United States of America v. Charles Antonio Gray

NOT FOR PUBLICATION
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff - Appellee,
v.
CHARLES ANTONIO GRAY,
Defendant - Appellant.
No. 23-1076
D.C. No.
1:22-cr-00016-DLC-1
MEMORANDUM*
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the District of Montana
Dana L. Christensen, District Judge, Presiding
Submitted April 3, 2024**
Portland, Oregon
Before: OWENS and FRIEDLAND, Circuit Judges, and SILVER, District
Judge.***
Charles Gray appeals from his conviction by guilty plea for possession with
intent to distribute methamphetamine. He contends that the evidence of
* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
*** The Honorable Roslyn O. Silver, United States District Judge for the
District of Arizona, sitting by designation.
FILED
APR 18 2024
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS

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methamphetamine underlying his conviction was the fruit of an unconstitutionally
prolonged traffic stop, and that the district court improperly denied his suppression
motion. As the parties are familiar with the facts, we do not recount them here.
We affirm.
We review a district court’s denial of a suppression motion de novo and its
underlying factual findings for clear error. United States v. Evans, 786 F.3d 779,
784 (9th Cir. 2015). “We review reasonable suspicion determinations de novo,
reviewing findings of historical fact for clear error and giving due weight to
inferences drawn from those facts by resident judges and local law enforcement
officers.” Id. at 788 (quoting United States v. Valdes-Vega, 738 F.3d 1074, 1077
(9th Cir. 2013) (en banc)).
The district court properly denied Gray’s suppression motion. Officer
Kilpela did not unconstitutionally prolong the traffic stop. A traffic stop “can
become unlawful if it is prolonged beyond the time reasonably required to
complete [the] mission” of the stop. Illinois v. Caballes, 543 U.S. 405, 407 (2005).
The “mission” of a traffic stop is “to address the traffic violation that warranted the
stop and attend to related safety concerns.” Rodriguez v. United States, 575 U.S.
348, 354 (2015) (citation omitted). However, “an officer may prolong a traffic
stop if the prolongation itself is supported by independent reasonable suspicion.”
Evans, 786 F.3d at 788.

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1. Kilpela’s pre-consent conversations did not unconstitutionally prolong
the stop. Gray contends that Kilpela’s conversations with Dewitty, Dixon, and
Gray before obtaining Dewitty’s consent to search the car were unconstitutional
because Kilpela was “investigating a criminal offense” when “he had no
reasonable basis for doing so.” However, “no reasonable suspicion is required to
justify questioning that does not prolong the stop.” United States v. Mendez, 476
F.3d 1077, 1080 (9th Cir. 2007). Kilpela questioned Dewitty, Dixon, and Gray for
around twelve minutes while filling out paperwork for the stop and checking the
VIN number of the car. See id. (holding that the detective’s questions about
defendant’s gang tattoos while running an identification check on defendant “could
not have expanded the duration of the stop since the stop would, in any event, have
lasted until after the check had been completed”). There is no indication that the
stop would have been shorter if Kilpela had not talked to them.
2. Gray next contends that Kilpela prolonged the stop because he did not
have the reasonable suspicion required to ask Dewitty if there was anything illegal
in the car. Reasonable suspicion depends on “whether the facts and circumstances
within the officer’s knowledge are sufficient to warrant a prudent person to believe
a suspect has committed, is committing, or is about to commit a crime.” United
States v. Willy, 40 F.4th 1074, 1080 (9th Cir. 2022).
Based on Kilpela’s knowledge at the time, it was reasonable for him to

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suspect criminal activity. See Ornelas v. United States, 517 U.S. 690, 695 (1996)
(stating that reasonable suspicion is a “commonsense, nontechnical conception[]
that deal[s] with ‘the factual and practical considerations of everyday life on which
reasonable prudent men, not legal technicians, act’” (quoting Illinois v. Gates, 462
U.S. 213, 231 (1983))). As the district court found:
(1) the vehicle had been rented in the name of a third party who was not
present in the vehicle; (2) Mr. Gray and Ms. Dixon did not know who
had rented the car; (3) the vehicle was approximately 1,400 miles from
where it had to be returned in two days . . . ; (4) the occupants were
traveling from a known narcotics hub down a major drug corridor; . . .
(5) Mr. Gray, Ms. Dewitty, and Ms. Dixon contradicted one another in
their statements regarding their travel plans . . . [; and (6)] rental cars
are often used in drug trafficking.
These findings are not clearly erroneous and support the relatively low bar of
reasonable suspicion. See Valdes-Vega, 738 F.3d at 1078-80 (finding reasonable
suspicion where a truck with foreign plates drove “in a suspicious manner” near a
checkpoint in “an area frequented by smugglers”). Thus, because Kilpela had
reasonable suspicion to ask Dewitty if there was anything illegal in the car, he did
not unconstitutionally prolong the stop.
AFFIRMED.

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