 U.S. 715 (1972) and
Youngberg v. Romeo, 457 U.S. 307 (1982). In Jackson, the
Supreme Court articulated a general “rule of reasonableness”
limiting the duration of pretrial detention for incompetent
defendants and requiring, at a minimum, “that the nature and
duration of commitment bear some reasonable relation to the
purpose for which the individual is committed.” 406 U.S. at
733, 738. Thus, “[w]hether the substantive due process rights
of incapacitated criminal defendants have been violated must
be determined by balancing their liberty interests in freedom
from incarceration and in restorative treatment against the
legitimate interests of the state.” Mink, 322 F.3d at 1121
(citing Youngberg, 457 U.S. at 321).
Although the specifics of the calculus may vary, the
framework set out in Jackson, and applied to restorative
competency services in Mink, is equally applicable to
individuals awaiting competency evaluations. Weighing the
parties’ respective interests, there must be a “reasonable
relation” between the length of time from the court order to
the inception of the competency evaluation.
Essentially for the first time on appeal, DSHS argues that
the district court applied the wrong constitutional provision
to Trueblood’s claims because the more specific Sixth
Amendment speedy trial right supercedes substantive due
process analysis where plaintiffs challenge delay, rather than

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TRUEBLOOD V. WASH. STATE DSHS 13
the fact or conditions of confinement.4 We exercise our
“limited discretion to consider purely legal arguments raised
for the first time on appeal,” Lahr v. Nat’l Transp. Safety Bd.,
569 F.3d 964, 980 (9th Cir. 2009) (citations omitted), in order
to put to rest the state’s effort to shift the focus of the
litigation and because consideration of the legal issue at this
stage will not prejudice the class members.
The Sixth Amendment is ill-suited to the claim on appeal.
Unlike in Sixth Amendment cases, these class members do
not seek relief from prejudicial delays in their criminal
prosecutions. Their complaint is that they should receive a
timely determination of competency—a go or no-go decision
on whether their criminal proceedings will move forward and
whether they are eligible for restorative services. Many of
them will never be tried, or might not be tried until after a
lengthy restorative treatment process. Their focus is not the
guarantee of a speedy trial.
To determine whether there has been a speedy trial
violation, courts balance the “[l]ength of delay, the reason for
the delay, the defendant’s assertion of his right, and prejudice
to the defendant.” Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514, 530
(1972). In United States v. Sutcliffe, we excluded delays due
to competency issues from both the statutory and
constitutional speedy trial analysis in part because “the delays
were all either directly caused by Defendant or . . . were
4 Throughout this litigation, DSHS invoked the Fourteenth Amendment
as the basis for its arguments. The district court did not consider the Sixth
Amendment either at summary judgment or at the trial. DSHS contends
that two references to the Sixth Amendment in its trial brief were
sufficient to raise the argument before the district court or, alternatively,
that as a pure question of law, we should consider the Sixth Amendment
argument on appeal.

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TRUEBLOOD V. WASH. STATE DSHS 14
deemed necessary in the interests of justice.” 505 F.3d 944,
957 (9th Cir. 2007). Our sister circuits are in accord that
competency-related delays are not relevant to the speedy trial
inquiry.5 We reject the state’s argument that the Sixth
Amendment, not the Due Process Clause, provides the
framework for Trueblood’s claims.
II. DUE PROCESS REASONABLENESS DOES NOT COMPEL
COMPETENCY EVALUATIONS TO BE COMPLETED IN
SEVEN DAYS
We recognize the challenges inherent in the district
court’s task of setting a reasonable time frame, particularly in
light of the state’s history of non-compliance with its own
performance targets and with court orders. As the district
court found, the state has “demonstrated a consistent pattern
of intentionally disregarding court orders . . . and [has]
established a de facto policy of ignoring court orders which
conflict with [its] internal policies.” The state acknowledges
that “some of the waiting periods are excessive and
indefensible.”
In fashioning a remedy, however, the district court did not
ask whether there was some reasonable relation between the
timing and the confinement, nor did it distinguish sufficiently
5 See, e.g., United States v. DeGarmo, 450 F.3d 360, 362–63 (8th Cir.
2006) (competency delays not considered under statutory or constitutional
speedy trial analysis, even where the defendant did not request the
competency evaluation and the evaluation took longer than the state
statute required); United States v. Cope, 312 F.3d 757, 777 (6th Cir. 2002)
(sixty-six day competency delay not presumptively prejudicial under the
Sixth Amendment); United States v. Vasquez, 918 F.2d 329, 333, 337–38
(2d Cir. 1990) (even unreasonable delays in competency evaluations not
considered in determining whether the right to a speedy trial was violated).

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TRUEBLOOD V. WASH. STATE DSHS 15
between the pre- and post-evaluation categories at issue. The
findings and conclusions elide what is a reasonable delay
when providing restorative services with what is a reasonable
delay when conducting initial competency evaluations, often
assessing both categories together under the rubric of
“competency services.” Yet, both the class members and the
state have different interests at the pre-evaluation stage than
they do once a finding of incompetency has issued. The state,
correctly observing that the categories of pre- and post-
evaluation class members are distinct, does not challenge the
seven-day deadline for providing restorative services.
In Mink, all of the detainees had been found incompetent
and had a distinct “liberty interest[] in freedom from
incarceration” so they could receive restorative treatment.
322 F.3d at 1121. The state had no legitimate interest in
keeping them “locked up in county jails for weeks or months”
following an incompetency determination. Id. The interests
to be weighed before a finding of incompetency bear a
similarity to the Mink situation, but are factually distinct. The
state argues that it has an interest in accurate evaluations,
preventing the stigma of an incorrect determination, avoiding
undue separation of a detainee from her counsel and family,
and protecting the detainee’s rights to counsel and against
self-incrimination. In contrast, Trueblood claims a legitimate
interest in mitigating the harm caused to detainees who
languish in jail awaiting a competency determination and in
reducing the impact of solitary confinement and other
conditions often imposed on mentally ill detainees who are
awaiting evaluation. The court’s findings neither weigh the
interests related to competency evaluations as distinct from
other competency services, nor benchmark these interests
against a range of constitutionally acceptable timeframes.

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TRUEBLOOD V. WASH. STATE DSHS 16
With respect to the evaluation deadline, the district court
did not articulate a sufficiently strong constitutional
foundation to support the mandatory injunction. Indeed, the
findings are couched in terms of what is “reasonable and
achievable,” not whether the state’s present fourteen-day
requirement bears the constitutionally requisite reasonable
relationship, or whether the balancing of interests requires a
seven-day deadline. Seven days, while perhaps feasible, does
not constitute a bright line after which any delay crosses the
constitutional Rubicon. Indeed, most jurisdictions in the
United States do not require initial competency evaluations to
be carried out in seven days. According to the state’s expert
report, the national average for competency evaluation
deadlines is thirty-one days, while fifteen states have no
specific statutory deadline for evaluations, and only six have
deadlines under ten days. Federal law allows up to thirty
days for federal detainees. 18 U.S.C. § 4247(b). The district
court did not consider any less restrictive alternatives, nor did
it identify any reason why Washington should be held to such
a restrictive rule other than that “[w]ith appropriate planning,
coordination, and resources” nothing prevented DSHS from
“providing competency services within seven days.” But
even if the seven-day time frame is not constitutionally
mandated, that does not mean that Washington should let up
on achieving its seven-day target.
The injunction has two other deficiencies. First, it
mandates compliance within seven days of the signing of a
competency evaluation order, not receipt of an order by
DSHS. This requirement goes beyond what Trueblood
requested and fails to account for any period from issuance of
the court order to receipt. To be sure, neither the court nor
the state should dally, but practical impediments, such as
intervening weekends or the time necessary to obtain

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TRUEBLOOD V. WASH. STATE DSHS 17
documents, can eat up the time period. Notably, even
Trueblood’s expert stated only that the majority of
evaluations could be completed within ten days of the receipt
of a court order. Second, the permanent injunction currently
excludes the possibility of an extension for delays attributable
to non-clinical interests of a detainee awaiting evaluation,
including the unavailability of defense counsel or a defense
expert. In such cases, after the evaluation deadline has
passed, the criminal defendant would automatically be moved
to a state psychiatric hospital, often far from his lawyer and
family, and then transferred back to jail if he is found
competent, all without the detainee’s consent. To honor the
state’s interests in accurate and efficient evaluations and the
defendant’s right to counsel, the district court should consider
a broader “good cause” exception.
The question then remains: what constitutes a reasonable
time in which to conduct the evaluations? We leave the
answer to the district court in the first instance, but note that
federal courts have often looked to a state’s own policies for
guidance because “appropriate consideration must be given
to principles of federalism in determining the availability and
scope of equitable relief.” Rizzo v. Goode, 423 U.S. 362, 379
(1976); see also Lewis v. Casey, 518 U.S. 343, 362 (1996)
(concluding that a federal injunction had “failed to give
adequate consideration to the views of state [] authorities”).
During the course of this litigation, Washington amended
its law to set a fourteen-day maximum time limit for
competency evaluations, although the legislation incorporated
a non-binding seven-day performance goal. Wash. Rev.
Code § 10.77.068. The court’s findings and conclusions do
not take into consideration this legislative change, nor do they
consider whether this time limit would pass constitutional

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TRUEBLOOD V. WASH. STATE DSHS 18
muster.6 On remand, the district court should evaluate the
effects of the revised legislation.
CONCLUSION
Washington has thus far failed to comply with its own
target goals, which is why a permanent injunction remains an
appropriate vehicle for monitoring and ensuring that class
members’ constitutional rights are protected. In crafting a
structural injunction that alters the state-wide processes by
which individuals are evaluated for legal competency,
however, the district court melded its findings with respect to
competency evaluations and restoration services, did not
tailor its findings to the timeliness of initial competency
evaluations, and unduly focused its ruling on the timing of
services that were attainable as a practical matter rather than
the constitutional parameters of the remedy. In light of the
Fourteenth Amendment’s due process reasonableness
framework, the district court abused its discretion when it
concluded that seven days was the “maximum justifiable
period” primarily because it was feasible for DSHS to
conduct evaluations within seven days in the vast majority of
cases. See Katie A., ex rel. Ludin v. Los Angeles Cnty.,
481 F.3d 1150, 1155 (9th Cir. 2007) (“Where an injunction is
issued against state officials, a district court will be deemed
to have committed an abuse of discretion . . . if its injunction
requires any more of state officers than demanded by federal
constitutional or statutory law.”) (quoting Clark v. Coye,
60 F.3d 600, 604 (9th Cir. 1995) (omission in original)
(internal quotation marks omitted).
6 At oral argument, Washington proposed that, if there had been a
Fourteenth Amendment violation, the best remedy would be to order
Washington to comply with its own law.

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TRUEBLOOD V. WASH. STATE DSHS 19
We vacate paragraph (1) of the permanent injunction
issued on April 2, 2015, with respect to in-jail competency
evaluations, and remand this case to the district court to
modify the permanent injunction, consistent with this
opinion, including considering Washington’s 2015 law and
taking into account the balancing of interests related
specifically to initial competency evaluations.
Each party shall bear its own costs on appeal.
REVERSED AND REMANDED.

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